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           Summary of Thesis: 
 
 
This thesis recommends that the ‘ecocritical’ turn in American Literary Scholarship be 
brought into contact with ‘symptomnal’ forms of ideology critique, namely after the post-
Althusserian thinking of Fredric Jameson, Slavoj Žižek and Deleuze-Guattari. This 
recommendation is made on the basis that the ecocritical turn has neglected to apprise itself 
of a thoroughgoing prehistory; by bringing together the lessons of Marx and Lacan, post-
Althusserian thinking enables us to address the disavowal of formal and theoretical concerns 
constitutive of first-wave ecocriticism, and to acknowledge this as symptomatic of North 
American cultural and political pluralism more broadly. Where such disavowal promoted a 
widespread rejection of poststructural theories of immanence in the Americanist milieu of 
the 1980s, we consider how it effectively blocked psychoanalytic and Marxist approaches to 
literary form and human subjectivity.  
 
Following an initial examination of ecocriticism after Althusser and Balibar’s thesis on 
‘symptomnal reading’, our study goes on to reassert issues of subjectivity for ecocriticism. 
Žižek’s subjectivist approach to ideology critique therefore enables us to diagnose the legacy 
of modern epistemology and thereafter to analyse ecocritical motivations of sublime 
aesthetics. By pursuing broader, ‘valetudinary’ issues in relation to literary form, the latter 
half of the thesis exceeds the former’s emphasis on ideology critique, moving to engage the 
post-subjectivist, ‘stratoanalytic’ project of Deleuze and Guattari. Predicated upon an a-
subjective philosophy of differential relations, stratoanalysis suggests an ecological 
extension of ‘schizoanalysis’, enabling us to reappraise eco-literary and eco-philosophical 
concerns, chiefly after post-symptomatological analyses of the relationship between high 
modern literature, pre-personal affect and the ‘eco-social’ coding of desire. It is in this way 
that we assert the ‘body without organs’ as the privileged clinical figure with which to 
address eco-social organisation, and thus, exceed the subjectivist logic of the symptom.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Robert ‘Rorschach’ Marriott (1973-
2011), one of life’s best friends, and whose untimely death in May of this year 
brought a renewed sense of drive and perspective to the project. !
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(i) Assembling the ‘Eco-Clinic’ 
 
 
The works of culture come to us as signs in an all-but-forgotten code, as symptoms of 
diseases no longer even recognised as such, as fragments of a totality we have long 
since lost the organs to see. 
 
—Fredric Jameson1 
 
The world is the set of symptoms whose illness merges with man. 
 
—Gilles Deleuze2 
 
If the mantra of this thesis must be ‘critical theory derives from historical 
circumstance,’ then it is because any critical orientation worth its salt must be 
evaluated as a product of specific cultural ‘complexes’. This appears nowhere more 
necessary than in the case of the ‘ecocritical’ turn in American literary scholarship. 
Given more typically as ‘ecocriticism’, the specialism initially emerged at a series of 
conferences of the Western Literary Association in the mid-1980s, a short while prior 
to the establishment of the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) in 1988. Distinguishing itself from other literary specialisms by 
privileging ecological matters over social justice concerns, ecocriticism’s contribution 
to the subject area comes by way of its core condemnations of the ethical imperatives 
and critical solipsisms of the ‘anthropocene’ epoch.3 As Herbert F. Tucker would have 
it, by ‘claim[ing] as its hermeneutic horizon nothing short of the literal horizon itself’, 
                                                
1 Jameson, Fredric. Marxism and Form. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974). p. 416. 
2 Deleuze, Gilles. Essays Critical and Clinical. Trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco. 
(London: Verso, 1998). p. 3. 
3 First coined in 2000 by Nobel Prize-winning scientist Paul Crutzen, ‘anthropocene’ might be read in 
analogy with the ‘holocene’ (or ‘entirely recent’) geological epoch; for Crutzen, however, the term 
serves to denote the extent to which the human influence on the biosphere has been sufficient in recent 
centuries to have constituted an entirely new geological era. 
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the movement promises to reestablish the consequence of non-human determinants for 
literary research over those that are markedly cultural in origin.4  
Of course, no tidy binary can persist between the nominally ‘natural’ and the 
‘cultural’ without denying long centuries of epistemological debate and conjecture. As 
Raymond Williams implies in his now seminal Problems in Materialism and Culture 
(1980), if ‘nature’ is one of the most complex and incompletely-defined words in the 
English language then it would seem that any critical premise that draws upon its 
problematic status must either risk a certain indeterminacy or suffer from over-
compensation or abject reductionism. During a highly-spirited first-wave that 
persisted well into the 1990s, ecocritical advocates worked diligently to secure 
suitably ‘ecological’ epistemologies, or those that would enable robust negotiation of 
this much-debated but no less enduring schism as it might relate to eco-literary 
reception, drawing upon the rhetorical and doctrinal models of such American ‘nature 
writers’ as Henry David Thoreau, Annie Dillard and Wendell Berry to a significant 
extent. Diversifying in essential ways since that time, an initial ‘nation-centredness’, 
or almost exclusive focus on American literatures and their constitutive genealogies of 
‘settler culture’ and ‘New World pastoral’, has given way to a complex 
interdisciplinary purview that today boasts ‘ecoglobalist’ outreach.5  
Gainfully exceeding an inaugural ambit of nineteenth-century 
‘Transcendentalist’ writing (Emerson, Thoreau, Fuller) and twentieth-century ‘toxic 
discourses’ (Carson, Leopold), ecocritical researchers have since come to submit 
progressive theses on such unconventional and heterodox topics as ‘ecotourist 
narratives’, ‘biopiracy’ and ‘acoustic ecology’ and regular colloquia on ‘ecological 
imperialism’, ‘queer ecology’ and ‘biosemiotics’ have made for innovative dialogue 
with such extra-literary disciplines as geology, climatology, population studies, and 
                                                
4 In the introduction to the New Literary History special issue on ecocriticism in 1999, Tucker and the 
other editors of the journal described how the specialism ‘challenges interpretation to its own 
grounding in the bedrock of natural fact, in the biospheric and indeed planetary conditions without 
which human life, much less humane letters, could not exist’. See Tucker, Herbert F. ‘From the 
Editors.’ New Literary History 3, (1999). p. 505. 
5 The ecocritical canon is quite simply vast, implicating works well beyond the ambit of Americanist 
literary research. As such the writers listed should simply provide some sense of the movement’s initial 
emergence within Americanist disciplines. Whilst literary figures are our primary concern here, a 
wealth of non-literary writers are of great significance to ‘eco-centric’ studies and we will inevitably 
include some reference to important scientific figures such as Charles Darwin, E. O. Wilson and Rachel 
Carson. 
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environmental law. In the process, such dialogues have pointed up the wider 
difficulties facing the academy where the limitations of specialised erudition would 
foreshorten and constrain sufficiently ‘ecological’ enquiry, whilst dramatising 
powerfully those debates over the interdisciplinary consequence of interpretation. 
 And yet despite the very best efforts of such writers as Dana Phillips, Sue Ellen 
Campbell and Patrick D. Murphy to redress a number of persistent misapprehensions 
regarding such pivotal critical trends as poststructuralism, critics both internal and 
external to the movement have nevertheless come to identify a definite show of 
‘theoretical inarticulation’ amongst ecocritical researchers; a deficit that may 
ultimately impede wider development and credibility within the academy.6 That this 
transpires to be the case should be acknowledged as much less the product of 
philosophical negligence or insufficient expertise, however, than as the result of a 
deliberate program of methodological resistance. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
poststructuralism has proven deeply troubling to preservationist orientations, largely 
on the grounds that close textual scrutiny unhelpfully threatens the referent and thus, 
the ontological status of biotic ‘reality’ itself.7 In motivating American ‘wilderness 
narratives’ towards an ‘ecoliterate’ and culturally-informed hermeneutic, first-wave 
ecocritics purposefully denied the formal conceits of continental philosophies of 
language, rejecting wholesale the works of Lacan, de Man and Derrida, ostensibly 
‘postmodern’ thinkers who had gained equal parts popularity and notoriety in the self-
same, pluralistic context.8  
Assured that ‘high’ (or largely ‘continental’) theory remained obscurantist and 
solipsistic, and thus, anathema to their environmentalist aims and objectives, principal 
writers of the movement, such as Lawrence Buell and Glen A. Love, distinguished 
                                                
6 See Phillips, Dana. The Truth of Ecology: Nature, Culture, and Literature in America. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2003). Also, Murphy, Patrick D. Farther Afield in the Study of Nature-
Oriented Literature. (Charlottesville and London: University Press of Virginia, 2000). Also, Gifford, 
Terry. ‘Recent Critiques of Ecocriticism.’ New Formations. No. 64. (Spring, 2008). 15-24. 
7 During the late 1980s, debates over the role of poststructuralism in producing a sense of ‘relativism’ 
proved heated. Rorty’s work in particular has shown how the notion may well be applied to that of 
‘pragmatism’ by realists, largely on the grounds that it destabilises truth claims. See Rorty, Richard. 
Consequences of Pragmatism. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982). 
8  As David Wood notes, ‘[i]t could be argued... that the direction [Derrida] took cuts against 
environmental concerns’. Wood, David. ‘Specters of Derrida: On the Way to Econstruction.’ Ecospirit: 
Religions and Philosophies for the Earth. Eds. Laurel Kearns and Katherine Keller. (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2007). 264-287. p. 264. 
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their contributions of the 1990s by a certain methodological radicalism: upholding 
such writers as Thoreau and Dillard for their ‘Green,’ neo-realist content, Buell and 
Love enacted a seemingly retrograde, yet not entirely ill-founded strategy that, it was 
argued, should sufficiently attest to the ecopolitical challenges presented to literary 
studies without conceding to poststructural analyses of form or rhetorics of 
Difference.9 In one of the key papers that served to rally the movement, Love 
expresses immense dissatisfaction with what he perceives as the oblique and 
disobliging tendencies of poststructuralism. Given the impact Love’s paper has had 
upon successive ecoliterary researchers, his objections are here worth quoting at 
length: 
 
...many [poststructural] theorists suspect that the verb to be is 
not worth worrying about at all, since it may not have a 
referent, at least not one we can discover, trapped in language, 
or rather in writing, as we are. They insist that a concern with 
being is the province of metaphysics, an outmoded and 
discredited way of thinking. In their view, the discursive is of 
necessity always recursive, and they feel unable to talk about 
the putative object of discourse directly. For the most radical 
deconstructionists and the most antic postmodernists, this 
feeling of inability raises the possibility that there is no such 
thing as an actual object of discourse in the first place. They 
suggest that any given ‘object’ is best regarded as a meaning-
effect of the discourse in which it is embedded, rather than as 
an entity.10 
                                                
9 Buell has been most radical in this regard: ‘The claims of realism,’ he argues, ‘merit reviving ... so as 
to enable one to reimagine textual representations as having a dual accountability to matter and to 
discursive mentation’. See Buell, Lawrence. The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing 
and the Formation of American Culture. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). p. 92. 
10 As Love continues: ‘For this reason, they maintain that if a discourse is to be theoretical, it must not 
be understood as a theory of anything other than itself: theory is a metadiscourse couched in writing 
laden with jargon, and this sort of writing is both deliberately obscure and entirely self-erasing. Since 
self-erasure keeps metadiscourses from becoming metaphysical discourses, and since deliberate 
obscurity keeps them from being intelligible to anyone not already an initiate, any claims a theorist 
happens to make are null with regard to the truth about the world, although claims about the possibility 
of such truth are another matter. It is the peculiar privilege of theoretical discourse, and of theorists, to 
 6 
 
Evidently, Love’s words appear immensely strong, suggesting that he has 
foreclosed entirely on modes of close textual analysis that would uphold ‘meaning-
effects’ over the virtues of an implied empiricism, and as such are perhaps all too 
readily dismissed as lumpen and polemical. And yet as Dana Phillips has noted, 
Love’s would seem to remain a fairly representative account of what a great many 
ecocritics take theory to be.11 Despite the earnest declarations of second-wave writers 
to sufficiently exceed and reframe their foregoing ambit, almost all monographs, 
essay anthologies and journal editions dedicated in some fashion to the ecologically-
informed humanities have appeared obliged to open with staunch declarations of 
fealty to anti-theoretical paradigms, or more typically, with an apologetic rehearsal of 
the methodological conservatisms that shaped their movement’s earliest forays; a 
rehearsal which has often times seemed to amount not only to the continual 
justification of the fledgling practice they are involved in, but more significantly, to a 
plea for the continuing possibility of literary studies itself. 
But whether or not ecocritical first principles have since met with 
disapprobation on the grounds that they were insufficiently attentive to ideological 
determinations, or have found belated, revolutionary distinction for so unprecedented 
and audacious a rejection of theory, this thesis will nevertheless consider how they 
cannot ever be formally divorced from the mode of production under which they first 
coalesced, nor from the constraints to which its practitioners remain institutionally 
subject. Despite the methodological epiphanies of hitherto Romanticist ecocritics such 
as Greg Garrard (who has recently embraced evolutionary psychology) and 
encouraging collections like the recent New Formations special edition 
Earthographies: Ecocriticism and Culture (Spring 2008), what ecocriticism 
nevertheless seems to lack most is an awareness of the economic fabric of its own 
constitutive epoch, an awareness that would surely embolden any motivation of the 
‘simplicity narratives’ of ‘Green’ literatures with a properly materialist reflexivity.  
                                                                                                                                      
deny those claims outright’ Love, Glen. “Revaluing Nature: Toward an Ecological Criticism.” The 
Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology. Ed. Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm. 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996). 212-237. p. 212. 
11 Phillips, Dana. The Truth of Ecology: Nature, Culture, and Literature in America. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). p. 137. 
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As such, the ecocritical rapprochement with theory, whilst by no means as 
thoroughgoing or discipline-wide as certain second-wave writers would maintain, 
nevertheless seems mysteriously repressed in some way, even guilty, perhaps, of 
certain neo-liberal complicities, prompting the field to remain not only better 
characterised as a Green-hued reception theory than as a critical hermeneutic per se, 
but as in dire need of a careful and thoroughgoing prehistory.12 Stated more plainly, as 
a symptom of the crisis it would seek to overcome, ecocriticism must itself meet with 
a sufficiently ‘metacritical’ analysis, with a rigorous self-assessment, perhaps even a 
psycho-cultural analysis, adequate not only to its increasing heterogeneity, but equally 
to its constitutive contradictions and conservatisms, its oversights and omissions, and 
most significantly, its unacknowledged repressions and exclusions, particularly if it is 
ever to convincingly contend with such social justice concerns as Post-Colonial or 
Gender studies.   
Whilst it is hoped that this ‘symptomnal’ assertion should find sufficient 
legitimation throughout the course of this thesis, we might nevertheless acknowledge 
at the outset how the adequate historicisation of ecocritical mores and practices 
enables precisely such a ‘metacritical’ reorientation. Subsequent chapters will 
therefore advance a number of post-Althusserian lines for reorientation after an initial 
consideration of the exclusions and repressions of literary theory made by pluralist 
ideologues throughout the North American academy of the 1980s. Ever attentive to 
the ideological intimations of that which is absent or excluded, Fredric Jameson’s 
work bids us to acknowledge how ‘the repudiation of theory is itself a theory’.13  
And if we invoke Jameson here then it is not simply to underscore that which 
should be relatively self-evident, but so as to highlight more substantially that by way 
of a putatively ‘postmodern’ writer whose work actively embraces poststructural 
tenets, the indissociability of the theoretical, the historical and the economic might be 
gainfully registered. Moreover, it is by way of precisely such thinking—drawing on 
                                                
12 Love’s position in his 2003 book, Practical Ecocriticism: Literature, Biology, and the Environment, 
appears more disconcerting still, particularly when, following Lawrence Buell, he makes a baffling 
distinction between the ‘ecological’ and the ‘ideological’ as approaches to our post-pastoral period, as 
if ecology were somehow altogether impartial or ideologically-neutral for its scientific apodicity. See 
Love, Glen A. Practical Ecocriticism: Literature, Biology, and the Environment. (Charlottesville: 
University of Virginia, 2003). p.70. 
13  Jameson, Fredric. The Ideologies of Theory, Essays 1971–1986. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minneapolis Press, 1988). (2 vols: ‘Theories and History of Literature vols 48 and 49’). p. 456. 
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Jameson, but not limited to him—that we will consider how the constitutive strategy 
of disavowal underwriting first-wave ecocriticism went hand-in-hand with the vested 
blocking of Marxist critical theories under North American cultural pluralism more 
generally, and which might today remain accountable for the deficit of ecocritical 
papers advocating poststructural theories of immanence.   
Thus, whilst a number of ‘third party’ theories have steadily found favour 
amongst ecocritics since the impassioned theory debates of the 1990s, those writers 
who have deployed such diverse approaches as Bakhtinian dialogics and Harraway’s 
‘cyborg’ theory have nevertheless fallen short of any fully-fledged elaboration of 
metacritical principles.14 Of course, the movement can hardly be described as entirely 
bereft of reflexivity or self-awareness; the inevitable association of ecocriticism with 
the generalised ‘Green’ trends that have in recent decades touched almost all aspects 
of contemporary social life, coming to compete so forcefully for our ethical attention, 
has necessitated that the movement fight in certain quarters to keep its eco-virtuous 
rhetoric from dismissal, from appearing worn or disintensified by media hyperbole, 
and thus from being readily trivialised. Suspected at best of naive, or ‘uncritical’ 
naturalism, at worst, of a certain malfeasance and the cynical ‘green washing’ of a 
subject area more typically associated with social justice concerns, ecocritics have had 
to submit to lengthy and often times extraordinarily disproportionate processes of 
legitimisation.  
And yet few ecocritics show direct interrogation of their own interests and 
motives, and moreover, as these might be structured by the demands of the 
marketplace; the ‘Greening’ of literary scholarship would appear to be a ‘self-
evidently’ worthy reorientation of the discipline, a self-evidentiality that elsewhere we 
might find wholly indefensible, and thus summarily dismissible, and yet Green studies 
often appear somehow immune to such reproach. Despite debate over vested 
interpretations of data from the ecological sciences and the extent to which this would 
strongly underwrite preservationism and other forms of environmentalist anxiety—
particularly under the ‘petropolitical’ climate of recent decades—we must surely 
query the urgent desire to read in an ecological connection for the very fact that it is 
typically inspired by anxieties, anxieties that are fueled by ecological concerns over 
                                                
14 See The Greening of Literary Scholarship: Literature, Theory and the Environment. Ed. Steven 
Rosendale. (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2002). 
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subjective relations to eco-systemic wholeness and equilibrium as much as over 
traditional concerns with pollution and sustainability. Such examination must surely 
precede any immediately apparent ‘ecocentric’ impetus, or at the level of common-
sense or doxa, and what is more, examine that desire eco-clinically.  
This brings us once more to the psychic aspect of our ‘eco-clinic’. In 
psychoanalysis, the fundamental fantasy is the myth of egoic wholeness as opposed to 
subjective fracture, which at base, is the source of all human pathology and resistance. 
In the second half of his career, Lacan demonstrated how the affect of anxiety alerts 
the subject to his or her ‘Imaginary’ fragility by way of an irruption of the ‘Real’. 
Would such insight not lend itself in crucial ways to the examination of ecological 
motivations, particularly where the wide-scale and at times, uncritical adoption of a 
generalised ecologism exhibits at best a problematic core of conservatism or 
homeostatic thinking, at worst, a sort of re-sacralising and theophanic zeal? Would the 
type of reading of the American ‘apocalyptic imagination’ that we find in such studies 
as Mike Davis’ Ecology of Fear: Los Angeles and the Imagination of Disaster (1998) 
not benefit immensely from an analysis of the hypostatisation (or ‘reification’) of 
political interests from the vitalistic and pre-individual fluxes of desire?   
Preeminently, Freud’s conception of psychoanalysis and of a ‘Copernican’ 
unconscious checked its clinical veracity against the horrors of the first World War, 
which is, of course, typically given as the first truly ‘modern’ conflict, not merely in 
its mobilisation of armoured tanks and poison gas, but rather for the profound and 
enduring impact that its horrors had upon the human relationship to self-annihilation, 
perhaps even to species-extinction. Moreover, the Great War brought home the 
materiality of those pathologies and unconscious forces that would impel such 
catastrophic and seemingly ‘total’ forms of destruction. More precisely still, to reckon 
with the magnitude of the conflict is to recognise the valetudinary spur that such 
events had upon clinical observation in the reconfiguration of the modern episteme 
more generally. Throughout The Birth of The Clinic (1963/1973), for example, 
Foucault shows the extent to which the ‘fundamental place of medicine in the over-all 
architecture of the human sciences’ is attributable to its being ‘closer than any of them 
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to the anthropological structure that sustains them all’, and thus, that ‘medical thought 
is fully engaged in the philosophical status of man’.15  
We might suggest that it can therefore be no less engaged in the philosophical 
status of nature, for surely it is under the current ecological ‘crises’ of the present 
time—whether as objectively ‘real’ or ideologically imagined as these may transpire 
to be—that the threat of sickness and death, the pressure of accelerated finitude under 
the spectre of ecological ‘catastrophe’, bring with them corresponding modifications 
to our epistemological and ontological prospects. More significantly, the secular re-
situation of the human species within a broader ecology demands an alertness to what 
we might call the ‘post-social’ moment, where conceptions of ‘health’ and a correct 
relationship to the non-human forces of the biome become paramount, and most 
especially in view of the profusion of all manner of industrial, semiotic and 
ideological pollutives.  
Whilst it might remain altogether ‘perverse’ to open a study such as ours—
concerned as it is with the literary apprehension of nonhuman environs—in direct 
consideration of the clinical and the consequence of the valitudenary, we might 
nevertheless take up this observation towards a call for the necessity of the clinical, 
and acknowledge not only how the medical paradigm has imparted a form of 
observational empiricism, a ‘clinical gaze’, directly inspired by experiences of 
finitude, of sickness and death, but that this gaze might be actively affirmed rather 
than resisted and disavowed. As Freudian psychoanalysis upholds, disavowal 
(verleugnun) is fundamental to the operation of perversion, involving the 
simultaneous recognition and denial of a particular phenomenon; in Lacanian clinical 
terms this would result from the denial of symbolic ‘castration’, or of the necessary 
recognition of absence or lack that marks entry into the Symbolic order (or Law), a 
recognition crucial to ‘healthy’ subject formation. Perversion occurs when denial of 
castration is ‘acted out’, having significant consequences for political demonstration. 
When we identify with thought we lose being, when we choose words we erase the 
things they represent.16 As Žižek and Jameson have shown, such formal logic can be 
                                                
15 Foucault, Michel. The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception. Trans. A. M. 
Sheridan. (London: Routledge, 2003).  p. 244-45. 
16 For Lacan, what we also lose through castration is our enjoyment (or jouissance), which is subject to 
a Symbolic prohibition, prohibited by the phallus. Paradoxically, of course, such enjoyment is 
constituted by such prohibition and does not precede it. This loss is perhaps more significant still for 
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applied to the complexes that sustain all manner of traditional political and social 
justice struggles.  
And yet if in this way we might seem to suggest psychoanalysis as the 
quintessential ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ after Paul Ricouer, then this is only half the 
story. Rather than effectively privilege epistemology over ethical concerns, a move no 
doubt hotly anticipated by the Green anti-theory lobby, we might instead actively 
acknowledge the limits of interpretation when working in the eco-literary aesthetic 
domain. Whilst Ricoueur’s existential phenomenology worked to describe the 
interpretive procedures of Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud in such a fashion, the term is 
more often employed today by cultural conservatives such as Harold Bloom to rebuke 
politicised forms of literary criticism. For our purposes, psychoanalysis might 
therefore be invoked as simultaneously a means of considering latent motives and 
unconscious processes in ecocritical endeavour and yet also as the avatar of an anti-
hermeneutic methodology, identifying of, but content not to have the final word on, an 
ineliminable and fundamentally uninterpretable Real.  
Necessarily then, an essential component of a metacritical purview that would 
work to demystify a particular cultural complex must be an adequate 
conceptualisation of human subjectivity under late capitalism. Entailing a concerted 
acknowledgement of unconscious processes as these relate not only to interpretation 
in the first instance, but to the elucidation of institutional practices as in their own way 
symptoms of a cultural unconscious, such an approach does not necessarily result in 
psychic determinism. Rather than encouraging a paranoid relation to cultural texts, 
fueling the assumption that to interpret is to critically eliminate opacity or uncertainty 
through analytical bowlderisation, certain post-psychoanalytic modes of criticism can 
actively dispel such paranoia. In Laplanche and Deleuze, for example, we find 
approaches fundamentally accepting of resistances to meaning, fostering a view of 
cultural forms and complexes as much less puzzles to be decoded or obstacles to be 
overcome, than as representatives of an indomitable (perhaps ‘uncolonisable’) 
dimension of reality. 17   
                                                                                                                                      
the metacritical reorientation of an ecopolitics, but we will address how this concept plays out 
differently in our selected thinkers a little later in the thesis. 
17 Sceptical about the viability of a ‘cultural unconscious’ for literary studies, Tim Dean suggests that   
‘[d]iagnosing aesthetic artifacts as cultural symptoms tends to preempt the possibility of […] ethical 
consideration’. Moreover, Dean contrasts the Žižekian approach with that of Laplanche, whose 
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As we shall see, in the work of Deleuze and Guattari a concern with pre-
individual affect leads to a ‘schizoanalytic’ approach to life and literature that 
privileges a non-identitarian ‘delirium’, that not only ousts Oedipal interiority and the 
nuclear family as capitalist fabrications, but suggests them as precisely those forces 
that sustain un-ecological, or inhibited and exclusive relations; relations that deny 
desire (and we must at once say ‘Nature’) qua ‘difference in itself’. What this should 
do is show how despite the fact that a number of post-Lacanian theories have 
necessarily had language as their object—the social is bound by language and speech 
acts, ‘the unconscious is structured like a language’ etc.,—we might nevertheless 
begin to discern an ‘eco-discursive’ value in their logics, irrespective of their 
putatively ‘poststructural’ designation. In differentiating those poststructuralisms that 
would emphasise the Real over the Symbolic in this way, we at the very least lend 
eco-psychologists a vocabulary from within which to articulate what we might 
provisionally term an ‘eco-subjectivity’.  
This thesis will therefore look not simply to Lacanian psychoanalysis as it 
stands discretely, but to a range of post-Althusserian Marxists who incorporate the 
lessons of Lacan in a more or less explicit manner, and in a concerted bid to redress 
theoretical inarticulation prior to reasserting precisely such a metacritical purview. 
Moreover, by drawing on such thinking we might assuage ecocritical reservations 
over the abandonment of political praxis by ‘high’ theorists; as Žižek and writers such 
as Jameson, Macherey, and Deleuze and Guattari have shown, both psychoanalysis 
and Marxism have been constituted by a distinct unity of theory and practice, sharing 
concerns with the historical and material accretion of the subject and the social.18 
What is more, both doctrines have been at pains to negotiate the discontinuities 
                                                                                                                                      
Lacanianism consists of a refutation of Ricouer’s phenomenological reading of Freud and which is 
articulated about the notion of an ‘enigmatic signifier’ (or a signifier that does not form part of a 
signifying chain but instead causes something else to take its place), enabling Dean to suggest that 
‘[t]he concept of the unconscious licenses interpretation as an interminable enterprise that permanently 
defers analysis of the disruptive impact aesthetic experience may have on us […] but the enigmatic 
signifier holds the potential to halt interpretation and thus to reorient the focus of criticism.’ Dean, Tim. 
‘Art as Symptom: Žižek and the Ethics of Psychoanalytic Criticism.’ Diacritics. 32.2: (Summer, 2002): 
21–41. p. 39.  
18As Steven Helming says of Jameson’s work ‘[it is] a criticism capable of achieving mediations 
between the social and the individual that could draw on psychoanalysis without reducing the social to 
the categories of individual psychology’. Not only is this spanning of individual and collective registers 
essential to the Marxo-Lacanian theories drawn upon by this thesis, but it keeps us from precisely the 
sort of anthropocentric solipsism that almost all ecocritics militate against. Helming, Steven. 
‘Jameson’s Lacan’. Postmodern Culture. 7 (1). (September, 1996). p. 1. 
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between words and things, sharing complex relationships to literary expressivity—
particularly to metonymy and figuricity—in the formation of their respective 
hermeneutics. 
These are negotiations that necessarily confront any ecocritic, albeit on a 
battleground of another sort; the hypostatisation or reification of complex natural 
phenomena under the narcissistic processes of identitarianism and consumerism 
foreshorten and foreclose on life processes.19 This thesis will therefore argue that to 
attempt to negotiate such discontinuities is to enjoin duties of a simultaneously 
economic and ‘clinical’ sort, and we will see more fully how this perception of 
simultaneity enables a thinker like Deleuze to discern in good Nietzschean fashion 
how high modernist authors such as Proust, Sacher-Masoch and Kafka serve as 
‘clinicians of civilization’, palpating the social body and grouping symptoms as a 
physician would, leading him to elegantly assert: ‘[t]he world is the set of symptoms 
whose illness merges with man’. 20 
In short, Marxism and psychoanalysis have both been concerned with the 
representation of a material Real/reality that, if we can have even an idea of it, has 
already become a part of our representations, and thus the constitution of which is 
therefore as much a question of the operation of the psyche as of (eco)political 
economy.21 As Žižek reminds us in The Sublime Object of Ideology (1989), Lacan 
                                                
19 In an essay written half a decade before his seminal The Environmental Imagination (1995), Buell 
promised to elucidate an ‘ideological grammar’ of American pastoral. Whilst drawing on an entirely 
untheoretical ‘diagnostic’ vocabulary, acknowledging the ‘pathological aspects’ of the male pastoral 
imagination as it pertains in particular to accounts of American frontier life and settler culture, Buell 
does not sufficiently extend the clinical trope, nor the clear implications of his work to the North 
American critical-institutional milieu or the economic base that would sustain it. When he makes an 
extremely strong point in suggesting how ‘to read Rachel Carson’s ‘elegiac, Thornton Wideresque’ 
opening to Silent Spring (1964), in which she describes ‘the death of a typical our town’ as ‘regressive 
fantasy’ would be ‘to read it the same way the [pesticide] industry’s defenders sought to make us read 
it’, he promises a level of kultur kritik that the remainder of his paper simply reneges on. See Buell, 
Lawrence. ‘American Pastoral Ideology Reappraised.’ American Literary History. Vol. 1. No. 1. 
(Spring, 1989): 1-29. p. 13, 19. 
20 Deleuze, Essays, p. 3. 
21 Whilst it is beyond the remit of this thesis to consider Lacan’s Marxism to any great extent, it will be 
useful to acknowledge certain formal symmetries between Marx and Lacan, and the extent to which 
Jameson, Žižek and Deleuze (with and without Guattari) present nuances and breaks with different 
periods of Lacan’s work. 
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claimed that Marx himself invented the symptom.22 Both Lacan and Marx conceive of 
existing social economies or psychic systems as accommodating sites of disruption 
that are internal and even essential to the operations of the systems themselves. Both 
writers depart from classic Enlightenment views of consciousness as an autonomous 
vehicle, instead rendering it in terms of what Valente calls a ‘wholly reflexive, deeply 
heteronomous imposture’.23 For Althusser, Marxism and psychoanalysis both address 
a particular structure of mis-recognition. For Marxism, this is the mis-recognition that 
individuals make history; for psychoanalysis, it is the subjects’ mis-recognition of 
themselves as centred autonomous egos.  
As ecocritic Walter Clark has it, ‘[e]nvironmental literature is not a form that 
creates distance’.24 If this is so, then the ‘necessary’ alienations that underpin subject 
formation in psychoanalysis, the vertiginous condition of Rimbaud’s ‘je est un autre’, 
and which Lacan terms méconnaissance, takes its place as a constitutive and pre-
personal estrangement prior to those the subject undergoes during socio-political 
determination (as ‘black’, ‘gay’ or ‘straight’, even ‘Green’). Just as Freud’s dictum 
maintains that ‘the ego is not master in his own house’, the ecocritical pairing of oikos 
and kritis, and from which we obtain ‘house judge’, immediately suggests a wealth of 
under-acknowledged Oedipal relations that might haunt and constrain ecocritical 
epistemologies. Whether these are to be found in such ecotheologies as the ‘Gaia’ 
hypothesis and ‘mother earth/Shiva the destroyer’, or such ‘deep’ ecological notions 
of attachment to place and ‘reinhabitation’ as we find in Arne Naess, Gary Snyder or 
Kirkpatrick Sale, they surely warrant careful scrutiny.25  
                                                
22 In fact, it was Lacan who suggested that it was not Freud but Marx who introduced the symptom into 
modern thinking ‘as a sign of what does not work in the real’  (Lacan, session of December 10th, 
1974).  See Žižek, Slavoj. The Sublime Object of Ideology. (London: Verso, 1989). p. 11. 
23 Valente, Joe. ‘Lacan’s Marxism, Marxism’s Lacan (from Žižek to Althusser)’. The Cambridge 
Companion to Lacan. Ed. Jean-Michel Rabaté. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 153-
172. p. 160. 
24 Clark, Walter. H. "What Teaching Environmental Literature Might Be." Teaching Environmental 
Literature: Materials, Methods, Resources. Ed. Frederick O. Waage. (New York: MLA, 1985). 4-8. p. 
7. 
25 Looking as he does to the Greek etymology of the term ‘ecocritic’—to oikos and kritis—and which 
taken together yield ‘house judge’—William Howarth derives an obliging gloss on the term, suggesting 
a figure he characterises as a well-versed, ethological arbiter of the ‘world household’ and therefore as 
one ‘who judges the merits and faults of writings that depict the effects of culture upon nature, with a 
view toward celebrating nature, berating its despoilers, and reversing their harm through political 
action’. Howarth’s definition is useful here insofar as it not only claims an unambiguously political 
valence for the movement, but a potentially Oedipal one, for problematically endowing the specialism 
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What this initial marshaling of theorists amounts to is an evaluation of a number 
of diverse ‘diagnostic’ approaches, with differing positions on psychoanalysis, clinical 
interpretation and perhaps most significantly, the structural logic of symptom 
formation. In one definition of the symptom, Žižek describes it as ‘the point of 
emergence of the truth about social relations’; in Deleuze, as we have noted somewhat 
fleetingly, a more Nietzschean evaluation of ‘active’ and ‘reactive’ forces begets a 
literary formalism in which ‘[t]he world is the set of symptoms whose illness merges 
with man’. 26  Whilst these images of what the symptom might amount to for 
(eco)cultural analysis supply a first look at a diagnostic approach to metacriticism, 
they are by no means the only definitions that we will consider and deploy in the 
following pages; in Lacan, from whom all of our symptomatologists take inspiration if 
not the underlying grammar for their technical vocabularies, the trope of the symptom 
underwent significant transformation during a dynamic and lengthy career, only 
amounting to a generalisable, sociocultural ‘concept’ (in the strong sense) in his late 
writings.27  
Following Jacques-Alain Miller’s systematic periodisation of Lacanian thought, 
both Jameson and Žižek focus their attention most earnestly on this ‘late Lacan,’ 
wherein the concept of the Real (that which absolutely resists symbolisation or 
representation)—along with the notions of drive, jouissance, Thing, and objet petit a 
associated with it—is preeminent.28 Yet Jameson’s equation of the Lacanian Real with 
                                                                                                                                      
with a degree of prosopopoeia: personifying and thereby giving voice to the otherwise ‘mute’ earth in 
the anthropocentric sphere. See Howarth, William. ‘Some Principles of Ecocriticism.’ The Ecocriticism 
Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology. Eds. Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm. (Athens: 
University of Georgia Press, 1996). 69-91. p. 163. 
26 Žižek, Sublime, p. 26; Deleuze, Essays, p. 3. 
27 In Lacan’s own work, the symptôme/sinthome enjoys steady reformulation throughout the long years 
of seminars and critical practice. In his late reading of Joyce, given at Seminar XXIII in 1975, we see 
how Lacan interprets the author's entire oeuvre as an extended symptom, a complex, literary abreaction 
effecting a specific organisation of jouissance, and so Joyce’s management of pleasure/pain via the 
(dis)satisfactions of language as this may have proven adequate or not to his individual pathology. For 
Lacan, jouissance neatly evokes the paradoxical satisfaction derived by the subject from his symptom. 
As in Deleuze’s post-Lacanian writing on literature—and which we will consider in chapter 3—we see 
how Joyce is less the neurotic patient, as the clinician of both himself and his cultural milieu in working 
on and through language as a poet-novelist. In his ‘pathology’, Joyce is a writer who cannot be 
objective about his experience of the complexities of Dublin and whose work therefore supplies a firm 
literary exemplar for the development of Lacan’s principal conceits. 
28 The period typically referred to as ‘late’ Lacan starts with Seminar XX. Following on from Lacan’s 
recognition of the irreducibility of the Real, the later teaching is characterised by a concern with the 
Real as immovable, insistent, but also intimately bound up with language in its entirety. 
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history, particularly in his The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially 
Symbolic Act (1981), lends diverse emphases to the historicising aspect of our 
project.29 Wherever the historical accretion of the human subject and the social 
remains neglected by ecocritics, we forgo a truly materialist critique. In other words, 
what theories privileging of the Lacanian Real effect is to bring ecocriticism into 
contact with debates concerning the politicisation of that which is excluded for being 
beyond the reach of representation and which might thus present to the specialism an 
indispensable means of articulating relations with what I shall term ‘biotic alterity’. 
Registering how these Lacanian notions emerge as sympathetic with the logic of 
Marxian ideology critique proves indispensable where a properly ‘ecoclinical’ 
position is our object. The ‘asymptotic’ theorising that we find in Lacan, Žižek and 
Deleuze offers a means of approaching a sense of the Real—of the nonhuman, the 
materiality of history, the unconscious or difference ‘in itself’—by way of the sort of 
non-representational ‘palpation’ we find in clinical diagnoses. New materialities, new 
groupings of symptoms might be drawn up as a fundamental component of a broader 
eco-clinical rubric. It may seem churlish to cite Marx and Engel’s famous declaration 
that ‘[t]he philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is 
to change it’.30 And yet it is surely a sentiment shared by many an ecocritic, 
psychoanalyst and Marxist alike, and one that it seems imperative to acknowledge the 
many homologies and antipathies between from the outset, particularly where we 
might encounter ideological resistances not only to Marxist paradigms, but equally to 
Lacanian ones, from ecocritics themselves. 
  
 
                                                
29 Despite the works of such environmental historians as Leo Marx, John Opie and William Cronon, 
writers whose commitments to tracing the North American cultural past have yielded important insights 
on American settler culture and New World pastoral, particularly as these relate to modernity and 
urbanism for ecoliterary consideration, none of these writers have apprised the movement of a 
substantial link between human subjectivity and history, and thus its practices of historicisation remain 
bereft of studies that would analyse its maturation in terms of a ‘clinical’ epistemological unfolding. 
Uncognisant of the sort of symptomnal basis that might diagnose the singularly problematic 
relationship that ecocriticism evinces to institutional culture, ecocritics would remain deprived of 
substantial metacritical resources, and what after Deleuze amounts to the same thing, of conceptual 
adequation. 
30 Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. The German Ideology. (New York: International Publishers, 1981). 
p. 123. 
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(ii) Case Studies 
 
What remains now is to consider in detail how subsequent chapters will address 
key issues confronting the specialism. Accordingly, as we move to consider different 
aspects of the field and the extent to which our selected post-Althusserian theories 
might benefit or transform the material at hand, each chapter will initially make a case 
for the merits of a particular writer, opting more substantially for one over the other. 
These recommendations will be guided by a sense of the pertinence of that thinker to 
the particular level of debate, yet will not shirk from conceding their respective 
limitations. On the contrary, such ‘limits’ will themselves be treated symptomnally, 
enabling us to explore how critical preferences are no less dependent upon the 
inertias, blockages and impasses of desire. Whilst we will initially consider the 
cultural level only, we will subsequently move to consider the psychic, before 
ultimately considering the interchange between these two levels. The unifying links 
will remain the relationship between desire and immanence, the impact of Althusser’s 
Spinozist influence upon contemporary theory and how these underpin and transform 
symptomnal approaches to ecocriticism. 
 
As such the first chapter will commence with an analysis of totality and 
immanence for ecocriticism, acknowledging those few attempts to account for eco-
subjectivity and the ways in which these have failed to sufficiently address ideology 
or the need for a ‘metacritical’ approach, before moving to apprise our debate of the 
critical legacy of Spinozism, with a particular emphasis in the latter part of the chapter 
on its place in Althusser and Balibar’s ‘symptomnal reading’. This section of the 
thesis will not make close literary readings, nor consider in depth those made by 
individual ecocritics. Rather, literary ecocriticism per se will be reckoned with as a 
movement and in terms of its relationship to the North American cultural and political 
pluralism from which it emerged. This will include an acknowledgement of the 
exclusion of those critical theories considered as Marxist socialist, and thus, will 
examine how theories of immanence have remained under-regarded by ecocritics, 
largely to the detriment of a properly ‘metacritical’ ecocritique. 
 
Like the first, the second chapter of the thesis will be given over to refining the 
theoretical basis by which the succeeding half of our project will proceed. We will 
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here investigate the relationship between ideology and aesthetics, noting in particular 
the role of ‘affect’ in rethinking the eco-literary relationship to the ‘violent signs’ of 
environmental catastrophe. We will do so initially by way of post-Kantian writings on 
the ‘sublime’, moving to a closer look at Žižek’s post-Althusserian Lacanianism and 
the manner by which his principal conceit, that the Kantian sublime can be read after 
Lacan’s reading of Freud’s ‘Thing’ (Das Ding), might be employed as a means to 
clinically evaluate eco-ideology. Opening with a reassertion of the Kantian subject 
enables us to reconsider the legacy of subjective interiority—particularly the 
ecocritical disavowal of such ‘human-all-too-human’ concerns as pleasure and 
displeasure (or jouissance)—by way of affects that are experienced in the sublime 
moment. Yet it is the metacritical implications of such a moment that might give us to 
reconsider ecocriticism as discourse. As such, recourse will be made to Žižek’s work 
insofar as it enables us to apprehend why ‘enjoyment is a political factor’. As the most 
sustained usage of sublime aesthetics for ecocriticism, Lee Rozelle’s Ecosublime 
(2006) will form the focus of analysis as we unpick the pros and cons of subjectivist 
ideologie kritik for the movement. 
 
Transforming ideologie kritik, Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘schizoanalytic’ project 
enables us to propose a subsequent section on the relationship between literature and 
impersonal desire. Significantly, we will consider how schizoanalysis begets a 
‘stratoanalysis’, a ‘geophilosophical’ orientation that incorporates all manner of non-
human ‘becomings’ in its analysis of the organism, the individual and the State, and 
which thus has what we will term an ‘ecological pathos’ at its core. Although a French 
rather an American author, Proust is afforded an honorary status in Deleuze’s Anglo-
American literary canon; after the notion of assemblage, a term that bridged the 
schizoanalytic and stratoanalytic projects, we will consider how his literary-
philosophical work remains of immense value for ecocriticism, chiefly insofar as 
Deleuze extracts an impersonal sense of ‘worldliness’ from La recherche du temps 
perdu (1913-1927). Despite Proust’s emphasis upon the bourgeois society of France 
in the early twentieth-century, his symptomatology of different ‘worlds’ nevertheless 
enables us to consider the role of pre-personal affect as part of a ‘Deleuzian sublime’, 
one that in emphasising the notion of ‘sympathy’, advocates a stratoanalytic openness 
to that which ‘hurts us’.  
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The sympathy that Deleuze discerns in Proust will be crucial for the remainder 
of the thesis; by presenting a means of reckoning with the writer as an ‘eco-clinical 
thinker’, chiefly by way of an ‘a-signifying’ conception of signs, Deleuze opens up 
stratoanalysis as a resolutely non-subjectivist approach, focused upon what in his 
‘geology of morals’ with Guattari he will name as three principal ‘strata’—the 
physico-chemical, the organic and the anthropomorphic. The manner by which Life 
(or desire) is ‘imprisoned’ by ‘organisms and genera’ reveals Deleuze and Guattari’s 
geophilosophy to owe as much to literary figures as to a Nietzschean-Spinozist 
subversion of Kantian synthetic philosophy. By extending their thesis on ‘desiring-
production’, Deleuze and Guattari’s stratoanalysis enables us to retain a critique of 
Oedipal interiority, or of the familial values that sustain instrumental and consumerist 
attitudes, whilst suggesting ways in which literary form relates to a sense of ‘formless’ 
matter, to the non-human within man as much as that which lies outside him.  
 
A stratoanalytic approach to eco-literary production therefore supplants Žižek’s 
Hegelian symptomatology by way of its principal conceit of the ‘Body without 
Organs’ (BwO) or ‘plane of consistency’, and which in effect, supplies us with a 
concept that by exceeding the Marxo-Lacanian symptom/sinthôme, enables us to 
move beyond a merely diagnostic approach towards one with ‘therapeutic’ 
implications. This movement away from a signifying symptomatology will in turn 
lead to consideration of the debt Deleuze and Guattari owe to Kafka’s literary 
pragmatics; between their schizoanalytic and stratoanalytic writings, Deleuze and 
Guattari published an important volume on Kafka, and in which they attended to the 
‘collective assemblages of enunciation’ that are presupposed by any instance of 
language use, whether ‘nature-writing’ or otherwise. Extending their concerns with 
historically-contingent social machines in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari 
emphasise how Kafka’s ‘minoritarianism’ attests to a mode of creativity they describe 
in terms of a ‘becoming-animal’, a broadly utopian position on desire, language and 
society that crucially engineers a path beyond the Oedipal deadlock. By presenting 
this significant literary figure as at once a cultural diagnostician and agent of social 
transformation, Deleuze and Guattari suggest an approach to ‘eco-virtue’ after a 
specific conception of affective signs that are constitutive at the organismic as much 
as the perceptual level. A stratoanalysis of ‘regimes of signs’ will then enable us to 
reconceive of Thoreau’s eco-critical precedent, an historical figure whose work and 
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example has in many respects contributed towards today’s eco-liberal perceptions of 
‘Wilderness.’ Finally, this will enable us to acknowledge how ‘eco-virtuous’ 
responses to ‘Climate Change’ can be diagnosed in terms of the reactionary values at 
their core.  
 
A key chapter on science will develop our concerns with desire in the previous 
sections towards consideration of why it is that ecocritics must develop ‘ecological 
literacy’, and chiefly by way of Glen A. Love’s work in this connection. As has been 
noted in brief, Love remains outspoken against poststructural and postmodern forms 
of literary analysis whilst remaining committed to a biological foundationism and the 
informing of literary research with the expertise of the life sciences, particularly 
evolutionary biology. In incorporating Darwinian ideas into his thesis, Love supplies 
our project with an important case study that might be investigated alongside a 
Deleuzian thesis; not only do Deleuze and Guattari rigorously distinguish and define 
the powers particular to art, science and philosophy in What is Philosophy? 
(1991/1994), but they also celebrate and challenge the Darwinian evolutionary 
paradigm in significant ways. What this chapter will do is enable us to move towards 
an understanding of the intersection of literature and ecology, particularly as the 
global hegemony of the sciences might be seen to force a ‘hermeneutic corridor’ of 
interpretation. Love’s reading of the high modernism of Willa Cather might then be 
re-examined after our Deleuzian position on percepts and affects, particularly insofar 
as Love attempts to draw together literary ideas concerning archetypes with the notion 
of biological universalism in the work of controversial biologist E. O. Wilson. 
 
In a final chapter on picaresque writing and humour, we will consider whether 
or not the putative ‘innocence’ of first-wave ecocriticism was not perhaps a direct and 
concerted response to the vicissitudes of postmodern cynicism. If today we know that 
we are receiving an ideologically distorted version of reality, then it might be 
suggested that the ecocritical strategy sets itself against the non-rejecting compliances 
of the cynical subject. Might ecoliterary research intervene in this process, and most 
particularly where a humorous lens emerges as tenable? Deleuze and Guattari’s 
remarks on humour present a means of rethinking the Galenic notion that ‘melancholy 
is the humor closest to the earth’, and as such, presents a number of lines with which 
we might reconceive of picaresque literature for so apparently solemn a state of affairs 
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as ecological catastrophe. The seriousness of certain, adversarial modes of 
ecocriticism remains problematic where given as a response to or quarrel with the 
underlying ideologies of the mode of production; contestation and embattlement 
presuppose a certain seriousness, the seriousness that effects the very dialectic of any 
conflict if it is to be seen as at all worthy or valuable. Deleuze’s work should aid us in 
this connection, identifying and calling for a ‘superior irony’ commensurate with the 
immanent ethical extensions of his ‘superior empiricism.’  
 
Joseph H. Meeker’s work on picaresque literature and a ‘play ethic’ remains the 
only significant touchstone for this aspect of the field, and therefore the chapter will 
evaluate his work by way of Deleuze and Guattari, drawing in the process from 
Edward Abbey’s picaresque account of eco-sabotage in The Monkey Wrench Gang 
(1975), a text renowned for having inaugurated the American Earth First! movement, 
and which portrays an eleventh-hour assault upon the aggressive development of the 
Utah and Nevada canyon lands and mesas.  
 
All of which will enable us to draw to a conclusion, in which we will evaluate 
the continuing possibility of an eco-clinical approach to literature. 
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1: Symptomatic Reading 
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(i) Prehistory 
 
Our first chapter opens with two, broadly ‘historicising’ questions, both of which 
will inform our general assertion that ecocriticism requires a metacritical engagement 
with its own prehistory. Our first question will again be one familiar from our 
introduction: namely, what might keep ecocritics from a Marxo-Lacanian approach to 
literature? Fundamental to our thesis, this broadly ideological question, one concerned 
with the relationship between desire and its capture, between symptom and cause, will 
be supplemented by a more properly philosophical one regarding concepts. This will 
take the form of a post-structural enquiry into ecocritical motivations of ‘immanence’, 
which tend to remain focused, often uncritically, upon ‘Nature’ as global whole (or 
‘Totality’) rather than upon the historical, political and economic senses of the term. 
This deliberately theoretical enquiry will aid us in an eco-clinical diagnosis of the 
movement’s ‘problematic field’, the specific ‘horizon’ of sense, or cultural and 
political ‘unconscious’ to which it remains immanent. 
Such questions will serve our ‘immanent critique’ of the movement, or one that 
would reckon with its constitution under determinate historical and political 
conditions. This is because an immanent critique, or a form of criticism that 
acknowledges the genesis of its object, necessarily turns upon an apprehension of the 
conditional limits of a given system, milieu or environment, and moreover, upon how 
such limits nevertheless remain productive. As our opening remarks suggested, 
because the aim of our study is to assert theories of desire for ecocriticism, it will be 
key to recognise how certain limits, blockages and absences—whether biological, 
cultural/political or conceptual—might be acknowledged as ‘symptoms’, yet beyond 
any Hegelian-Marxist basis in a logic of contradiction.1 As such, our provisional line 
of questioning will draw us towards a first example of ‘symptomnal reading’, one that 
ascertains critical standards and criteria from within the cultural ‘pathology’ in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 As our introduction made clear, this thesis will motivate three post-Lacanian symptomatologies in a 
bid to evaluate their respective bearing upon our assembly of an ‘eco-clinic’. Althusser and Balibar’s 
emphasis on ‘catachresis’ supplies us with a first look at the symptom; Žižek’s Lacanian emphasis 
upon the Real/Symbolic relation will supply a second; and Deleuze’s Nietzschean conception of forces 
and flows, of the impasses or ‘blockages’ that beset Life, will supply a third. These will lead us in the 
latter half of the thesis to posit the necessity of schizoanalysis as a post-symptomatological, 
‘therapeutic’ approach.    
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question, yet which follows Althusser’s assertion that it is in the appendix to part I of 
Spinoza’s Ethics that we might find ‘the matrix of every possible theory of ideology.’2 
It is therefore on the basis of Althusser’s recognition in Spinoza of a theory of Man as 
a desiring-thinking ‘mode’ within nature that we will consider the emergence of 
ecocriticism under the North American cultural and political pluralism of the 1980s. 
When in the third and fourth sections of this chapter we explore this analysis in full, 
we will pay particular attention to the climate of ‘general persuasivity’ that 
characterised the era, suggesting how this might be diagnosed after Althusser and 
Balibar’s thesis in Reading Capital (1968/1970), a text that draws on Spinoza to 
reconfigure our understanding of writing, ideology and history.3  
Whilst Reading Capital was the result of a Freudo-Lacanian analysis of Marx’s 
writing prior to 1845, one that discerned how the philosopher’s ‘mature’ critical 
project was somehow latent in the form of his earlier, ‘immature’ (or ‘ideologically’-
biased) writings, the distinction drawn in that study between a ‘theoretically-
immature’ and ‘mature’ criticism—or in Althusserian terms, the ‘epistemological 
break’ between a humanistic,  ideological naiveté and a properly ‘theoretical’ and anti-
humanist ‘science’—is one that is suggestive indeed for our own attempt at immanent 
critique, promising as it does a range of ‘symptomnal’ implications for the 
historicisation of first-wave ecocriticism. Whilst Althusser famously claimed that 
‘Marxism was not an historicism’, what he ultimately hoped to show was that the 
Marxist humanisms of Lukács or Sartre, for example, did not sufficiently overcome 
the difficulties of obtaining a non-ideological, or ‘scientific’ theory of history, nor a 
properly conceptual form of materialist critique that had incorporated the lessons of 
structuralism.4  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!Althusser, Louis. ‘The Only Materialist Tradition, Part I: Spinoza.’ Trans. T. Stolze. The New 
Spinoza.!Ed!Warren Montag and Ted Stolze (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997):!3)20. 
3 Although she does not consider ecocriticism in her work, we will follow Ellen Rooney’s adaptation of 
Althusser and Balibar’s thesis. Along with her notion of ‘general persuasion’, this adaptation proves 
key to exploring an ecocritical prehistory as part of a broader, eco-clinical analysis. See Rooney, Ellen. 
Seductive Reasoning: Pluralism as the Problematic of Contemporary Literary Theory. (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1989). pgs. 26-7. 
4 As Althusser makes plain: ‘I should like to suggest that, from the theoretical stand-point, Marxism is 
no more a historicism than it is a humanism; that in many respects both historicism and humanism 
depend on the same ideological problematic; and that, theoretically speaking, Marxism is, in a single 
movement and by virtue of the unique epistemological rupture which established it, an anti-humanism 
and an anti-historicism.’ See Althusser, Louis and Étienne Balibar. Reading Capital. Trans. Ben 
Brewster. (London: Verso, 1979). p. 119. 
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We might, therefore, explore the notion of ‘historicism’ strategically, so as to get 
at the very challenge of history for ecocriticism, a literary specialism that would by 
definition seek to demote humanist social justice concerns. We will follow Althusser’s 
‘structural’ reading of Marx in this way, acknowledging the Spinozism that he draws 
upon to renounce Hegelian dialectics, and principally as this leads him to develop his 
a-subjective, non-teleological notion of ‘structural causality’, or vision of history as 
‘process without subject or goal(s).’5 Not only does Hegelian Idealism privilege 
human Reason, but ultimately retains teleological positions on contradiction, history 
and totality. As we proceed we will acknowledge how for Althusser structure is the 
‘unconscious’ of social relations—whether our concerns be ‘environmental’ or 
otherwise—whilst considering how this ‘relational’ unconscious might be conceived 
of without negativity, without the reductivity that Hegel imparted so influentially in 
the Philosophy of History (1837), in which the World Spirit, with its anthropological 
‘destiny of reason’, permeated whole civilisations.6  
This will supply us with a means of approaching the paradoxical tendency 
amongst ecocritics to retain humanist sensibilities, a symptomatic tendency that, 
despite their ostensibly ‘anti’ or ‘post’ humanist ethos, appears to persist throughout 
their thinking. 7  As counter-intuitive as it might first appear, our Althusserian 
symptomatology is here precisely that which would diagnose this tendency. If Marx’s 
pre-1845 writings were too humanistic for Althusser, then his post-1845 writings were 
sufficiently ‘scientific’, which is to say that by virtue of their conceptual maturity they 
no longer amounted to an historicism, amounting instead to a fully-fledged ‘Historical 
Materialism’. That an avowedly ‘non-theoretical’ movement like ecocriticism might, 
in its own preliminary writings, have similarly gestured towards a theoretical maturity 
‘to come’, to the sort of immanent cultural criticism that their (Althusser-inspired) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Althusser, Louis. Essays in Self-Criticism. Trans. Grahame Lock. (London: New Left Books, 1976). 
pgs. 96-99. 
6 Later in the chapter we will consider how this constitutes Althusser’s basic challenge to Hegelian 
‘expressive causality’, in which Hegel posited totality as an essence that is ‘expressed’ at every level of 
society. Towards the chapter’s end will see how this relates to our ecocritical concerns with Althusser’s 
notion of ‘relative autonomy.’ See Poster, Mark. ‘Althusser on History without Man.’ Political Theory. 
Vol. 2, No. 4 (Nov., 1974): 393-409. p. 400. 
7 As Poster puts it: ‘Against the denigration of unconscious structure by humanists, who viewed it as 
mere mechanism, the structuralist revealed its opaqueness to the social subject and lucidly exposed the 
degree to which it was impossible for the subject to transform the structure. Subject and structure were 
systematically and radically out of phase.’ See Poster, Althusser, p. 397. 
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post-structuralist rivals were suggesting, enables us to draw a parallel between the 
example of the young, Hegelian Marx and that of such first-wave ecocritics as 
Lawrence Buell and Glen A. Love, both of whom we have acknowledged as ‘anti-
theoretical’ exemplars principal to the movement’s formation.  
For all its apparent lop-sidedness, this parallel, between Marx as the great 
political economist whose influence remains irrefutable and a handful of lesser-known 
career-academics working in a somewhat marginal literary discipline, nevertheless 
remains key, particularly when we seek to account for the ecocritical rejection of 
theory as part of its broader, institutional ‘problematic.’ Like most (post) structuralists, 
for Althusser, the problematic is the immanent, yet unconscious field of relations that 
circumscribes any instance of cultural production. 8  In the case of ecocritical 
approaches to literature, we can follow Althusser in ‘bringing to consciousness’ the 
‘pre-conceptual’ genera and mystifications that populate the problematic field of a 
movement that has emerged within a specific, North American institutional context. 
Just as such pre-medical concepts as the Galenic ‘humors’ were supplanted by the 
development of medical science, the ‘epistemological break’ that might be said to be 
pending for ecocriticism is one in which this transition from certain, culturally-biased 
and ‘inadequate’ ideas about eco-literary relations—about how its practices might 
remedy ‘non-ecological’ attitudes and habits—develops into a properly ‘scientific’ 
(qua theoretical) and ‘adequate’ ‘eco-theory’, sufficiently aware of its own ideological 
biases.  
The parallels between this ‘coming to consciousness’ and the Freudian process 
of transference should already be clear. Just as Marx’s work prior to 1845 was not yet 
‘Marxian’ for being (pre) conceptually-dependent upon the philosophical 
anthropologies of Hegel and Feuerbach, we might endeavour to show how 
ecocriticism similarly remains too humanistic, too empirical in this Althusserian sense 
of unconsciously adhering to a subject-centered objectivity, to a pre-conceptual 
weltanschauung of genera and mystifications.9 Where Althusser’s Spinozan-Marxism 
is informed by his readings of Freud and Lacan, we find an ‘anti-humanism’ that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Althusser follows Jacques Martin in defining the problematic as both ‘the particular unity of a 
theoretical formation’ and a ‘determinate unitary structure.’ See Althusser, Louis. For Marx. Trans. 
Ben Brewster. (London: Penguin Books, 1969). pgs. 32, 67. 
9 Not only did Althusser reject Marx’s Hegelianism, but also his early recourse to Feuerbach’s 
humanist anthropology. 
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dissolves the humanist subject. By frequently insisting upon an ‘empirical’ attention to 
environmental life, such ecocritics as Lawrence Buell and Glen Love appear to have 
uncritically endorsed a quasi-positivist and foundationalist ‘empiricist psychology’; in 
their bid for a less-anthropocentric literary theory, they have neglected the challenge 
posed to empiricism by structuralist positions on impersonal structure, challenges that 
comprehensively dethrone egoic ‘experience’, thus leading them to risk the 
unconscious reproduction of precisely the conventional humanist values they would 
otherwise hope to denigrate.10 We will therefore show why ecocriticism should be 
treated as an institutional case study, not merely because its ‘immature’ first-wave was 
methodologically constrained by unacknowledged ideological-biases, but because its 
putatively more ‘mature’ second-wave might remain equally beset by humanist 
inhibitions that would, if not subjected to a sufficiently thoroughgoing meta-critique, 
be revealed as no less symptomatic of an all-too-pluralist (or all-too-liberal) bid to 
retain a ‘non-theoretical’ neutrality or ‘innocence’.  
Later in the chapter we will suggest that this proclivity for theoretical innocence 
was tied to a paradoxically exclusionary pluralism, to a cultural and political 
orientation that enabled it to demote social justice concerns in favour of 
‘environmental’ issues. We will show that where this ‘ideology of the text’ remains 
unrecognised, it would sustain ecocriticism as little more than a compromise-
formation, as a ‘pale green’ shadow of what it might otherwise amount to, particularly 
where any commitment to a less forgiving, nationally-critical, or truly ‘revolutionary’ 
mode of analysis would call upon it to risk its liberal subjectivity.11 It is, therefore, a 
parallel that informs our broader call for the movement to attend to its abiding 
concerns with ‘nature-writing’, ‘wilderness narratives’ and ‘toxicity discourses’ only 
after it has attended to the consequences of its own prehistory, to precisely the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 As Berman explains, this neglect remains historically vested, remaining tied to the conflict between 
the inheritance of ‘empiricist psychology’ in Anglo-American literary criticism, particularly the New 
Criticism. See Berman, Art. From the New Criticism to Deconstruction: The Reception of Structuralism 
and Post-Structuralism. (Chicago: University of Illinois, 1988). 
11 Writing in 1981, Jameson discusses which ‘ideology of the text’ will become dominant in the 
context of ‘American cultural and ideological life’ in the next twenty years. This is, as Gregg Lambert 
has indicated, an essential consideration where Althusser’s characterisation of the modern university is 
one concerned with the ‘reproduction’ of knowledge, or as an ‘ISA’ (Ideological State Apparatus) 
within capitalist societies. See Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially 
Symbolic Act. (London: Routledge (Classics Edition), 2002). p. 222; Also, Lambert, Gregg. Who’s 
Afraid of Deleuze and Guattari? London: Continuum, 2006. p. 17. 
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ideological biases of the social and political milieu out of which it first emerged. To 
consider that which has been neglected or ‘disavowed’ by the movement in our first 
chapter will stand us in good stead when in chapter two we move to consider the 
methodological developments of certain second-wave writers.   
We can begin to account for this disavowal by posing the first of our three 
principal questions: namely, what might keep ecocritics from a Marxo-Lacanian 
approach to literature? If our concerns are with extracting an ecocritical prehistory, a 
term borrowed strategically from the practice of clinical psychoanalysis, yet which is 
deployed here beyond any orthodox psychoanalytic concern with the personological 
register, then we must consider why eco-literary approaches to ‘eco-psychology’ 
remain separated somehow from the type of deeper-reaching, historical and cultural 
analysis that Marxo-Lacanian thinking offers. As Althusser does in his notion of the 
problematic, our clinical definition of prehistory invokes Freud, specifically, his 
infamous case study of the ‘Wolf Man’.12 The failure of ecocritics to grasp what the 
‘theoretical practice’ they have constitutively disavowed actually amounts to proves 
decisive for our ‘eco-clinic’, especially if we consider how their rejection of theory 
ultimately remains theoretical.13   
With this in mind, let us now pursue this first question as far as we able prior to 
posing an allied one, or one regarding the relationship between immanent critique, 
history and notions of totality. This will initially entail noting how prior ecocritical 
studies that have promised an ‘eco-clinical’ approach have neglected to forge a 
connection between their object and ideology critique, or more precisely, between the 
mode of production of late capitalism and the very desire to read ecocritically. What 
we tend to find in such studies is the suggestion of an ‘eco-clinical’ project in only the 
most superficial of senses, with little more than an emphasis upon the private 
experiments of individual writers—such as Thoreau, Dillard or Abbey—and how they 
have individually struggled with eco-mimetic and eco-phenomenological approaches, 
with cloistered experiments in literary endeavour and ‘ecological attunement’, rather !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Freud’s psychoanalytic notion of ‘prehistory’ and the allied one of Nachträglichkeit, or ‘after-effect’, 
describe the manner in which symptoms might be conceived of as trans-historical ‘traumata’, as the 
‘untimely’ echoes or after-effects of an intensely felt primordial trauma, or what in his paradigmatic 
study of the ‘Wolf Man’ in From the History of An Infantile Neurosis (1918), Freud would term the 
‘primal scene.’ See Freud, Sigmund. The Freud Reader. Ed. Peter Gay. (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1989). pgs. 400-426. 
13 As Jameson reminds us, ‘the repudiation of theory is itself a theory’. See Jameson, Ideologies, p. 456. 
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than with insights of any broader, materialist value. In other words, we tend to find 
little or no metacritical bearing upon the libidinal and political economies that have 
sustained such production.  
In Seeking Awareness in American Nature Writing (1992), for example, a text 
noteworthy for its original valencing of canonic American writers and thus, to the 
broader establishment of the ecocritical turn, Scott Slovic devotes his opening chapter 
to ‘Approaches to the Psychology of Nature Writing.’ In that chapter he identifies 
Annie Dillard, Edward Abbey, Wendell Berry, and Barry Lopez as ‘students of the 
human mind’, and ‘literary psychologists’ whose chief occupation ‘is with the 
psychological phenomenon of ‘awareness’.’14 Yet no sustained engagement with 
psychoanalytic theory since Freud is forthcoming. Whilst encouraging us, for 
example, to set down the canonic Walden (1854) and take up Thoreau’s much less 
widely known Journals—an immense, unexpurgated and thus, far less contrived 
resource that, Slovic argues, might be reconceived of as ‘a forum for testing 
perspective’ and ‘a testing ground of consciousness’ that presents to us in unattenuated 
form Thoreau’s ‘principal habit of mind’—the greater promise of Slovic’s conceit 
goes undeveloped, forestalled somehow by a lack of precisely the type of clinical 
insight recommended above. 15  In making occasional reference to American 
psychologist and vitalist philosopher William James (1842-1910), and at times to 
Emersonian ‘correspondence’ theory, Slovic, like those few ecocritics who have 
followed him, refrains from bringing to Thoreau’s epistemology a strong, materialist 
assessment that might fully diagnose his ‘spirit of commitment to environmental 
praxis.’16 By drawing on the little-known psychology of James, and in so thin a 
fashion, we find very few moments in which his discussion reaches anything like the 
psycho-political ferment of Freudian stripes of Marxist critique or of those post-
Althusserians working to politicise the Lacanian Real. At the very least, a literary 
critic like Jameson or Macherey would have granted Slovic the immanent reflexivity 
that his work so evidently lacks.  
Prior to exploring such a reading, however, we might consider another more 
recent example, or Theodore Roszak’s The Voice of the Earth: An Exploration of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Slovic, Scott. Seeking Awareness in American Nature Writing. (Utah: University of Utah Press, 
1992). p. 3. 
15 Slovic, Seeking, p. 49-50; 21-22. 
16 Buell, Environmental, p. 430. 
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Ecopsychology (2001), which makes frequent reference to Dickens, Blake and Shelley, 
and towards what again amounts to a largely lacklustre, if not decidedly vulgar 
elaboration of a sort of ‘pop-ecopsychology.’ Indeed, the disparity that Roszak’s work 
proves most symptomatic of, or that between a hazy, non-psychoanalytic notion of 
‘psychology’ that persists amongst theory-wary ecocritics, and such thoroughgoing 
‘materialist psychiatry’ as Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘schizoanalysis’, will give us to ask, 
as they have done, if there can be any psychology but that of the priest?17 As ‘anti-
theological’ as this assertion might outwardly appear, it is one that would not only 
enable us to address the ideological function of belief since modernity, to clinically 
inspect the myth of ‘secularity’ under capitalist society, but to redress the lingering 
transference of ‘spiritual and even transcendental qualities onto the secularized text.’18 
As Žižek asserts after Marx’s classic indictment of religion, ecology is in many 
respects ‘the new opium for the masses,’ replacing the comforting totalisations of 
religion in the putatively scientific and secular West.19 This is a sentiment that will 
have a number of consequences for our concerns with the ‘pieties’ of eco-virtue in 
chapter three, when we consider the extent to which eco-literary aesthetics are tied up 
with a ‘paranoid’, Oedipal form that affords desire its contents.  
Yet for now, let us continue to build towards such analysis by acknowledging 
the shortcomings of one final example, Rinda West’s Out of the Shadow: 
Ecopsychology, Story, and Encounters with the Land (2007). Despite, on the surface 
of things, offering an equally unremarkable (not to mention, markedly unfashionable) 
range of narrative engagements with Jungian models, West’s text promises something 
more in her notion that the ‘nature’ of the unconscious might be ‘recovered’ through a 
literary meditation upon the ‘shadow’ aspect of the individual psyche. This is 
especially promising where she presents the notion of ‘re-storying’, or the eco-valent 
re-imagining of old stories as a form of therapy, as an eco-political form of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 On the notion of a ‘materialist psychiatry’ see Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane.  (London: 
Continuum, 2004), pgs. 5, 24, 38, 129. On the psychology of the ‘priest’, see p. 122.  
18 Lambert acknowledges how this theological sensibility remains the legacy of ‘the application of 
principles of interpretation and definitions of the elements of the textual work that were first developed 
by the Christian Fathers such as Augustine and Aquinas.’ Accordingly, much post-structural criticism 
(Barthes, Foucault) was concerned with wresting the notion of the author from such theological 
determinations. See Lambert, Gregg, Afraid, pgs. 18-22. 
19 See Žižek’s lecture ‘Ecology: A New Opium For The Masses,’ given at the Jack Tilton Gallery, New 
York on November 26th 2007.  http://www.lacan.com/zizekecologyvideo.html [Accessed 19/09/09]. 
! 31!!
détournement. Moreover, by bringing Aldo Leopold’s ‘land ethic’ into contact with 
Jungian notions of ‘individuation’ and maturity, West almost delivers a psycho-
cultural meditation upon colonialism and capitalism. Nevertheless, West reneges on 
such promise by failing to pursue this insight as fully as she might; not only does she 
insufficiently challenge ‘Nature’ as a concept, but her eco-political argument proves 
unsatisfying indeed when her thesis fails to engage in any strong analysis of the 
liberal-humanist basis of ‘sustainability’, or the manner in which a psychoanalytic 
approach to literature might provide a basis for immanent cultural critique.20  
It proves telling, then, that it has only really been within the domain of 
‘ecofeminist’ research that we have seen anything like the sustainment of 
simultaneously clinical and material approaches to ecocriticism, and which moreover, 
might sufficiently question the very desire to read ecologically.21 Concerned with the 
relationship between androcentrism and ‘productivity’, ecofeminists have most 
convincingly explored the link between cultural history, economics and subjectivity, 
usefully acknowledging the extent to which their sub-specialism would necessarily 
negotiate the tensions of patriarchal instrumentalism. In the process they have 
acknowledged the degree to which such major North American poets as Sylvia Plath 
might present singular case studies in this regard.22 And yet few such studies have 
developed their premises towards critiques of those instances of internal 
androcentrism that may have befallen the movement, nor in a way that would 
foreshadow or benefit the metacritical aims of the present study.23 Since Hilary 
Klein’s ‘Marxism, Psychoanalysis, and Mother Nature’, which first appeared in the 
Summer 1989 issue of the journal Feminist Studies, only a handful have deployed 
post-Lacanian paradigms, or a synthesis of such with Marxian theories, and none that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 An infinitely more politically-minded text would be Adrian Parr’s relatively recent study. Although 
not written with literary concerns in mind, Parr considers directly how notions of sustainability serve to 
streamline rather than challenge the capitalist imperative. See Parr, Adrian, Hijacking Sustainability. 
(Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2009). 
21 The term ‘ecofeminism’ tends to be attributed to Le Féminisme ou la mort (1974) by French feminist 
and science fiction writer Françoise d’Eubonne, a work that envisioned a future in which feminist 
attitudes prevailed, saving the biome from ecological disaster. 
22 See in particular, Brain, Tracey. ‘‘Or shall I bring you the sound of poisons?’ Silent Spring and Sylvia 
Plath.’ Writing the Environment: Ecocriticism and Literature.  Eds. Kerridge, Richard and Neil  
Sammels. (London: Zed Books, 1998). pgs. 146-164. 
23 For an example of the type of ecofeminism that not only neglects poststructural psychoanalysis, but 
French feminist thought altogether, see Karen J. Warren. Ecofeminist Philosophy: A Western 
Perspective on What It Is and Why It Matters. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).  
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have appeared to address what we might describe as the movement’s own status as a 
symptom of a geopolitical unconscious.24  
It is here, however, with the very basis of ecofeminism in what Jameson has 
referred to as ‘alliance politics’, an ideological formation pertaining specifically to the 
North American context of the 1970s and 80s, that we might reckon with a materialist 
understanding of ecocriticism after the philosophical legacy of totality, particularly 
where notions of political unification and agency remain pressing for ecocriticism. As 
we will shortly consider, Jameson’s The Political Unconscious (1981) supplies an 
essential historical document for any assessment of the North American intellectual 
context of the latter part of the cold war era. Not only does Jameson present a 
challenge to Althusser’s ‘structural causality’ in that study, one based principally upon 
a sense that the cultural and political differences between the French and North 
American milieus called for very different approaches to political theorising, but by 
doing so he enables us to better explore the relationship between totality and literary 
interpretation for ecocriticism. Given the theoretical bias in the latter portion of this 
thesis, it will be essential to note how Jameson finds a certain apotheosis in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s work; the sort of experimental, decentralizing (qua ‘molecularising’) 
politics that would stem from Althusserianism would seek to dissolve totality in a 
detrimental way, amounting to a species of ‘autogestion’, to an explosive theory-
politics that was altogether unnecessary for the ‘already molecular’ North American 
scene. 25 As Jameson says: ‘The privileged form in which the American Left can 
develop today must therefore necessarily be that of an alliance politics; and such a 
politics is the strict practical equivalent of the concept of totalization on a theoretical 
level.’26  
Before we can answer our first question, therefore—or what has kept ecocritics 
from Marxo-Lacanian theory—it appears that our second question proves necessary, 
regarding as it does, notions of totality under a specific cultural and political climate 
for first-wave ecocritical practice. In other words, we can supplement our enquiry by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 See Klein, Hilary Manette. ‘Marxism, Psychoanalysis, and Mother Nature.’ Feminist Studies. 15.2 
(Summer 1989): pgs. 255-278; also, Mellor, Mary. Breaking the Boundaries: Towards a Feminist 
Green Socialism. (London: Virago, 1992).  
25 Jameson denigrates autogestion in The Political Unconscious (1981), but for a thorough discussion 
of the term see Rochard, Michel, particularly as quoted in Bernard E. Brown. Socialism of a Different 
Kind: Reshaping the Left in France. (London: Greenwood Press, 1982). p. 50. 
26 Jameson, Political, p. 54 n 31. 
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asking why it is that we tend to find that ‘eco-psychological’ approaches to literature 
began with a disregard for immanent critique of the historical, institutional and 
disciplinary milieu within which ecocriticism—itself a decidedly liberal form of ‘eco-
subjectivity’—first emerged. Put more philosophically, we might concern ourselves 
with why ‘ecological’ motivations of immanence tend to remain focused upon Nature 
as global ‘totality’ rather than upon the historical, economic and linguistic (or 
‘regional’) senses of the term. The points that Lambert raises in his analysis of 
Jameson’s ‘cultural war’ with postmodernism, and which stems from his ‘strategy of 
containment’, or bid to ‘corral’ and ‘inoculate’ the threat posed by the French post-
structuralists to the American Left, prove deeply pertinent in this regard.27 
Prior to asserting a certain ‘identity’ of the critical and the clinical in chapter 
three, we can begin to explore this complex of issues by emphasising how, outwardly, 
any prehistory of the sort we are concerned with seems to turn directly upon such 
disregard of totality qua disavowal. Where perceptions of individual, national or 
‘ecological’ totality are concerned, perceptions of what it is to be a discrete subject, to 
live and work within a particular national context, or to be aware of how these more 
‘regional’ totalities relate to the greater, ‘global’ totality of the ‘biosphere’—
particularly where the totality of language itself is determining—prove crucial to a 
prehistory of a movement that would ostensibly receive literature ‘ecocritically’. But it 
is where Jameson would argue for the relative necessity of totalisation within the 
North American context that proves singularly important for our concerns with the 
covert humanism that would keep ecocriticism from its more radical, ‘anti’ or ‘post’-
human potential. If ecocritical practices of reading and writing might be addressed 
after critical theories informed by the lessons of Althusser, or those that would 
investigate the ideological nature of totalities and part-to-whole relations—
investigations that embrace Spinozan causality as much as Lacan’s post-Saussurean 
motivation of structural linguistics—then some account of the problems posed to 
agency by the anti-humanism unleashed by his ‘scientific’ Marxism seems necessary. 
Shortly, therefore, we will see how it is Spinoza who provides Althusser with 
much of his philosophical and political grounding; whilst this will enable us to forge a 
link between ecological issues, the libidinal concerns of psychoanalysis and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27 Lambert, Afraid, pgs. 17 and 33. 
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political-economic concerns of our selected Marxisms—namely those of Jameson, 
Žižek and Deleuze-Guattari—it is one that will require us to sustain this sense of 
‘regional’ differences in perceptions of totality. In fact, it will be key to see how 
Althusser’s Spinozan epistemology gives him to employ the psychoanalysis of Lacan 
in a very particular fashion, chiefly as an authority upon the primary totality of the 
subject. Although Saussure’s structuralism was key to Lacan’s thesis on subjectivity, 
when Althusser draws, for example, upon the Freudian concept of overdetermination, 
he nevertheless reads it with a Spinozan emphasis; if for Freud overdetermination 
suggests that ‘a neurotic symptom cannot be traced back to a single or original trauma 
but is compounded by many levels and stages of psychic development’, then this can 
be read after Spinoza’s non-Idealist position on causality, or one in which ‘the 
structure is nothing outside of its effects’, suggesting that human phenomena are never 
unequivocal and ‘that they are always laden with multiple meanings.’28  
This largely psychoanalytic position on causality, determination and meaning 
enables us to reckon with how ecocritical approaches to literature retain unique 
relationships to interpretation; if Nature as totality proves no less symptomatic of 
certain cultural notions of ‘alienation’, ones born of specific historical conditions and 
which are beholden to specific psycho-cultural forms of individuality and interiority, 
then the social role of the ecocritic proves decisive. Like the Oedipal social 
organisation we will discuss in chapters two and three, their persistence remains 
essential to any ‘eco-clinical’ understanding of desire, literature and the environment, 
particularly where interpretation would remain both a literary and a political concern. 
For all its apparent ‘obviousness’, however, few ecocritics have worked to account for 
the ecological significance of totality in this connection. The clear exception would be 
Timothy Morton, however, who has given rare voice to this eminently ideological 
concern, alluding to the curious inability of the environmentally-minded to think 
totality of an economic or historical sort, particularly as this might relate to our 
valuations of one much bigger, more inclusive, and ultimately, more-than-human:  
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Although he attributes it to Marx, the following formulation is truly Althusser’s own: ‘the effects are 
not outside the structure, are not a pre-existing object, element or space in which the structure arrives to 
imprint its mark: on the contrary… the whole existence of the structure consists of its effects, in short… 
the structure is merely a specific combination of its peculiar elements, is nothing outside its effects.’ 
See Althusser and Balibar, Reading, p. 189; Also see Poster, Althusser, p. 401. 
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… any thinking that avoids “totality” is part of the problem. So 
we have to face it. Something about modern life has prevented us 
from thinking “totality” as big as we could. Now we can’t help 
but think it. Totality looms like a giant skyscraper shadow into the 
flimsiest thought about, say, today’s weather. We may need to 
think bigger than totality itself, if totality means something 
closed, something we can be sure of, something that remains the 
same.29 
 
As we have already begun to suggest, what this call to think totality amounts to 
is significant for any discussion of interpretation; prior to conceiving of how Lacan’s 
post-structuralism enables us to address the relationship between individual and 
political totalities in chapter two, we can nevertheless begin to acknowledge how from 
a broadly ‘eco-political’ perspective there must be a dual acknowledgement: Firstly, 
that whilst there is indeed a totality larger than those of historical or economic 
discourses in the non-human biosphere, that secondly, there is nevertheless an inherent 
risk that in acknowledging a larger totality—something open, something including 
those non-human forces as chaotic yet as ‘everyday’ as the weather, and thus 
something we cannot entirely be sure of—we displace adequate discussion of key 
historical-economic forces. Not only do we lose sight of the immanent conditions that 
have enabled the instrumentalist attitudes and desires that have wrought biospheric 
degradation, but we equally constrain our critical and clinical approaches to them. 
Later in the chapter we will show how Althusser and Balibar enable us to diagnose the 
historical emergence of ecocriticism in a number of ways, but chiefly on the grounds 
that anti-Stalinist, ecocritical pluralists in the North American milieu of the 1980s 
rejected a specifically political notion of totality, whilst tending to replace it with the 
no-less ‘political’, no-less culturally-biased, totality of ‘Nature.’30  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Morton, Timothy. The Ecological Thought. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). pgs. 
4-5. 
30 This uncritical and/or non-political grasp of totality persists amongst those who would approach 
environmental phenomenology. In Reflections on the Edge of Askja (2005), for example, the eco-
psychology of Pall Skulason gives Nature in a manner that appears to block economic factors, chiefly 
because it retains the term uncritically, as merely the non-ideological ‘reality’ that binds all things: ‘To 
live, to be able to exist, the mind must connect itself with some kind of order. It must apprehend reality 
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The relationship between totality and interpretation is therefore particularly 
important where the desire for meaning appears symptomatic of abiding cultural 
desires for teleology and closure. What might it be to displace human narrative drama 
that is merely ‘framed’ by non-human environments and actively foreground mesas, 
arroyos, arboreal forests and oceanic terrain? What place does interpretation have 
where the ecocritic would work to give new, ‘eco-mimetic’ sense to a Conrad novel, 
or make a reading of Poe that is much less unconcerned with human mystery than with 
the ‘sense’ of biospheric implication? The ecocritical party line has always insisted 
that it ‘challenges interpretation to its own grounding in the bedrock of natural fact, in 
the biospheric and indeed planetary conditions without which human life, much less 
humane letters, could not exist.’31 Yet theoreticians since Heidegger have remained 
sensitive to how such a ‘bedrock of natural fact’ remains implicated within an 
‘enframing’ process, what he termed das Gestell, or ‘the overall horizonal 
understanding of being that gives unity to an epoch.’32 This sense of unity becomes 
important when we consider the anxieties that attend our present, ‘environmental’ 
moment.  
As Žižek avers, living as we are ‘in the midst of ecological catastrophe’ it is 
‘especially important that we conceive this catastrophe as […] meaningless.’’ If this 
appears a somewhat ‘irresponsible’ assertion, then it should be understood to reflect 
what Žižek views as an imperative not to surrender our interpretations of Natural 
events to any pseudo-totality: ‘i.e. that we do not ‘read meanings into things,’ as is 
done by those who interpret the ecological crisis as a ‘deeper sign’ of punishment for 
our merciless exploitation of nature, etc.’33 Beyond quasi-theological condemnations 
of human activity by a punitive anima mundi (or ‘world soul’), to do so would be to 
stop thinking about our environmental implication; not only would this reduce and 
contrive the complexity of the contemporary ‘ecological’ situation—one that is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
as an independent whole… The mind lives in, and we live, in a relationship of faith with reality itself. 
This relationship of confidence, which is always by nature uncertain and insecure… [This] relationship 
of confidence… is originally, and truly, always a relationship with reality as a natural totality: as 
Nature.’ Skulason, Pall. Reflections at the Edge of Askja: On Man’s Relation to Nature. (Reykjavik: 
University of Iceland Press, 2006). p. 11. 
31 Tucker, Editors, p. 505. 
32  See Kolb, David. ‘Heidegger and Habermas on Criticism and Totality.’ Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research. Vol. 52, No. 3 (Sep., 1992): 683-693. p. 691. 
33 See Žižek, Slavoj. Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel and the Critique of Ideology. (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1993). p. 140. 
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dependent upon all manner of complex cultural and climatic factors—but it would 
distract us with an imaginary and ideal unity that remains difficult to substantiate. 
 
Later in the thesis we will consider how Deleuze and Guattari similarly council 
against the perils of interpretation, aiding us in rethinking the very desire for meaning 
after their notion of ‘precocious totality’, which forms an integral part of their thesis 
on ‘desiring-production’.34 Such a view of totality rests upon their rejection of the 
‘lack’ that is presupposed by the phallic organisation of desire under orthodox 
Lacanian accounts of castration, signification and fantasy, and which can be ousted as 
an ‘illegitimate’ or metaphysical understanding of its syntheses after their immanent 
critique of psychoanalysis. While this will enable us to consider how it is that an 
emphasis on lack might keep us from ‘sufficient’ ecological awareness, largely by way 
of Oedipal social organisation, for now, however, we will remain with a broader 
consideration of the relationship between interpretation, totality and immanence.35 
This is because we must now turn our attention to the ‘disciplinary’ location of 
ecocriticism; to emphasise how totality remains an ideologically-charged concept will 
give us to ask why the concept of immanence appears germane (or inclusive) enough 
to restore humanity to its humbler status as but one species in the greater biosphere, 
yet appears to remain misunderstood (or exclusive) where political economy is 
concerned? This has particular bearing where the constraints of our educational 
institutions—those limits comprising our intellectual ‘eco-system’—prove determinate 
for ecocriticism as a discipline. Prior to engaging Althusser and Balibar’s thesis on 
‘symptomnal reading’, then, we might say a few further words on the historical 
accretion of attitudes to totality, noting how these are linked to those of national 
identity, particularly where the Althusserian notion of the university as an ISA remains 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 See Deleuze and Guattari. Anti-Oedipus, pgs. 80, 131. 
35 As our introduction made clear, the differences between psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis will prove 
decisive for our study. To some extent, Lacan’s account of the Imaginary, or that register which 
mediates ‘between the Innenwelt and the Umwelt’ (the inner world and the outer world) can be seen to 
extend Spinoza’s own epistemological and political castigations of the faculty in his Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus (1670). Where totality is concerned, however, the Lacanian Imaginary supplies the 
very matrix of individual Bildung, or as Lacan himself has it, is the register wherein ‘a drama’ with its 
own ‘internal thrust’ takes the subject from the ‘insufficiency’ of the ‘fragmented body image’ through 
the integrated ‘form of its totality’ to the ‘armour of an alienating identity.’ As we shall see, this schema 
is much transformed by Deleuze and Guattari. See Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. (London: 
Routledge Classics, 2001). pgs. 3-4. 
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pertinent. Whilst addressing totality as symptomatic of the institutional ‘eco-system’ 
in this way may appear at best too figurative, at worst, to unhelpfully conflate the 
complexities of both under a reductive metaphor, it nevertheless supplies a provisional 
rhetorical gambit with which to sustain our assertion that a properly metacritical 
approach must call for an inspection of the ties the academy retains to issues of 
national heritage.  
As Raymond Williams has it, ‘the idea of nature is the idea of man . . . the idea 
of man in society, indeed the ideas of kinds of societies.’36 Similarly, the notion of 
ecology remains a largely vested one, ‘simultaneously real, collective, and 
discursive—fact, power, and discourse—and needs to be naturalized, sociologized, 
and deconstructed accordingly.’37 Beyond any first-order (and putatively overcome) 
‘nation-centredness’, therefore, ecocriticism must surely begin by acknowledging its 
debt to the North American institutional context. Writing in 1989, as ecocritical papers 
were first starting to emerge in earnest, Jonathan Culler acknowledged how  
 
American universities are structured by the conflict between 
the model of the production of knowledge and the model of the 
reproduction of culture. There is a tension between them, with 
local variations that may be quite difficult to interpret. Though 
the vast expansion of funded scientific research led the second 
model to become dominant after the War, the play of the two 
models continues, especially in educational rhetoric. The 
resistance to literary theory and speculative criticism often 
takes the form of appeals to the importance of reproducing or 
transmitting the cultural heritage.38  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36  Williams, Raymond. ‘Ideas of nature.’ Problems in Materialism and Culture. Ed. Raymond 
Williams. (London: Verso, 1980). 67–85. p. 71. 
37  Escobar, Arturo. ‘After Nature: Steps to an Anti-essentialist Political Ecology.’ Current 
Anthropology. Vol. 40, No. 1 (February 1999). 1-30. p. 2. 
38 Culler, Jonathan. ‘Criticisms and Institutions: The American University.’ Post Structuralism and the 
Question of History. Eds. Derek Attridge, Geoff Bennington, Robert Young. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989). 82-100. p. 93. 
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Where Culler notes a ‘resistance to literary theory and speculative criticism’, we 
can extend our foregoing assertion that the North American ‘cultural heritage’ remains 
one in which certain eco-mimetic, pastoral and other non-theoretical forms of nature-
writing might be privileged on this very basis (Thoreau, Emerson et al).39 As we have 
noted in brief, the reproduction of knowledge relies upon certain libidinal 
mechanisms, to which the ISA is essential; the contradiction peculiar to ecocriticism is 
its situation within the university as ISA, yet its discourses, particularly insofar as they 
would critique instrumental productivity, retain a metacritical potential. Thus the 
reproduction of particular forms of subjectivity, forms that would (re)produce a 
generalised ‘eco-subjectivity’ as much as an ‘eco-feminist’, or other putatively 
‘radical’ subjectivity, remains no less an institutional concern after Althusser’s thesis 
on ‘interpellation’.40 Just like the family, religious institutions and the mass media, the 
university can only ever hope to promote a semblance of ‘freedom’ of thought or 
speech where the requirements of the job market, social status and professional 
funding bodies remain determining. Not only does Althusser’s notion of 
overdetermination present a challenge to what we think governs the form of our 
thinking, that like any other facet of material existence it is simultaneously both cause 
and effect, but in turn gives us to reconsider the illusion of subjective autonomy vis-à-
vis our continual petitions for social reform rather than any substantial or 
‘revolutionary’ change in the mode of production.41 
 
Therefore, whilst the Marxian component of our metacritical approach imparts 
an understanding of capitalism as the untranscendable horizon under which the 
academy itself must labour, it moreover begins to reveal institutional literary criticism 
as bound up in a broader, structural ‘unconscious’. As we will shortly see, it is by way 
of Spinoza as much as Freud and Lacan that Althusser can dissolve the Cartesian 
‘knowing subject’, troubling liberal subjectivity by rendering individuals unconscious 
‘bearers’ (Träger) of structural relations, or of a given ‘problematic’.42 Prior to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39 Ibid. 
40 It is not simply the extent to which we ‘freely accept […] subjection,’ but to which we are ‘always, 
already’ interpellated (i.e. we are always operating within ideology), that is key. See Althusser, Louis. 
Lenin and Philosophy. Trans. Ben Brewster. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978). pgs. 182, 176. 
41 For the essay ‘Overdetermination and Contradiction’, see Althusser, Louis, For Marx. pgs. 87-128. 
42 Althusser seizes upon Marx’s own use of the term Träger, claiming that the problematic thinks in 
and through the subject: ‘The sighting [for example] is thus no longer the act of an individual subject, 
endowed with the faculty of “vision” which he exercises either attentively or distractedly; the sighting 
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deepening our Althusserian analysis, however, it is useful to invoke, if only briefly, 
Jameson’s extension of the notion of a ‘political unconscious’ into a specific, 
‘geopolitical unconscious’, noting in particular the ways in which the concept of 
totality features in his historical analysis of North American cultural production. Not 
only does Jameson’s emphasis upon the North American situation lend his work to our 
project more broadly, but at this juncture his cultural critique, whilst sharing many of 
Althusser’s concerns with ideology, retains a number of more markedly dialectical 
strategies that enable us to test the latter’s ‘anti-humanism’ throughout the remainder 
of the chapter.43  
 
Let us consider, then, how in The Geopolitical Aesthetic (1992), for example, 
Jameson transforms what he describes as the ‘banal political unconscious’, towards a 
global valencing of the concept: 
 
what I will now call a geopolitical unconscious. This it is 
which now attempts to refashion national allegory into a 
conceptual instrument for grasping our new being-in-the-
world.44 
 
Throughout The Geopolitical Aesthetic we find an emphasis on totality, and in 
particular on the ways certain representations (particularly of a cinematic sort) contain 
within them an allegorical or ‘cognitively mapped’ apprehension of this totality.45 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
is the act of its structural conditions, it is the relation of immanent reflection between the field of the 
problematic and its objects and its problems... It is literally no longer the eye (the mind's eye) of a 
subject which sees what exists in the field defined by a theoretical problematic: it is this field which 
sees itself in the objects or problems it defines sighting being merely the necessary reflexion of the 
field on its objects.’ See Althusser and Balibar, Reading,  p. 25. (Original emphases). 
43 Jameson’s inclusion in our thesis as a ‘post-Althusserian’ thinker is significant inasmuch as in his 
earlier writings he set out to ‘coral and inoculate’ the influence of such French ‘postmodernists’ as 
Barthes, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Sollers and even Althusser himself; writers whom he 
at that time determined to offer the principal ‘rival hermeneutic’ to his more orthodox Marxian mode of 
interpretation. On this see Lambert, Afraid, p. 17. 
44  Jameson, Fredric. The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System. 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992). p. 3. 
45 Jameson also discusses ‘Cognitive mapping’ in Postmodernism: Or, The Cultural Logic of Late 
Capitalism (1991), drawing upon Kevin Lynch’s The Image of the City (1960) as much as Althusser’s 
Spinoz-o-Lacanian concern with the subject’s Imaginary relations to the Real conditions of existence. 
Jameson describes it as enabling ‘a situational representation on the part of the individual subject to that 
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Viewing the assassination of John F. Kennedy in 1963 as ‘the paradigmatic 
assassination in (Western) modern times,’ Jameson suggests that this was not simply 
because Kennedy himself was so significant (‘in that respect, Malcolm X, or Martin 
Luther King, or Bobby Kennedy probably generated more intense experiences of 
mourning’), but because of the prevailing sense at the time that this assassination 
brought the whole of the USA together, generating a sense of totality qua national 
unity: 
 
the experience of the media, which for the first time and 
uniquely in its history bound together an enormous collectivity 
over several days and vouchsafed a glimpse into a Utopian 
public sphere which remained unrealized.46 
 
Whilst Jameson’s emphasis is anything but literary here, it nevertheless aids us 
in reckoning with the importance of totality for our concerns with the ‘greening’ of 
North American institutions. The manner in which ‘eco-cultural’ media might bind 
together an ‘enormous collectivity’, in the process offering a glimpse of a ‘utopian 
public sphere’, is something that ecocritics are all too familiar with.47 Therefore, to 
suggest that environmentalism per se appears problematic as a ‘totalising’ cultural 
force is tempting indeed; certain Marxo-Lacanianisms would give us to consider how 
Green or environmentalist ideologies necessarily depend upon a highly vested notion 
of totality, of a specific (de)politicisation of ‘nature’ as totality. At once, they also 
present us with an opportunity to understand its relationship to nation-centred views of 
utopianism, suggesting that ecocritics might strive to acknowledge any reconciliatory 
impulse that might be going unchecked at the heart of any insufficiently ‘metacritical’ 
desire for Green ‘utopia’. In other words, to inspect what national interests might be 
served by an ostensibly ‘green’ imperative is to engage the political economy of one’s 
own prehistory. Accordingly—and as we have provisionally used Jameson to show—
it is not by abandoning cultural studies or cultural theory that ecocriticism might best 
dissolve the anthropocentrism that threatens the non-human biome, but rather via a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
vaster and properly unrepresentable totality which is the ensemble of society’s structures as a whole.’ p. 
51.  
46 Jameson, Geopolitical, p. 47. 
47 Ibid. 
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concerted re-emphasis upon human society and history by way of critiques of cultural 
production.48 
We might, then, pose a further series of questions, which will draw together 
what we have gleaned in response to the first two, forming the critical focus of the 
remaining sections of this chapter. If Jameson’s ‘geopolitical unconscious’ would 
appear to suffice where our concerns are broadly ‘ecological’, why might Althusser’s 
more thoroughly ‘anti-humanist’ approach prove necessary? More precisely, how does 
his Spinozism contest Jameson’s Hegelianism? We can begin to explore these 
questions by posing one more: namely, how might we attend to the determinate, 
historical relationship between theory and history itself for ecocriticism? This 
seemingly paradoxical question turns upon the historical rejection of theory by 
ecocritics, but recognises that we have yet to consider how this has inhibited attention 
to that particular historical period per se. Evidently, what we are at pains to consider 
here is just what cultural history amounts to for ecocriticism, a discipline that 
ostensibly emerged from a specific North American milieu during the latter portion of 
the cold war epoch, yet which at once seeks to alert those who would subscribe to it—
increasingly on a global stage—to the altogether different temporalities of the ‘natural’ 
world? For a Marxist like Raymond Williams, it is essential to note how ‘the idea of 
nature contains, though often unnoticed, an extraordinary amount of human history.’49 
Before looking more deeply at the climate of cultural and political pluralism out 
of which ecocriticism emerged, however, and the extent to which such a climate 
inevitably produced nation-centred forms of literary research in this connection, it 
benefits us to take a philosophical detour in order to consider more fully the Spinozan 
stripe of materialism implicit to post-Althusserian Marxisms and the notion of 
‘conceptual adequation’ so central to their political efficacy. Not only do we find in 
such Spinozisms a more immanent, rational-materialist position on ideology for an 
‘ecological’ criticism, but in reckoning with the Althusserian shift in emphasis from 
Hegel to Spinoza we better understand the relationship between prehistory and history 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 Although she is not a literary ecocritic, this is effectively what Jennifer Daryl Slack has argued: 
‘…that we jettison ecoculturalism, in favor of a revitalized commitment to cultural studies.’ See Slack, 
Jennifer Daryl. ‘Resisting Ecocultural Studies.’ Cultural Studies 22:3 (2008): 477-497. p. 477.  
49 Williams, Problems, p. 68. 
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as part of a particular style of ‘symptomnal reading’.50 This will, in turn, enable us to 
re-assert an approach to eco-criticism that is both ‘post-anthropocentric’ (qua ‘anti-
human’) and historically-aware. 
 
 
(ii) Immanence and Spinozism 
 
Whilst immanence has supplied rhetorical support to those few non-literary 
ecocritics, whom, like Luke Higgins and Adrian Ivakhiv, have recognised important 
post-theological extensions of the concept, it has nevertheless failed to capture the 
imagination of eco-literary researchers more particularly, whether with respect to 
philosophically legitimising the relationship between literary enquiry and assorted 
earth sciences, or in supporting the investiture of narrative analysis with materialist 
cultural histories.51 This may appear something of a dramatic or inflated claim, 
particularly given the extent to which Spinozan ‘monism’—or univocal immanence—
has undoubtedly contributed to the ecophilosophical understanding of human 
‘situatedness’ or ‘embeddedness’ within nature, endowing non-literary 
environmentalists with a seemingly ready-made ‘naturalist’ ethics. In the 1970s, ‘deep 
ecologist’ Arne Naess ventured that: ‘No great philosopher has so much to offer in the 
way of clarification and articulation of basic ecological attitudes as Baruch Spinoza.’ 52 
And yet whilst it remains true that a palpable desire for immanent bases for 
discussion has indeed arisen amongst ecocritics, it would appear to remain precisely at 
the level of desire, and papers and monographs that would evince substantial dialogue !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 In Essays in Self-Criticism (1974/1975), in which Althusser addresses his earlier work with Etienne 
Balibar, Reading Capital (1968/1970), explaining how it might be conceivable that they were not in fact 
the structuralists that they had been denounced as, he nevertheless concedes to a certain philosophical 
heresy, for ‘[w]e were guilty of an equally powerful and compromising passion: we were Spinozists.’ 
See Althusser, Louis. Essays in Self-Criticism. Trans. Grahame Lock. (London: New Left Books, 1976). 
p. 132. 
51 See Higgins, Luke. ‘Toward a Deleuze-Guattarian Micropneumatology of Spirit-Dust.’ Ecospirit: 
Religions and Philosophies of the Earth. Eds. Laurel Kearns and Catherine Keller. (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2007). See also Adrian Ivakhiv’s excellent blog forum on the implications of 
immanence for ecocriticism: http://aivakhiv.blog.uvm.edu/  [Accessed 09/2009]. 
52 See Naess, Arne. ‘Spinoza and ecology.’ Speculum Spinozanum, 1677-1977. Ed. Siegfried Hessing. 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977) 418-425. p. 423. See also Naess, Arne. Freedom, Emotion 
and Self-subsistence (Oslo: Universitets-forlaget, 1975). 
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between the ecologically-informed literary specialist and those critics working on 
Spinozist theories of immanence would seem decidedly few in number, an absence 
attesting to a theoretical blind-spot that remains as frustrating as it does debilitating. 
That leading lights in the environmental movement had acknowledged Spinoza proves 
especially vexing when we consider how for all their concern with Nature and 
immanence, they had nevertheless failed to trace a link to such immanent critiques of 
economy and history as Althusser’s. As we considered in our discussion of totality, 
such motivations of immanence tend not to extend to immanent critique, to anything 
more than a sense of Nature as the underlying, a-political field of ‘reality.’ 
By neglecting a Marxian reading of Spinozan philosophy, ecocritical concerns 
with the relationship between literary representation and environmental depredation 
have largely failed to recognise the philosopher’s influence in such a way as to bridge 
ecological and traditional political debates, constraining eco-critiques of capitalist 
ideology. To date, extremely few Spinoz-o-Marxian or Marxo-Lacanian treatments of 
such ‘nature writers’ as Thoreau, Abbey or Snyder have emerged.53 This is a grave 
shortcoming indeed; the inherent materialism of such philosophies presents them as 
much critiques of ideology as it renders them wholly germane to the principles of 
systemic interdependency essential to ecological thinking. Whether Lucretian or 
Spinozist, such philosophies comprehensively destabilise the mechanistic basis of 
positivist epistemologies, chasing away the stubborn spectre of the cogito so 
fundamental to Cartesian (and ‘bourgeois’) humanism. 
 
And yet how does Spinozism, a philosophy that proclaims the illusion of free 
will, relate more precisely to post-Althusserian ideology critique? How, for example, 
do Spinoza’s ‘adequate ideas’ supply a position on a symptomnal approach to 
ecocriticism, one that would diagnose the covert humanism that keeps it from post-
structural theories of immanence? Specifically, how might they inform our 
understanding of the relationship between the non-human environment, post-structural 
theory and literary form per se? Althusser’s challenges to Hegelian Marxism are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
53 Notable exceptions would be Steven Rosendale’s ‘The Jungle, Social Change, and the Class 
Character of Environmental Impairment.’ The Greening of Literary Scholarship: Literature, Theory and 
the Environment. Ed. Steven Rosendale. (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2002). Pgs. 59-76; also 
Adrian Ivakhiv’s ‘Stirring the Geopolitical Unconscious: Towards a Jamesonian Ecocriticism.’ New 
Formations #64 (Spring, 2008). 98-109. However, Ivakhiv concerns himself principally with cinematic 
examples and as such, does not enter into a discussion of literary form under a symptomnal rubric. 
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complex, beyond the remit of the present thesis. Yet it is in his fundamental reading of 
Marx after Spinoza and Lacan that we obtain a thesis against Hegelian dialectical 
contradiction and ‘expressive causality’, against the primacy of the ‘subject’, or that 
spectre of modernity that would support ‘non-ecological’ attitudes and desires.  In 
order to understand why this must form the focus of our eco-clinic, let us first concern 
ourselves with an understanding of Spinoza’s ‘naturalist’ ethics.   
 
As a monist, Spinoza viewed the universe as the dynamic expression of a single 
Substance; humankind therefore remains inseparable from Nature, automatically 
complicating any reductive, nature/culture dichotomies (or overly simplistic positions 
on causal relations). Nevertheless, as one ‘determinate mode’ amongst others, the 
human animal seeks to develop its capacities to ‘affect’ and ‘be affected’ via what in 
the Ethics (1677) Spinoza termed ‘conatus’ (or striving).54 Implicated in the attribute 
of Thought as well as that of Extension, humankind distinguishes itself by way of 
certain (in)adequacies; through comprehending and subsequently participating in the 
Natural order, Man promises both his own and its enhancement. It is the degree to 
which our ideas about our activities, emotions or ‘affections’ remain either ‘adequate’ 
or ‘inadequate’ that we might achieve a sufficient causal relationship to our own 
effects (internal or external); this promises an increase in ‘active’ rather than ‘sad’ 
passions (or passivity).55 
 
However, whereas Hegelian Idealism posits Spirit or Mind as the primary 
agency of history and progress, Spinoza’s concern with the development of adequate 
ideas provides only the unguaranteed possibility of such attainment. Or, in depending 
less on the progress of Spirit and confidence in Reason, and more precisely on the 
human propensity to exceed subject-centered relations, Hegel’s teleological triumph of 
Spirit is displaced by Spinoza’s far humbler belief in our mere potential to achieve 
adequate knowledge. In other words, whereas imagination binds us to certain 
‘misrecognitions’, Spinoza’s modal view of humanity within Nature contributes to an 
overturning of, for example, Marx’s early (or largely Hegelian) conception of 
‘alienation’, with its root in a definition of Man as a free, rational agent. Whilst for !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 Citations of Spinoza’s Ethics will conform to book number followed by proposition number. For 
example in this instance: III p9. 
55 Spinoza, Ethics, III p3. 
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Hegel, ‘the real is the rational and the rational is the real, and a seamless, definitive 
account of the historical process is therefore possible’, for Spinoza, by contrast, ‘real 
and rational remain distinct.’56 We will see how Lacan’s distinction between the 
Symbolic and Imaginary registers of the human psyche benefits from this Spinozan 
distinction between two categorically different kinds of thought later in the thesis, but 
for now, it is important to note that for Spinoza, it is not that Spirit and matter require 
reconciliation, rather it is the extent to which human powers may be realised and 
increased that lends his ontology to our eco-clinical project.57 
What this distinction means for the assertion of a metacritical ecocriticism 
should, it is hoped, be clear. Philosophically speaking, Spinoza offers a model of non-
transcendent causality, enabling a non-Hegelian position on history and human agency 
that is a-subjective and non-teleological.58 This in turn enables us to recognise a 
Spinozist form of ideology critique that suggests, like Nietzsche’s philosophy would 
after him, a decentering of the Hegelian absolute subject, who is not God’s privileged 
being. In his Essays in Self-Criticism (1974/1976), Althusser thus describes a 
‘materialism of the imaginary,’ an affirmation of the political dimensions of Spinoza 
that would shift the tenor of the latter’s modal thesis from the purely epistemic to what 
Valente calls the ‘onto-pragmatic domain’, or from classic Marxist questions of ‘false 
consciousness’ to the fully-fledged recognition of ‘false positions’.59  
 
In the Appendix to Book I of the Ethics, and in the Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus, we find in fact what is undoubtedly the first !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56  See Holland, Eugene. ‘Spinoza and Marx.’ http://clogic.eserver.org/2-1/holland.html [Accessed 
20/09/09]. 
57 If, as Holland has put it, ‘eliminating the notion of dialectical contradiction from accounts of 
historical process does not necessarily entail eliminating it from analyses of discourse and thought’, this 
is because we must acknowledge how there nevertheless remains a dialectic in Spinoza, but it is 
resolutely non-Hegelian (for being devoid of mediation), and should perhaps, this thesis will argue, be 
conceived of more profitably after Deleuze’s ‘lyrical’ or ‘asymmetrical’ dialectic (more on which in 
chapter three). And moreover, as Jameson for one has made clear, adherence to one form of dialectics 
does not necessarily mean adherence to all forms of dialectics. To suggest that there is no reason to 
assume that history mirrors thought, or vice versa is therefore to understand the merits of Spinozism in 
this connection. See Holland, Eugene. ‘Spinoza and Marx.’ http://clogic.eserver.org/2-1/holland.html 
[Accessed 20/09/09]. 
58 As Althusser puts it: ‘Because he ‘begins with God’, [Spinoza] never gets involved with any Goal, 
which, even when it ‘makes its way forward’ in immanence, is still figure and thesis of transcendence.’ 
He therefore rejects Hegel’s ‘expressive causality’. See Althusser, Essays, p. 135. 
59 Althusser, Essays, p. 136; Valente, Lacan’s Marxism, p. 160. 
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theory of ideology ever thought out, with its three characteristics: 
(1) its imaginary ‘reality’; (2) its internal inversion; (3) its 
‘centre’: the illusion of the subject. An abstract theory of 
ideology, it will be said.60 
 
Practically speaking, therefore, Spinozism since Althusser should encourage us 
to track down those inadequate ideas, concepts and figurations that would not only 
keep us from obtaining an increase in power (qua ‘ideology’), but from critical 
positions that are themselves ideologically-inhibited. Where inadequate ideas continue 
to sustain illusion, typically in line with social or political mandates, ‘Man’ is itself an 
inadequate idea. The monistic apprehension of Man as a part of Nature as a single 
Substance rather than as its privileged subject (or ‘master’), supplies a purview within 
which the productive potential of Nature as a whole can no longer be limited to the 
localised productivity of Man. Here we begin to see how a ‘regional’ totality might 
relate to the notion of Nature as ‘global’ totality.  
For Marxism, this means it can relinquish its ‘productivism’ (or its exclusive 
focus on marketable productive forces) and shift its critical focus accordingly.61 Whilst 
we will attend to this notion more fully in chapters two and three we might here begin 
to sense how ecocriticism would benefit from this intersection of Spinozism and 
Marxism. Where, for example, conventional ideology critique would remain content 
with the analysis of anthropomorphic psychosocial structures, and with a 
corresponding increase in power at the social level, a Spinozan philosophical basis is 
more philosophically equipped to go beyond the limits of the psychosocial, beyond !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 As Althusser makes plain: ‘Spinoza's ‘theory’ rejected every illusion about ideology, and especially 
about the number one ideology of that time, religion, by identifying it as imaginary. But at the same 
time it refused to treat ideology as a simple error, or as naked ignorance, because it based the system of 
this imaginary phenomenon on the relation of men to the world ‘expressed’ by the state of their bodies. 
This materialism of the imaginary opened the way to a surprising conception of the First Level of 
Knowledge: not at all, in fact, as a ‘piece of knowledge’, but as the material world of men as they live it, 
that of their concrete and historical existence. Is this a false interpretation? In certain respects, perhaps, 
but it is possible to read Spinoza in such a way. In fact his categories do function, daringly, in this way 
in the history of the Jewish people, of its prophets, of its religion, and of its politics, where the primacy 
of politics over religion stands out clearly, in the first work which, after Machiavelli, offered a theory of 
history’. Althusser, Essays, pgs. 135-36. 
61 As we will later see, it is from such a standpoint that Deleuze and Guattari can state in Anti-Oedipus 
that Nature = Industry... = History. See Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pgs. 3-4. 
! 48!!
any privileging of human subjectivity, towards ontological comprehension of the 
complex interrelationships between determinate modes (whether given in terms of 
organic ‘species’ or inorganic modes of life) and their respective milieux, or in other 
words the emphasis upon precisely the symbiotic, immanent interdependencies that 
ecological discourses would call for.  
Drawing no less upon the illusions of Spinoza’s inadequate ideas as Lacan’s 
Imaginary register, or that register to which perceptual falsehoods, abject fantasies and 
wish-fulfillments are attributable, such a theoretical approach to ecocriticism would 
deliver an ‘anti-humanist’ ideology critique, or one that is destabilising of what in 
chapter two we will acknowledge as the post-Kantian transcendental ‘subject.’ Prior to 
examining how this relates to literary form and content in that chapter, we might 
nevertheless acknowledge briefly how such an approach would enable Glen Love’s 
eminently eco-literary search for a purview that, like the one he finds in Melville’s 
Moby-Dick, ‘sweeps us out of our immaterial roles and presses us into a momentous 
drama in which we are confronted with the elements that link each of our lives to all 
life and our place within a biotic community.’62 At the properly philosophical (or 
conceptual) level, such an approach would require a revision not only of what we take 
dialectical negativity to be, but equally of those mechanistic views of causality 
inherited from canonical Enlightenment thinkers: 
 
in his effort to grasp a ‘non-eminent’ (that is, non-transcendent) 
not simply transitive (á la Descartes) nor expressive (á la Leibniz) 
causality, which would account for the action of the Whole on its 
parts, and of the parts on the Whole -- an unbounded Whole, 
which is only the active relation between its parts: in this effort 
Spinoza served us, though indirectly, as a first and almost unique 
guide.63 
  
Enabling us to articulate the co-implication of categories that were previously 
conceived of as dualistic and dichotomous, this notion of an ‘unbounded Whole’ that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Love, Practical, p. 13. 
63 Althusser, Essays, p. 141. 
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Spinozan immanence imparts, transforms our sense of totality, whether this be 
psychic, national-cultural (or ‘regional’), or biospheric and ecological (or ‘global’). 
For Althusser, this revaluation of part-to-whole relations underpins his notion of 
‘structural causality’, one that enables us to provisionally show how whilst 
dynamically interlinked, such registers retain a ‘relative autonomy’.64 We will shortly 
see how post-Althusserianism supplies not only a wealth of useful antagonisms to 
instrumentalist attitudes, but at once might give us to conceive of a ‘history without 
Man’, a properly theoretical ‘post-humanism’ as it might pertain to eco-literary 
production and reception. That ecocritics would forego Pierre Macherey’s A Theory of 
Literary Production (1966/1978), for example, a study that develops the implications 
of Althusser’s incorporation of Spinozan materialism in a pointedly literary 
connection, seems neglectful and imprudent if not wholly disheartening (yet which as 
we have begun to suggest, transpires to be resultant of a far more vested state of affairs 
than the mere institutional situation of such studies within exclusively Marxist—qua 
‘sociological’ or ‘political’—discourses).65 Such work as Macherey’s would redress 
the balance wherever immanence appears to remain at best a figurative and 
inspirational notion of Nature’s totality for ecocritics. Immanence qua immanent 
critique would reorient the ecocritical understanding of literary production and 
reception in a metacritical way, enabling such concerns as national and institutional 
histories to become available for debate. 
As we shall see in successive chapters, Althusser’s blend of Spinozan ethics and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis remains discernible (yet becomes much transformed) in 
Jameson, Žižek and Deleuze; reformulating Marx’s classic definition of the concept as 
‘the imaginary representation of the subject’s relationship to his or her real conditions 
of existence’, we find a certain inflection in the post-Althusserian schools that should 
supply a stimulating and moreover adequate complexity to those seeking to 
understand the place of literature in ecological debate: not only does literature play a 
fundamentally ‘utopian’ role in Jameson and Deleuze (a sort of immanent key to 
social mythologies or, rather, to social mythology as such), thus demanding a criticism !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Althusser and Balibar define structural causality as the ‘determination of the elements of a whole by 
the structure of the whole.’ See Althusser and Balibar, Reading, p.187. 
65 In an as yet untranslated work, Hegel ou Spinoza (1979), Macherey better develops Spinoza’s 
materialism as a significant alternative to the Hegelian schema. Accordingly, the type of interest that is 
usually conferred upon his work is that of a political, rather than a literary sort. 
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adequate to what such utopianism implies, both materially and ideologically, but 
moreover, it can be reconceived of as a sort of ‘affective ecology’ in its own right.  
It would seem altogether lamentable, then, that an ‘earth-centred’ or ‘ecocentric’ 
discipline should fail to avail itself of so germane a thinker as Spinoza (and his diverse 
line of critical descendants) or such potentially anti-instrumentalist discourses as 
contemporary Marxisms; unless of course, such an approach remains too troubling to 
the essentially liberal sensibilities of the Western institutional milieu to warrant the 
closer inspection that this thesis asserts that it deserves. Where literary production and 
the ideological complicity of texts (as aspects of a profoundly ‘unecological’ 
episteme) appears to remain of second-order interest, this must again, be by virtue of 
certain conservatisms implicit in any ‘pale green’ ethos that would maintain that the 
fundamentally preservationist ‘message’ underwriting many ecocritical orientations 
should not go obscured by undue ‘theoretical’ hubris. 
 
(iii) Symptomatic Reading 
 
Despite Althusser’s deployment of Spinoza contra Hegel in his ‘scientific’ 
reformulation of Marx, which as we have begun to acknowledge, is in and of itself of 
great amenability to the present study, it is his ‘lecture symptomnale,’ which 
underpinned the classic Reading Capital (1968/1970) with Étienne Balibar, that is 
perhaps of most immediate utility to our project. Implementing Lacanian procedure, 
the study addresses certain rhetorical fragilities in Marx’s use of metaphor and 
figuration. Indicating how the faute (‘errors’ or ‘mistakes’, but also ‘crimes’) in 
Marx’s literary form register as its symptoms, Reading Capital presents a proto-
deconstructive analysis of latent content. Conceiving of these inadequacies of 
language as gestures towards as yet unactualised concepts to come, towards that which 
paradoxically appears both latent in and absent from the text, symptomatic reading for 
Althusser and Balibar amounts to a philosophical project of ‘correction’ (qua 
refinement). By deploying Lacan’s conception of the symptom to Marx’s own work—
or as a means of interpreting the neurotic’s persistence in his or her subjection to the 
socio-symbolic—Althusser and Balibar propose not only the development of a sort of 
‘science of contradiction’—by which Marx’s own ‘symptomatic’ trope, or materialist 
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‘contradiction’, supplied him with a means of theorising the propensity of any given 
socio-economic order towards revolutionary change—but consequently, the 
development of a generalisable symptomatology.  
As we have seen, Spinoza supplies Althusser with a means to assert a Marxism 
with a different sense of causality and thus, an altogether different sense of etiology. 
Necessarily, where on a broadly Hegelian account, language is conceived of as a 
signifying system that is negatively conditioned, or enabled by relational limits that 
paradoxically imply difference and at once its cancelation by virtue of a necessary 
equivalence between elements (or words), such limits ‘cannot be themselves signified, 
but have to show themselves as the interruption or breakdown of the process of 
signification.’66 Let us consider, then, how Althusser’s Spinozist approach might 
benefit ecocriticism as a discourse that would, however inadvertently, de-emphasise 
Hegelian negativity and thus, the humanist telos of Hegelian progress and history. 
Althusser claims that his symptomnal reading attends to ‘the action of a real 
drama, in which old concepts desperately play the part of something absent which is 
nameless, in order to call it onto the stage in person—whereas they only “produce” its 
presence in their failures…’67 But this dialectic of presence/absence, as Hegelian (and 
thus, dialectical) as it outwardly appears, is nevertheless one that opens without a 
sense of teleological progression onto our concerns with theoretical maturity for 
ecocriticism. Whilst the symptom is here given as the ‘radical impossibility of the 
concept to appear “in person”, because ‘it is still in the process of being produced’, 
this instance of catachresis, or the (ab)use of existing words to denote something that 
as yet cannot be named, gestures towards a new conceptual horizon, yet one that 
refuses the perfection of completeness: in other words, one that acknowledges 
continual process.68 
We will see how this enables analysis of first-wave ecocriticism as a symptom of 
North American cultural and political pluralism shortly, but for now this sketch of a 
specifically formalist type of symptomnal reading already begins to challenge the first-
wave ecocritical strategy of valorising ‘Green’ neo-realism, or the canonical ‘nature-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Laclau, Ernesto. Emancipation(s). (London: Verso, 1996). p. 37, original emphases. 
67 Althusser and Balibar, Reading, p. 29. 
68 Friedman, Geraldine. ‘The Spectral Legacy of Althusser: The Symptom and Its Return.’ Yale French 
Studies. No. 88. (1995): 165-182.  pgs. 169, 174. 
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writing’ of Thoreau, Abbey or Dillard as mimetically sufficient to the conveyance of 
environmental experience, or the privileging of manifest content for eco-rhetorical 
ends. Most explicitly, it is where Althusser and Balibar discuss Galileo’s ‘Great Book 
of the World’ that we find an approach that enables us to reappraise our earlier 
concerns with eco-cultural tendencies towards totalising forms of interpretation. Such 
an approach enables us to diagnose such tendencies as themselves symptomatic of 
theoretical ‘immaturity’:  
 
to treat nature or reality as a Book, in which, according to Galileo, 
is spoken the silent discourse of a language whose “characters are 
triangles, circles and other geometrical figures,” it was necessary 
to have a certain idea of reading which makes a written discourse 
the immediate transparency of the true, and the real discourse of a 
voice.69 
 
As Geraldine Friedman points out, this ‘incarnational, consubstantial discourse’, 
with all of its Christian resonances, ‘depends upon a metaphysics in which truth 
inhabits the word as the soul of the body.’70 As such, an ‘innocent’ reading, or that one 
we might here correlate with an eco-mimetic reading/writing of the biome, is ‘an 
understanding of the world as a text to be taken at face value’, which is what Althusser 
and Balibar insist that the ‘still ideological’ young Marx, mired in his prehistory, 
practiced until he switched to a scientific problematic. It is precisely here, therefore, 
that we can extract a symptomatological understanding of the distance between 
immaturity and maturity with which to address a certain ‘epistemological break’ 
between first and second-wave ecocriticism:  
 
We… have the right to speak about an ‘epistemological break’ 
and to use this philosophical category to mark the historical-
theoretical fact of the birth of a science, including, in spite of its 
unique character, Marxist revolutionary science, by the visible !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Althusser and Balibar, Reading, p. 16. 
70 Friedman, Symptom, p. 173. 
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symptom of its emergence from its prehistory, its rejection of the 
errors of that prehistory. On condition, of course, that what are 
only effects are not taken for the cause -- but instead that the signs 
and effects of the ‘break’ are considered as the theoretical 
phenomenon of the appearance of a science in the history of 
theory, which brings up the question of the social, political, 
ideological and philosophical conditions of this irruption.71 
 
As we will shortly consider, it is precisely this concern with the material 
conditions that would induce an epistemological break that can help us to understand 
the emergence of first and second-wave ecocriticism. Moreover, the very immanence 
of the effects of the ‘absent cause’ in Althusserian-Spinozism enables us to advance a 
symptomnal view of any ideology that would privilege a non-theoretical approach; in 
other words, it is where Althusser draws upon Spinoza to show how the ‘problematic’ 
is an unconscious field of ideational presuppositions, one that merely harbors the 
potential for a ‘scientific’ qua non-ideological theory to emerge, that enables us to 
dispense with the anthropocentric assurances of Hegelian historicism. Again, this is 
precisely why a sufficient prehistory should matter for ecocriticism; an inspection of 
how the first-wave problematic may or may not have ‘matured’ towards a second-
wave ‘science’ might turn upon an Althusserian reading of instances of catachresis 
amongst principal first-wave writers.  
When, for example, Lawrence Buell writes disparagingly about the 
‘dichotomizing’ of the respective commitments of Michael Denning’s ‘Marxist 
hermeneutic’ and Walter Benn Michaels’ ‘cultural poetics’ in an early essay, he 
cements his status as an historically-predisposed ‘ecocritic’. What we find is that it is 
not the internal dividedness of the ‘newer historical criticisms’ that concerns him, so 
much as the fact that such ‘intratribal’ pluralism might prevent these thinkers from 
impacting upon literary studies per se.72 What is crucial to note here, however, is how 
Buell’s own concerns with the historical legacies of Thoreau and John Muir are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
71 Althusser, Essays, p. 118. 
72 Buell is here referring to the literary reception of such works as Michaels’ The Gold Standard and 
the Logic of Naturalism (1987), and Denning’s Mechanic Accents: Dime Novels and Working Class 
Culture in America (1987). See Buell, Lawrence. ‘It’s Good, But is it History?’ American Quarterly. 
Vol. 41. No. 3 (Sept., 1989): 496-500. pgs. 496, 499. 
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accordingly beset by an overly self-conscious use of such words as ‘naturally’ and 
‘empiricist’, usages that are ultimately constrained by an awareness of the 
‘attenuations and elisions’ that would, if not mediated by the ‘social historian as 
superego’, risk resulting in either an overtly synchronic attention to form, or just as 
undesirably, in an ‘old style consensus historiography.’ 73  
But Buell seems more mindful here of the necessity for ‘actual’ or ‘empirically-
factual’ and ‘contextual indebtedness’ as of the structural  limitations of disciplinary 
and institutional Law (qua the Althusserian ‘problematic’). Accordingly, what Buell’s 
writing seems to suggest is a symptomatic ‘gesturing towards’ a form of ecocriticism 
‘to come’, one that appears to find one of its earliest prefigurations in an essay from 
1989, when he suggests a broadly materialist position on the ‘interest-group politics’ 
that characterise the ecocritical canonization of Muir and Thoreau.74 We will see how 
Buell’s own moments of catachresis might therefore supply the theory-curious second-
wave ecocritic with diverse means of rethinking the ecological-literary relationship to 
history later in the thesis, and by way of the differing positions Žižek and Deleuze 
evince on Hegelianism; the latter’s Nietzscheanism will give us to revalue history as 
such, yet specifically where a Marxian form of eco-critique might exceed any 
normative ‘Historical Materialism’.75 For now, however, it remains necessary to 
emphasise how the above procedure makes available for discussion those latent 
elements that subsist and inhere in a text despite what is manifestly being said, 
revealing catachresis as a diagnostic concern. This gives us to note the similarities 
with the Lacanian aspects of Jameson’s work, for whom the absent cause as history is 
commensurate with the Real as that latent content which necessarily exceeds language 
as the principal expressive mode of the ‘Symbolic’ register. By couching the 
construction of the individual subject in terms of its entry into language, and as 
perpetually oriented towards an unobtainable someTHING (the ‘Real’), Lacan 
described a paradigm somewhat homologous with a Marxian perspective, in which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Ibid. 
74 See Buell, Lawrence. ‘The Thoreauvian Pilgrimage: The Structure of an American Cult.’ American 
Literature. Vol. 61. No. 2 (May, 1989): 175-199. 
75 As Nietzsche has suggested, is our relationship to what he terms ‘Nature naturelle’, or to the non-
anthropomorphised natural world, the world not viewed through the lens of history and consciousness, 
not ultimately paradoxical, chiefly for being fundamentally restorative of cultures that have become 
trapped in history, thus tilling the earth for the ‘non-ecological’ individual? On this and many other 
aspects of Nietzsche’s thinking on nature and ecology, see Del Caro, Adrian. Grounding the Nietzsche 
Rhetoric of Earth. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004). p. 64. 
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society determines the consciousness of its individuals, grounded at all times in the 
unapprehendable ‘reality’ of history. As Jameson puts it: 
 
…it is not terribly difficult to say what is meant by the Real in 
Lacan. It is simply history itself; and if for psychoanalysis the 
history in question here is obviously enough the history of the 
subject, the resonance of the word suggests that a confrontation 
between this particular materialism and the historical 
materialism of Marx can no longer be postponed.76 
 
When compared with the Real of ‘historical narrative’ we might reckon with the 
inadequacies of a particular author’s Imaginary ones. Because history abjectly defies 
symbolisation, always being in excess of our bids to represent it, it can never be 
grasped in itself in any text. But Jameson points out that some version of history is 
necessarily discernible in every text, in much the same way each of us carries some 
notion of what the Real World outside our consciousnesses must be. Therefore, we 
must ‘distinguish between our own narrative of history—whether psychoanalytical or 
political—and the Real itself, which our narratives can only approximate 
asymptotically’. 77  Like the Lacanian Real, history is that which would provide 
‘unanswerable resistance’ not only to the ideological fantasies of such ‘nature writers’ 
as Thoreau or Dillard, but also to those of the reader or critic who would extrapolate 
such work towards vested ends.78  
Thus for all his initial differences with Althusser, by drawing this concept from 
Lacan, Jameson also draws upon and reconfigures somewhat the classical Hegelian 
notion of ‘mediation’. To acknowledge this enables us to allay, to some extent, those 
ecocritical fears discussed above regarding theoretical insensitivity to the very 
different requirements of the North American and French milieus, and specifically as 
mediation might be invoked to account for the relationship between individuals and 
the real totality underlying a society. Whether it is the form of a Joseph Conrad novel, 
or that critical narrative told by an ecocritic in support of raising environmental !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 Jameson, Ideologies, p.104. 
77 Jameson, Ideologies, p. 107. 
78 Jameson, Political, p. 170. 
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awareness, the subtitle of Jameson’s The Political Unconscious, which asserts 
‘Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act’, proves significant; the narratives that mediate 
our existences (from the myths and stories we tell ourselves, to the plot-lines of 
novels) symbolically embody our social reality. As such, if ‘genre is essentially a 
socio-symbolic message’, then we might insist that so too must non-fictional ‘nature-
writing’ be, for ‘form is immanently and intrinsically an ideology in its own right.’79 
Showing the points of affinity between Althusser and Jameson in this way 
allows us not only to encompass matters psychic, economic, historical and ecological 
in a single sweep—and as these reveal the ‘political unconscious’ or ‘structural 
problematic’ within which a given writer was (or remains) situated—but moreover to 
do so in a ‘scientific’ or theoretical way. Despite their differences over class and 
humanism, (i.e., whether they remain Spinozan or Hegelian), such thinkers would not 
only enable us to think more complexly about the ecologically-problematic 
subjectivism we find central to instrumental reason, but equally, we will argue, to 
negotiate the tendency towards conservative forms of ecocriticism. Prior to exploring 
the relationship between eco-literary aesthetics and ideology in chapter two, therefore, 
we might at this juncture deploy Althusser’s lecture symptomnale, specifically as it 
relates to the cultural legacy of North American pluralism. This is because the 
historicisation of social movements is key to understanding psychic repression, of 
particular value where later we will attempt to understand subjective interiority as it 
might inhibit ‘ecological’ attitudes. A statement from a recent essay of Jameson’s, in 
which he aired the need ‘to defend the position that literary criticism is or should be a 
theoretical kind of symptomatology,’ serves to usher such discussion in.80  
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 The Real or History is, in our ‘fallen world of capitalism,’ necessarily ‘that which resists desire, that 
bedrock against which the desiring subject knows the break-up of hope and can finally measure 
everything that refuses its fulfillment’. See Jameson, Political, pgs. 141, 170. 
80 Moreover, ‘[l]iterary forms (and cultural forms in general) are the most concrete symptoms we have 
of what is at work in that absent thing called the social.’ See Jameson, Fredric. ‘Symptoms of Theory or 
Symptoms for Theory?’ http://criticalinquiry.uchicago.edu/issues/v30/30n2.Jameson.html [accessed 
15/09/09].  
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(iv) Pluralism and Exclusion 
 
The politics of pluralism are frequently cold war politics81 
 
Jameson’s suggestion of the need to ‘defend’ symptomatological approaches to 
literature, as if somehow they might be less fashionable than they once were, seems at 
first blush more than a little perplexing, particularly if we consider the resurgence of 
interest in Lacanian critical theory in recent years and specifically, the work of such 
eminently ‘clinical’ thinkers as Žižek and Deleuze. Yet Jameson nevertheless registers 
that we might somehow have dissuaded ourselves from certain ‘metacritical’ 
perspectives even if we remain committed (in principle at least) to a range of 
experimental methodologies; a dissuasion that can only be borne of a fundamental, yet 
clandestine air of ‘persuasivity’ that inheres as a formal property within the dogmatic 
and totalising narrative of the late capitalist axiomatic. 
 
It is therefore after Ellen Rooney’s observation that ‘political pluralism, 
‘American-style’, is nothing but the exclusion of Marxisms’ that we might more fully 
acknowledge not only the originating moment of ecocriticism under a climate of 
‘hegemonic pluralism’, but why it is that theories of immanence (such as those we  
have nominated) have failed to impact upon Americanist ecocriticism in substantial 
ways, keeping the movement from such important critical-clinical resources as the 
quasi-ecological ‘assemblage’ theory of Deleuze and Guattari.82 If the symptomnal 
reading of Althusser and Balibar, with its psychoanalytical emphasis on the latent 
content of Marx’s language, spans concerns with expressive form as ideologically-
determined, it equally permits us to more complexly conceive of how ecocritics may 
have desired to distance themselves from such a climate, albeit problematically so.  
 
If ‘old’-style pluralism was seen to recuperate almost any other critical account 
(feminism, minority, Marxist) that emphasised otherness, difference, conflict, or 
discontinuity within the problematic of ‘general persuasion,’ then the absent or 
excluded term was always going to be exclusion itself. Or more precisely, driven by a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 Rooney, Seductive, p. 18. 
82 Rooney, Seductive, p. 26. 
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generalised agenda of persuasion, an agenda given ideological coherence by a host of 
unacknowledged presuppositions, limits, exclusions and repressions, US ‘pluralist’ 
rhetoricians of the 1980s-90s accused their opponents of a monolithic 
totalitarianism—the exclusion of pluralism—precisely in order to exclude them: 
‘[The] reduction of heterogeneous Marxisms to a monolithic Stalinism is always 
achieved in the name of pluralism’.83 The ‘old’ pluralists of the Cold War epoch, 
whose orientation Rooney discerns as ‘less an affable form of methodological 
eclecticism,’ than ‘an ensemble of discursive practices constituted and bounded by a 
problematic of general persuasion,’ were therefore about the business of chasing 
socialist theory from their door; first-wave ecocritics were, of course, operating under 
precisely such a climate of ‘general persuasion,’ and as such, developing in response 
to its ideological mandates.84  
 
No discourse that challenges the theoretical possibility of 
general persuasion, no discourse that takes the process of 
exclusion to be necessary to the production of meaning or 
community and asserts, with Althusser, that is the definition of 
a field which, ‘by excluding what it is not, makes it what it is,’ 
can function within pluralism.85  
 
The ‘exclusion’ of Marxisms by North American pluralists in this way not only 
aids us in understanding the institutional academic trends of that period, but more 
particularly, the emergence of first-wave ecocriticism as a largely non-theoretical 
practice of reading after a paradoxical mode of ‘innocence’ directly effected by the 
pluralist hegemony. Endowing us with an understanding of concrete, discipline-
shaping forces, such distinctions are of course essential where the ecocritical 
specialism would, on first appearances, appear wholly ‘pluralist’ in the benign, 
methodologically-inclusive sense. Obtaining their force by way of precisely the sort of 
repressions that Lacanian Marxism would be best suited to analyse, such pluralists 
emphasised a gesture of exclusion based on a critical awareness that historically !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83 Rooney, Seductive, pgs. 26-7. 
84 Rooney’s principle arch-pluralist is Wayne C. Booth, author of Critical Understanding: The Powers 
and Limits of Pluralism. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). pgs. 1-2. 
85 Rooney, Seductive, p. 5. 
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irreducible interests divide and define reading communities. Or, by way of the 
observation that interests and reading are inextricably bound together.  
 
We have seen how, in its emphasis on such material factors, Althusserian 
symptomatology begins to furnish us with an approach to ecocriticism that 
acknowledges its formation as the consequent effect of the repression of certain 
signifiers constitutive of what we have moreover identified after Jameson as a 
‘geopolitical unconscious’. We might again cite Althusser and Balibar’s Reading 
Capital at this juncture, acknowledging how this conception of an unconscious is akin 
to the structural ‘problematic’ that is registered after their concern with the ‘epistemic 
break’ in the ‘mature’ author of Capital, who enacts a significant rejection of the 
‘religious myth’ of reading. We might thereafter begin to tie this concern to a 
provisional conception of first-wave ecocriticism as ‘innocent’ for being untheoretical 
(qua ‘non-Marxist’). 
 
Marx could not possibly have become Marx except by 
founding a theory of history and a philosophy of the historical 
distinction between ideology and science... this foundation was 
consummated in the dissipation of the religious myth of 
reading. The Young Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts read the 
human essence at sight, immediately, in the transparency of its 
alienations. Capital, on the contrary, exactly measures a 
distance and an internal dislocation (décalage) in the real, 
inscribed in its structure, a distance and a dislocation such as to 
make their own effects themselves illegible, and the illusion of 
an immediate reading of them the ultimate apex of their 
effects: fetishism. It was essential to turn to history to track 
down this myth of reading to its lair... the truth of history 
cannot be read in its manifest discourse, because the text of 
history is not a text in which a voice (the Logos) speaks, but 
the inaudible and illegible notation of the effects of a structure 
of structures.86 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86 Althusser and Balibar, Reading, p. 17. 
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It is in this passage that Althusser determines Marx’s establishment of a 
revolutionary new and anti-humanist conception of history: as Althusser puts it, the 
‘revolutionary inventor of a science (the science of history)’.87 We have already seen 
how this is in and of itself significant for ecocriticism; here, however, we might extract 
more fully from this passage the fundamental Althusserian opposition between science 
and ideology, which is to say an ‘idea’ about writing that by its very ‘adequacy’ 
sustains a ‘structural’ (qua immanentist) symptomatology towards an analysis of 
ecocritical reading under pluralism. If Marx’s (mis)use of language betrays a certain 
blindness or non-seeing where analysis of the social is concerned, a kind of linguistic 
index of an always already ideological unconscious that exceeds symbolic expression, 
then for his readers it is a betrayal and a non-seeing that nonetheless signals fissures in 
his theoretical problematic towards an incipient conceptual horizon.  
 
As we have acknowledged in Buell’s eco-valent historicism, this becomes 
salient when we consider how ecocriticism stakes out a very specific mode of 
engagement, often taking its cues from an already heavily ideologically-determined 
form of literature—the polemical nature writing of Henry Thoreau or Edward Abbey 
for example—and thus, effects a corresponding horizon of relevance or sense. If, for 
Althusser, a problematic gives shape and structure to the visible terrain of a discourse, 
it at once ‘structures the invisible... defined as excluded by the existence and peculiar 
structure of the field of the problematic’.88 If in Reading Capital the symptom registers 
that which we cannot see from within our present theoretical problematic, the very 
‘ecocentricity’ of much ecocriticism would, in many respects, preclude a necessary 
degree of metacritical self-awareness via a sort of ultra-Green disavowal of human 
subjectivity. Such ‘innocence’ amounts to a theoretical immaturity that does not allow 
for an immanent critique of subject-positions. We cannot see ourselves seeing the 
trees, it seems, for we have rendered the trees more real than the eye that would see 
them.  
 
If a symptomnal view of literature is to be assessed for its veracity where 
ecocritical concerns would pose reformist challenges to the anthropocentrism of neo-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 Althusser and Balibar, Reading, p. 51. 
88 Althusser and Balibar, Reading. p. 26. 
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liberal ideology and instrumentalist depredation, the influence of the pluralistic 
climate that Rooney identifies cannot be underestimated. Specifically, the pluralist 
polemic against theory might then be conceived of as a defence of the innocence of 
reading, over and against the ‘guilty’ or interested reading attributable purely to the 
(Marxist) poststructuralists. Put another way, in discerning how Marx ‘deconstructed’ 
the political economy of Adam Smith via his own textual analysis, we follow 
Althusser in characterising a symptomatic reading as not only that by which a critic 
discloses a text’s problematic, but where metacritically, an American movement such 
as ecocriticism might be seen to repress theory tout court for its socialist complicity. 
Despite the putative ‘innocence’ of first-wave ecocriticism and its construal of the 
self-sufficiencies of American nature-writing, any mode of reading must always betray 
‘interest’, or as Althusser would later describe it, a certain ‘guilt’.89 As Rooney has it 
in her concerns with the inherently persuasive orientation of pluralist discourses, ‘guilt 
is associated with persuasion. The possibilities and impossibilities of persuasion reveal 
the play and struggle of interests’.90  
 
The sort of persuasivity that ecocriticism has required and perhaps even desired, 
must surely render it as guilty as the next literary reception theory? That theory has 
been excluded as a repressed component from ecocriticism appears symptomatic of a 
determinate historical condition enabled precisely by a North American pluralist 
agenda that would preserve its own ideological ground without recognising its 
exclusionary basis: ‘An awkward if not troubled relation to theory is central to the 
pluralist problematic... Theory threatens to force pluralism to announce its own 
systematic exclusions; on those grounds alone it must be avoided if at all possible’.91 
By simultaneously conceiving of ecocriticism as a symptom (with its formation under 
determinate historical conditions) and suggesting symptoms for ecocriticism (or how 
its exponents might implement symptomatic practices of reading), the movement can 
be examined for the problems of exclusion and persuasion where these surface as both 
political and theoretical issues. Moreover, the movement can be appraised for those 
environmentalist ‘fantasies’ (qua ideology) that would not so much serve as critique as 
to mask such wounds, whether stemming directly from the work of writers like !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
89 Althusser and Balibar, Reading, p. 28. 
90 Rooney, Seductive, p. 42. 
91 Rooney, Seductive, pgs. 30-2. 
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Thoreau or Dillard, or from their reception by critics like Buell and Slovic who have 
extracted second-order ecocritical argument from them.92 
 
All of which returns us, after the trope of the symptom, to matters of health and 
fortitude; if capitalism views itself as the optimum model of socio-economic health 
despite a series of undeniably pathological symptoms (widespread oppression, poverty 
and misery), then the Althusserian Marxist serves as a sort of social clinician, 
palpating those areas where the painful problems of modern society have been ‘buried’ 
or repressed. If, decades since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the term 
‘Balkanization’ continues to register the tendency of literary criticism to beget all 
manner of exotic (yet swiftly reified) specialisms, what we then begin to find in 
Althusserian Marxism is a means of redressing ecocriticism as a specific practice of 
reading that might remain in denial of its guilt or persuasivity.93 
 
 
(v) Relative Autonomy 
 
 
Given the extent to which Althusser’s work on ideology and ‘oppressive 
totalities’ insists upon certain decentrings in its focus on the gaps and exclusions 
underwriting Marx’s own textual form, the parallels with what would come to be 
identified as ‘deconstruction’ remain clear. But despite the continuing aversion to 
precisely this type of poststructural analysis (as maintained by such ecocritics as 
Jonathan Bate, for example), we might suggest that by way of Althusser’s notion of 
‘relative autonomy’ a measure of reprieve be given to poststructuralism and any fears 
over psycho-cultural determinism allayed. As Tim Dean has argued, ongoing reactions 
to New Critical formalism in literary studies have generated profound skepticism 
regarding any notion of autonomy when it comes to aesthetic practice. Claims on !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
92 See in particular Buell, Lawrence. The Environmental Imagination: Thoreau, Nature Writing, and the 
Formation of American Culture. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
93  The notion of ‘Balkanization’ in this connection is Harold Bloom’s, and attributable to his 
conservative criticisms of the ‘excessive’ specialisation of humanitarian disciplines: ‘After a lifetime 
spent in teaching literature I have very little confidence that literary education will survive its current 
malaise…. We are destroying all intellectual and aesthetic standards in the humanities and social 
sciences, in the name of social justice…. The Balkanization of literary studies is irreversible’. Quoted in 
Todorova, Maria. Imagining the Balkans. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). p. 36. 
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behalf of ‘relative autonomy’ have occasionally met with consternation amongst left-
leaning humanitarians, who would uphold Althusser’s concept as a largely anti-
Marxian idea. Althusser makes clear what he means by relative autonomy when he 
argues that  
 
[t]he fact that each of these times and each of these histories 
[including the history of aesthetic forms] is relatively 
autonomous does not make them so many domains which are 
independent of the whole: the specificity of each of these times 
and each of these histories—in other words, their relative 
autonomy and independence—is based on a certain type of 
articulation in the whole, and therefore on a certain type of 
dependence with respect to the whole.94 
 
Yet Dean suggests that we might retrieve what Althusser meant by relative 
autonomy by recognising it as a commitment to discursive specificity in terms of 
aesthetic alterity or otherness.95 We might emphasise the degree to which ethical as 
well as epistemological issues are involved in our approaches to eco-aesthetics if we 
recognise how discursive specificity suggests acknowledging that element of 
irreducibility or alterity particular to distinct cultural domains. For Dean, appraising 
aesthetic examples in ‘less individualistic ways’ might register a certain critical 
progress, but must acknowledge the assumption that any cultural text should be 
understood as a compromise formation, or the symptomatic product of a conflict 
whose terms are at least partly unconscious.  
 
Whether one approaches textual forms in the context of an authorial or a cultural 
unconscious, the conviction still holds that the work of art is duplicitous or ignorant of 
something, that it exhibits contradictions of which it is unaware and therefore requires 
extraction by critical specialists. On such a view, neither artists nor their cultures are 
considered masters of the conflicts that produce their work; instead the role of 
mastery—of interpreting the symptom—falls to the demystifying critic. Hence Dean’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
94 Althusser and Balibar, Reading, p. 100, original emphasis. 
95 See Dean, Tim. ‘Art as Symptom: Žižek and the Ethics of Psychoanalytic Criticism.’ Diacritics. 32.2: 
(Summer, 2002): 21–41. 
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suggestion that there is something ethically suspect about so ostensibly progressive an 
approach to cultural forms: ‘[I]n other words, that there is a significant disjunction 
between the politics and the ethics of cultural study’.96  
 
But whilst the New Critical position on aesthetic autonomy propagated a view of 
art as self-sufficient and problematically removed from mass culture, the Althusserian 
account of relative autonomy presents art as disruptive of discrete boundaries, as 
troubling rather than reinforcing the divide between high and low cultural products. 
Therefore, as Dean suggests, that which we term ‘aesthetic’ might more properly 
amount to those experiences in which meaning is disrupted by alterity, which means 
that the sort of popular cultural references supplied by a thinker like Žižek ‘may give 
rise to an experience whose relative autonomy from normative coordinates of sense 
requires acknowledging’.97 By reading Althusser through Laplanche, Dean suggests 
that the concept of relative autonomy pertains equally to cultural production and to our 
critical reception of it: ‘Relative autonomy at the level of reception implies a 
fundamental irreducibility to sense or understanding’.98 Putting this matter at its most 
schematic, Dean suggests that Laplanche’s concept of the ‘enigmatic signifier’ 
rewrites at the level of reception what Althusser meant by relative autonomy.99 
 
If alterity—be it biotic or otherwise—is of preeminent concern for a given mode 
of cultural or literary criticism, then it surely requires an approach that is weighted 
towards ethics over pure epistemology. In Althusserianism and late Lacanianism, the 
ethics of psychoanalytic cultural criticism, whilst certainly motivated by the abiding 
desire to demystify, might ethically restrain that desire to do so in any absolute and 
total sense. Where our focus in the present thesis is with post-Lacanian epistemologies 
as these may respond to eco-literary complexes, the effects of the Real on 
interpretation would take eminence, which would also keep us from any deterministic 
psychoanalysis of Green motives: it would be disobliging in the extreme to suggest 
any ready equation between the ecocritical disavowal of poststructuralism (with its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
96 Dean, Art, p. 31. 
97 Dean, Art, p. 38. 
98 Ibid. 
99 ‘Thus whereas the concept of the unconscious licenses a critical commitment to demystification, the 
concept of the enigmatic signifier puts the brake on demystification’. See Dean, Art, p. 39. 
! 65!!
challenges to the Law) and castration anxiety, or to insist that, taken as a whole, the 
movement would benefit from a collective moment of abreaction or catharsis.  
 
As we have thus far noted in brief, the notion of ‘relative autonomy’ that we find 
in Althusser might supply a partial solution in this regard insofar as it shows how 
aesthetic forms cannot only exist as an expression of ideological or cultural conflicts, 
or that art cannot be fully determined by (or reducible to) its contextual matrix. Whilst 
further consideration of this aspect of post-Althusserianism will no doubt show up the 
many differences in the thinkers this thesis draws upon, it is hoped this will provide a 
fuller sense of what symptoms might be for ecocriticism, rather than what they must 
be. Rather than suggesting that ‘ecocentricity’, like environmentalism, is reducible to a 
sort of hysterical group fantasy, the consistency of which is maintained by a 
fantasmatic cast of ecologism (or ‘biophilia’) that would in effect, conceal a deeper 
absence or problematic, we might instead develop a fuller sense of what 
ecosubjectivity and ecosemiotics might amount to.100 
 
The present thesis would not, then, merely amount to a project of actively 
reassuring ecocritics, or of challenging the assumptions that the theory from which 
they initially recanted maintains the sort of epistemological depredations that would 
threaten the biome itself. Crudely put, if the various social and cultural determinants 
comprising works of eco-literary merit (Thoreau, Dillard, Berry, Abbey et al) require a 
moment of ‘deconstruction’, then of necessity we would point out how an 
Althusserian Marxist would subsequently move to a crucial phase of reconstruction, 
even if during that phase he or she remains aware of the many contradictions her 
position contains. This is because like the contemporary ecocritic, an Althusserian 
Marxist would nevertheless work to retain a fundamentally political sense of what he 
or she is doing. And so however important the initial disregard for deconstruction 
remains to the movement’s ongoing aims and objectives, in what follows we will 
actively consider our post-Althusserian approaches and the extent to which these 
might again show how the movement might honour the fundamental neo-Marxist 
injunction: that the ecocritical problematic is not one of merely interpreting the world, 
but one of actively changing it. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
100 The term ‘biophilia’ is taken from Edward O. Wilson and describes a blind irreverence for life. See 
Wilson, Edward O. Biophilia. (MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).  
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Which returns us to consideration of the forces that would arrest change, 
whether institutional or extra-institutional. If we are to acknowledge how theory and 
politics suffer so problematic a relationship since the Fukuyaman ‘end of history’, it is 
of course crucial to acknowledge the degree to which they remain indivisible: ‘If, as 
Gramsci says, intellectuals in the capitalist state function as ‘experts in legitimation’, 
then theoretical criticism might be deemed the place where critiques of legitimacy are 
continually being carried out—in a quarter where they may seem to pose the least 
direct threat to social and political institutions.’101  By way of analyses of critical 
pluralism as an effect of a politics of exclusion (particularly the exclusion of Marxism) 
within North American institutions throughout the cold war era, we have begun to 
obtain a first idea of an ecocritical prehistory. In doing so, we have established 
grounds for a form of ‘eco-clinic,’ or post-Althusserian ‘meta-commentary’ as 
apprised of theories of human subjectivity as of those that would enable critique at the 
institutional level. But in acknowledging several, often extremely disparate theories of 
the symptom as these might pertain to language, literature and the constraints facing 
professional criticism, so putatively ‘un-clinical’ a discipline as ecocriticism must 
surely reckon more fully with immanence if it is to accommodate and act on these 
concerns.  
 
Despite the obvious ‘innocence’ or seemingly naïve gestures of a practice of 
reading that would favour the content of nature-writing and mimetic referentiality over 
stylistic or formal concerns, we might acknowledge more fully how any form of 
‘interest’ necessarily keeps us from innocence despite abiding claims to a sort of post-
human ethical immunity. Wheresoever a rejection of form persists on the grounds that 
it is most often obscurantist and hubristic, what, then, might lead us beyond a 
relatively simplistic assessment of this sort towards one accommodating of the 
numerous paradoxes at work in such issues? Surely it must be the concept of 
immanence. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
101 Culler, Criticisms, p. 96. 
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Let us now consider the relationship between aesthetics and ideology for 
ecocriticism. This will give us to consider Kant’s transcendental subject, and the 
manner in which sublime aesthetics necessarily presuppose it. !
! 68!
2: Violent Signs I 
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(i) Symptom / Sublime 
 
Nature loves to hide 
 —Heraclitus1 
 
By neglecting theoretical approaches to ‘nature writing’, ecocriticism risks 
neglecting too the relationship between ideology and aesthetics. Whilst it is heartening 
to note those few instances of second-wave ecocriticism that have embraced a measure 
of aesthetic theory, very few indeed have attempted a clinical understanding of the 
connection between desire, aesthetics and ideology. Whilst papers by Aaron Dunckel, 
James Kirwan, Rick van Noy and Lee Rozelle have suggested sublime aesthetics as 
something of an ideal mode of engagement for those ecocritics who would seek to 
enact a more theoretically-mature ‘second wave’, they have nevertheless fallen short of 
any metacritical analysis of the movement’s institutional locatedness and specifically, 
those instances of humanist liberalism that would constrain it.2  
 
Having suggested approaches to the prehistory of North American ecocriticism in 
our first chapter, therefore, we might now seek to understand why such second-wave 
experiments with the aesthetic writings of Edmund Burke or the Kantian ‘analytic of 
the sublime’ have failed to produce an ecocriticism with a clinical component at its 
core. This will mean extending the concerns we began to broach in our first chapter 
regarding concepts, specifically where the desire to motivate them proves symptomatic 
of certain limits immanent to prevailing notions of ecocriticism. For any properly 
‘critical’ approach, the aesthetic emphases we find in Kant’s late philosophy and the 
manner in which such writers as Zupančič and Žižek have subsequently deployed these 
in a political connection might be evaluated for their role in any ongoing diagnosis of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 See Heraclitus, fragment cxxiii. 
2 See the following three papers: Noy, Rick Van. ‘Surveying the Sublime: Literary Cartographers and the 
Spirit of Place.’; Dunckel, Aaron. ‘“Mont Blanc”: Shelley’s Sublime Allegory of the Real.’; Kirwan, 
James. ‘Vicarious Edification: Radcliffe and the Sublime’, each of which can be found in section III, 
‘Rethinking Representation and The Sublime’ of The Greening of Literary Scholarship: Literature, 
Theory, and the Environment. Ed. Steven Rosendale. (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 2002). pgs 
181-206, 207-223 and 224-246, respectively. 
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ecocriticism, particularly where a ‘clinical’ approach would recommend a genealogy of 
eco-cultural values.  
 
This chapter will, therefore, continue to uphold an emphasis on ecocritical pre-
history, which is to say with that which remains presupposed by its terms, whilst 
shifting the focus of discussion onto the relationship between subjectivity, aesthetics 
and value-formation. Unlike those examples cited above, however, our emphasis here 
will involve attention to Kantian aesthetic and moral philosophy as it relates to 
Lacanian theories of desire and the social. As such, we will initially embark upon a 
genealogical evaluation of the legacy of Kant’s transcendental Idealism and the extent 
to which it has underwritten both modern aesthetics and contemporary (eco) liberalism. 
Given the onus upon recognition and representation in Kant—what many post-Kantian 
critical theorists will name as a reductive fealty to ‘common sense’, or more precisely, a 
common sensibility—the fact that this subjective form has gone largely 
unacknowledged by ecocritics will give us to consider the eco-political value of 
bringing it to consciousness, particularly where the notion of duty, or a ‘deontological’ 
ethics remains principal to Kant’s ethico-aesthetic thesis.  
 
As Žižek avers, not only did Kantian reason take its part in enabling Freud to 
postulate the unconscious, but his notion of the ‘categorical imperative’ has its 
psychoanalytic correspondent in Freud’s punitive, guilt-inducing ‘superego’, the 
psychic agency key to the success of any ideology.3 This will have two consequences 
where our inspection of the sublime for ecocriticism is concerned: firstly, it will, as 
such Lacanians as Žižek and Zupančič have indicated, enable us to reckon with a 
certain a priori morality or ‘Lawfulness’ underwriting the very desire to do 
ecocriticism. This will have consequence for how we consider ideology for eco-literary 
research, specifically in relation to Lee Rozelle’s Ecosublime (2006), which holds that 
it is in the face of both awe-inspiring and catastrophic (or ‘sublime’) environmental 
events that we, and those North American literary figures who have preceded us, 
experience a deontological calling, a dutiful spur to act on behalf of our environs, but 
which ultimately tests our sense of what the social is. Where eco-virtue and the notion 
of the ‘eco-social’ are concerned, Rozelle’s methodological utility of the sublime !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Žižek, Sublime, p. 88. 
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suggests itself as symptomatic of a certain utilitarian ethos, one that does not 
sufficiently inspect the values implicit in the Kantianism it privileges, and which 
therefore proves of metacritical concern, particularly when, as Zupančič has suggested, 
‘the stronger the subject’s superego, the more this subject will be susceptible to the 
feeling of the sublime.’4 
 
This is significant where Rozelle’s work, most apparently, appears to refrain from 
acknowledging its own basis in a liberal-humanist reading of Kant, treating the sublime 
moment as a spur to a reformist eco-politics, rather than towards any revolutionary, 
‘post-humanist’ position, critical of its own imperatives. To emphasise the consequence 
of the superego for ecocriticism will accordingly entail a closer, eco-clinical 
examination of the relationship between sublimated desire and the partial satisfaction of 
drives in Lacanian thinking. By following Rozelle in his discussion of North American 
nature-writing, specifically his readings of Edgar Allen Poe and Isabella Bird, we might 
enter more fully into a meditation upon the very desire to read ecocritically, one that 
necessitates a coming to terms not only with those biospheric elements that elude 
representation, broaching upon the place of signification and interpretation and how the 
‘desire of the Other’ proves consequential for ecocriticism, but with a certain ethical 
compromise with respect to what Lacan terms the ‘Real’. In other words, if in Lacan 
there is a basic distinction between desire (as hitched to the order of representation) and 
the unconscious drives that have no representable goal or object of satisfaction but 
rather only satisfaction per se as their object, then we might consider the place of the 
‘will’ or drives when we seek to interpret nature-writing toward eco-political ends. Are 
such imperatives as ‘sustainability’ truly ‘eco-centric’ or merely ‘all-too-human’? 
 
Once we have apprised ourselves of the humanist consequences of the Kantian 
legacy, noting the primacy of recognition and representation for transcendental 
Idealism, and thereafter how this takes its part in supporting a certain bourgeois 
conception of totality and meaning for society, we will take into account how Rozelle’s 
work may be reconceived of after Žižek’s Lacanian concern with ‘sublime objects of 
ideology’, those ineffable, unrepresentable objects, which, like ‘Nature’, can be said to 
‘quilt’ the ideological fabric. Not only does Žižek’s psychoanalytic approach loan us a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Zupančič, Alenka. Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan. (London: Verso, 2000). p. 154. 
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diagnostic perspective upon Kantianism as itself a symptom of an immanent limit in 
Enlightenment epistemology, but enables us to underscore how by proving 
symptomatic of an unthinkable element in Kant’s own work, the term ‘Nature’ remains 
fundamentally aporetic, throwing into question any hasty, environmentalist deployment 
of his aesthetics. This thereafter enables us to consider how for all its apparent 
‘maturity’, Rozelle’s second-wave adoption of Kantianism inevitably remains inhibited 
by a trenchant liberal-humanism, chiefly where his motivation of sublime aesthetics 
fails to inspect the values inherent in Kant’s own philosophy, therefore keeping it from 
precisely the type of deeper-reaching and immanent psycho-cultural analysis we have 
begun to prescribe above.  
 
* 
 
We might begin, then, by considering how in the first half of the seventeenth-
century, during the period following Descartes’ inauguration of modern philosophy, 
empiricism and rationalism were ascendent as divergent, if not wholly opposed 
philosophical traditions. Whilst both sought to break with pre-modern dogmatism and 
metaphysics, it would not be until the latter half of the eighteenth-century, however, at 
the apex of the Enlightenment, that Kant’s ‘Copernican revolution’ would begin to lay 
the groundwork for a fully-fledged ‘aesthetic’ theory, or one in which a reflection upon 
the site of experience—upon that which ‘gives’ the phenomenal world—would 
necessitate a rigorous account of humanity’s basis in representation.5 Taking empirical 
knowledge as entirely synthetic, as a posteriori or derived from experience, Kant 
viewed the rationalists as arguing instead for an analytic, a priori basis for knowledge, 
or knowledge derived from that which is inherent to reason. This elementary divide !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 It is in the preface to the second edition of The Critique of Pure Reason (first ed. 1781; second ed. 
1787) that Kant compares himself to Copernicus, announcing that he has effected a Copernican 
‘revolution’ in philosophy: ‘We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus’ primary 
hypothesis’. More particularly with respect to ‘point of view’, Kant writes: ‘[concerning] the invisible 
force that holds the universe together… [it] would have remained forever undiscovered if Copernicus had 
not dared in a manner contradictory of the senses, but yet true, to seek the observed movements not in the 
heavenly bodies, but in the spectator. The change in point of view, analogous to this hypothesis, which is 
expounded in the Critique, I put forward in this preface as a hypothesis only, in order to draw attention to 
the character of these first attempts at such a change, which are always hypothetical. But in the Critique, 
itself it will be proved, apodeictically not hypothetically, from the nature of our representations of space 
and time and from the elementary concepts of the understanding’. See Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason. Ed. Norman Kemp Smith. (London: Macmillan, 1933). pgs. 22, 25. 
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between the analytic (as a priori) and synthetic (as a posteriori) enabled him to readily 
(if somewhat reductively) characterise the work of his predecessors and thereafter, to 
argue for a much revised, ‘transcendental’ conception of knowledge.  
 
As a ‘critical philosophy’, therefore, Kantianism would supersede previous 
rationalist and empiricist philosophies insofar as it allowed for a form of knowledge 
that could be both synthetic and a priori. This is because for Kant, whilst any emphasis 
upon relations to the outside world must be synthetic, we must nevertheless remain 
concerned with the form of the relations and not with that which is experienced, with 
those a priori structures that ‘give’ experience rather than the content of discrete 
experiences. For Kant, this pure, ‘transcendental’ form of ‘synthesis’ remains both 
consistent and universal. Yielding the transcendental ‘subject’, this Copernican turn 
inaugurates ‘point of view’, or the discovery of that which remains presupposed by 
experience: a ‘supersensible’ (or ‘noumenal’) subjectivity. Kantianism remains 
‘Idealist’, therefore, inasmuch as the mind is upheld as the ground of all experience: ‘if 
I remove the thinking subject, the whole material world must at once vanish because it 
is nothing but a phenomenal appearance in the sensibility of ourselves as a subject, and 
a manner or species of representation.’6  
 
It is precisely because the subject is not another object of rational knowledge but 
the very power to ‘give’ (or represent) objects that it can be distinguished from that 
which is causally determined. 7  For Kant, this ‘Law-giving’ ‘power’—one that 
conditions rather than is conditioned—opens onto the practical vocation of Reason and 
thus grounds morality; an autonomous subject is non-determinable as an object and 
ultimately wields the ‘faculty’ (or power) of judgement (Urteilskraft). Significantly, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Kant, Pure, p. 383. 
7 Symptomatic of the early phases of modernity, Descartes’ cogito subjected thought to a grounding 
substance within the world and thus foreclosed the question of how this substance would itself be known. 
Inaugurating the first critiques of Cartesianism, Kant therefore reformulated the subject as that 
synthesising power which determines being as substance. Kantianism thus prompts us to enquire if it is 
possible to think the very possibility of representation itself without positing a human who represents. If 
we persist in the belief that the subject is itself a type of substance then we not only forgo true autonomy, 
but misrecognise a movement as a reified thing or substance. Kantianism holds that we must recognise 
the subject as that which permits the very possibility of the thinking of things; rather than a represented 
thing, the subject is a procedure of representation that, as Kant maintains in the Critique of Practical 
Reason, averts the anthropologist error of tracing and explaining things in general from one more 
empirical thing (i.e., man, mind, or res cogitans).  
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this will include aesthetic judgements of ‘beauty’ and ‘sublimity’ and which remain 
indissociable from notions of nature’s ‘purposiveness without purpose’ in the case of 
judgements of beauty (or serving no purpose whilst nevertheless appearing to), and an 
incarnation of immense power, infinity, or extreme turbulence in the case of 
judgements of sublimity.8 This will prove ideologically significant for our concerns 
with eco-literature when we consider how for Kant, such judgements pertain in 
different ways to a polis via the notion of a sensus communis or ‘common sense’. 
 
 For our ‘eco-clinical’ purposes, then, we can begin to approach this link between 
aesthetic judgements, common sense and ideology by first considering in more detail 
how Kant’s aesthetic theory relates to his moral philosophy. We can then move to link 
our findings to the assertions of Žižek and Zupančič regarding the Freudian superego, 
thereafter acknowledging how their work in turn takes its part in a Lacanian 
understanding of desire and the social for eco-literary research. Before considering it in 
any depth, we can begin by acknowledging Kant’s third Critique as unifying the aims 
of the first two, drawing together the transcendental approach and its practical and 
moral implications. Thereafter we can ascertain that judgements, defined as the 
subsumption of a particular under a universal (a concept)—say for example in the way 
that a general rule might be applied to particular instances—play a crucial role in the 
synthetic a priori basis of Idealism, which gives us to understand Kantian morality as 
equally a priori. This is important where ‘common sense’ possesses a ‘legislative’ 
function. 
 
 Because, for Kant, judgements can be said to mediate between Understanding, or 
that which supplies concepts (such as the universal itself) and Reason, which draws 
inferences, they therefore supply a certain unity.9 Where ‘common sense’ is concerned, 
then, such ‘unity’ proves eco-politically significant, particularly where aesthetic 
judgements remain key to an ideological understanding of subjective autonomy and 
moral activity in an ‘environmental’ epoch. Specifically, it is important to think here in 
terms of the ‘legislative’ power of the notions of ‘common’ and ‘good’ sense as they !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Kant, Judgement, § 22. 
9 Simply put: ‘my ability to judge effectively is thus determined by my ability to apply a general concept, 
which has universal validity and which exists prior to experience’. See Shaw, Philip. The Sublime. 
(London: Routledge, 2006). p. 76.   
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govern Kant’s faculty of judgement. Although our focus will remain with aesthetics 
and shortly, with how these relate to our eco-literary concerns, the fact remains that 
aesthetic judgements ultimately have ethical consequence in Kant’s epistemology. As 
Deleuze has indicated, despite his emphasis upon immanent critique, Kant’s 
characteristic shortcoming is that he does not allow for the internal generation of sense 
from a particular problem, and which he appears to sustain ‘in order to preserve the 
ethical accord of the faculties.’ 10  Although we will not discuss the strictly 
philosophical conception of the problem and its relation to the faculties here at any 
length, it is nevertheless crucial to note how this ‘accord’ of the faculties is one integral 
to the ethical role of judgement in the operation of pure and practical reason, rendering 
it, as Deleuze has noted, ‘inevitable that common sense should seem to us a kind of a 
priori fact beyond which we cannot go.’11 
  
 As we will see in chapter three, for a thinker like Deleuze, Kant’s evaluative (and 
pre-emptive) need for ‘just measure or “justice”’ is of great importance to 
understanding non-ecological attitudes as it forces a certain closure in Kantian 
epistemology, an inhibition that as we will shortly see, not only loans his moral 
philosophy all too readily to a universal, liberal ‘sensibility’, one that remains palpable 
in contemporary environmentalism, but does so by way of an a priori logic of ‘sense’ 
that retains a fealty to the assumption that thought must necessarily possess a good and 
upright nature and thus have truth as its object: ‘[Common sense] designates ... an a 
priori accord of faculties, or more precisely the ‘result’ of such an accord. [...] 
Common sense appears not as a psychological given but as the subjective condition of 
all ‘communicability’. [...] Kant will never give up the subjective principle of a 
common sense of this type [...] the idea of a good nature of the faculties of a healthy 
and upright nature which allows them to harmonize with one another and to form 
harmonious proportions.’12 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 See Farrell, Patricia. ‘The Philosopher-Monkey: Learning and the Discordant Harmony of the 
Faculties.’ Thinking Between Deleuze and Kant: A Strange Encounter. Eds. Edward Willatt and Matt 
Lee. (London: Continuum, 2009): 11-27. p. 19. 
11  See Deleuze, Gilles. Kant’s Critical Philosophy: The Doctrine of the Faculties. Trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. (London: Athlone, 1984). p. 23. 
12 Deleuze, Kant, p. 21. 
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Because our concerns are with a Lacanian reading of Kant’s aesthetic and moral 
philosophy, for now we will suspend any engagement with Deleuze’s post-Kantianism, 
focusing instead upon how Kant describes aesthetic judgements in particular as 
‘disinterested’—which is to say that in elevating us above the world of objects, of 
sensible flora and fauna, the faculty of judgement ultimately tells us more about the 
functioning of the human mind and the libidinal economy underwriting it than about the 
properties of nature per se. Taken together with the legislations of common sense, it is 
in this way that we might begin to register how transcendental Idealism loans itself to 
an ‘un-ecological’ instrumentalism. As Nick Land has shown, this is chiefly by virtue 
of Kant’s ‘universal form’, or that ‘which is necessary for anything to be ‘on offer’ for 
experience, it is the ‘exchange value’ that first allows a thing to be marketed to the 
enlightenment mind.’13 This enables us to begin to bridge ‘mere’ aesthetic concerns 
with our clinical concerns with desire and environmental ideology.14  
 
As a basis for a universal, secular subjectivity, for our relations to alterity or the 
‘otherness’ we encounter in experience, the representational logic of Kantian idealism 
must therefore be acknowledged wheresoever it might be said to support a non-
‘ecological’, or broadly instrumentalist outlook, wheresoever it might be said to 
structure our Western cultural assumptions, largely through its demonstrable 
amenability to capitalist modes of exchange. Before looking at how certain forms of 
Marxo-Lacanian thinking can aid us in thinking through these issues, it is important to 
stress further how Kant’s universalism of human (re)cognition relates to his moral 
philosophy. This is of especial interest where it implies the assumption of universal 
qualities that would result in the denial of specifics, which, in our case, may mean the 
disregarding not only of unique environmental factors, but of all the differences that 
might constitute and concern those individuals who live in different cultures and climes 
and therefore whose relationship to the biome is equally specific. We encounter this 
reductionism in Kant when we consider how common-sense relates to the aspiration of 
individual virtue described by the ‘categorical imperative’, one within which we are !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Land, Nick. Fanged Noumena: Collected Writings 1987-2007. (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2011). p. 67. 
14 Beauty, for example, ‘is not a concept of an object, and a judgement of taste is not a cognitive 
judgement. All it assumes is that we are justified in presupposing universally in all people the same 
subjective conditions of the power of judgement that we find in ourselves.’ See Kant, Immanuel. Critique 
of Judgement. Trans. Walter S. Pulsar. (Indianapolis and Cambridge, Mass.: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1987). § 15 and p. 156. 
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bidden to ‘[a]ct only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it 
should become a universal law.’ 15  
 
The categorical imperative has significant implications for any insufficiently 
metacritical stripe of ‘eco-virtue’, which as we will consider, might risk retaining 
precisely that which would appear most anathema to its aims and objectives: an 
autonomous, ‘all-too-human’ moral subject. Like other Nietzschean neo-Marxists, Nick 
Land suggests that with Kantianism, ‘Western cultural history culminates in a self-
reflecting bourgeois civilization.’16 This seems especially pertinent where our concerns 
are with the tendencies toward all-too-liberal forms of eco-critique, particularly when 
we acknowledge Stephan Körner’s eco-cultural nuancing of the categorical imperative, 
observing that as all effects happen in accordance with laws of nature, one must ‘[a]ct 
as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of 
nature.’17  
 
These concerns prove most interesting from a clinical, symptomatological 
perspective when we consider how the third Critique is often considered to indicate that 
Kant had reached a certain threshold in his thinking, gesturing towards a type of 
philosophy ‘to come’ that in his elderly years he personally did not have the strength to 
formulate. As our concerns will increasingly lie with issues of an impersonal and 
productive unconscious, this is a broader, epistemic point that we will return to again 
and again throughout the thesis. For now, let us look in more detail at the last offering 
of Kant’s philosophical career, his Kritik der Urteilskraft [Critique of Judgement] 
(1790), noting the distinction he draws in that study between judgements of beauty and 
sublimity, and moreover the significance of ‘disinterestedness’ for them. It is by way of 
disinterestedness that we can begin to link the categorical imperative to our nominally 
aesthetic concerns. Let us begin by noting how Kant distinguishes between the quality 
of the affects attending our appreciation of the beautiful from those attending that of the 
sublime. ‘The former delight is very different from the latter in kind’, Kant comments, 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (2nd ed.) Trans. James W. Ellington. 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994). p. 421. 
16 Land, Fanged, p. 60. 
17 Körner, Stephan. Kant. (Middlesex: Penguin, 1955). p. 136. 
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…for the beautiful is directly attended with a feeling of the 
furtherance of life; and is thus compatible with charms and a 
playful imagination. On the other hand, the feeling of the 
sublime is a pleasure that only arises indirectly, being brought 
about by the feeling of a momentary check to the vital forces 
followed at once by a discharge all the more powerful, and so it 
is an emotion that seems to be no sport … charms are repugnant 
to it; and since the mind is not simply attracted by the object, 
but is also alternately repelled thereby, the delight in the 
sublime … merits the name of the negative pleasure.18 
 
 As we have noted in brief, Kant gives the beautiful as that judgement concerned 
with harmony and form; nature does not trouble us in this regard and such judgements 
suggest nature as containable and therefore under one’s control. By contrast, however, 
the sublime is that which exceeds or overflows our powers to attribute immediate form 
and measure to an object, presenting ‘a momentary check to the vital forces.’ This 
results from the failure of the faculty of Imagination to represent to itself such powerful 
and infinite natural phenomena as ‘volcanoes in all their violence of destruction; 
hurricanes with their track of devastation; the boundless oceans in a state of tumult.’19 
Yet regulated as it is by common sense, the ‘legislative’ faculty of Understanding 
eventually triumphs over such failure, amounting to ‘a discharge all the more 
powerful’, or the triumph of the quintessentially human power of Reason. When 
contemplating the stars, for example, the failure of Imagination to present an object ‘fit’ 
for Understanding does not prevent us from sustaining an ‘Idea’ of the universe as 
infinitely massive. Understanding supplies the concept of infinity, which is presented 
negatively by virtue of the inability of Imagination to present an object that would be 
adequate to this concept.20  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Later, Kant again stresses that this ‘negative pleasure’ is a kind of pleasure-in-pain, at once ‘a feeling 
of displeasure, arising from the inadequacy of imagination in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude to 
attain to its estimation by reason, and a simultaneously awakened pleasure, arising from the very 
judgement of the inadequacy of the greatest faculty of sense being in accord with ideas of reason.’ See 
Kant, Judgement, § 23 and § 27. 
19 Kant, Judgement, § 28. 
20 ‘The sublime cannot be contained in any sensible form’ because it ‘only concerns ideas of reason, 
which, though they cannot be exhibited adequately, are aroused and called to mind by this very 
inadequacy, which can be exhibited in sensibility.’ See Kant, Judgement, § 23. 
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As Philip Shaw puts it, ‘‘whereas natural beauty’ provides judgement with an 
echo of its own capacity for self-determination, so that nature appears ‘preadapted’ or 
‘purposive’ to this faculty, the sublime, by contrast, appears to frustrate judgement, to 
the extent of calling its autonomy into question. The sublime is… an affront or 
‘outrage’ to our powers of comprehension.’21 Yet this affront is short lived insofar as it 
results in a moment in which we identify a greater power within ourselves; Reason is 
that power which, as we have begun to suggest, guarantees subjective autonomy and 
therefore the capacity for morality.  
 
Yet it is by way of a particular ‘disinterestedness’ that, as Zupančič points out, 
points to a certain divide within the house of Reason, enabling us to broach upon how 
Kantianism opens up the Freudian notion of the superego. For Zupančič, in the sublime 
moment ‘the subject is confronted with the traumatic proximity of a (threatening) 
Thing, and responds by introducing a new distance, a kind of disinterestedness in face 
of something of drastic concern. This is precisely what Kant refers to as the pathos of 
apathy.’22 If a sense of mastery over nature can be said to be obtainable from 
judgements of beauty, which is itself ultimately tied to the very power to judge, then the 
sublime proves curious insofar as the disinterestedness that accompanies it ultimately 
results in a certain distance from the reasoning ego. For Freud, this rests upon the 
superego, upon the subject’s having ‘withdrawn the psychical accent from his ego and 
having transposed it on to his superego. To the superego, thus inflated, the ego can 
appear tiny and all its interests trivial.’23 It is in this way that a sense of elevation or 
distance from both the ego and its sensible relation to the world is attained. 
 
As Zupančič confirms, this elevation is common to both the sublime and the 
superego: ‘This dominion the subject feels over herself and her ‘natural existence’ is 
precisely the capacity of the superego to force the subject, despite all the demands of 
reality, to act contrary to her well-being, to renounce her interests, needs, pleasure, and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21 Shaw, Sublime, p. 78. 
22 Zupančič, Ethics, p. 154. 
23 Freud, Sigmund. Art and Literature. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988) (The Pelican Freud Library, 
vol. 14). p. 430-31. 
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all that binds her to the ‘sensible world.’’24 As such, disinterestedness is a first clinical 
outcome of the ‘negative pleasure’ experienced in the sublime moment, and which 
enables Žižek to develop his thesis on ‘sublime objects of ideology.’ In order to grasp 
how Žižek fuses Kantian aesthetics and Freud-o-Lacanian libidinal theory to ideology 
critique, we need to initially consider two things: firstly, how such negative pleasure 
might be given in terms of ‘jouissance’, or of an unrepresentable and thus excluded 
surplus that betokens the unbearable ‘kernel’ of the Real, and secondly, how this relates 
to Symbolic castration, to the signifying totality of language as a differential system of 
relations and the necessary sublimation of desire constitutive of the socio-symbolic 
order. In this way we can, as Žižek does, extend Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of the 
‘empty signifier’ at the heart of their Marxo-Lacanian approach towards an eco-clinical 
diagnosis of this relation and how can it help us to understand signification and 
meaning for ecocriticism, an eco-literary discipline that in its earliest publications, 
sought to demote both psychoanalytic and textual concerns.25  
 
As we saw in our first chapter when we followed Althusser and Balibar’s analysis 
of catachresis in Marx’s writing, the relationship between text and concepts is as much 
a clinical concern as a critical one. But we have yet to engage Lacanian concerns with 
signification at any length. We might, therefore, begin by acknowledging a 
symptomatic difficulty wheresoever the word ‘Nature’ appears in Kant’s work. Prior to 
engaging in the politics of the empty signifier, it seems imperative to consider how, by 
initially defining Nature as the whole of phenomenal reality, Kant later asserts another 
conception of Nature as ‘the kingdom of ethical goals, as the community of all rational 
ethical beings.’26 As Žižek suggests, the structural ambiguity of this word can here help 
us to diagnose Kant’s motivations of ‘human nature’ and that which is considered to 
exist ‘beyond’ it: ‘for both Kant and Sade, the recourse to “nature” is a symptomatic 
gesture by means of which they shrink from the ultimate consequences of their 
theoretical edifice’.27 Monique David-Menard puts a finer point on this when she !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Zupančič, Ethics, pgs. 154-55. 
25 As Žižek acknowledges, it was Laclau and Mouffe’s work that first suggested to him the use of the 
‘Lacanian conceptual apparatus as a tool in the analysis of ideology.’ See Žižek, Sublime, p. xvi. See 
also Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical 
Democratic Politics. (Second Edition). (London: Verso, 1985). 
26 Žižek, Slavoj. The Parallax View. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006). p. 93. 
27 For many Lacanians, Sade is largely considered to be ‘the truth of Kant’; As Žižek has it: ‘Sade is the 
symptom of Kant’. Which is to say, the former enables us to understand the extent to which the latter’s 
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writes: ‘Nature is, in Sade as well as in Kant, the symptom of that which remains 
unthought in these two thinkers of the universal.’28 This acknowledgement of the 
‘unthought’—not only of that which perhaps cannot be thought, but equally, that which 
Kant and Sade (or any other writer) did not perhaps have the ‘strength’ for—provides a 
means of grasping what Lacan’s psychoanalytic concerns with signification amount to 
for an eco-clinical approach to an individual, cultural or political unconscious, both 
where specific writers are concerned, and particularly in the case of Kant, to that which 
his subjectivist legacy has bequeathed the Occidental imagination.29 
 
 Just as Zupančič has suggested, we might draw a metonymical correlation 
between the ‘cruelty’ that we find in the actual, biospheric world of ‘Nature’, in the 
example, say, of a hurricane or volcanic eruption, and ‘the cruel, unbridled and 
menacing superego – the ‘real or reverse side’ of the moral law (in us), of the superego 
as the place of jouissance.’30 It is in this elliptical way, via a sort of catachresis in Kant, 
that we can acknowledge more fully how desire invests our social and linguistic 
structures (or Lacan’s ‘Symbolic Order’) and why the dialectic between sublimation 
and sublimity might hold a key to understanding ecocritical ethics. A further question 
might then be: how is it that jouissance figures that which exceeds our Symbolic 
structures and why might the ‘psychoanalytic sublime’ of Zupančič and Žižek supply 
us with a critical-clinical rubric with which to address this ‘surplus’? This question is 
one that enables us to exceed our own emphasis upon the purely epistemological 
relationship between sensibility and reason, broaching more fully upon an ontological 
and materialist analysis of desire vis-à-vis biospheric experience, and so that we might 
ultimately reckon with its pertinence to ‘nature writing’. It pays, therefore, to follow 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
model of subjective and moral autonomy remains bound to a notion of Law that often renders fealty to it 
a painful experience; the ethical paradox being that ‘...societies prosper as a result of the transgression of 
[their] maxims’. See Žižek, Parallax, pgs.. 93-4,.; also. Lacan, Écrits p. 78. 
28 David-Menard, Monique. Les constructions de l’universal. (Paris: PUF, 1997). p. 64. 
29 In his own diagnosis of both Kant and Sade’s views of Nature, Žižek writes: ‘...in Kant as well as in 
Sade, the “elementary” neutral notion of Nature as the indifferent mechanism that follows its course is 
supplemented by another, “ethical” notion of Nature (the suprasensible kingdom of ethical goals; the 
diabolical commandment to pursue the evil path of destruction); and, in both cases, this second notion of 
Nature masks a certain gesture of shrinking back, of avoiding confrontation with the ultimate paradox of 
one’s position: the uncanny abyss of freedom without any ontological guarantee in the Order of Being’. 
See Žižek, Parallax, p. 93. 
30 Zupančič, Ethics, p. 156. 
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Zupančič’s lead at this juncture and turn more fully to Lacan in this regard, prior to 
engaging Žižek’s political extension of Laclau and Mouffe.  
  
 Lacan’s discussions of literature and theatre, particularly those concerning 
Sophocles and Joyce, would not, on first impression, appear to lend themselves to an 
ecocritical understanding of the sublime.31 Despite how contentious it remains to 
pursue Lacan ecocritically, however, it is nevertheless by way of his principal conceit 
of the Symbolic Order or ‘Big Other’—the intersubjective matrix of language, meaning 
and social convention—that we can move beyond our initial diagnosis of the 
elementary ‘self-deceptions’ and distortions constitutive of the ecocritical first-wave, 
towards an account of eco-literature and environmental ethics that would consider the 
motivation of specific aesthetic concepts. As Steven Rosendale indicates, the sublime is 
an ethico-aesthetic concept that would seem ready-made for eco-literary reception: 
‘Since most notions of the sublime include a recognition of the strictly unrepresentable 
elements of the human experience of the environment, the sublime might […] prove a 
particularly powerful concept for thinking about the limits, purposes, and potential of 
nature writing’.32 Understood in light of the Lacanian Symbolic, it is Rosendale’s 
acknowledgement of the ‘unrepresentable elements of the human experience of the 
environment’ in relation to the ‘limits’ of nature-writing that enables us to engage 
Lacanianism by way of the turn that such thinkers of ideology as Eagleton and Žižek 
have made to Kantian aesthetics in particular, enabling us to ‘more rigorously formalise 
the object of ideology-critique’.33  
 
Despite the limits of ‘common’ and ‘good’ sense that we have registered in 
Kant’s philosophy, limits that might readily be conceived of as blockages or symptoms !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 As Philip Shaw notes, despite his interest in the excessive and the unbounded, qualities that Kant 
attributed to the sublime in his third Critique, Lacan does not present a fully elaborated analysis of the 
concept. Twice in The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1986) he asserts the centrality of the sublime to his 
thought, yet in the first case, leaves the task of explaining it to another speaker, whose discourse is not 
published in the proceedings of the seminar. In the second case, his promise to ‘take up the question’ of 
‘the Kantian definition of the sublime’ is left unresolved. See Shaw, Philip. The Sublime. (London: 
Routledge, 2006). pgs. 135, 286, 301. 
32 Rosendale, Steven. ‘Introduction: Extending Ecocriticism’. The Greening of Literary Scholarship: 
Literature, Theory and the Environment. Ed. Steven Rosendale. (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 
2002). xv-xxix. p. xxiv. 
33 Sharpe, Matthew. ‘The Aesthetics of Ideology, or ‘The Critique of Ideological Judgment’ in Eagleton 
and Žižek.’ Political Theory. Vol. 34. No. 1. (Feb., 2006): 95-120. p. 116. 
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indicative of the post-Kantianism that would inevitably succeed him, how precisely 
does his aesthetic turn relate to our ideological concerns? We have seen how for 
Zupančič the sublime can readily be conceived of in terms of the superego, yet how 
does this relate to the type of Marxo-Lacanian ideology critique we are prescribing for 
ecocriticism more broadly? If for a non-Lacanian Marxist like Eagleton, Kant’s notion 
of beauty supports a sensus communis, or sense of a universal bond between individuals 
via agreements in taste, then this offers an understanding of ideology as that 
anticipation of a community of subjects similarly affected. For Žižek, however, it is a 
Lacanian understanding of the sublime that enables a ‘politics of ineffability’, or one in 
which the Master Signifier essential to the Law—in our case, that of ‘Nature’, which is 
essential to eco-ideology—and which is by definition a ‘signifier-without-signified’, or 
that someTHING about which we are never precisely certain, signals our acceptance of 
what others accept, or more precisely, ‘identification with the very gesture of 
identification.’34  
 
It is in this way that such signifiers can be said to be ‘sublime’; understood after 
Lacan’s reading of the Freudian ‘Thing’ (das Ding), or an unapproachable, 
metonymical object that stands in for the Real, and which promises a sense of ultimate 
contact and fulfilment. Not only do they assure an ideological ‘quilting’ of all other 
signifiers in any network of political ‘meaning’, but they at once paradoxically trouble 
it. As Sharpe maintains, Žižek places ‘a theoretical emphasis on how a political sensus 
communis is always constituted by reference to certain master signifiers, whose 
persuasive efficacy as the ‘quilting points’ of ideologies depend on the sublimity of 
what they (are taken to) invoke’.35 It is key, then, to acknowledge how, although Lacan 
evidently neglects the strictly ‘environmental’ implications of the Kantian sublime, 
turning away from any immediate concern with the ecological implications of 
instrumental Reason, which by producing a concept of infinity or power sustains a 
sense of human mastery over nature, it is nevertheless the manner in which Žižek 
motivates his psychoanalytic theory that we can develop what Donougho terms a 
‘pragmatics of the sublime’, or ‘what is done or performed in judging or experiencing 
something to be sublime, along with the often tacit assumptions made about how others !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Sharpe, Aesthetics, p. 112 and Žižek, Slavoj. The Indivisible Remainder: An Essay on Schelling and 
Related Matters. (London: Verso, 1996). p. 142. 
35 Sharpe, Aesthetics, p. 117. 
! 84!
will likely receive it.’ 36  Such ‘structural’ awareness is crucial to our thesis, particularly 
given that the sublime ‘has usually been taken as implicating subjectivity or selfhood in 
some crucial way’, an implication that suggests why ‘a focus on performativity might 
prove revealing of this process.’37 By looking to how the doctrine of the sublime relates 
to the Lacanian concept of sublimation we can begin to assess how it is that 
environmentalism and ecocritical approaches to literature are ultimately inscribed 
within the Symbolic Order.  
 
Reversing Freud’s view of the process by which the libido is transferred from a 
material object (the body of the mother, for example) towards an object that has no 
obvious connection with this need (the love of God or ‘Gaia’), for Lacan the libido is 
instead shifted ‘from the void of the “unserviceable” Thing to some concrete, material 
object of need that assumes a ‘sublime’ quality the moment it occupies the place of the 
Thing.’38 This shift, is sublimation, is in itself the essence of the Real-Symbolic 
relationship; as we saw in our introduction, it amounts to the creation of a signifier by 
way of a ‘phallic’ prohibition or Symbolic castration, enabling us to underwrite any 
psycho-cultural assessment of ideology. Not only can we acknowledge how desire 
invests the social field, but how linguistic, aesthetic and moral concerns are interlaced. 
Just as Freud followed Kant in characterising his discovery of the unconscious as 
‘Copernican’ in magnitude, or one displacing man’s relationship to the cosmos, it is by 
way of das Ding that we can understand how for Lacan the sublime is integral to 
understanding the sublimation process, relating to his linguistic re-formulation of the 
unconscious, within which the Real, like the concept of infinity in the Kantian sublime, 
is constituted negatively in the formation of a signifier. As the primary absence or 
‘wound’ at the centre of the Real, the Thing becomes that ‘sublime’ object without 
which signification could not occur: ‘the fashioning of the signifier and the introduction 
of a gap or a hole in the real is identical.’39 
 
If the Real ‘is revealed in and through the limits of language’, then we can see how 
sublimation, or the investiture of desire that founds religion, science, culture, and art, !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 Donougho, Martin. ‘Stages of the Sublime in North America.’ MLN. Vol. 115. No. 5. Comparative 
Literature Issue. (Dec., 2000): 909-940. p. 910. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Žižek, Reader, p.157. 
39 Lacan, Ethics, p. 121. 
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remains integral to human processes of language and meaning making. Thereafter, we 
can acknowledge how sublime experience is paradoxically that which both founds and 
troubles meaning after a metonymical exposure to the Real by way of the Thing; 
ecocriticism then appears as a formation concerned less with meaning as with imparting 
a new relationship to sublimity, or to the constitutive ‘violences’ of non-human alterity. 
Moreover, the Real can be read as constituting a ‘critique of symbolic, signifying 
categories’ predicated upon the sense that ‘[w]e have become aware that language is not 
innocent, and we feel the effects in our words, in our actions, and in our bodies… even if 
we would prefer to deny this awareness.’40 As the metonymical agent of the Real, the 
Thing therefore is therefore a key to broaching a link between aesthetic (critical) and 
pathic (clinical) approaches; it cannot be presented yet must be presupposed. It is 
therefore of the order of the unconscious yet sublime for being ‘impossible for us to 
imagine it.’41 
 
As ‘interior’ as these concerns appear, it is through the Thing as ‘sublime object’, 
or as that which marks the limit of symbolisation, that we can check how a fundamental 
emptiness, ‘the-beyond-of-the-signified’ without which signification could not occur, 
relates not only to our concerns with literature, but to (eco)social formations more 
substantially.42 As Philip Shaw puts it, ‘[o]bjects that come to signify this beyond 
become infinitely attractive, fearful, overbearing, or more simply ‘sublime.’’43 From an 
ecological perspective we might therefore reconsider not only the sublimity that 
accompanies our experience of the boundlessness of the oceans or outer space, but 
equally when confronted with specific moments of ecological catastrophe, with the 
volcanic activity of Eyjafjallajökull, the devastations of Hurricane Katrina, or even the 
profligate spectre of burning Iraqi oil wells during the two gulf wars. In unpicking the 
relationship between inside and outside, between human interiority and environmental 
milieu, we might acknowledge how the sublimity of the Thing imparts a sense of 
strangeness, of unease, an uncanny force that marks an alienation that is primary and 
which is only partially mediated by our relationship to the Symbolic Order, which is 
itself effected by the detour of sublimation. So again, while Lacan never fully develops !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 Crockett, Clayton. Interstices of the Sublime: Theology and Psychoanalytic Theory. (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2007). p. 160. 
41 Lacan, Ethics, p. 125. 
42 Lacan, Ethics, p. 54. 
43 Shaw, Sublime, p. 135. 
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his thesis on the sublime, there are substantial resources in his triad of Real, Symbolic 
and Imaginary registers for our eco-clinical project, not least insofar as the relationship 
between the sublimation of the Symbolic (or ‘Big Other’) and the sublimity of the Thing 
helps us to restore an emphasis upon subjectivity to ecocritical debate. 
 
In this way we can begin to redress our concerns with jouissance and such 
concepts as ‘Nature’ after Žižek’s thesis on sublime objects of ideology. Given the 
centrality of the term to contemporary environmentalism as an ‘ideological fantasy’—
Nature’s status as a Master Signifier—we must here stress how such networks of 
meaning are ultimately governed by our superegoic desire to ‘enjoy’ or share in the 
jouissance that a particular fantasy promises. For Žižek,  
 
the Master-Signifier is the privileged site at which fantasy 
intervenes, since the function of fantasy is precisely to fill in the 
void of the signifier-without-signified: that is to say, fantasy is 
ultimately, at its most elementary, the stuff which fills in the 
void of the Master-Signifier: again, in the case of a Nation, all 
the mythic obscure narratives which tell us what the Nation is.44   
 
In other words, ideology exceeds a subject’s confrontation with it. This is because 
it is raised to the power of a transcendental object and there is only a recognition of its 
incomprehensibility at the superegoic level which both demands and governs our desire 
for pleasure-pain (jouissance). For consensual political hegemony to exist there has to 
be an elevation of Things to a sublime transcendental status—as sublime objects that 
act as empty Master Signifiers functioning below the level of language and the 
imagination to shape and frame an ‘ideological fantasy’.  
 
To the extent that there is belief in the sublime objects offered 
that remain incomprehensible, ineffable and therefore 
superegoic (God, the Great Leader, Democracy, Freedom, the 
Party), the subject remains interpellated within the system 
through desire to belong to it, willing to sacrifice its jouissance !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44 Žižek, Parallax, p. 373. 
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so as to participate in its shared jouissance. To the extent that 
certain issues remain too important to question since social 
cohesion depends on them, subjectivization sticks since the 
confrontation with the Real, which is the subject of jouissance 
(enjoyment), is evaded. The Symbolic and the Imaginary remain 
in tune with each other—the result is political acquiescence.45 
 
Where eco-literary research is our object, then, Kant’s location at the dawn of 
modern aesthetic theory supplies us, largely by way of Žižek’s Lacanian understanding 
of signification, with a clear reference as part of a broader diagnosis of the emergence 
of modernist subjectivity per se and its sustainment under a late capitalist, ‘eco-social’ 
epoch. If both Eagleton and Žižek extend the post-Lacanian lessons of Althusser, which 
is to say, the move ‘from a cognitive to an affective theory of ideology’, then they do so 
in such a way as to transform their forebear’s approach by way of Kant, developing 
critical theories that whilst remaining dependent upon some notion of a psycho-cultural 
unconscious, re-assert the capitalist subject as one for whom certain aesthetic 
judgments remain essential, particularly under the moral and ethical dilemmas of post-
modern consumerism.46 
 
 
(ii) An Eco-Clinical Analysis of Lee Rozelle’s Ecosublime 
 
We might, then, begin to engage Žižek’s approach more fully with a closer 
examination of Rozelle’s Ecosublime (2006), a thesis which at first blush, would appear 
altogether ‘eco-clinical’ in scope: 
 
What occurs for American spectators as scenes of material 
collapse permeate the media-enhanced image bubble is the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45Jagodzinski, Jan. ‘Struggling with Žižek’s Ideology: The Deleuzian Complaint, Or, Why is Žižek a 
Disguised Deleuzian in Denial?’. International Journal of Žižek Studies. Vol. 4. No. 1. 1-18. p. 4. 
46 Eagleton’s concerns with ideological ‘naturalisation’ bear upon the shaping of: ‘... our unconscious 
affective relations with the world,… the ways in which we are pre-reflectively bound up with the world 
... how that reality ‘strikes’ us in the form of apparently spontaneous experience ... the ways in which 
human subjects are at stake in it, investing in their relations to social life as a crucial part of what it is to 
be themselves.’ See Eagleton, Terry. Ideology. (London: Verso, 1991). Pgs. 18-19. 
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emergence of an ecocidal imagination, a toxic second self that 
festers just below the ego’s surface until the awe and terror of 
environmental destruction moves members of American 
commodity culture from our extended adolescence.47   
 
In addressing (amongst others) Isabella Bird, Edgar Allen Poe and Nathanael 
West—North American writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—Rozelle’s 
study would appear to connect environmental concerns to literary research in important 
ways. Specifically, however, it is by way of the psychoanalytic vocabulary in which 
portions of Ecosublime is ostensibly couched—deploying such notions as ‘ecocide’, 
‘toxic selves’ and ‘ego’—that Rozelle’s project appears to present precisely a post-
Kantian concern with subjectivity under North American consumerism equal to a 
‘mature’, second-wave approach. Where Rozelle describes environmental destruction 
to ‘move’ members of North American commodity culture, we might already infer how 
it is an affective approach that is supplying Rozelle with a means of addressing the 
relationship between non- and unrepresentable forces in relation to an experiencing 
subject. In fact, we might be forgiven for assuming that Rozelle is forging precisely the 
link between sublimity and psychoanalytic theories of desire that our thesis has thus far 
recommended: ‘...the ecosublime comes when the boundary between self and the 
postnatural world becomes permeated in a shock of transformation.’48 
 
Prior, however, to considering how this is simply not the case, we might consider 
the positive aspects of a study that offers a number of refinements to its subject area. 
Much less bibliocentric than many of its forebears, Ecosublime proves exceptionally 
generous in scope, asserting that ‘ecosublimity’ remains obtainable beyond firsthand 
experience of awe-inspiring wilderness or the (post)romantic literatures that would 
attest to it. Not limited to ‘mountain peaks, ozone holes [and] books’, but equally 
encompassing such post-industrial ‘texts’ as films, advertisements, and even video 
games, Ecosublime is a project that usefully discerns as much ecological savvy in the 
unlikely figure of Twin Peaks’ Agent Dale Cooper as in Edgar Allan Poe’s frontier 
travelogue The Journal of Julius Rodman (1840) or the most ‘geologically’-inspired !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 Rozelle, Lee. Ecosublime: Environmental Awe and Terror from New World to Oddworld. (Tuscaloosa: 
The University of Alabama Press, 2006). p. 8. 
48 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 28. 
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passages of William Carlos Williams’ Paterson (1946-58)—a generosity that itself 
suggests a broader concern with affective ecology, underscoring how the experience of 
Imaginative failure in the face of sensible immensity—the ‘shock and awe’ inspired by 
mountainous vistas, endless deserts, inhospitable oceans or the immeasurable tracts of 
infinite space—might then be recognised with equal relevance where the built 
environment is concerned.  
 
In so doing, Rozelle leans to some extent upon the ‘theoretical’ work of William 
Bowen and Joseph Tabbi, both of whom extend the concept of the sublime beyond any 
simplistic connection to imperiled ‘natural’ ecologies. Productive of a ‘technological’ 
Sublime beholden to a sense of contemporary ‘realism’, which is to say, ‘one whose 
psychology expresses itself in the material constructions of an emerging technological 
reality’, the terror and futility provoked by ‘present[ing] the technological culture in its 
totality’ presents Rozelle with an opportunity to acknowledge the place of subjective 
negativity itself in the ‘post-natural’ milieu. 49  Engaging in a brief, preliminary 
discussion of Kantianism, Rozelle therefore aids the ecocritical second-wave in its 
rapprochement with theory, yet as we shall consider, ultimately keeps himself from 
drawing more substantially upon Freudian, Lacanian and Žižekian approaches, each of 
which, as we have noted, rely upon post-Kantian notions of subjectivity. Whilst the 
reasons for this may be strategic, retaining Rozelle an audience amongst his theory-
wary ‘first-wave’ peers, it seems disappointing from a putatively ‘second-wave’ writer, 
forgoing him in particular the opportunity to benefit from the turn to sublimity made by 
Žižek in The Sublime of Object of Ideology (1989).  
 
We can begin by considering how Rozelle’s ecological insight of a ‘limitless 
oceanic terrain’, one that is somewhat begrudgingly borrowed from Freud, might then 
have found better extension. In the hands of different psychoanalysts, ecocritics and 
philosophers, the sublime’s figuration of a subjective threshold or ‘limit’ pertains as 
much to a diagnosis of ‘eco-virtuous’ epiphany—supplying as it does, inspiration for ‘a 
stark awareness that place matters’—as to a symptomnal revision of non-ecological 
approaches to literary aesthetics and semiology.50 Where ecocritic Neil Evernden hoped !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Tabbi, Joseph. Postmodern Sublime: Technology and American Writing from Mailer to Cyberpunk. 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995). Pgs. x, 1. 
50 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 50. 
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to obtain a key to extending ‘the boundary of the self into the ‘environment’’, we can 
consider the tenability of Rozelle’s politicised motivation of the sublime in this regard, 
one that would ultimately grasp its function in the ‘transition from contemporary inertia 
to energized consciousness’, a catalytic role central to his thesis as an ostensible work 
of second-wave ecocriticism, yet which fails to thoroughly investigate that which it 
otherwise names as problematic: the ‘un-ecological’ fact of modern interiority.51 
 
Where the eco-literary conjunction is our concern, Rozelle’s first chapter can be 
taken metonymically for the unfulfilled promise of his fuller thesis. Entitled ‘Oceanic 
Terrain’, the abiding allusion is to Freud’s discussion of a universally-binding or 
‘oceanic’ feeling in his renowned psycho-cultural study, Civilization and Its 
Discontents (1930). The literary emphasis of the chapter is upon two works: Poe’s The 
Journal of Julius Rodman (1840), an account of an exploitative trapping expedition in 
the Rocky Mountains and which Rozelle identifies as a work of ‘nineteenth-century 
expansion literature’, and Isabella Bird’s A Lady’s Life in the Rocky Mountains (1879), 
a proto-environmentalist travelogue about an Englishwoman’s exploration of the 
Rockies in 1873.52 Whilst acknowledging in brief Stephen Mainville’s work on Poe’s 
‘interior frontiers’, or those of ‘the unconscious, the unknown, the limit of 
consciousness’, Rozelle himself resists developing such a psychoanalytical approach, 
asserting that ‘such bodies of criticism must be laid to rest in order to further a critique 
of that which lies outside: historical forces, cultural markers, and ecological 
processes’.53  
 
In attempting a critique of precisely this sort, Rozelle establishes how Rodman’s 
accounts of ‘sights beautiful or awful’ are permeated with Burkean renderings of the 
sublime.54 The distinction between the sublime and the beautiful in Burke, but also in 
Kant, whom he makes fuller recourse to in establishing his own, non-psychoanalytical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Both Rozelle and Hitt look to Neil Evernden’s early ecocritical essay, “Beyond Ecology: Self, Place, 
and the Pathetic Fallacy” for a key to extending ‘the boundary of the self into the ‘environment.’’ For 
Evernden’s essay, see The Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology. Eds. Cheryll Glotfelty 
and Harold Fromm. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996). 92-104. p. 101. See also Hitt, 
Christopher. ‘Toward an Ecological Sublime.’ New Literary History. 30.3 (1999): 603-23. See also, 
Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 4.  
52 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 11. 
53 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 12. 
54 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 13. 
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‘ecosublime’, supplies Rozelle with a figure that ‘transcends disinterested beauty.’55 It 
is in this way that Rozelle can address how Rodman’s initial expressions of ‘romantic 
sublimity’, discernible in his accounts of ‘the seeming infinitude of the river, the 
immensity of the territory, the divine presence in nature’, all of which render him a 
Romantic, ‘Wordsworthian vessel’, are less significant than his seemingly polar 
transformation into an instrumental capitalist, or an individual for whom the rift 
between the ideal and the material, the noumenal and the phenomenal, is much less 
significant than is ‘inscribing value upon the wild on the basis of exchange.’56  
 
As Timothy Morton reminds us, ‘the birth of consumerism coincided with (and to 
some extent was) the Romantic period’, an insight which may run contrary to popular 
understandings of Romanticism, and which betokens its dialectical inverse, the hope 
that ‘[p]eople may eventually recognize in the Romantic period the beginning of 
“environmental” ways of understanding and acting.’ 57  As a trapper of animals, 
Rodman’s relationship to the wild is similarly one of aestheticisation, of mediation and 
displacement; observing a colony of beavers at work on their dam, he marvels at the 
industry of the animals in a moment of high anthropomorphism. As Rozelle notes, this 
sees him ‘impose cultural markers onto ecological processes’ and therefore, he remains 
someone who ‘never sees the wilderness he explores; significant acts of displacement 
and projection keep him from experiencing ecosublimity.’ 58  It is not until he 
experiences a violent encounter with a bear that a degree of sublimity, or a jolt 
sufficient to bring nature out of its depletionist aesthetic (or culturally-displaced) status 
as the backdrop for human cultural enterprise, is experienced.  
 
Rozelle describes how ‘the clash that ensues titillates and horrifies Rodman’, a 
paradoxical sensation typical to almost all notions of sublimity since Burke, through 
Kant, to Schelling, Coleridge and the twentieth-century postmoderns, such as Lyotard, 
Jameson and Žižek.59 Moreover, ‘[t]his spark of perverse bliss occurs where culture and 
nature glance off one another in conflict.’ 60  While supporting a dichotomous !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 32. 
56 Rozelle, Ecosublime. p. 14-15. 
57 Morton, Ecology, pgs. 82-3. 
58 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 16. 
59 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 17. 
60 Ibid. 
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opposition, Rozelle sees the ecosublime in a mostly unacknowledged, yet loosely 
Lacanian way, or in terms of an incursion of the unconscious Real into the Symbolic 
fabric: ‘…as metonym for the forest, the bear seeks to diffuse the crew’s enlightened 
destiny in the void.’61 Although the ecosublime moment is not truly attained by 
Rodman, however, a degree of sublimity nevertheless serves to unsettle the 
expansionist, frontier Imaginary that would support Rodman’s assumption of human 
control over nature, rendering it distinct from the domestications implicit to judgements 
of beauty, which would in their own way capture and ‘tame’ the non-human biome, as 
can be extrapolated from Kant’s aesthetics.  
 
It is in this preliminary fashion that Rozelle offers a diagnosis of North American 
expansionism by way of Poe’s literary invention, albeit without seeming to fully 
acknowledge the debt his project owes to twentieth-century symptomatological 
thinking: ‘By beautifying the substrate, debasing it as game, making anthropomorphic 
projections, and depicting Rodman’s perverse death wish, Poe reveals nascent 
pathologies of the American depletionist’.62 Such statements, regarding nation-centered 
‘pathologies’, are never followed up by any thorough analysis of the mechanisms of the 
drives, or of the basis of desire in representation, specifically as a thinker like Žižek 
would assemble these after a critique of the role of fantasy in supporting capitalist 
ideology. Moving to a reading of Isabella Bird, however, who ‘uses literary depictions 
of environmental apprehension and comprehension to litigate for increasingly 
domesticated spaces’, Rozelle offers something of an justification by discussing why 
Freud proves only halfway germane to his project.63  
 
A proto-environmentalist text, which, in its emphasis upon the frontier miner, 
reports upon their ‘turning the earth inside out, making it hideous’, A Lady’s Life in The 
Rocky Mountains (1879) reveals ‘ecocidal vistas of horror’ of ‘a West being torn and 
discarded.’64 It is the sublimity experienced by Bird’s narrator, that ‘supersedes’ the 
beautiful qualities of the ‘frontier symbolic.’65 Rozelle expands upon his conception of 
an ecosublime by describing it as an ‘ecological “oceanic”’, once again drawing !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 19. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 20. 
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directly upon that ‘something limitless, unbounded’ that characterises the Freudian 
oceanic in Civilization and Its Discontents, and which Freud elsewhere describes as ‘a 
feeling of an indissoluble bond, of being one with the external world as a whole.’66 
Although Freud recognised the necessity of studying such a universal human sensation, 
it was one that he himself deemed to be infantile and primitive, one that could only give 
rise to the ills of organised religion and which must therefore be repressed for the good 
of civilisation; such a clear statement of secular suspicion, particularly when supported 
by passages upon the need for separation under an individualistic logic of fulfilment, 
gives Rozelle to reject Freud, whom he denigrates on the basis that he unashamedly 
‘embodies the anti-ecological posture of the post-Enlightenment West.’67  
 
And yet inasmuch as the work of Poe and Bird dramatises ‘the social realities of 
clear-cutting, strip mining, and species decline in nineteenth-century America’, it would 
surely benefit from a reading after Lacan’s primary conceit of the Symbolic Order (or 
Big Other), which, in its dialectical relationship with the Real, enables analysis of such 
depletionism at the level of precisely those ‘social realities’ and the necessary 
sublimations and fantasies that inform them.68 As we saw in our study of Žižek’s 
Lacanian understanding of Kantian aesthetics, this would enable us to understand how a 
Master Signifier draws together or ‘quilts’ all of the other elemental terms under a 
broader ideological rubric. Thus, whilst Rozelle’s text appears outwardly ‘ecoclinical’, 
particularly in his undeveloped notion of a ‘frontier symbolic’, a term deployed but 
once in the entire chapter, he fails to acknowledge the link between sublimation, the 
Symbolic and sublimity in Lacanian psychoanalysis, and which, as we have begun to 
show, would truly enable us to renegotiate eco-ethical formation.      
 
Having attributed first-wave ecocriticism to a particular cultural and historical 
milieu, we must therefore sustain the extension of our analyses in a methodological 
connection, considering what post-Kantian accounts of the sublime loan to the 
ecocritical second-wave. This enables us to explore more precisely the metacritical 
shortcomings of a thesis that, whilst initially promising, fails to foreground human !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Rozelle, Ecosublime, pgs. 64-5. See also Freud, Sigmund. Civilisation and Its Discontents. Trans. 
James Strachey. (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1962). p 12. 
67 Rozelle, Ecosublime, 21. 
68 Rozelle, Ecosublime, 12, emphasis added. 
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subjectivity in precisely the manner that would sufficiently dispel the ‘constructionist 
axiom’ its author claims to reject.69 By citing Aaron Dunckel’s essay on Shelley in the 
light of ‘purely external aspects of the environment’, Rozelle admires his colleague’s 
conviction that such externality, achievable by way of a sublime epiphany, ‘enables if 
not permanent release from, [then] at least a deep questioning of cultural (perhaps even 
‘multicultural’) solipsism.’70 Yet Rozelle is the first to recognise the manner in which 
any ecological questioning of the ego and valorisation of the noumenal world is 
‘undone’ by the first chapter of Lawrence Buell’s Writing for an Endangered World 
(2001), in which pure externality is chased away by the implication of the human 
subject in ‘essential networks’, in an interdependent web of biospheric being that 
knows no separation.71 
 
Resting as it does upon the power of sublimity to inspire ethical advocacy, if 
Rozelle’s notion of an ‘ecosublime’ suggests a re-negotiation of the ‘stumbling block’ 
that would keep an ‘object-centred activity’ (mere experience of the sublime) from 
begetting a ‘subject-centred activity’ (sublime as spur to environmental advocacy), then 
we might ask if his difficulties are not chiefly Symbolic? Can Rozelle’s ‘failure’ not 
here be diagnosed (and perhaps even ‘cured’) by way of an ‘eco-clinical’ analysis that 
would not only understand the relationship between fantasmatic symptoms and 
unconscious drives, but moreover, do so without becoming enmeshed in ‘unecological’ 
discourses of interiority? Given the degree of egoic turmoil that Rozelle acknowledges 
the experience of ecosublimity to provoke—and thus the level of post-social, ecological 
awareness that this would in turn augur—his theoretical basis seems nothing short of 
inhibited, hampered by way of precisely the sort of anti-theoretical (yet deeply 
ideological) ‘innocence’ that we acknowledged at length in our first chapter, and 
oblivious, it seems, to how essential Lacan’s post-Freudian reading of sublimity might 
be in this regard—for the very fact, it seems, that it bears a relationship to Freud at all.72  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 6. 
70 Dunckel, Aaron. ‘‘Mont Blanc’: Shelley’s Sublime Allegory of the Real.’ The Greening of Literary 
Scholarship: Literature, Theory, and the Environment. Ed. Steven Rosendale. (Iowa City: University of 
Iowa Press, 2002). 207-223. p. 221. 
71 Buell, Lawrence. Writing for an Endangered World: Literature, Culture, and Environment in the U.S. 
And Beyond. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). p. 6. 
72 Lacan addresses sublimity in his seminar on The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, describing it as ‘an object 
raised to the level of the (impossible-real) Thing’. That is to say, with Kant the Sublime designates the 
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Deeming it both ‘anachronistic’ and insufficiently ‘ecological’ to pursue 
psychoanalysis beyond the superficial supply of rhetorical terminology, the opening 
chapters of Ecosublime have, as we have seen, asserted that the psychoanalyst 
‘embodies the anti-ecological posture of the post-Enlightenment West’ as part of a 
declaration that seems undeniably heartfelt, yet more than a little shortsighted where the 
relative inhumanity (or ‘pre-individual’ non-humanity) of the passions or drives—the 
‘Real’ of the symptom for Freud, Lacan and Žižek—would impinge upon the 
sovereignty of the humanist ‘I think’ (be it ‘ecologically’-engaged or instrumentalist 
and depredatory in manifestation).73 Two (admittedly brief) indictments of Freud’s 
negativity cement Rozelle’s general conviction that psychoanalytical nature-writing is 
tantamount to anti-ecologism, specifically where the ‘oceanic’ connectedness with the 
external world as given in Civilization and Its Discontents is ineffectual for being all 
too readily subsumed under organised religious and nationalistic frameworks; a 
purview that for Rozelle would neglect the interdependencies sine qua non to an 
enhanced sense of ecological embeddedness.74 Žižek freely admits that ‘Lacanian 
theory is perhaps the most radically contemporary version of the enlightenment’, but 
this should of course be taken as part of a broader strategy undermining of capitalist 
ideology and thus by extension, of depredatory instrumentalism.75 
 
Underwriting, as it does, much of Žižek’s ideological theory, sublimity can be 
said to mark ‘the impotence and nullity of Man (as a part of nature) when he is exposed 
to a powerful display of natural forces that evokes, in a negative way, his greatness as a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
relation of an inner-worldly, empirical, sensuous object to Ding an sich to the transcendent, trans-
phenomenal, unattainable Thing-in-itself. 
73 Deleuze suggests that Freud’s interest in pathology indicates a break with the German Idealist 
tradition: ‘if Freud was completely on the side of an Hegelian post-Kantianism—in other words, of an 
unconscious opposition—why did he pay so much homage to the Leibnizian Fechner and to his 
‘symptomatologist’s differential finesse?’ See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. (London: Continuum, 
2004). p.133. 
74 The reference is to the first chapter of Das Unbehagen in der Kultur [Civilization and Its Discontents] 
(1930), in which Freud appears to valorise individuality as integral to the success of civilisation, 
denigrating the ‘oceanic’ feeling as infantile, primitive and spiritual, and recommending an emphasis on 
individual satisfaction or enjoyment as an index of independence from the world. See Freud, Sigmund. 
Civilization and Its Discontents. Vol. 21 of The Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund 
Freud. (London: Hogarth Press, 1961). pgs. 17, 20. 
75 Žižek, Sublime, p. 7. 
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noumenal ethical subject.’76 If the ‘networks’ that Lawrence Buell would rightly 
advance in lieu of outmoded subject-object dichotomies are to be upheld, does the 
‘supersensibility’ of the ‘noumenal ethical subject’—the fact that it is not an object but 
rather that which gives objects, and therefore precisely the form that would condition 
any ‘content’—not keep the sublime tied to the Freud-o-Lacanian dialectic of the 
Symbolic-Real?  
 
This would at once both support and challenge Rozelle’s basic alteration of the 
essential question “Who am I?” to “Where am I?”, which he poses within ‘the context 
of our current crisis as it emotively and materially relocates the human self as 
ecological niche’, by way of a dialectical displacement.77 If Rozelle’s desire is to 
explore how ‘crises of progress’ serve to ‘transfigure our conceptual hardware from 
delimitation to niche consciousness’, a desire that necessarily appears Symbolically-
determined, then it is one that might benefit from the violent exchange of affects in 
Lacan’s late writings on art and literature, particularly when, as Ettinger shows, ‘we 
enter the drive, jouissance and art via the same cavity, where they exchange affects, 
where art by accumulating potentiality shakes frontiers of sense into becoming 
thresholds, and infuses changes in culture.’78 Rozelle’s notion that ‘a realization of 
ecological crisis can also be acquired through mediated or represented environments’ 
then seems perfectly sympathetic when he states that ‘there is no affective difference 
between the natural sublime and the rhetorical ecosublime; both have the power to 
bring the viewer, the reader, or player to heightened awareness of real natural 
environments.’79 
 
Whilst insisting that ‘[b]oth can promote advocacy’, Rozelle’s thesis nevertheless 
excludes an extended treatment on literary form, offering instead a non-formalist 
approach that again celebrates the mere content of a literary work; ‘Poe’s Julius 
Rodman and Nathanael West’s Miss Lonelyhearts are two characters […] who do not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 Žižek, Parallax, p. 164. 
77 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 1. 
78 ‘Art, says Lacan, is related to jouissance through the ‘anatomy’ of a cavity (vacuole). An inaccessible 
trace of a lacking part-object—objet a—‘tickles the Thing (das Ding) from within’ and this is ‘the 
essential quality of everything we call art.’’ See Ettinger, Bracha Lichtenberg. 'Trans-Subjective 
Transferential Borderspace'. A Shock To Thought: Expression After Deleuze and Guattari. Ed. Brian 
Massumi. (London: Routledge, 2002): 215-239. p. 217. 
79 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 7. 
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experience ecosublimity, but their inability to actualize the referent perhaps enables 
readers to perceive the world anew.’80 Other characters ‘do experience the ecosublime 
moment. This occurs because their interactions generate in them the awe of integration 
with the ecological (apprehension) and the terror in realizing the tentativeness and 
incalculable uncertainty of their world (comprehension).’81 It must therefore be our 
business here to not merely critique Rozelle, but instead to affirm his premise as 
entirely worthwhile whilst extending it by offering a more thorough engagement with 
the formalist and ontological theories he would deem, as he does Freud’s 
psychoanalysis, un-germane and depletionist.  
 
Such a strategic reversal, however counter-intuitive, serves to underpin any eco-
clinical orientation keen to account for desire qua ‘life’. As Colebrook has shown, we 
might obtain (at least) two philosophies of ‘vitalism’ (or ‘life’) with which to 
reinvigorate prevailing approaches to (eco)literature and which hinge upon contrasting 
understandings of ‘meaning’ and ‘sense’ as they express vitality.82 On the one hand, a 
comforting because ‘self-enclosed’ relation to the world can be had, predicated as this 
typically is upon the satisfying and identitarian unities of meaning; on the other hand, 
we discern what Colebrook describes as the ‘dream of a pure and unimpeded 
becoming’, a properly ‘Deleuzian’ assertion that tallies in useful ways with Alfred 
Tauber’s observation that in Thoreau, for example, we obtain ‘competing claims for the 
self—one of independence and one of responsibility; one based on autonomy, the other 
on relation.’83 Remaining concerned as it does with meaning, Žižek’s work, inspired in 
part by Freud’s dichotomy between the survivalism of the bounded ego and the promise 
of the ‘oceanic feeling’ obtainable through the annihilations of the death drive, the 
phenomenal/noumenal relation in Kantian aesthetics and moral philosophy is one that 
Žižek advances as essential to knowing the meaning of freedom for beings situated 
within Nature.84 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 Ibid. 
81 Rozelle, Ecosublime, pgs. 7-8. 
82 Colebrook, Claire. Deleuze and the Meaning of Life. (London: Continuum, 2010). pgs. 36-7. 
83 Colebrook, Meaning, p. 38; Tauber, Thoreau, p. 165. 
84 ‘[T]he ultimate parallax, the third space between phenomena and the noumenon itself, is the subject’s 
freedom/spontaneity, which—although, of course, it is not the property of a phenomenal entity, so that it 
cannot be dismissed as a false appearance which conceals the noumenal fact that we are totally caught in 
an inaccessible necessity—is also not simply noumenal’; and thus, ‘[o]ur freedom persists only in a space 
in between the phenomenal and the noumenal’. See Žižek. Parallax. pgs. 22-23. 
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If Rozelle’s concerns amount to a ‘materialist’ rather than ‘idealist’ approach, 
ones that would reject psychoanalysis as evidence of the latter, then at the very least he 
might have made better use of Leo Marx’s The Machine in the Garden: Technology 
and the Pastoral Ideal in America (1964), a text published prior to the first-wave 
institutional rise of eco-literary research, and which supplies an important proto-
ecocritical illustration of the mid-nineteenth-century ‘technological sublime’ as it 
pertains to the exhilaration prompted by the industrial networks of early capitalist 
America. Marx draws upon (amongst other sources) the literary figure of Melville’s 
Ahab, the great avatar of American individualism and entrepreneurship at its most 
maniacally obsessive and who in ‘identif[ying] his will with the power of machines’, 
powerfully figures a sentiment shared by a great many of his fellow countrymen, who 
under the day’s ‘rhetoric of progress’ held that the railways, steamboats, bridges, dams 
and other “improvements” confirmed that rapid New World industrialisation enabled 
the nation ‘to see the sublime progress of the race.’85  
 
This specific motivation of a pre-Futurist, technological ‘sublime’ should aid in 
maintaining a sufficiently problematic status for the concept, particularly where, as 
Jameson notes, ‘revolutionary or communist artists of the 1930s also sought to 
reappropriate this excitement of machine energy for a Promethean reconstruction of 
human society as a whole’, an essential consideration for any sense of the sublime as 
more than merely a preservationist spur to an idealised ‘Green’ eschewal of 
technological culture, and problematised further after Lawrence Buell’s observation 
that Thoreau himself, the retiring ‘hermit’ of Walden Pond and ‘sponsor of 
technological devolution’, found ‘railroads and telegraphs’ more exciting than not.’86  
 
It is this contradictory desire for that which would ultimately effect biospheric 
depredation—an industrial culture that would inspire its own propagation by way of a 
sublime exhilaration—that Rozelle elects not to pursue after the elementary eco-clinical 
approach his work hints at. Given his alleged concern with the American ‘ecocidal 
imagination’—with that which subsists below the ‘ego’—and as such with the ‘nascent !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
85 Marx, Leo. The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America.  (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). (1964). Pgs. 196-7. 
86 Jameson, Postmodernism, p. 36. See also, Buell, Environmental, p. 149. 
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pathologies of the American depletionist’, Rozelle invokes ‘ego’ along with what he 
terms ‘biocentric jouissance’ and therefore ‘lack’ as these notions relate to modernist 
descriptions of place in T. S. Eliot and Nathaniel West, even going so far as to link 
them with an un-referenced but surely Lacanian conception of the ‘signifying chain’.87 
Yet as we have noted above, such concerns would almost certainly initiate an 
ecoclinical perspective, despite (if they were endorsed in full) leaning towards a 
normative, Lacanian ontology. Such terms appear so fleetingly (in these three pages 
alone) as to offer little more than an indication of a potential approach rather than a 
mature thesis proper, and no sustained analysis follows their initial appearance.88 
Where, by contrast, a writer like Timothy Morton would acknowledge the degree to 
which ecocultural criticism must embrace psychoanalytic thought if it is to get at the 
‘strange strangeness’ of our species’ biotic implication, Rozelle appears not so much 
allergic to any such suggestion, as quite simply stunned by the horizon to which his 
own project gestures—by trying to engage an eco-valent stripe of Kantian subjectivism 
in the present day, whilst circumventing a long century of psychoanalytic debate and 
conjecture.89 !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
87 Rozelle, Ecosublime, pgs. 8, 36, 38. 
88 In a personal correspondence with the author, Rozelle said: ‘The ecocriticism that I admire uses theory 
to ultimately foster scientifically learned and biocentric/ecocentric worldview & knowledge.  It is finally 
political. So after reading Atwood’s Surfacing (1972), for example, I can definitely see how Lacan can be 
employed. I am skeptical of works that can’t quite decide whether their concerns are inward or outward, 
the result being a book with a sufficiently green title but really interested in anthropocentric models & 
theory.’ [personal email to the author 15/1/10]. 
89 In fairness, Rozelle’s study pre-dates Morton’s by one year. See Morton, Timothy. Ecology Without 
Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007). 
 100 
 
3: Violent Signs II 
 101 
 
(i) Towards an Ecological Pathos: Stratoanalysis and Sympathy 
 
There is no judgement in sympathy, but agreements of convenience  
between bodies of all kinds. 
—Deleuze1 
 
This chapter has two principal aims. Firstly, it considers how Deleuze and 
Guattari’s impersonal and productive model of the unconscious breaks with the 
psychoanalytic logic of signification we have thus far prescribed. Whilst a 
psychoanalytic mode of ideology critique has enabled us to broach those historical and 
aesthetic concerns facing eco-literary research, Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia project can help us to exceed any emphasis upon subjectivity and 
interpretation, which, we will argue, can only take us so far in understanding the ‘eco-
clinical’ problematic. Secondly, therefore, we will emphasise how the schizoanalytic 
model of the unconscious advanced in Anti-Oedipus (1972/1977) is in many respects 
inherently ‘ecological’, particularly when we acknowledge its subsequent extension into 
the concept of ‘assemblage’ and the notion of ‘stratoanalysis’ presented in such later 
volumes as Dialogues (1977/1996), Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature (1975/1986), 
and A Thousand Plateaus (1980/1988).  
The extent to which schizoanalysis and stratoanalysis remain broadly 
synonymous will prove decisive for the latter half of our thesis, particularly when we 
consider how both terms invoke highly specific conceptions of ‘multiplicity’ and 
‘exteriority’, both of which remain principal to Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis on desire, 
whether given in terms of ‘desiring-production’ in Anti-Oedipus, or in terms of 
assemblage in their later works.2 These terms will have numerous implications for the 
eco-literary and eco-psychological conjunction, particularly when we acknowledge how 
Deleuze and Guattari indicate a non-personological ‘pathos’ or ‘sympathy’, a dynamic 
form of ‘convenience’ between bodies of all kinds and which enables us to exceed the 
                                                
1 Deleuze, Gilles and Claire Parnet. Dialogues. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987). p. 52. 
2 Whilst it is useful to note that the latter term assemblage does to some extent replace the duality of 
desiring machines/BwO as given in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, we will not here concern 
ourselves with what is self-evidently a finer point in Deleuze studies per se. 
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Kantian-Lacanian emphasis on judgement and lack we acknowledged in Žižek’s psycho-
political theory in chapter two. Informed as it is in key ways by a highly literary, yet 
entirely non-signifying and ‘pragmatic’ conception of language, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
‘machinic’ ontology of assemblage, process or agencement motivates an altogether 
different ethico-aesthetic, offering an affirmative conception of desire qua Life and 
which underwrites their immanent account of the emergence, production and 
transformation of the actual world.  
Crucially, this conception of desire informs Deleuze and Guattari’s non-
personological understanding of ‘delirium’, an affirmative revaluation of clinical 
pathologies that moreover emphasises their zoological, sociological and world-historical 
contents. Taken together with the ecological implications of Jakob von Uexküll’s notion 
of umwelt and his studies of animal behaviour, the process philosophy of Alfred North 
Whitehead and the ecologically-oriented psychology of Gregory Bateson, this already 
broadly ‘eco-clinical’ understanding of desire and delirium will lead us to insist upon the 
importance of multiplicity and assemblage for thinking about environmental writing, 
beyond our forgoing Marxo-Lacanian concerns with ‘Green’ ideology. Extending from 
Deleuze’s earliest work, in which a ‘transcendental empiricist’ conception of ‘habit’ 
developed a Spinozist stripe of immanence in line with a British empiricist insistence 
upon ‘procedures’ or ‘functions’ rather than principles, Deleuze’s resulting notions of 
‘contraction’ and ‘passive synthesis’ emphasise the milieu or ‘environment’ from which 
all things, beings or entities are constituted and within which they continually ‘become’.  
This proves most significant for the literary-clinical emphasis of our project when 
we consider how Deleuze discerns this ‘superior empiricism’ in a selection of Anglo-
American literary figures, a canon equal in many respects to the ‘nomadic’ philosophical 
tradition he discerns in Spinoza, Leibniz, Nietzsche and Bergson, and which is 
characterised by its habitual substitution of the multiplicitous AND over the indicative IS 
of discrete Being. Comprised of amongst other writers, T. E. Lawrence, Virginia Woolf, 
and Henry Miller, this experimental practice at the heart of Deleuze’s ‘literary clinic’ 
delivers its ‘wild’ or superior empiricism by way of ‘affects’ and ‘percepts’ rather than 
concepts.3 Significantly for this, our first engagement with Deleuze and Guattari, it will 
                                                
3 ‘Because empiricism is like the English novel. It is a case of philosophizing as a novelist, of being a 
novelist in philosophy.’ Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 68. 
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be equally key to note how the Deleuzian literary clinic is informed by such honorary 
Anglo-Americans as Marcel Proust and Franz Kafka as by the science and psychology of 
Uexküll, Whitehead and Bateson. The clinical-critical syncretism that Deleuze and 
Guattari enter into draws the literary, the philosophical, and the scientific together in a 
manner that a number of ecocritics have tentatively attempted, yet hitherto without 
producing a sufficiently clinical analysis of such significantly ‘un-ecological’ factors as 
the nuclear family structure. 
As we will see, by advancing literary usages of language, schizoanalysis posits its 
clinical-political critique after an a-signifying semiotic that dispenses with the 
psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious as the stage upon which the Oedipal 
psychodrama is played out. What this means for eco-literary research is that just as 
common-sensical notions of neurosis and psychosis are transformed by Deleuze and 
Guattari’s emphasis upon multiplicity and the exteriority of relations, by a reconception 
of desire that demotes interiority after the ‘pure’ exteriority of the virtual as the 
‘transcendental’ field of emergence that exceeds Kant’s subjective transcendentalism, so 
too are those common-sensical assumptions pertaining to what ‘the environment’ 
amounts to. Schizoanalysis and after it stratoanalysis therefore enable us to recast notions 
of identity, literature and ‘bio-diversity’ in markedly eco-clinical ways, chiefly by 
delivering a post-Romantic ‘mechanosphere’ beyond any bio-centric ecological 
hypothesis.4 Just as the representational logic inherent to the nuclear family is revealed to 
inhibit a more-than-human grasp of desire, such machinic diversity exceeds the merely 
biological register altogether, including consideration of all manner of geological and 
‘cosmic’ flows, and again attesting to a more-than-human, non-anthropocentric 
orientation that views all of life as perpetually intermezzo or between becomings.  
What the Deleuzian view of Life and literature affords us therefore is insight into 
how language and Life (or more-than-human desire) share a relationship given in terms 
of such becomings, or of active, machinic transformation rather than the passive 
negativities of mimesis and representation. For Deleuze and Guattari desire is an 
assembling, combining and arrogating force, always already inclusive of a range of 
zoological and other non-human elements, forces and affects in the production of all 
                                                
4 ‘There is no biosphere or noosphere, but everywhere the same mechanosphere.’ Deleuze and Guattari, 
Plateaus, p. 69. 
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manner of non-filiative hybridisations and which destabilise inherited Being via active 
experimentation. As we will see, whilst the literature of Proust enables us to exceed 
normative, or familial and Oedipal readings of desire, the writing of Kafka proves 
especially salient to understanding the dynamic commingling of utterances and bodies 
typically read in terms of the Symbolic Law or judgement. Productive of multiple 
‘becomings-other’, such commingling will enable us to redress psychoanalytic 
approaches to such pressing concerns as Climate Change, concerns that are shaped and 
disseminated by scientific and media usages of language. Once we have considered the 
importance of Deleuze’s Proustian semiotic to our ‘ecological pathos’ or ‘sympathy’, we 
might therefore address the ‘eco-virtuous’ component of ‘eco-social’ transformation after 
Deleuze and Guattari’s Kafka-inspired thesis on ‘collective assemblages of enunciation’.  
In this way, therefore, we have already begun to acknowledge how a Deleuzian 
eco-clinic differs from a nominally Marxo-Lacanian one. If schizoanalysis reconfigures 
our understanding of subjectivity after its already broadly ‘ecological’ outlook, then it in 
turn transforms our motivation of symptomatology as a core concern of our eco-clinic. 
Although Deleuze’s earliest writings on literature embrace the Nietzschean 
symptomatology of active and reactive forces, one that diagnoses cultural value-
formation in terms of the affirmation or denial of Life processes, it is here our business to 
consider how whilst informed by such a symptomatology, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
schizoanalytic and stratoanalytic projects offer something equal to the concrete changes 
recommended by much environmental rhetoric. By exceeding a merely diagnostic 
approach, Deleuze and Guattari’s work comes to assert the ‘therapeutic’ potential 
imparted by a post-psychoanalytic grasp of pre-personal affects, singular points and the 
exteriority of relations. As we will see, stratoanalysis is in many respects the extension of 
schizoanalysis beyond the ‘internal’ critique of psychoanalysis presented in the Anti-
Oedipus, offering a fully-fledged ‘geo-philosophical’ form of analysis that is as 
politically-engaged as it is clinically-informed, yet which obviates ‘the interiority of a 
substance or subject’, highlighting instead the pre-individual or virtual forces that are 
contracted, captured and stratified in the formation of actual bodies and objects.5  
 
So let us begin to look more thoroughly at how an ‘eco-philosophy’ of this sort 
takes us beyond the privative, Oedipal orientation of the psychoanalyst, and which 
                                                
5 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, p. 9. 
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sustains interiority qua insularity, aiding and abetting the ‘neurotic’ territories of the 
sheltered, suburban lifestyle.6 We will shortly do so in a pointedly literary connection, 
marking the ways in which the literature of Proust has traditionally been read after a 
psychoanalytic bias and which is usefully redressed after Deleuze’s singular and in many 
respects, revolutionary reading of la recherche. What will remain crucial to 
understanding the ‘revolutionary’ nature of such a reading will be grasping the move it 
permits from the interpretation of symptoms as per the psychoanalytic mode to a 
machinic one acknowledging of assemblages and strata; Deleuze and Guattari’s principal 
conceptual innovation, the ‘body without organs’ (BwO), will serve to articulate this 
move, a term that is as literary as it is clinical in provenance.  
 
Yielding ‘a physics of primary or bare matter’, and which speaks of an ‘outside’ 
or purity of matter and function prior to either forming or formalising, Deleuze and 
Guattari derive the BwO as much from Proust, Beckett and Burroughs as from their 
philosophical and scientific readings. A figure for the virtual body or ‘phase-space’ that 
is presupposed by any series of connections whatsoever, it again enables them to 
emphasise multiplicitous processes of emergence and becoming over the illusory 
foundation of static Being.7 In doing so it is crucial to note the extent to which they draw 
on Antonin Artaud’s usage of the BwO as an appeal against the ‘judgement of God’, a 
judgement that in his own schizophrenic delirium Artaud felt to be imposed upon Life by 
organs and which Deleuze and Guattari extend to both organisms and organ-isation in 
general. Taken together with insights from the non-literary philosophies and sciences 
named above, the pathological provenance of the BwO therefore proves integral to a 
post-subjective philosophy of multiplicity that in turn begets a pragmatics focused upon 
the productivity of relations as the proper and primary concern of a machinic ontology.  
 
The BwO will therefore remain key to our assertion of the ecological relationship 
between the ‘schizophrenic’ unconscious and literary production, chiefly insofar as it 
enables us to exceed personological and ideological concerns with the individual, the 
family and the State in favour of analyses of social and historical machines that have 
                                                
6 Ibid. 
7 The notion of the BwO vis-à-vis ‘phase-space’ is more precisely attributed to Manuel DeLanda’s 
markedly ‘scientific’ reading of Deleuze and which draws on Henri Poincare’s terminology to elaborate 
the degrees of movement, freedom or dimensionality of a given system. See in particular DeLanda, 
Manuel. Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy. (London: Continuum, 2002).  
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proven productive of ‘stratified’ relations and formations. This is because the language 
of the personal register, which takes identity, representation and ideology as its focus, 
fails to account for the occupation of the individual by a non-individual, non-subjective 
pathos of virtual affects and singularities that are stratified by the territorialising and 
coding operations of a range of social machines. Whilst this analysis is in certain respects 
akin to the conditioning forces of the Althusserian ‘problematic’ field we considered in 
chapter one, and which was deployed towards analyses of ideological interpellation, the 
Deleuzian problematic extends to analysis of the more-than-human elements that 
comprise any field of relations whatsoever after the thesis on matter and emergence 
acknowledged above. Again, by critiquing identity per se as a ‘neurotic’ concern, one 
that is in many respects aided and abetted by psychoanalysis, we open up an already 
broadly ‘environmental’ sensibility, chiefly via an emphasis upon the immanence of 
diverse ‘milieus’, and from which all entities and individuals are contracted via social 
processes of capture and stratification.  
 
Once more, the critique of neurotic culture implicit in this sensibility and the 
processes of extraction, capture or stratification integral to it will be shown to possess a 
no less clinical relationship to language, to literary ‘creativity’, or the actualisation of 
virtual forces via literary machines that operate within and against the strata, dramatizing 
the relationship between the unformed matters and non-formalised functions of the BwO 
after a conception of the book as literary assemblage. This will again turn upon an 
acknowledgement of language as a-signifying; the intensely literary derivation of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s otherwise Marxo-Freudian notion of desiring-production and its 
passage into a strata-critical geophilosophy turns upon an understanding of what 
language does rather than what it represents. By emphasising the performative 
dimension of language, Deleuze and Guattari are less concerned with literary 
symptomatology as a signifying practice of diagnosis than they are with a microphysics 
or ‘micropolitics’ of desire, and thereafter with the manner in which words, utterances 
and verdicts effect the transformation of bodies and the world or milieu in which they 
are situated.  
  
Accordingly, this chapter marks a turning point in our thesis. As we have begun 
to acknowledge, it is after a micropolitics of actual-virtual relations that we might depart 
from a purely signifying symptomatology, reconnecting with our concerns with 
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surpassing dialectical negativity in chapter one, and engaging a critical-clinical positivity 
towards a more therapeutic orientation, one in which concerns with bodily capability and 
performance outweigh those of meaning and signification. Despite a degree of 
conceptual congruity between the earlier, schizoanalytic term ‘desiring-machines’ and 
that of assemblage in the later works, however, this chapter will privilege the latter term, 
as it appears to offer a more nuanced understanding of environmental language and 
literature, incorporating as it does notions of ‘collective utterances’ and ‘incorporeal 
transformations’ that situate and re-position material bodies.8  Whilst both terms attest to 
the extent to which individuals, organisms and other entities evince ‘territorial’ captures 
of heterogeneous elements and all manner of animal, vegetable, and mineral flows, the 
latter enables us to consider the relationship between the immaterial domain of signs and 
semiotics and the organisation of such material conditions as natural resources and 
geographical boundaries that typically concern any eco-critic, and in a manner that the 
former does not:  
 
In assemblages you find states of things, bodies, various 
combinations of bodies, hodgepodges; but you also find 
utterances, modes of expression, and whole regimes of signs. 
The relations between the two are pretty complex. For 
example, a society is defined not by productive forces and 
ideology, but by ‘hodgepodges’ and ‘verdicts.’ Hodgepodges 
are combinations of interpenetrating bodies. These 
combinations are well-known and accepted (incest, for 
example, is a forbidden combination). Verdicts are collective 
utterances, that is, instantaneous and incorporeal 
transformations which have currency in a society (for 
example, ‘from now on you are no longer a child’…).9 
 
                                                
8 It is key to note how the French term agencement refers not only to constellations, arrangements and 
assemblages, but to their dynamic, non-static and processual nature. As such: ‘We will call an assemblage 
every constellation of singularities and traits deducted from the flow - selected, organized, stratified - in 
such a way as to converge (consistency) artificially and naturally; an assemblage, in this sense, is a 
veritable invention.’ See Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, p. 406. 
9 Deleuze, Gilles. Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995. Trans. Hodges, Ames and 
Mike Taormina. Ed. Lapoujade, David. (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006). p. 177. 
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This imbrication of the material and the immaterial, and which transforms how 
we consider language and desire, chiefly in terms of the manner in which corporeal 
bodies are given new social status by incorporeal transformations, can be motivated for 
eco-clinical research in terms of how it equally revalues what we take ‘health’ to be. By 
first acknowledging language’s essential ‘redundancy’, which is to say, the manner in 
which language is repeated throughout the social field, such that it is without origin in 
individual minds, Deleuze and Guattari again invoke their very particular notion of 
delirium, drawing upon the register of the ‘fourth person’ singular. The association 
between language and schizophrenia in Anti-Oedipus relies upon the phenomenon of 
glossolalia in the schizophrenic unconscious, or the fact that humans are situated within 
flows of language that precede them, filling the allegedly ‘individual’ unconscious with 
national histories, myths, various discourses, and so on. As we will see, in this sense 
there are strong grounds for re-thinking Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of redundancy and 
such trans-cultural ‘memes’ as Climate Change, and moreover in far more literary a 
manner than the approach recently proposed by Joseph Dodds.10 
 
Thus, prior to considering the debt that Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘anti-Oedipal’ 
conception of literature owes to Proust, an influence that enables them to postulate a 
‘new earth’, or a psycho-social sphere of becoming, more precisely defined as ‘the world 
of transverse communications, where the finally conquered nonhuman sex mingles with 
the flowers, a new earth where desire functions according to its molecular elements and 
flows,’ let us first expand our sense of how the Deleuzian view of literary production 
attends to the nonhuman in Man, supplying a window onto an impersonal and largely 
‘unliveable’ dimension of Life, and which nevertheless traverses and conditions the 
human.11 Rather than serving to marshal all of those personal experiences, opinions, 
emotions and identifications that are typically seen to comprise the bildungsroman, the 
family history or other dramatic fictional accounts, the literary figure is for Deleuze 
simultaneously patient and clinician, an experimenter at the threshold or limit of bodily 
and psychic integrity and therefore automatically a cultural diagnostician insofar as 
psycho-social limits are continually addressed and tested.  
                                                
10 Despite the timeliness of his work, Dodds draws chiefly on cinematic examples in making his case and 
then largely after a psychoanalytic bias that constrains the Deleuze-o-Guattarian aspects of his project. See 
Dodds, Joseph. Psychoanalysis and Ecology at the Edge of Chaos: Complexity Theory, Deleuze/Guattari 
and Psychoanalysis for a Climate in Crisis. (London: Routledge, 2011). 
11 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pgs.  350-351. 
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The perspective that the author possesses upon bodily pathos and thinking logos, 
upon the dynamic relationship between the material and the immaterial, can give us to 
reconceive of literature as an assemblage of forces, but moreover as a practice of health, 
or as a commitment to a particular way of living. The act of writing is one of bricolage, 
yet therefore automatically one of becoming. Again, this more-than-personal notion of 
health extends Nietzsche’s valetudinary concerns in such a way as to revalue cultural 
production. In their introduction to A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari 
demonstrate how a book is a machinic assemblage, or a multiplicity that has neither 
subject nor object.12 What this assertion does is again insist upon the impersonal nature 
of language, but also of its outside, upon those ‘sensations, percepts and affects’ that 
make possible the human. One side of an assemblage faces the physico-chemical, 
organic and anthropomorphic ‘strata’, or ‘acts of capture’ that ‘operate by coding and 
territorialization’; in the case of a book, such codes and territories would ‘doubtless make 
of it a kind of organism, or signifying totality, or determination attributable to a 
subject.’13 
 
Crucially, however, this relationship to the strata, which are ‘beneficial in many 
respects and unfortunate in many others’, is balanced by a relationship to the BwO as 
‘plane of consistency’, that which Deleuze and Guattari first described in Anti-Oedipus 
as the agent of disjunction or ‘anti-production’, and which is ‘continually dismantling the 
organism, causing asignifying particles or pure intensities to pass or circulate.’14 In 
addition to the descriptions we have begun to give of it above, therefore, the BwO might 
be conceived of as a figure for the ‘death’ that coexists with and makes possible Life 
beyond the Freudian conception of the death drive. Such an impersonal conception of 
language, of desire, territories, books and the regimes of signs that Deleuze and Guattari 
describe, have great bearing upon our understanding of eco-literary production, chiefly 
insofar as they recast writing itself as becoming, as a ‘delirious’ negotiation with those 
material forces we habitually consider ourselves to be independent of.  
 
In this way, then, our first point, concerning Deleuze and Guattari’s break with 
                                                
12 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, p. 4.  
13 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, pgs. 4, 40.  
14 Ibid. 
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interpretation, will be addressed in terms of their schizoanalytic project, particularly 
insofar as this enables us to reckon with the paranoid, Oedipal form that enforces a sense 
of separation from worldly forces and equally, the notion of writing as a signifying 
practice. Whilst Marxo-Lacanian ideology critique relies upon both conceits for its 
efficacy, Deleuze and Guattari aver that: ‘Literature is an assemblage. It has nothing to 
do with ideology. There is no ideology and never has been. All we talk about are 
multiplicities, lines, strata and segmentarities, lines of flight and intensities, machinic 
assemblages and their various types, bodies without organs and their construction and 
selection... Writing has nothing to do with signifying. It has to do with surveying, 
mapping, even realms that are yet to come.’15 Needless to say, such an approach takes its 
part in a ‘geo-philosophical’ project that is self-evidently ‘eco-philosophical’ in all but 
name.  
 As we have begun to indicate, Deleuze and Guattari’s project breaks in important 
ways with Žižek’s approach as considered in our last chapter, with its Lacanian emphasis 
upon master signifiers and ‘sublime objects of ideology’. Although it might appear that 
at this juncture our eco-clinic has simply substituted one clinical vocabulary for another, 
the truth of the matter is far more technical, turning upon the fact that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia project not only demotes ideology in its bio-
political analyses of organisms and the State, but in the process draws more substantially 
upon literature in both its formulation and exposition, whereas Žižek’s psychoanalytic 
engagement with German Idealism generally does not. Moreover, Deleuze and Guattari 
privilege a model of the unconscious as a schizophrenic process of production, of pre-
personal affects and ‘transverse communications’ that explicitly revalues our 
understanding of man/nature in a manner that Žižek’s symptomnal concerns with the 
structural ambiguities of Kantian moral philosophy do not.16 
 
Again, not only does Deleuze and Guattari’s insistence upon a non-
personological unconscious in Anti-Oedipus draw upon a great many literary figures in 
                                                
15 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, pgs. 4-5. 
16 ‘…we make no distinction between man and nature: the human essence of nature and the natural essence 
of man become one within nature in the form of production or industry, just as they do within the life of 
man as a species… man and nature are not like two opposite terms confronting each other… rather they are 
one and the same essential reality, the producer-product. Production as process overtakes all idealistic 
categories and constitutes a cycle whose relationship to desire is that of an immanent principle.’ Deleuze 
and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pgs. 4-5. 
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its development, but in the process forges a link between a non-signifying semiotic and 
literary usages of language. As we have already suggested, understanding the distinction 
Deleuze and Guattari draw between normative linguistic models of language, in which an 
inherent order or equilibrium presides over the process of signification, and the power 
that high modern literary experimentation possesses to disarticulate dominant forms of 
expression, remains crucial to understanding the break their project makes with orthodox 
psychoanalysis. Not only will this subsequently enable us to understand the 
geophilosophical relationship between the organic and socio-political strata that 
stratoanalysis takes as its focus, but moreover to conceive of how a-signifying signs 
benefit our eco-clinic insofar as they can be said to trigger material processes of 
production.17  
 
Crucially, therefore, we will consider how, amongst numerous other resources, 
the Capitalism and Schizophrenia project draws upon the literature of Proust, offering a 
critical-clinical position on the relationship between delirium and semiotic production, 
and which opens up the very sense of worldly embeddedness and emplacement that 
ecocritics typically seek to explore; the signs emitted by earthly, social and aesthetic 
‘worlds’, and which La recherché is so renowned for cataloguing, can be seen to 
indicate, amongst other things, a productive delirium or ‘pathos’, and which after 
Deleuze again remains broadly ‘ecological’. Essentially, the ‘delirium of interpretation’ 
that Deleuze discerns in Proust opens up a significant conversion from a logic of 
interpretation to one of production, going on to underwrite the inherently political 
orientation of the broader, Capitalism and Schizophrenia project. In his earlier study, 
Proust and Signs (1964/1976, 1973/2000), Deleuze had already suggested Charlus as a 
schizophrenic figure who powerfully dramatises this process, and who therefore enables 
us to rethink the relationship between symptoms and signs, between effects and causes, 
between organised bodies (or ‘territories’) and unorganised matter.18  
                                                
17 We will follow the work of Ronald Bogue, Mark Bonta and John Protevi in this connection. See Bogue, 
Ronald. Deleuze and Guattari. (London: Routledge, 1989). p. 138. Also, Bonta, Mark and John Protevi. 
‘Preface’. Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Glossary and Guide. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2004). vii-ix. 
18 ‘…anyone who listens to Charlus or who meets his gaze finds himself confronting a secret, a mystery to 
be penetrated, to be interpreted, which he presents from the start as likely to proceed to the point of 
madness. And the necessity of interpreting Charlus is based on the fact that this Charlus himself interprets, 
as if it were his own madness, as if that were already his delirium, a delirium of interpretation.’ Deleuze, 
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It is in this way that the notion of the symptom, tied as it typically remains to 
psychoanalytic concerns with a personological unconscious, will be supplanted by that of 
the BwO or plane of consistency. By bearing a very particular relationship to the 
unformed or ‘formless’ domain of matter that Deleuze and Guattari maintain as essential 
to grasping the relationship between bodily pathos and semiotic logos, between 
production and anti-production, it will be crucial to note how this domain is presupposed 
by any instance of writing practice, whether ‘nature writing’ or otherwise, but thereby 
how the literary relationship to collective assemblages of enunciation is potentially a 
utopian one, opening up, chiefly via the earlier, schizoanalytic concern with delirium, 
questions of individual and societal ‘health’ vis-a-vis new modes of expression adequate 
to new modes of life. The formal and semiotic experimentation that such writers as 
Kafka, Beckett and Proust engaged in are therefore shown to be more than simply 
symptomatological or diagnostic in the Nietzschean sense, a sensibility that Deleuze 
maintained throughout his earlier, individually-authored writings, but moreover, actively 
‘eco-clinical’, chiefly insofar as they incorporate a ‘therapeutic’ concern with a form of 
impersonal transference that ultimately exceeds psychoanalytic subjectivism.  
 
And so although a French rather than an American writer, this mode of 
transference and the concept of the BwO can be explored in terms of the ‘sympathies’ 
that Proust’s writings make palpable. Beyond his status as an exemplary semiotician, and 
as a literary-philosophical thinker of temporality par excellence, Proust is afforded an 
honorary status in Deleuze’s ‘superior’ Anglo-American literary canon, chiefly on the 
grounds that his writing offers more than a window upon the bourgeois social worlds of 
pre-war France, and rather a post-subjectivist understanding of delirium that proves 
crucial to Deleuze and Guattari’s delirious notion of a ‘new earth’; the example of 
Charlus, but also those of Albertine and Marcel in the pages of La recherché invests all 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s later writings on individuation with a utopian sensibility, yet 
one in which the new earth relates to ‘human’ desire as much as to the world of material 
flows from which it is ‘assembled’, and which therefore contribute in key ways to the 
                                                                                                                                      
Gilles. Proust and Signs: the Complete Text. Trans. Richard Howard. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000). p. 172.  
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BwO as their literary-political figure for the relationship between bodily organisation and 
unformed matter.19  
 
At bottom, therefore, the BwO provides the key to understanding the connection 
we will here rely upon between schizoanalysis and stratoanalysis, between assemblages 
and literature, and thereby, to understanding the relationship between the human, the 
biome and the three principal strata—the physico-chemical, organic, and 
anthropomorphic. It will therefore prove decisive for the remainder of our thesis, not 
least where we emphasise the literary-clinical sensibility of Deleuze’s notion of 
‘sympathy’, which will prove essential to our notion of ecological pathos, and which 
marks the affirmation of both the non-equilibrial states of the biosphere and those of 
human delirium and other ‘pathic’ states; the world and the ego/self are more 
appropriately (and more productively) conceived of after the BwO than after 
psychoanalytic models of individual, social and biospheric wholeness, totality or 
equilibrium.  
Where a stratoanalysis would begin by asking the seemingly absurd question 
‘who does the earth think it is?’, we can then proceed to observe how this is a question 
that ultimately rests upon the schizoanalytic concern with delirium as much as upon the 
incorporeal transformations that Deleuze and Guattari attribute to regimes of signs in A 
Thousand Plateaus, and which take their part in the organisation and capture of life by 
way of ‘order words’ (mots de ordre). Taken together, these post-symptomatological and 
geo-philosophical terms and concepts will enable us to understand the eco-political 
consequence of aesthetic and semiotic experimentation in a manner that begins to 
connect them to scientific concerns with species and populations, and which will be key 
for our analysis of evolutionary biology and archetypal myth after Glen Love’s 
ecocriticism in chapter four. 
 
                                                
19 As Surin has acknowledged, a great many non-anglophone writers comprise Deleuze’s honorary ‘Anglo-
American’ canon, including Lautréamont, Hölderlin, Ghérasim Luca, Artaud, Genet, François Villon, 
Gombrowicz and Tournier. Surin identifies the omission of Proust from this roster after the negative 
remarks made by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus where they indict him ‘for seeking a 
salvation through art, ‘a still Catholic salvation’, as opposed to finding a salvation ‘in real life’, which is 
where the Anglo-American novel locates it’. See Surin, Kenneth. ‘The Deleuzian Imagination of 
Geoliterature.’ Deleuze and Literature. Eds. Ian Buchanan and John Marks. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2000): 167-193. p. 188. See also, Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, p. 186.     
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(ii) Proust as an Eco-Clinical Thinker? 
 
 
Let us begin, then, by conceiving of how Proust’s literature enables us to invoke 
Deleuze’s notion of ‘sympathy’ as a geophilosophical link between schizoanalysis and 
stratoanalysis. We can do so by first considering how in The Gardens of Desire: Marcel 
Proust and the Fugitive Sublime (2004), Stephen Gilbert Brown presents a more 
orthodox, psychoanalytic reading of Marcel’s ‘Edenic childhood garden.’ Given the great 
many heterosexual, homosexual and platonic relationships that populate and define 
Proust’s La recherché du temps perdu (1913-1927), it is curious to note how Brown 
ascertains a broadly ‘eco-clinical’ relationship from their exposition; by reading Marcel’s 
epiphanous engagements with the infamous madeleine and cobblestone in terms of a 
certain sublimity, encounters that spur Marcel into involuntary flights of memory and 
epistemological inquiry, Brown offers a reading that appears to suggest a form of 
sublime experience after a neurotic emphasis upon the maternal body. In this way Brown 
recommends that the relationships in La recherché be interpreted towards a sense of a 
lost Edenic ‘garden’, a reading that is evidently implying a state of grace from which a 
modern individual like Marcel feels expelled by the encroaching, androcentric forces of 
industrial capitalism: 
 
The profane desire to “merge” with the maternal sublime that is 
thwarted here enervates the “merger hunger” that is futilely 
displaced onto the opposite sex (Gilberte, Albertine), and then 
onto same-sex relationships (Saint-Loup, Charlus). The a priori 
desire that governs the self of The Search is a desire to 
surmount its own sexual differentiation: a desire repeatedly 
thwarted in reality until fulfilled on the illusory plane in art. The 
narrator’s deepest neurotic fears are associated with the “drame 
coucher”: a fear grounded in absence, in anxiety associated with 
separation from the beloved, and which establishes the pattern 
of separation anxiety for every love affair in the novel.20 
 
                                                
20 Brown, Stephen Gilbert, The Gardens of Desire: Marcel Proust and the Fugtive Sublime. (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 2004). p. 23. 
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This reading of desire in terms of human relationships, in terms of art as a 
platform from which to begin to consider in ethico-aesthetic terms the human 
relationship to the more-than-human world, would enable us to link back quite 
successfully to our Marxo-Lacanian approach in chapters one and two, to sustain in 
particular the issues we raised in the latter chapter over a political understanding of 
Nature and sublime aesthetics in our analysis of Lee Rozelle’s Ecosublime. Where we 
saw how Žižek developed his thesis on ‘sublime objects of ideology’, we noted that he 
did so after a reading of the Freudian ‘Thing’ (das Ding). This in turn gave us to suggest 
that Rozelle’s second-wave ecocriticism might make a more properly political utility of 
this approach, emboldening his own, loosely eco-clinical outlook with Lacanian 
concepts. Were we to sustain such logic, we might similarly acknowledge here how 
Brown’s work on Proust might profitably connect with Žižek’s work in this connection. 
Yet we are here presented with a perfect opportunity to explore how after Deleuze and 
Guattari, a schizoanalytic and thereafter stratoanalytic approach breaks with a number of 
Žižek’s theoretical tenets, chiefly insofar as it does not lean upon Freudian and Lacanian 
concerns with the maternal body. This is because what Brown’s reading appears to rely 
upon most problematically is the thesis on separation anxiety set out by another Brown, 
the post-Freudian psychoanalyst Norman O. Brown in his historical study, Life Against 
Death (1959).  
 
Prior to invoking Deleuze and Guattari’s impersonal unconscious and the 
ecological notion of sympathy it implies, then, we might first acknowledge, as the above 
reading of Proust does, the normative, Oedipal reading that psychoanalytic criticism 
would make of such literature. We can do so by considering how for Norman O. Brown, 
humans are historical beings because they disavow death; neurosis results from the 
prolonged nurturing and dependency of human children by and upon their parents. 
Because of this, children develop unreasonable expectations regarding gratification. 
Separation from the parents would imply death. Hatred for the parents emerges from a 
sense that they cannot provide the necessary succour, and a powerful sense of guilt 
ensues.21 On this view, the repetition compulsion comes to be seen as the result of the 
repressed death instinct fusing with the pleasure principle; repressing death (via 
separation) affirms the drive for pleasure, often via a sustainment of infantile pleasures 
                                                
21  Brown, Norman. O. Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytic Meaning of History. (Middletown: 
Wesleyan University Press, 1959), pgs 125, 171, 242 and 256. 
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and thus, ‘history/progress’ is readily determined as an analogical, cultural extension of 
these unconscious processes, chiefly after the manner set out by Freud in Totem and 
Taboo (1913) and Civilisation and its Discontents (1930). The instrumental and 
environmentally-damaging orientation of contemporary techno-capitalism can then be 
considered on these clinical grounds. 
 
However, in the opening chapter of Difference and Repetition (1968/1994), 
Deleuze determines repetition as a positive, transcendental condition; the death instinct 
‘is transcendentally positive, to the point of affirming repetition… repetition [is] affirmed 
and prescribed by the death instinct.’ 22  What this means is that when in his 
schizoanalytic project with Guattari, Deleuze shows how it is not the fear of physical 
death and its disavowal that inspires repetition, he therefore demonstrates how it cannot 
be separation anxiety that holds the key to understanding the socio-political role of 
neurosis and guilt under capitalist society. Rather, what is altogether mistaken is the 
assumption of a universal family structure. As one of the key insights of Anti-Oedipus 
and its immanent critique of psychoanalysis, Deleuze and Guattari here reverse the 
Freudian etiology; rather than reducing socio-historical life to the mechanics of a 
universalising psychology, they instead ‘propose an apparently paradoxical model of the 
psyche… wherein the mechanisms that carry out repression at the same time free the 
human organism from instinctual determination, so that it is the form of social 
organisation that determines whether psychic repression serves social oppression or 
escapes it.’23  
 
This emphasis upon Man as a species beleaguered by its familial organisation is 
one that will concern us throughout the remainder of the thesis; as we have already noted 
to some extent, Deleuze and Guattari enable us to break with a certain etiological basis 
that has dominated clinical thinking since Freud. What we might do now is consider in 
more detail how after Nietzsche, Deleuze and Guattari break with Norman O. Brown’s 
                                                
22  Moreover, Deleuze refers to repetition as ‘a superior pathos and pathology.’ In other words, repetition 
gives to thought a pathos which allows it to think its own limits. See Deleuze, Difference, pgs. 5 and 16. 
23  To emphasise separation anxiety in the manner that both Browns do, is thus to remain within a Freudian 
purview wherein the causal relationship between psychic and social organisation is misunderstood, the 
prevailing aim being not to privilege the reorganization of social relations, so much as to remain committed 
to a therapy of ‘deep-seated “psychological regeneration,”’ and ‘the transformation of “historical 
consciousness…into psychoanalytic consciousness.”’ Holland, Eugene. Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-
Oedipus: Introduction to Schizoanalysis. (London: Routledge, 1999). p. 10. 
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reading of Freud so as to sustain our eco-literary and stratoanalytic concerns with a non-
Oedipal Proustian sublime. Thus, it is here important to note how if for Brown anxiety 
causes repression, then we can only hope to end repression (and one imagines, social 
oppression too) by overcoming our infantile fears of death and separation. That Stephen 
Gilbert Brown’s reading of Proust retains precisely this logic reveals it as one that a 
schizoanalyst would entirely disagree with, particularly when we conceive of how for 
Deleuze and Guattari it is rather repression that causes anxiety and that we must 
therefore consider how social oppression generates such repression. We can then begin to 
see how any attempt to free the human organism from deadening forms of repetition 
might be attempted in precisely the manner that Deleuze and Guattari suggest in chapter 
three of Anti-Oedipus, where specific historical circumstances are upheld as determinate.  
 
This reversal of a principal Freudian tenet becomes most significant for our non-
Oedipal reading of Proust when we note how it informs the notion of the BwO, drawing 
significantly on Nietzsche’s notions of the ‘eternal return’ and ‘will to power.’ As we 
will shortly see in our stratoanalytic concerns with literature and bio-political 
organisation, this is a key schizoanalytic insight insofar as the will to power and eternal 
return enable us to construe repetition in terms of creative variation and innovation, as a 
positive understanding of desire as a force for renewal and expansion.24 As we have 
noted, in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari had already drawn upon Proust in 
suggesting a ‘new earth’, or one that rests upon a non-neurotic and schizophrenic 
understanding of ‘desiring-production’ and which might lead us to escape the neurotic 
repetitions of the capitalist socius. By describing how the ‘narrator-spider’ of Proust’s La 
recherché, figures ‘the world of transverse communications, where the finally conquered 
nonhuman sex mingles with the flowers, a new earth where desire functions according to 
its molecular elements and flows,’ they insist that ‘such a voyage does not necessarily 
imply great movements in extension; it becomes immobile, in a room and on a body 
without organs—an intensive voyage that undoes all the lands for the benefit of the one it 
is creating.’25  
 
                                                
24 Nietzsche himself expressed such variation in his own literary practice: ‘Nietzsche's aphorisms shatter 
the linear unity of knowledge, only to invoke the cyclic unity of the eternal return, present as the 
nonknown in thought.’ Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, p. 6. 
25 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pgs. 350-351. 
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This schizoanalytic understanding of literature is one that gives them to 
acknowledge how ‘literature is like schizophrenia: a process and not a goal, a production 
and not an expression.’26 Whilst this ‘earth’ refers to a specific understanding of desire, it 
is one that has significant implications for how we understand the relationship between 
human pathology, non-human affect, and the eco-literary pathos we have thus far only 
broadly alluded to. Thus, whilst Stephen Gilbert Brown would claim that ‘Proustian 
desire is neurotic in nature insofar as it foregrounds the sorrows of separation anxiety’, 
after Deleuze we would instead begin to acknowledge how it gestures towards a 
‘schizophrenic’ desire, an impersonal, bio-energetic flow which shows how we might 
revalue La recherché as a modern literary opus that enables a schizoanalytic 
condemnation of Oedipal ‘territories’ and revaluing of schizophrenic ‘delirium’, 
recasting our abiding eco-literary concerns, specifically where the immanence of desire 
and semiotic processes makes the plane of literary composition a fundamentally ethico-
political one. This becomes most significant from a stratoanalytic perspective when we 
see how Brown maintains a particularly ‘Idealist’ and neurotic understanding of Marcel’s 
creative imagination, specifically as it pertains to his material environs:  
 
the need to cope with the romantic wounds of the material world 
prompts Marcel’s turn away from the material to the immaterial, 
as a means of satisfying his idealizing desire. This leads directly 
to the first works of his idealizing imagination: a Norman gothic 
Balbec church, a Turneresque Normandy coastline, Berma’s 
reinscription of the classic Greek ideal in Phedre, Ruskin’s 
Venice, or the feudal sublime embodied in the names of 
Geneviève de Brabant and Guermantes.27  
 
This emphasis upon neurotic interiority as a spur to a creative response to 
external places, to the more-than-human worlds in which we live, does not suggest the 
type of non-Idealist and material perspectives that we find in Proust and Signs, Anti-
Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. As such, we can now begin to reconceive of eco-
sublimity in terms of a sympathy with environmental flora and fauna, those non-human 
elements that nevertheless impact upon our creativity after a logic of schizophrenic 
                                                
26 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 144. 
27 Brown, Stephen Gilbert, Gardens, p. 24. 
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‘becoming’ rather than neurotic ‘being’. In their reading of the Austrian author Hugo von 
Hofmannsthal, for example, Deleuze and Guattari speak of a form of zoological 
sympathy experienced by Lord Chandos, the protagonist of a high modern epistolary 
narrative who undergoes an epiphanous moment of eco-sublimity during an encounter 
with a cellar full of dying rats; looking down at the mother rat, surrounded by her ailing 
young, Chandos does not experience pity so much as what Deleuze and Guattari describe 
as an unnatural participation with a form of impersonal suffering, an ecological pathos 
that comes to a writer who is undergoing a crisis of language: ‘Then a strange imperative 
wells up in him: either stop writing, or write like a rat.’28  
 
Where, as Deleuze does, Brown would acknowledge how Proust is a consummate 
semiotician, sensitive to the signs of his bourgeois social milieu, he nevertheless does so 
in an all-too-human way, neglecting the extent to which Proust begins to suggest the 
constitutive violence of pre-individual and impersonal forces. When Brown describes 
how in Proust, ‘[t]he real is supplanted by the ideal, which in turn seeks to superimpose 
itself upon the real—in vain, until the ideal and the real are reunited in the end through 
involuntary memory, their merger eternalized in a work of art whose principal aim and 
most salutary effect is to gratify the “merger hunger” of a disordered self’, he is 
concerned with retaining the creative act as gratifying of the neurotic familiality Marcel 
feels abandoned by.29 In Brown’s summation there is a great pathos and experience of 
pain informing Marcel’s creative work; the struggles to ‘liberate’ a self capable of 
bridging (yet not transmuting or exorcising) a sense of primary separation are ultimately 
negative and contrary to the becoming Deleuze and Guattari insist is the true vocation of 
literary production. As we will later see, Brown’s is a reading that ultimately 
‘reterritorialises’ Proust’s revolutionary and eco-clinical potential upon a sense of lack 
and thus a desire for the maternal body. 
 
Pain in the material world induces Marcel to search for pleasure 
in the realm of the symbolic, prompts the inward turn into the 
self, which evolves into an epic struggle to liberate from within 
itself that creative self which alone can eternalize the mother, can 
justify the sacrifice of the mother to art, can unite both mother 
                                                
28  Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, p. 240. 
29  Brown, Stephen Gilbert, Gardens, p. 24. 
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and son in an immortal embrace that gratifies forever the “merger 
hunger” of the soul. All prisoners in Recherché are surrogates for 
the ideal self imprisoned within itself: Genevieve imprisoned in 
her tower, the female imprisoned within Charlus, the lost selves 
of Marcel imprisoned in the petites madeleines, the steeples of 
Martinville, and the trees of Hudimesnil, etc.30 
 
Again, what this implies for our eco-clinic is a point of departure from the 
sublime aesthetics we engaged in chapter two, marking a significant break with the 
emphasis we maintained there upon Kantian judgement, and with Žižek’s Lacanian 
extension of such in his thesis on sublime objects of ideology. When, for example, 
Deleuze and Guattari describe how the German pre-Romantic Karl Philipp Moritz, who 
‘feels responsible not for the calves that die but before the calves that die and give him 
the incredible feeling of an unknown Nature affect’, they describe too how ‘affect is not 
personal feeling, nor is it a characteristic; it is the effectuation of a power of the pack that 
throws the self into upheaval and makes it reel. Who has not known the violence of these 
animal sequences, which uproot one from humanity, if only for an instant, making one 
scrape at one’s bread like a rodent or giving one the yellow eyes of a feline?’31  It is this 
power to ‘throw the self into upheaval’, one that may well appear to evoke the type of 
eco-sublime described by Lee Rozelle, which nevertheless exceeds the Kantian sublime 
insofar as it exceeds subjectivization per se. Moreover, it is one that augurs not only a 
reversal of our understanding of psychoanalysis and the political, of the human and the 
inhuman becomings that are available to it, but revalues our understanding of matter, 
enabling us to understand how the BwO proves to be a more sophisticated means of 
grasping eco-cultural relations. 
 
Let us now turn to how these Proustian concerns enable a stratoanalysis adequate 
to understanding the relevance of eco-clinical literary research to such seemingly non-
literary concerns as Climate Change. We can begin by remaining with Proust, whom, as 
we have begun to acknowledge, Deleuze owed a career-long debt to, upholding as no 
less a ‘cultural physician’ than Kafka. In Negotiations he is recorded as saying that ‘la 
recherché is a general semiology, a symptomatology of different worlds. Kafka’s work is 
                                                
30  Ibid. 
31  Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, p. 240. 
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a diagnosis of all the diabolical powers around us. As Nietzsche said, artists and 
philosophers are civilization’s doctors’. 32  For the theory-wary ecocritic, therefore, 
Deleuze’s volume on Proust proves noteworthy from the outset, suggesting as it does a 
clinical notion of ‘worldliness’ drawn as much from La recherché du temps perdu as 
from the ontology of Spinoza. Rather than bowdlerizing the text with a merciless 
application of ‘theory’, Deleuze instead demonstrates how Proust himself had already 
discerned (or ‘diagnosed’) those affective elements and processes of actualisation that 
comprise different ‘worlds’, both their social and non-human (or ‘environmental’) 
elements.33 
 
But as we have already begun to suggest, a schizoanalytic approach to literature 
begets a stratoanalytic one, and that moreover, both are, in a sense, less concerned with 
symptoms and diagnosis as they are with a notion of therapy, specifically one that in 
Anti-Oedipus would promise to cure us of the very desire for the cure that psychoanalysis 
offers.34 In order to understand how this post-symptomatological thesis relates to a 
stratoanalysis of organic and alloplastic (or cultural) strata, we must first acknowledge 
how for Deleuze, Proust and Kafka do more than simply diagnose signs of personal 
illness; because signs ‘imply ways of living’ they ultimately problematise the 
personological register itself, indicating other ‘possibilities of existence... they’re the 
symptoms of life gushing forth or draining away.’35 In his final essay collection, Critique 
et clinique (1993/1997), Deleuze extends this ‘vitalist’ thesis in such a way as to suggest 
a quasi-eco-clinical view of Life, suggesting that whilst literature appears as ‘an 
enterprise of health’, it is a health that would be ‘sufficient to liberate life wherever it is 
imprisoned by and within man, by and within organisms and genera.’36  
 
 It is here, with a sense of the organismic ‘imprisonment’ or capture of life, that 
we begin to acknowledge Deleuze and Guattari’s stratoanalytic concern with ‘differential 
                                                
32 Deleuze, Gilles. Negotiations. Trans. Martin Joughin. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990). 
Pgs. 142-43. 
33 Describing Logique du sens as ‘a convoluted story’, Deleuze maintains the work is ‘an attempt to 
develop a logical and psychological novel’, premised on the notion that ‘an evaluation of symptoms might 
be achieved only through a novel.’ See Deleuze, Logic, p. 273. 
34 More precisely, they speak of ‘the schizophrenization that must cure us of the cure.’ Deleuze and 
Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 76. 
35 Deleuze, Negotiations, pgs. 142-43. 
36 Deleuze, Essays, p. 3. 
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ratios of rate of capture over rate of escape’, and thus after a paradox principal to both 
the science of ecology and Deleuze’s ‘critical and clinical’ hypothesis: Some notion of an 
organism and a subjectivity must prevail if we are to creatively work against them. 
During a public roundtable on Proust in 1975, Deleuze underscored this broadly 
‘ecological pathos’ in terms of a recognition of limits, specifically in a statement 
pertaining to La recherché: ‘At the end, the narrator offers a glimpse of his method: to be 
open to what hurts him. That is a method.’37 As we have seen, whilst for a writer like 
Stephen Gilbert Brown, Proust’s narrative supplies a diagnosis of the Oedipal 
organisation of desire in the social ‘worlds’ of bourgeois France, Deleuze’s notion of 
‘worldliness’—his Spinozist distinction between individual social ‘worlds’ and the 
immanent ‘world’ of primary substance from which they are actualised—enables us to 
enjoin instead a strata-critical reading of human and inhuman desire, to apprehend flows 
of ‘pre-personal’ intensities and affects, of pre-individual forces that are selected, 
captured and deselected by the abstract machine of stratification.38  
 
Where our concerns remain eco-clinical, then, we can explore the pathic 
relationship between the organic and ‘alloplastic’ (or cultural) strata by considering how 
for Deleuze and Guattari our organs are deterritorialising machines that ultimately beget 
culture as a compensatory and reterritorialising movement.39 By remaining with the 
notion of Oedipus and Brown’s neurotic reading of Proust, we can see how organs can be 
conceived of after a certain stratification (or selecting and consolidating) of material 
flows, functioning as part of an historically-contingent social machine that determines 
which connections and patterns of different organs remains permissible. Where in Anti-
Oedipus the BwO was put forward as a means of understanding unconscious desire as a 
‘factory’, one that has at its core a tripartite process of synthetic production in which the 
three syntheses of connection, disjunction, and conjunction enable an understanding of 
the investments of desire and capital after a Nietzschean reading of Kant, Freud and 
Marx, in A Thousand Plateaus we find that, just like the organism which it would 
logically appear to oppose, the BwO is given as a ‘representation of limits of 
                                                
37 Deleuze, Gilles. Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975-1995. Trans. Hodges, Ames and 
Mike Taormina. Ed. Lapoujade, David. (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006). p. 48. 
38  It is important to emphasise the Spinozan aspect of stratoanalysis, because ‘all BwO’s pay homage to 
Spinoza.’ Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, p. 154. 
39 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, pgs. 60-61. 
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processes.’40 Where in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari discuss the ‘legitimate’ and 
‘illegitimate’ usage of the three syntheses, they are at pains to develop the thesis on 
passive synthesis that Deleuze had outlined in Difference and Repetition, after a critique 
of the negativity and lack that psychoanalytic approaches to desire would constrain by 
way of exclusive and inhibited connections and disjunctions. In doing so, they at once 
name two regimes of ‘molar’ and ‘molecular’ production that in turn supplies any 
ecological approach to literature with a means of reckoning with the ‘capture and escape’ 
dynamic of the strata. If the organism corresponds to a pure, ‘actualised’ fixity of the 
molar regime then the BwO can be conceived of as the non-captured, ‘virtual’ 
potentiality of the molecular flow. 
 
What the movement from schizoanalysis to stratoanalysis offers our eco-literary 
clinic, therefore, is a means of retaining the former’s concerns with Oedipal social 
organisation and the illegitimate (or non-immanent) usage of the syntheses, whilst at 
once enabling us to grasp how the material flows that organisms draw off in their 
constitution belong to the earth itself as a BwO. Increasingly, Climate Change is forcing 
humanity to recognise how the world that we once took to be composed of relatively 
stable entities (‘bodies’, or beings) is in fact a multitude of flows moving at various 
speeds: rocks and mountains appear as very slow-moving flows; organic things as flows 
of biological material through developmental systems; discrete languages as flows of 
information, words, etc. Where an ‘ecological pathos’ of a literary sort is concerned, 
then, we come to see how the forces that ‘excite’, ‘move’ or ‘hurt’ us indicate a 
‘transcendental’ or ‘virtual’ field of pure, or molecular differences that simultaneously 
inform and resist crude subject-object and nature-culture dichotomies. Insofar as ‘[t]he 
writer returns from what he has seen and heard with bloodshot eyes and pierced 
eardrums’ Deleuze acknowledges an openness to excessive forces; discernible through 
instances of weakness and exhaustion, through interruptions, ‘schizzes’ and breaks, and 
via such (dis)articulations as stammering, vibrating and trembling, writing bears a 
privileged relationship to this sense of ‘Life’, which is registered in its struggle with that 
which blocks and inhibits it: ‘Writing is a question of becoming, always incomplete, 
always in the midst of being formed’.41 
 
                                                
40  Protevi, Organism, p. 38. 
41 Deleuze, Essays, p. 1. 
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By emphasising how Proust’s method necessitates remaining open to such 
‘becomings’, to the energetic struggle with limits that are imposed by ‘organisms and 
genera’, we might already, at this preliminary stage, begin to infer that a Deleuzian 
‘sublime’—if it remains necessary to call it that—is not simply concerned with the limits 
of the human organism, with recognising Life as ‘something more than personal’, but 
moreover, is automatically in excess of subjectivist ontologies. By acknowledging the 
constitutive violences that all beings are obliged to undergo—violences of capture, 
stratification and folding—we can here deepen our understanding of why Deleuze 
dispenses with a pre-established self or subject and how literature and language draw us 
to acknowledge the capture of Life in terms of form and content. Proust’s Charlus, for 
example, despite his ‘imperial individuality’, is described by Deleuze as a ‘galaxy’, a 
‘pathos’ comprised not only of the keen affects of his flashing eyes and resonant voice, 
but ultimately by a delirious and ‘vegetal’ force that knows no logos. Similarly, 
Albertine ‘slowly extracts herself’ from a ‘galaxy of girls’, her ‘jealousies’ and ‘lies’ that 
differentiate her from the field of ‘jeunes filles’ are not mere character traits, but 
paradoxically precede her, intensive components of a pre-personal field from which her 
character is actually synthesised.42 
 
Thus, prior to exploring how this in turn relates to Deleuze and Guattari’s work 
on Kafka and how his writing enables us to reckon with ‘collective assemblages of 
enunciation’ for such concerns as Climate Change, we can begin to outline an eco-
clinical orientation that would acknowledge an account of ‘passive synthesis’, or one that 
gives us to acknowledge how signs and their affects are ultimately productive at both the 
‘perceptual’ and ‘organismic’ levels. 43  Pre-dating his work with Guattari on the 
formation of social machines, Proust and Signs supplies useful insight into relations of 
affect, acknowledging not only how they concern our mind and perception, but how 
through a range of ‘involuntary’ and ‘unconscious’ syntheses, prove constitutive of our 
being.44 Again, such ‘forces’ are of the ‘outside’, which is not to say that they are merely 
                                                
42 ‘[Charlus’] verbal interpretative madness masks the more mysterious signs of the non-language working 
within him; in short, the enormous Charlus network.’ Whereas Albertine is extracted from ‘[a] whole 
delirium of action and demand, quite different from Charlus’s delirium of ideas and interpretation’ (ibid.). 
See Deleuze, Proust, pgs. 175-80.  
43 Deleuze, Negotiations, 142-43. 
44 It is key to note here that Deleuze and Guattari do not conceive of matter as pure receptivity, and which 
of course defines their break with Kantian hylomorphism. We might think of this in terms of a degree of 
synthetic self-causality that resists / obsoletes Kant’s insistence upon the conscious imposition of form. 
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exterior to humans or other entities, but of an order of ‘Reality’ that retains a 
fundamental freedom from form, or which necessarily precedes identity.45  Just as 
Deleuze states that ‘the forces within man do not necessarily contribute to the 
composition of a Man-form, but may be otherwise invested in another concept of form’, 
so we may say that literature and language are also possessed of these forces that may 
enter into relations with other forces of the outside.46 Whilst in A Thousand Plateaus, 
Deleuze and Guattari discuss relations of forces in terms of ‘diagrams’, or ‘abstract 
machines’ that ‘pilot’ cultural ‘assemblages’, it is here useful to provisionally remain 
with his Proustian semiotic, for it pertains more specifically to the relationship between 
signs, literature and ‘worldliness’.  
 
Thus, we can begin to understand ‘worldliness’ by considering how for Deleuze, 
Proust’s la recherche cannot be referred ‘to a system of subjectivity… that is alien to 
it’.47 Literature is a negotiation of the capture and shaping of forces, a largely ‘stratified’, 
yet potentially revolutionary affair. Considered in ‘diagrammatic’ terms, we would 
acknowledge this as an enveloping of ‘unformed matters’ and ‘non-formalized 
functions’, yet at this juncture we might instead emphasise the non-subjective emphasis 
Deleuze identifies in Proust’s narratology:  
 
There is less a narrator than a machine of the Search, and less 
a hero than the arrangements [agencement] by which the 
machine functions under one or another configuration, 
according to one or another articulation, for one or another 
purpose, for one or another production. It is only in this sense 
that we can ask what the narrator-hero is, who does not 
function as a subject. The reader at least is struck by the 
insistence with which Proust presents the narrator as incapable 
of seeing, of perceiving, of remembering, of understanding… 
etc.48  
 
                                                
45 Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault. Trans. Sean Hand. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986). pgs. 
86, 101. 
46 Deleuze, Foucault. p.124. 
47 Deleuze, Proust, p. 181. 
48 Deleuze, Proust, p. 181.  
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Broadly ‘ecological’ in many respects, this a-subjective, ‘machinic’ or 
‘schizoanalytic’ understanding of the text is therefore inherently ‘eco-clinical’ for being 
‘strata-critical’; in its ‘machinism’, it exceeds any orthodox psychoanalytic model, 
having at its core this pre-personal figure of the BwO as its non-subjective motor. 
Shortly, Kafka will give us to acknowledge the ethical consequences this has for our 
notion of eco-virtue, one that is intensified under the prospect of imminent Climate 
Change. It is therefore at the perceptual level, or that which is more commonly 
associated with the semiological register, that we will initially remain.49 This is because, 
in Swann’s Way, the first volume of la recherche, Deleuze shows how the narrator is 
compelled to ‘seek’ out the answers to a variety of affective ‘sign-problems’ following 
his encounters with such everyday objects as a madeleine and a cobblestone, objects that 
appear to conceal signs that for him are nothing less than mnemonic transports. How 
might the ‘encounter’ with a particular ‘sensuous impression’ transport Marcel so fully 
into environs beyond those he presently inhabits?  
 
Evoking the memory of aunt Leonie and Sunday mornings in Combray, it is the 
taste of the madeline that prompts Marcel to recall ‘immediately the old grey house upon 
the street... the garden which had been built out behind it... and with the house the town, 
from morning to night and in all weathers, the Square where I used to be sent before 
lunch, the streets along which I used to run errands, the country roads we took when it 
was fine’, etc.50 More importantly, perhaps is the question of how that which inspires 
these memories of other ‘worlds’, operating as it does at the level of la recherche’s 
narrative content, relates to Deleuze’s concerns with formal experimentation—with 
nonstandard syntax, the fragmentation of words, or the proliferation of figures of speech? 
Just as Proust’s use of language cannot be likened to the high modernism of Gertrude 
Stein or Samuel Beckett, to what Gaudlitz terms the ‘liminal expression’ or ‘stuttering’ 
                                                
49 It is important to note at this juncture, however, that in Proust et les signes Deleuze does not develop the 
‘materiality’ of signs as completely as in his later work, Spinoza et la problème de l’expression 
(1968/1990), nor, it must be said, necessarily present us with a generalisable theory of signs and 
symptoms. Nevertheless, by proposing the sign as that which affects us and tracking its implication within 
the pluralism of ‘worlds’ that comprise modern societies, it remains a significantly ‘materialist’ treatment 
that underwrites the later ‘synthetic’ philosophy of Difference et répétition (1968/1994) and L’Anti-Oedipe 
(1972/1977).  
50 Proust, Marcel. In Search of Lost Time Volume I: Swann’s Way. (New York: The Modern Library, 
1998). p. 64. 
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of bodily affectivity, neither can Marcel’s character be described as ‘valetudinarian’—or 
as someone for whom issues of health and sickness are paramount.51  
 
Nevertheless, it is by delivering a complex taxonomy of signs, signs that bear 
upon involuntary relations with specific environments, that Proust reveals affect—that 
which moves Marcel—as the key to unraveling the apparent ‘solipsism’—or tendency 
towards ‘interiority’—of high modernist culture. Equal to the existential grip that a 
particular sign has upon him, its ‘signing’ does not simply reflect upon the movements of 
his individual consciousness, but highlights its reciprocal dynamic with the particular 
‘world’ in which it is embedded. Whilst this is typically a ‘social world’ for Marcel, it is 
nevertheless in his ‘encounter’ with a range of signs that he experiences feelings that 
separate them from other objects and that impel him to better understand the forces they 
reveal, or the ‘something more than personal’ that people, things and places are 
necessarily pervaded by.52 It is through analysis of such forces that we can ascertain how 
specific traditions of interpretation have constructed and valorised the human 
‘individual’ as the primary territory, and thus contributed to environmentally-unaware 
relations to the more-than-human world, relations supported by those historical processes 
that Ian Watt identifies in the suburbanization of eighteenth-century England and which 
increased cultural emphasis upon private, inward life.53 
  
It is the relationship between the literary, values and this ‘inhuman’ dimension of 
force that must concern us here, therefore, particularly where the great works of literature 
have proven so putatively ‘human’ in scope. Whether the class struggles of Zola, the 
bildungsroman of Dostoyevsky and Dickens, the exfoliation of social mores in Woolf, or 
the lamentation of rampant bureaucracy in Kafka, we must consider how such socially-
                                                
51 Gaudlitz, Erika. ‘Stuttering in Beckett as Liminal Expression within the Deleuzian Critical-Clinical 
Hypothesis.’ Deleuze Studies. (Special Issue:’ Deleuze and the Symptom.’). Vol. 4. No. 2. (2010): 183-
205. p. 184. 
52 Deleuze, Negotiations, pgs. 142-43. We will not elaborate here upon the different types of sign Deleuze 
identifies in this early text on Proust. It serves our purposes at this juncture to merely indicate the 
materiality of an a-signifying semiotic, and to acknowledge the constitutive and perceptual ‘violences’ that 
all beings are obliged to undergo. 
53 ‘”Urbanity” denotes the qualities of politeness and understanding which are the product of the wider 
social experience which city life makes possible; with it goes [for example] the spirit of comedy which, in 
Italian, French or English comedy of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries centers on the gay life of the 
streets and the squares, where the walls of houses afford a purely nominal privacy. “Suburban,” on the 
other hand, denotes the sheltered complacence and provinciality of the sheltered middle-class home.’ See 
Watt, Ian. The Rise of the Novel. (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1957). p. 187.  
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oriented writing can be valued differently, not only with acknowledgement of how these 
works transmit pre-individual affects, but with an eye to how such forces form part of a 
broader, ethico-aesthetic ‘ecology’. As such, we must be careful when reading the 
apparent antithesis of ‘humanist’ literature—‘nature-writing’ or ‘wilderness narratives’—
not to negatively posit the plant, the animal, the rock (or even the ‘machine’) as those 
nonhuman forms of alterity against which the human is all too unsatisfyingly defined. 
Rather, it is with that which is nonhuman within the human, those forces that sustain, yet 
overflow and escape us, and that contribute towards the overcoming of such a being, with 
which an ‘eco-clinical’ project must begin. 
 
 
(iii) Regimes of Signs / Signs of Change 
 
‘…by means of the family photo, a whole map of the world.’54 
 
Let us now consider, then, how literary form or specific usages of language can 
aid us in understanding how bodies of all kinds are organised and transformed by 
diverse social machines. In particular we will consider how Deleuze and Guattari’s 
move from linguistics to ‘pragmatics’ enables us to reconceive of what we have 
tentatively described above as ‘eco-virtue’ and largely after their notion of ‘incorporeal 
transformation’. Despite John Protevi’s recent work on Hurricane Katrina, the eco-
virtuous attitudes and activity that have emerged under the media-enhanced spectre of 
Climate Change remain largely unexplored in terms of the stratoanalysis we have 
begun to describe and nominate.55 What is more, there is a means of approaching this 
shortfall after a concertedly literary engagement, something that Protevi, but also such 
scientifically-minded Deleuzians as Mark Bonta and Manuel DeLanda, do not broach, 
and which draws together many of our prevailing concerns, better preparing us for 
further eco-clinical analysis of specific examples of North American literary production 
in chapters four and five.  
 
                                                
54 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, p. 11. 
55 Protevi, John. ‘Katrina’. Deleuze/Guattari & Ecology. Ed. Bernd Hozengenrath. (Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009): 165-181.  
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We will again commence here with Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of another 
non-American author, Franz Kafka, whom like Proust, is nevertheless accorded an 
honorary ‘Anglo-American’ status in their work, and yet whose influence differs from 
the latter’s inasmuch as his particular ‘stratoanalysis’ and subsequent method of 
deterritorialisation / destratification suggests a means of renegotiating eco-social desire 
under late capitalism as the shift in the operations of certain social machines and the 
collective assemblages of enunciation they mobilise. Such stratacritical literature 
exceeds the emphasis upon the exfoliation of signs as per Deleuze’s Proustian 
semiotics, particularly where Kafka’s works indicate an experimental line beyond the 
Oedipal impasse after a ‘becoming-animal’ that forms part of a ‘minor literature’ with 
surprising implications for rethinking such North American nature-writers as Henry 
David Thoreau, and which therefore profoundly revalues our critical-clinical 
understanding of form, content and expression.  
 
Thus, on first reading Kafka’s work after an engagement with the fundamentals 
of schizoanalysis, ecocritics might be given to seize upon the great many zoological 
affects in Kafka’s already much celebrated, but also, over-interpreted bestiary; Gregor 
the beetle, Josephine the Singer (who is a mouse), the musical dogs etc., all have met 
with psychoanalytic and therefore Oedipal reductionism. And yet it is also Deleuze and 
Guattari’s central assertion that Kafka’s work offers an exemplary case study for those 
wishing to grasp a species of literature that is ‘minor’, or one in which ‘language is 
affected with a high coefficient of deterritorialization’, but moreover, that when taken 
together such an oeuvre resembles an animal’s ‘burrow’.56 Conceived of after the 
‘multiple entrances’ that it offers, none of which, like the rhizomatic and non-arboreal 
structures that Deleuze and Guattari advance throughout their writings, is privileged 
over another, we find in Kafka’s work much less an analogical resemblance than a 
‘revolutionary’ and ‘therapeutic’ statement of intent that appears to correspond to the 
threat posed by a predatory animal with the ‘enemy’ of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
schizoanalytic approach, or the much-maligned Signifier: ‘Only the principle of 
multiple entrances prevents the introduction of the enemy, the Signifier and those 
attempts to interpret a work that is actually open to experimentation.’57  
 
                                                
56 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, pgs. 3 and 16. 
57 Ibid. 
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Whilst an eco-clinical pursuit of this line would certainly yield a further 
understanding of the importance of multiplicity and of a non-interpretive, a-signifying 
means of approaching Kafka’s high modernism, for our purposes here we will 
emphasise instead how his literary experimentation contributes more broadly to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s revolutionary thesis, or the extent to which it enables us to find 
another path, another approach to our clinical concerns with the eco-political 
destratification of the anthropocentric stratum. This it will do by contributing towards 
an understanding of ‘regimes of signs’, chiefly after the extent to which by determining 
cultural codes, behaviors and practices, such regimes (or ‘collective assemblages of 
enunciation’) play a significant role in the constitution of the anthropomorphic stratum 
more generally. By developing upon their discussion of form and content outlined in 
Kafka: Toward A Minor Literature, Deleuze and Guattari go on to discuss in A 
Thousand Plateaus how forming and formalising forces capture an ‘unformed material 
of expression’, or how the pre-individual intensities and affects we have acknowledged 
in our preliminary discussions of the BwO may or may not ‘serve to express contents 
that will reveal themselves to be relatively less and less formalized.’58 
 
Thus, just as ‘the animal is part of the burrow machine’—which is to say, 
whether inside or outside of it, the animal’s diverse states of movement, fleeing and 
approach effect the coordinates of a larger machine—so too are we bidden to 
acknowledge how a ‘Kafka-machine’ demonstrates how ‘states of desire’ can be 
stratoanalysed in a literary manner that nevertheless remains ‘free of all 
interpretation.’59 As we will recall from chapter one, this anti-hermeneutic orientation 
retains the Spinozist ethology of bodily longitudes and latitudes, or one that retains an 
emphasis upon analyses and measurements of bodily performance and capability, 
insisting that we ask how diverse machines work rather than what they may or may not 
be purported to ‘mean’. Yet here, this ethology is adopted with regard to those 
machines, which, like Kafka’s ‘Penal Colony’, reveal the extent to which ‘men are 
themselves pieces of the machine,’ an observation given most memorably, perhaps, in 
The Trial, where Herr K is confronted with ‘the single machine of justice.’60 It is in this 
way that Deleuze and Guattari overturn the accumulated influence of ‘so many 
                                                
58 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, p. 6. 
59 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, p. 7. 
60 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, p. 8. 
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unfortunate psychoanalytic readings’, and which have come to govern, in key respects, 
approaches to psycho-cultural research that would clinically consider bureaucratic and 
other social mechanisms and the micropolitics of their operation.61 
 
As we saw in our discussion of Deleuze and Guattari’s reversal of the Freudian 
etiology, specifically with regard to the link between social oppression and psychic 
repression, the reading of Kafka that schizoanalysis makes obtainable is one that does 
not reterritorialise his experimentation upon a neurotic and overdetermined relationship 
to the Father, as per the ‘Oedipalization of the universe’ that Deleuze and Guattari 
characteristically find so wrongheaded, debilitating, and ultimately saddening, and 
which we have here begun to reveal as a primary hurdle to the development of a more-
than-human ecological outlook.62 Although we will not concern ourselves too greatly 
here with Kafka’s ‘Letter to the Father’ and the ‘exaggerated Oedipus’, which, like the 
‘blow up’ photo Deleuze and Guattari invoke in this connection, enlarges the paternal 
figure to ‘the point of absurdity’, it is nevertheless a key consideration if we are to 
prolong our simultaneously eco-clinical and geo-philosophical approach in a manner 
that would engage and inspire those ecocritics working on projects with a markedly 
geographical or bioregional emphasis. Again, this is perhaps best expressed in a 
formulation that exceeds the Lacanian concern with the Symbolic Order or Law as a 
matrix with which one must sufficiently identify in order to obtain a ‘healthy’ subject 
position within the prevailing Symbolic economy: ‘The question of the father isn’t how 
to become free in relation to him (an Oedipal question) but how to find a path where he 
didn’t find any.’63  
 
This formulation, with its implications of escape over liberty, with the 
unblocking of a socio-libidinal impasse that the father may well have succumbed to, but 
in the face of which the son may construct a new mode of experimentation that ‘invents 
a way out… putting it into connection with a whole underground network, and with all 
the ways out from this network,’ remains one that in key respects shows the complexity 
of all ‘environmental’ milieus, and in which physical and psychic terrains are shown to 
interlock and interpenetrate. Not only do we find the image of the ‘animal’ burrow, or 
                                                
61 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, p. 9. 
62 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, p. 10. 
63 Ibid. 
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the ‘becoming-animal’ that is often extracted from Deleuze and Guattari’s in many 
respects already ‘ecological’ grasp of the Kafka-machine, but at once an implicit 
schizoanalysis of the ‘city-county’ and ‘countryside-city’ relations that, for example, 
marked the Lawful distinction between the ‘devout’ yet entrapping ‘rural ghetto’ and 
the comparatively lucrative, yet oft-times ‘betraying’ opportunities to be had in city-
living that shaped the transitional Jewish diaspora.64  
 
Evidently, what we begin to discern here is the lineaments of a stratacritical 
understanding that again opens up our sense of how to clinically account for human-
environmental relations in a manner that does not ultimately support the old bi-univocal 
relationships that would sustain interiority qua insularity. As we have recommended, 
the unblocking of the impasses that Kafka demonstrates through his literary experiment 
therefore reveals how deterritorialisation is more or less synonymous with 
destratification and thus, how it subsequently appears key to proposing a path beyond 
the cultural patterns and habits that lock individuals, families and communities in a 
circuit that reproduces an economic base predicated upon an unsustainable attitude to 
resources and a blithe indifference to eco-systemic pollution. If the planet-wide yet in-
explicit pollution of the oceans remains easier to overlook or deny than the impact of 
tsunamis and other seismic activity that impacts more explicitly upon human habitation, 
then the further reaching yet subtle phenomenon of Climate Change, which is itself tied 
to complex processes of oceanic precipitation and increases/decreases in planetary 
temperature, has proven irrefutably linked to human activity, then all of the denials that 
keep us from recognising and transforming our habits might be considered in terms of 
an-Oedipal modes of post-psychoanalytic thought, those that would bid us to destratify 
(or experiment with) our patterns of connection towards the creation of new ‘eco-
social’ habits. 
Where Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Kafka begins to lead us, then, is 
towards their notion of a ‘regime of signs’ and the transition it marks from linguistics to 
pragmatics, or from the assumption of language as a system of communication to one 
that issues ‘order words’ (mots d’orde). The semiotic coordinates that are imparted 
during secondary-school grammar lessons install a host of basic dualisms that enforce 
an understanding of life and the human place in the world. This they do after codes that 
                                                
64 Ibid. 
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impose a sense of collective order, and it is in this way that Deleuze and Guattari draw 
together the Stoic theory of incorporeals with the non-standard linguistics of Labov, 
Austin, Searle and Markov to inform their impersonal thesis on societal power. What 
this thesis enables us to acknowledge, then, is how the machinic assemblages which 
refer to the domain of physical objects, interrelate, or affect and are affected by, the 
collective regimes of enunciation, which by contrast, refer to the order of language or 
what psychoanalysis terms the Symbolic. What is crucial to this interrelationship for 
Deleuze and Guattari is how order words effect ‘incorporeal transformations’, as in the 
example of a juridical verdict that sentences the condemned man by way of ‘the 
expressed element [l’exprimé] of the sentence of the judge.’65 As Ronald Bogue 
continues, ‘…the awarding of a degree, the passage of a law, the arrival at one’s 
majority – all are incorporeal transformations of bodies effected through language.’66 
Such order words form part of a ‘collective assemblage of enunciation’ or ‘regime of 
signs’ that Deleuze and Guattari deem to be ‘the set of incorporeal transformations 
which are in effect in a given society, and which are attributed to the bodies of that 
society.’67  
As political as this process already appears, it is therefore key to note how 
literary usages of language intervene in this process. Again referring to Proust, Deleuze 
and Guattari deploy their conception of assemblage [agencement] to describe an 
impersonal ‘free indirect discourse’, a movement of the fourth person singular that  
 
…is not explained by the distinction between subjects; rather, it 
is the assemblage, as it freely appears in this discourse, that 
explains all the voices present within a single voice, the glimmer 
of girls in a monologue by Charlus, the languages in a language, 
the order-words in a word. The American murderer “Son of Sam” 
killed on the prompting of an ancestral voice, itself transmitted 
through the voice of a dog.68 
                                                
65 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, p. 80. 
66 Bogue, Deleuze & Guattari, p. 138. 
67 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, p. 80. 
68 Ibid. 
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 What this post-linguistic turn indicates is an understanding of the power of 
expression to affect, and therefore to effect change in bodies of all kinds; extracted from 
a great many literary sources, not least those of Proust and Kafka, this non-
representative and performative understanding of language and society in terms of two 
types of assemblage enables us to glimpse how our attitudes towards more-than-human 
processes such as that described as ‘Climate’ might be clinically analyzed without 
recourse to signifying semiotics. Ecocritic Timothy Morton has attempted to offer a 
means of grasping climate in a manner that might sit well with this analysis of 
assemblages, if only he were to connect the emphasis we are placing here upon eco-
social transformation after Deleuze and Guattari’s profoundly non-ideological 
understanding of desire and the State to his proposal of the phenomenon as a ‘hyper 
object’, or as a ‘non-local’ object that is ‘massively distributed in time and space such 
that any particular (local) manifestation never reveals the totality of [it].’69  
 In his recent work, Morton contrasts the experience of individual raindrops or 
other climatological phenomena with that of climate ‘in itself’; by extension therefore, 
he suggests that we might use the hyperobject to rethink phenomenological relations 
more broadly, notably those pertaining to our (in)ability to experience and know climate 
change as a field event or ‘effect’ of complex biospheric relations.70 As fellow eco-
philosophical author and blogger Levi Bryant puts it: ‘We are aware of weather without 
being aware of climate. Climate requires a sort of leap and a detective work that ferrets 
out all sorts of traces.’71And yet where our concerns remain with how we may or may 
not be responding to Climate Change in an ‘eco-virtuous’ manner, or in one that would 
see us act in accordance with a transnational ethical mandate, we might consider here 
why Morton, and similarly, a psychoanalytic ecocritic like Joseph Dodds, does not 
pursue the link between Deleuze and Guattari’s thesis on collective assemblages of 
enunciation and Bateson’s work on an ‘ecology of mind’, particularly given the brief 
                                                
69 Morton’s blog is a vital extension of his published academic work and serves as a widely subscribed to 
forum for ecocritics of all walks and persuasions to advance, discuss and contest theoretical approaches 
to ecological and environmental concerns. For this particular citation see: 
http://ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.com/2010/11/hyperobjects-are-nonlocal.html 
70 If the discrete events that comprise the effected phenomenon (glacial melting, earthquakes, volcanic 
events etc) do not supply access to climate change as such, then Morton’s hyper-objectivity suggests a 
means of separating out our experience of a phenomenon from the thing in itself, or ‘entity in its own right’. 
71 See Bryant’s unpublished reading of Morton’s work @ 
http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2010/11/18/class-and-hyperobjects/ 
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mention Dodds makes of both approaches in his book-length study.72  
 Like Dodds, Morton has repeatedly made recourse to a more classical mode of 
ideology critique, one that, as we saw in chapters one and two, draws significantly upon 
Žižek’s uniquely post-Lacanian, but ultimately negative, Hegelian approach to 
subjectivity. What this again yields in Morton’s work is a laudatory, but mostly 
ideological critique of the concepts of ‘Nature’ and any environmental ideology that 
would sustain reactive thinking. Yet where a Lacanian ideology critique would remain 
more or less dialectically-predisposed, a Deleuzian approach would hope to renegotiate 
the tension between the diagnosis of a pathology, and the prescription of a remedy that 
if it is to paradoxically ‘cure us of the cure’, or to depart from the interminable analysis 
of the neurotic, subjectivist orientation, requires as part of its self-overcoming an 
understanding of the rhizomatic line of flight immanent to any system and the limits 
and impasses that define it, and which we acknowledged in prefatory fashion in the 
literary experimentation of Kafka above. Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘noological’ thesis of 
assemblages might therefore be seen as an experimental continuation of a project that is 
as literary as it is normatively ‘sociological’ and which moreover would rather study 
‘images of thought and their historicity’ than any normative thesis on interpellation, 
therefore bidding us to recognise noology as a creative destruction of prior images, or 
as an a-subjective potential of thought necessarily ‘confronted by counterthoughts, 
which are violent in their acts and discontinuous in their appearances, and whose 
existence is mobile in history.’73  
 Again, it is here a complex, ‘nomadic’ relationship between desire, thought and 
the captures of the State that concerns Deleuze and Guattari, one powerfully dramatised 
by the acts of the  
“private thinker,” as opposed to the public professor: 
Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, or even Shestov. Wherever they dwell, 
it is the steppe or desert. They destroy images. Nietzsche’s 
Schopenhauer as Educator is perhaps the greatest critique ever 
directed against the image of thought and its relation to the 
State. “Private thinker,” however, is not a satisfactory 
                                                
72 Dodds, Psychoanalysis and Ecology, pgs. 196-197. 
73 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, pgs. 415-416. 
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expression, because it exaggerates interiority, when it is a 
question of outside thought. To place thought in an immediate 
relation with the outside, with the forces of the outside, in short 
to make thought a war machine, is a strange undertaking whose 
precise procedures can be studied in Nietzsche (the 
aphorism…).74 
 This latter reference to the ‘desert’ that is palpable in the aphoristic prose style 
of Nietzsche, once again invokes the ‘outside’ (or exteriority) of the BwO; where ‘the 
Nietzsche case’ instructs us clinically, it speaks of a dangerous and extreme 
destratification, taken so far as to lose touch with the dominant reality: ‘We knew the 
schizo was not oedipalizable, because he is beyond territoriality, because he carried his 
flows right into the desert.’75 Significantly for any discussion of subjectivity and the 
State, we find the image repeated again in that of ‘… the deterritorialized socius, the 
desert at the gates of the city.’76 Noology is then a nomadic ‘war machine’ that 
bespeaks of the more or less controlled violences that mark all creative 
experimentation, and which leads us once again to the privileging of the superior 
empiricism Deleuze identifies in his own literary canon, yet which in his work with 
Guattari nevertheless emphasises the failure that almost always attends the 
deterritorialisation of territories psychic and geographical, that must attend such 
movements if the absolute deterritorialisation, or the catatonic degree-zero of clinical 
schizophrenia that marks the ‘completion’ of the process is to be kept at bay:  
Strange Anglo-American literature: from Thomas Hardy, from 
D.H. Lawrence to Malcolm Lowry, from Henry Miler to Allen 
Ginsberg and Jack Kerouac, men who know how to leave, to 
scramble the codes, to cause flows to circulate, to traverse the 
desert of the body without organs. They overcome a limit, they 
shatter a wall, the capitalist barrier. And of course they fail to 
complete the process, they never cease failing to do so. The 
neurotic impasse again closes—the daddy-mommy of 
                                                
74 Ibid. 
75 References to the ‘desert’ of the BwO are numerous in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus. See in 
particular pgs.  95, 142-144, 178, 210, 364. For this particular citation, see p. 75. 
76 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 112. 
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Oedipalization, America, the return of the native land—or else 
the perversion of the exotic territorialities, then drugs, alcohol—
or worse still, an old fascist dream. Never has delirium 
oscillated more between its two poles.77 
 What we might do here, then, is consider how in A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze 
and Guattari extend their discussion of the three major social machines in Anti-
Oedipus—the savage, the feudal and the capitalist—by offering analysis of a range of 
regimes of signs that exceeds the relative dualism between the desiring-machines and 
BwO in the earlier text as acknowledged above. In the later volume they emphasise two 
regimes in particular, the ‘signifying’ and ‘post-signifying’, and which for them 
correspond to despotic and authoritarian or ‘passionate’ social formations respectively. 
This emphasis takes part in a stratoanalysis when we consider how the 
anthropomorphic stratum is that through which we code the world and all of the affects, 
forces, objects and relations that comprise it through specific relations of signs; if on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s account, primitive societies do not relate all signs to the human 
face as privileged body-part in the manner that modern, despotic societies evidently do 
(typically those of monarchs and other important notaries such as military leaders etc., 
but which also remains palpable in the form of today’s ‘talking head’ politicians and 
television news reporters etc.,), then this is because the limits of signification are 
entirely different to those recognised in the latter social machine, which decodes or 
deterritorialises the primitive sign and reterritorialises it upon the body/face of the 
despot.  
 This can begin to help us understand the processes by which we code the signs 
that comprise such non-local, yet eminently ‘interpretable’ phenomena as Climate and 
the ‘Changes’ it is measurably undergoing in line with certain libidinal (molecular) and 
thus political (molar) biases. Whilst we will consider the relationship between the 
literary and the functional analyses and measures of the sciences in the following 
chapter, again, we can here begin with the basic tendency towards totalising forms of 
reading qua interpretation. As a centre of codification, the face proves key to the 
anthropomorphic stratum when we consider how despite the fact that it does not offer a 
universal centre in the sense that all peoples across the globe interpret its expressions 
                                                
77 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 144. 
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equally, it nevertheless comes to haunt popular (if not scientific) modes of 
interpretation. If by contrast, primitive societies reveal a tendency to instead relate signs 
to a host of different body parts, to animals, forms of plant-life, inanimate objects and 
also geographical places or regions, then we can begin to see how the French terms for 
face (visage) and landscape (paysage) supply Deleuze and Guattari with a crucial link 
through their euphonious resonance, giving rise to their own stratacritical elaboration of 
visagéité and paysagéité (or ‘faciality’ and ‘landscapicity’ respectively). As unwieldy 
as the latter term might initially appear, it nevertheless offers key insight not only into 
how specific languages differ in their representation / signification of actual forces and 
affects, but also, how a particular regime of signs would then begin to suggest creative 
or non-representative and a-signifying lines of experiment (or ‘lines of flight’) as a 
direct result of the particular impasses, blockages or limits they necessarily attest to.  
 The extent to which human dwellings and other constructions demarcate, 
populate and therefore stratify the earth as BwO must lead us to consider architecture 
after the a-signifying logic we have thus far promoted. In the following passage, 
Deleuze and Guattari present an analysis that bears citing at length, for it encapsulates 
almost all of our abiding geo-philosophical and eco-clinical concerns with territories, 
art and environments: 
Face and landscape manuals formed a pedagogy, a strict 
discipline, and were an inspiration to the arts as much as the arts 
were an inspiration to them. Architecture positions its ensembles 
– houses, towns or cities, monuments or factories – to function 
like faces in the landscape they transform. Painting takes up the 
same monuments or factories – to function like faces in the 
landscape as a face, treating one like the other: ‘treatise on the 
face and landscape’. The close up in film treats the face primarily 
as a landscape; that is the definition of film, black hole and white 
wall, screen and camera. But the same goes for the earlier arts, 
architecture, painting, even the novel: close-ups animate and 
invent all of their correlations. So is your mother a landscape or a 
face? A face or a factory? (Godard.) All faces envelop an 
unknown, unexplored landscape; all landscapes are populated by 
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a loved one or dreamed-of face, develop a face to come or already 
past. What face has not called upon the landscapes it 
amalgamated, sea and hill; what landscape has not evoked the 
face that would have completed it, providing an unexpected 
complement for its lines and traits?78  
 Just as the infant child might be forgiven for interpreting the face of the 
nurturing mother as a ‘landscape’ owing to the sheer physical fact that it fills the naive 
gaze during the suckling phase of its development, so too might we begin to 
acknowledge those tendencies towards a comforting / disconcerting state of 
environmental affairs on the basis of Deleuze and Guattari’s notions of visagéité and 
paysagéité. When they paraphrase Godard and ask ‘is your mother a landscape or a 
face? A face or a factory?’, they are clearly concerned with advancing the productive 
factory over and against the signifying theatre of the Oedipal psychodrama that has so 
long constrained our attempts to relate differently to each other and here, to the non-
human environment from which we are ultimately contracted.79  
 We can reconnect with Kafka’s literary experiment by acknowledging how 
Deleuze and Guattari also name a ‘post-signifying’ or ‘passionate’ [passionnel] regime 
that departs from signification by way of a process of ‘subjectification’ after which 
signs become liberated or deterritorialised from their previously despotic coding as in 
the example of the Jews in exodus from Egypt, who became wandering or migrant after 
following a line of flight from the social machine of which they were once a key 
element. This ‘real’ migrancy enjoins the migrant nomadism of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
geo-philosophical position on deterritorialisation to effect an eco-clinical approach that 
fully grasps language as more-than-signifying and therefore also contributes to our 
grasp of an ‘ecological pathos’ as a relationship between the material and the 
immaterial that is no less ‘real’ or productive of concrete social and political change. 
Crucially, In the latter part of chapter four, this analysis will again enable us to consider 
the reterritorialising tendency that eco-social change exhibits towards an eco-liberal 
bias and which we first began to identify and describe in chapter two, with the 
Kantian/Lacanian critical-clinical heritage that, Žižek’s work notwithstanding, in many 
                                                
78 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, pgs. 172-173.  
79 Ibid. 
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respects inhibits a revolutionary eco-politics, or one equal to a more-than-eco-liberal 
overhaul of capitalist economics per se. 
Kafka’s example enables us to prolong these concerns when we consider how in 
her book Thoreau’s Nature: Ethics, Politics, and the Wild (2002), Jane Bennett has 
attempted to bring Deleuze and Guattari’s Kafka-inspired notion of a minor literature 
and the deterritorialisation of language / destratification of the subject that it implies to 
her study of North American nature-writer and activist Henry David Thoreau. 
Moreover, in doing so, Bennett motivates a specific form of ‘sympathy’, deploying 
Thoreau’s own relational eco-epistemology in such a way as to enable us to sustain the 
non-interpretive pragmatics advanced above. Bennett begins by describing how in the 
Thoreau Room of the Concord museum (above the case in which they keep Thoreau’s 
last pencil etc.,) there is a plaque that reads: ‘“It was not objects themselves that 
concerned Thoreau; ‘the point of interest is somewhere between me and them.’ This 
point of interest, this felt relation, Thoreau called sympathy.”’80 Broadly speaking, this 
would seem to remain consistent with the Deleuzian view of desire qua assemblage, 
although Bennett appears to pursue this point of resonance only as a means of forging 
her own unique reception of Thoreau, or so as to excuse/embolden her lack of fidelity 
to the canonic Thoreau. We find no discussion of anything like the ‘unnatural 
participation’ we discerned in Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Hofmannsthal, 
although over the course of four brief pages Bennett does attempt to make a case for 
Thoreau’s writing as a species of ‘minor literature’.81  
 
What is perhaps most interesting to our eco-clinical project is that she does so 
initially in terms of ‘Wildness’: ‘The problem of a minor literature is not how to 
become major, but how to delay the reterritorialization of deterritorialized words and 
thus keep their radical potential—their Wildness—alive.’ 82  ‘For what is 
Wildness if not the experience of deterritorialization?’83 Yet this correspondence seems 
too tidy somehow. Bennett then connects it to her notion of ‘sojourning’, which she 
identifies as Thoreau’s ‘preference’, and which she compares with Deleuze and 
                                                
80 Bennett, Jane. Thoreau’s Nature: Ethics, Politics, and the Wild. (revised edition). (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2002). p. 79. 
81 Bennett, Thoreau, pgs. 95-99. 
82 Bennett, Thoreau, p. 96. 
83 Bennett, Thoreau, p. 97. 
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Guattari’s thesis on nomadism: ‘The former is the activity of collective assemblages of 
enunciation and the latter a part of the recrafting of an individual subject, albeit an 
artificially and artfully unified one.’84 She then asks if what Thoreau described as ‘a 
kind of doubleness’ might amount to the sort of mutual, non-human becomings in 
Deleuze and Guattari, but rightly acknowledges that Thoreau did not push for the 
revolutionary; Deleuze and Guattari say they admire literature that pushes language 
‘toward a deterritorialization that will no longer be saved by culture or by myth, that 
will be an absolute deterritorialization’, and therefore Bennett seems right to note that 
‘Thoreau valorizes Wildness in conjunction with crafting a mythic heteroverse.’85 
 
She then suggests that Thoreau’s ‘charm’, or the ‘rhetorical effect’ of his prose, 
‘is best described as somewhere between the poiesis of Heidegger and the revolutionary 
potential of Deleuze and Guattari’s minor literature.’86 This notion of charm Bennett 
suggests as a form of enchantment and which ‘increases one’s susceptibility to the 
Wild’, but that it also ‘memorializes’ it by erecting a monument to it in memory: ‘At its 
best, it memorializes a temporally and temperamentally unique instance of the Wild; it 
gives it more weight, more body, and thus sinks it deeper into one’s character. It is in 
this way that writing about the Wild helps to engender a will to Wildness, a bodily urge 
to deterritorialize.’87 These observations of Bennett’s are by no means offered in a 
strictly eco-clinical way (she does not explicitly discuss the virtual-actual materiality of 
the BwO, and therefore misses, perhaps, the opportunity to discuss the debt American 
Transcendentalism owes to post-Kantianism, and thereafter the Deleuzian critique of 
such), but they nevertheless seem useful to us perhaps, insofar as they contrast the 
revolutionary with the ‘mythic’ tendency towards non-human alterity that she intimates, 
even if she does not go so far as to develop its implications for thinking about Climate 
Change. Whilst Bennett is evidently no fool about Thoreau’s didactic politics, she 
remains keen to suggest him as someone who insists that we craft a new sensibility 
informed by the ‘Wild’, yet one that retains the markedly liberal distance between art 
and politics ‘needed to sustain the positive relation between them.’ 88 As a Thoreau 
scholar rather than a Deleuzian, she then caricatures the first volume of their joint 
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85 Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka, p. 26; see also Bennett, Thoreau, p. 98.  
86 Bennett, Thoreau, p. 98. 
87 Bennett, Thoreau, p. 99. 
88 Ibid. 
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project by asserting that this very point renders Thoreau altogether different from 
Deleuze and Guattari who would ‘simply tear down the curtain’ between the two 
domains.89  
 
Let us now consider the relationship between literature and science in chapter 
four, where we will further explore the difficulties presented by the memorialising 
tendencies of human desire in relation to non-human nature. 
 
 
                                                
89 Ibid. 
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4: Instruments of Desire 
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(i) Interdisciplinarity and Desire 
 
Interpretation is the logical channel of consilient explanation between science and the 
arts. 
—Edward O. Wilson1 
 
The State imposes a specifically artistic Oedipus, a specifically scientific Oedipus. 
 
—Deleuze and Guattari2 
 
For Carolyn Porter, we today ‘confront a virtually horizonless discursive field in 
which … the traditional boundaries between the literary and the extraliterary have 
faded.’3 Nowhere might this sense of a ‘horizonless’ field appear more consequential 
than upon the interdisciplinary terrain charted by ecocriticism, which, as veteran 
ecocritic Glen Love has it, ‘claims as its hermeneutic horizon nothing short of the literal 
horizon itself.’4 Paraphrasing ecologist Eugene P. Odum, Love goes on to describe the 
field as one of a number of ‘new interface territories’ given to an extraordinary degree 
of interdisciplinary ferment—a ferment that apprises North American literary reception 
of the ‘extraliterary’ disciplines principal to broader environmentalist studies, 
particularly those of climatology and the life sciences, and which would ‘contribute to 
the study of values in what we increasingly find to be a world where, to cite an 
ecological maxim, everything is connected to everything else.’5  
Yet how does the relationship between literature, science and value-formation 
relate to our forgoing discussion of desire for ecocriticism? How might our concerns 
with the capitalist social machine, with deterritorialisation and decoding, with Oedipus 
and the legitimate and illegitimate usages of the passive syntheses, bear upon these 
interdisciplinary concerns? What this chapter will do is consider how environmentalist  
                                                
1 Wilson, Edward. O. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. (New York: Knopf, 1998). p. 230. 
2 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 414. 
3 See Porter, Carolyn. ‘History and Literature: After the New Historicism’. New Literary History. 21. 
(1990): 253-78. p. 257. 
4 Love, Practical, p. 1. 
5 Love, Practical, p. 7.  
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concerns with ‘instrumentalism’, or with the subordination of non-human life to human 
use qua ‘resources’, might give us to address our concerns with libidinal economics in 
view of what C. P. Snow once characterised as the ‘two cultures’ debate, or the 
professional compartmentalisation that in key respects keeps the nominally ‘literary’ 
and the nominally ‘scientific’ spheres from fruitful dialogue and interaction.6 As we 
shall see, whilst for Snow, the polarization of the sciences and humanities remains 
bound to a legacy of specialisation that has its roots in the industrial revolution, one tied 
to drives for social standing and status, to the domestic and political values of an 
emergent middle class, after Deleuze and Guattari, the cultures responsible for their 
specific ‘planes of immanence’ are afforded a certain parity, entering into transversal 
moments of resonance and exchange that promise further deterritorialisations.7  
Whilst this chapter will privilege the ‘anti-oedipal’ and ‘stratacritical’ vocabulary 
of Deleuze and Guattari’s Capitalism and Schizophrenia project, noting the distinction 
they draw there between ‘nomadic’ (or itinerant) and ‘royal’ (or State) science, it will 
nevertheless supplement this with the refinements of their final collaborative venture, 
What is Philosophy? (1994), in which a discussion of these planes is given in greater 
detail. It is hoped that this elaboration of the two planes, particularly in conjunction 
with a third plane, that of philosophy, will enable us to make a technical, yet altogether 
necessary distinction between common sense or external conceptions of science and 
those particular or internal to the life sciences in question. Moreover, such an approach 
will enable us to distinguish between what Freud meant by science in his bid to secure 
legitimacy for his psychoanalytic project, and moreover what Deleuze and Guattari 
mean by it as post-Althusserian Marxists. As technical as these distinctions shall no 
doubt appear, they nevertheless remain essential to our project when we consider how 
in the context of the French Marxist and philosophical scenes within which Deleuze 
and Guattari were writing, the terms ‘science’ and ‘scientific’ retain, as we saw in 
chapter one, a meaning or sense that relates not only to the production of rigorous 
                                                
6 Just as we opened this chapter with Carolyn Porter’s testament to interdisciplinarity in the early 1990s, 
so too does it seem appropriate to draw here upon the 1990 re-publication of the introduction to Snow’s 
The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, an unmodified extract from a work first published in the 
1950s. See Snow, C. P. ‘The Two Cultures.’ Leonardo. Vol. 23. No. 2/3. New Foundations: Classroom 
Lectures in Art/Science/Technology for the 1990s. (1990): 169-173; Also, Snow. C. P. The Two Cultures 
and the Scientific Revolution. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959). 
7 Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. What is Philosophy? (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994). pgs. 117-199.  
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knowledge, but more precisely to a non-ideological, or much less biased, ‘mature’ and 
clinically-inclusive mode of critique, one qualified by a sense of ‘adequation’ after the 
Spinozism that has guided our project. Although in what follows we will certainly 
concern ourselves with science as a popularly misconceived of and homogenized 
cultural preoccupation, we will more concertedly address the spread of instrumental 
values that accompanies this misconception, looking at how Deleuzian noology might 
enable us to eco-clinically approach ‘scientific nihilism.’  
This later point appears key when we consider how ecocriticism’s core 
contribution to broader environmental debate is its highlighting of ecology as a rubric 
or meme that is more than scientific, which is to say as a term marking an epistemic 
shift that is impacting across almost all scholarly discourses, and which has significant 
implications for the manner in which they intersect and co-operate. As our eco-clinic 
has repeatedly suggested, it is through a literary grasp of language that bodily pathos 
and the ‘sympathies’ between forces can be rendered palpable and moreover, effect 
change via incorporeal transformation of bodies within diverse social machines. As we 
have worked to show above, the ‘humanities’ are thus traversed by an infinite variety of 
already ‘inhuman’ flows, and which render literary production intimately linked to a 
‘delirious’ apprehension of impersonal forces and structures, to a sense of machinic 
assemblages and regimes of signs that obviates discrete being after an ontology of 
becoming.  
It is in this way that we acknowledge too the becoming of the assemblages 
popularly and academically compartmentalized as discrete disciplines. As ecocritic 
Lawrence Buell had it in 1995, ‘during the past two decades [ecocritics] have ranged 
freely across the human sciences, subjecting ethnography and phenomenology and even 
scientific monographs to literary analysis almost as readily as sonnets and short 
stories.’8 Whilst such ‘co-operation’ might all too readily be subjected to classical 
ideology critique, and thereby characterised as that ‘peculiar to, and specifically 
distinguishing, the capitalist process of production’, we have seen how such a 
characterisation might nevertheless be read after a number of post-Althusserian lines 
with wholly divergent hermeneutic (or ‘anti-hermeneutic’) programmes.9 The emphasis 
on force that gave Deleuze and Guattari to depart from signification (or to postulate an 
                                                
8 Buell, Environmental, p. 85. 
9 Marx, Karl. Capital. (3 Vols). Trans. Ben Fowkes. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990). p. 452-53. 
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‘a-signifying’ symptomatology), for example, suggests that the extraliterary disciplines 
of the sciences might now be addressed in terms of their pertinence to theories of 
literary reception and interpretation and specifically, beyond narrow, post-Althusserian 
(or Žižekian) concerns with ideology.10 
We might begin, then, with the relationship between instrumental value and this 
sense of heightened connectivity, with the interdisciplinary hybridity that decades of 
cultural and political pluralism have enabled, and yet which proves paradoxical 
somehow when we consider the perversely inhibited or conservative tendencies 
capitalism exhibits with respect to scientific innovation, largely through the ‘retarding’ 
or reterritorialising effect that certain universalisms—such as the Oedipal subject and 
the nuclear family structure—might be seen to have at the cultural level. This might 
then shed further light upon the emergence of ecocriticism as a response to (as much as 
a prolongation of) late capitalist cultures in which certain technologies and other 
cultural fruits of ‘science’ stimulate the continual demand for further ‘progress’ and 
development. In this way, our proposed eco-clinical orientation might then appear as no 
less of a ‘line of flight’ born of the paradoxical impasses that subtend an otherwise 
apparently unregulated free-market  economy; as Jameson remarked of Cultural Studies 
in an essay of 1993: ‘[I]t came into the world as the result of dissatisfaction with other 
disciplines, not merely their contents but also their very limits as such. It is thus in that 
sense postdisciplinary.’11 
This image of ecocriticism as somehow ‘postdisciplinary’ is therefore one that 
recalls our discussion of North American cultural and political pluralism in chapter one; 
not only might it give us to inspect ecocriticism per se, but moreover in this chapter we 
might suggest a stratoanalysis of the root disciplines that the movement would typically 
marshal and operate between. We can here bring our stratoanalytic bias to bear upon the 
                                                
10 For Althusser, in order to be ‘scientific’—which is to say, to be beyond all ideology—a theory must be 
verified by purely internal criteria, such as those that are applied in mathematical demonstration. Whilst 
this amounts to an important observation of value to a Deleuzoguattarian approach to interdisciplinarity, it 
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ideology’ will pave the way for a Deleuzoguattarian ecocriticism that denies science its hegemonic role in 
North American culture, yet one informed by a diagnosis of structuralism as an ‘illness that has been 
ravaging the sciences of language, anthropology, psychoanalysis, etc., for quite some time’. Guattari qtd. 
in Dosse, François. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari: Intersecting Lives. Trans. Deborah Glassman. 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). p. 233. 
11 Jameson, Ideologies, p. 599. 
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postdisciplinary exchanges in question, considering in particular how in his essay on 
the superiority of Anglo-American literature, Deleuze speaks of the call for 
interdisciplinarity in the sciences. The fact that Deleuze enters into discussion of the 
sciences in an essay concerned for the most part with literature and philosophy provides 
us with a means of understanding the relationship between social and technical 
machines in this regard. Whilst in his earliest works, Deleuze might be said to propose 
‘an ontology that corresponds to contemporary physics and mathematics’, throughout 
his collaborative ventures he remains concerned with the social implications of biology, 
chemistry, geology and a host of quantum and complexity sciences. Yet crucially, the 
findings and potential of such fields are never put to work in a metaphorical way; 
Deleuze and Guattari are concerned with the ‘internal validity and coherence’ of 
science, art and philosophy, yet also with the ‘relations of resonance and exchange’ 
between them.12  
On Deleuze’s view, then, there is a co-operation at work here that requires a 
respect for the internal difference of a discipline; science might then be demoted, in 
certain respects, from the hegemonic status it is often afforded in contemporary society, 
and restored as a power, style of thought, or methodological orientation that 
compliments and intersects with those of art (productive of sensory aggregates) and 
philosophy (productive of concepts). In this way many of the sciences are therefore 
recast as much less the reductive and diminishing forces that some humanities scholars 
might fear them to be, so much as ones that open up and disrupt, contributing in 
profound ways towards the destabilisation of the stable identities that constrain and 
‘crucify’ Dionysian difference as per the political thrust of Deleuze’s broader project. 
Like the understanding of literature we advanced in chapter three, Deleuze’s view of 
the sciences is therefore as libidinal-political as it is methodologically-informed by 
them; integral and differential calculus, the ideas and hypotheses of Riemann, Monod, 
Prigogine and Stengers, but also Simondon’s thesis on individuation and Bergson’s 
work on intensive multiplicities, movement and time, all contribute towards the 
‘palpation’ of difference and the virtual/actual relations that occupied Deleuze 
throughout his career, and which as we have shown, lend us significant resources in our 
own examination of the societal body.  
                                                
12 Marks, John. ‘Introduction.’ Paragraph. Vol. 29, No. 2. (July, 2006). Special Number: Deleuze and 
Science. 1-18.  
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We might, then, already infer an approach to our concerns in this chapter with the 
privileged or hegemonic role of the ‘earth’ and other ‘hard’ sciences that remains so 
prevalent in the work of a number of ecocritics. Like the arts, interdisciplinarity in the 
sciences once again turns for Deleuze upon a discussion of ‘heterogeneous 
assemblages’, of science as rhizomatic (‘increasingly like grass’) and thus as ‘in the 
middle, between things and between other things’, ‘between domains’ and 
‘interregnums.’13 Yet when he notes that ‘it is true that the apparatus of power will 
increasingly demand a restoration of order, a recoding of science,’ we might once again 
recognise the loaded nature of the term ‘earth’ in the stratacritical vocabulary he 
developed with Guattari, particularly where the ‘terre’ of territory bespeaks of certain 
cultural and political sedimentations; the ‘failures’ or reterritorialisations that must 
follow any deterritorialisation that is not ‘absolute’, and which we acknowledged 
briefly in chapter three, would deny the ‘revolutionary’ movement of a range of 
sciences, and potentially inhibit an active form of eco-critique that reckons with the 
relationship between the eco-cultural unconscious and the economic base productive of 
art.14  
Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of recoding will therefore remain essential to our 
analysis of the ecocritical ‘cooperation’ between the life sciences and literary 
scholarship. This will have particular relevance when we again consider how social 
machines remain the proper concern of a stratoanalysis, or more precisely, how ‘tools 
always presuppose a machine, and the machine is always social before being technical. 
There is always a social machine which selects or assigns the technical elements 
used.’15 In this way we can further develop the concerns we began to raise in chapters 
two and three, wherein we discussed the all-too-human and thus, typically eco-liberal 
tendencies of much environmentalism, paying particular attention wheresoever the 
deterritorialising powers of science would intersect with those particular to philosophy 
and literature. Our relationship to tools and technologies remains of clear eco-clinical 
concern when we consider how for Deleuze 
 
                                                
13 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 68. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 70. 
 150 
science has never ceased to be delirious [délirer], to make 
completely decoded fluxes of knowledge and objects pass along 
lines of flight, continually going further afield. There is thus a 
whole politics which demands that the lines should be blocked, 
that an order should be established. Think, for example, about 
the role which Louis de Broglie had in physics, in preventing 
indeterminism from going too far, in calming the madness of 
particles: a restoration of order.16 
 
 The power of high modern literature to disarticulate dominant modes of 
expression might then be reconceived of in line with the powers that Deleuze here 
attributes to the sciences. If ecocriticism would acknowledge both powers, marking the 
ways in which the literary and the scientific compliment yet challenge one another in 
line with a ‘unifying’ ecological mandate, then it is surely our business here to 
acknowledge the extent to which the retarding or reterritorialising movement of Life (or 
the strata) inculcates the ‘restoration of order’ that Deleuze describes in the passage 
above. As we considered in our concerns with eco-piety in chapter one, after Deleuze 
and Guattari, the pseudo-scientific desire for an ‘eco-psychology’ risks an archaic and 
theological reterritorialisation, largely by virtue of a stubbornly humanistic propensity: 
‘Scientific knowledge as nonbelief is truly the last refuge of belief, and as Nietzsche put 
it, there never was but one psychology, that of the priest.’17 When we considered the 
legacy of Kantianism in chapter two, we suggested ‘truth’ and ‘knowledge’ as much 
less the goal of thought as defined under Enlightenment epistemology, but rather, that 
thinking be conceived of as a power of Life to create, and therefore at once to 
deterritorialise and destratify existing connections and relations.  
 
 In this way, E. O. Wilson’s notion that interpretation is that which conjoins the 
sciences and the arts (through what he terms ‘consilience’), might be read after Deleuze 
and Guattari’s assertion that the State is that entity which ultimately renders the 
revolutionary potential of both planes of immanence neutralised, recapturing them in 
line with its domesticating, paranoid, and ‘neurotic’ schema. Which is to say that for all 
                                                
16 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 67. 
17 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 122. 
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of the revolutionary power that both the arts and sciences possess, certain cultural 
forces—namely those upholding of the organism, the subject, Oedipus, and the State—
force what we might here term a ‘hermeneutic corridor’ of interpretation, delivering a 
form of eco-critique that remains shackled, in many respects, to a typically ‘humanistic’ 
orientation that, we might suggest, would benefit from a little more of the ‘ascesis’ that 
Deleuze and Guattari prescribe, the ‘desert’ (or ‘experimentation on oneself’) that 
would remedy the inhibited tendencies of the State, and which therefore calls to us from 
beyond the domestic securities of the city limits, a simultaneously destratified and 
destratifying influx of that more-than-biological ‘Life’ that would, somewhat 
paradoxically perhaps, allow a little more Dionysian blood to flow in Apollonian 
veins.18 
 
 Before turning to Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of the three ‘planes’ of art, 
science and philosophy in What is Philosophy? (1994), therefore, and to consideration 
of how their concerns with the powers particular to each discipline might develop and 
extend their earlier, schizoanalytic and stratoanalytic emphases, let us first look at some 
of the genealogical concerns that ecocritical interdisciplinarity raises for an eco-clinical 
approach. If certain psycho-cultural values remain implicit in Darwinian evolutionary 
theory, then we must address how these values are effected by social machines that 
precede the technical machines of the sciences they give rise to, and which code, 
decode and recode in line with their specific economic orientation. Because the 
symptomatological moment of Deleuzian schizoanalysis owes much to Nietzschean 
genealogy, and because this in turns leads Deleuze and Guattari beyond a merely 
diagnostic approach to cultural production, Nietzsche’s views on the active and reactive 
characteristics of conscious and unconscious life prove key to this post-psychoanalytic 
analysis of social machines and how it opens up our understanding of eco-cultural 
                                                
18 Our reference here is to Deleuze’s underlying philosophical concern with the representational 
practices of the arts and sciences, and the degree to which they fail to obtain ‘difference in itself’: ‘The 
greatest effort of philosophy was directed perhaps at rendering representation infinite (orgiastic). It is a 
question of extending representation as far as the too large and too small of difference; of adding a 
hitherto unsuspected perspective to representation—in other words, inventing theological, scientific and 
aesthetic techniques which allow it to integrate the depth of difference in itself; of allowing 
representation to conquer the obscure; of allowing it to include the vanishing of difference which is too 
small and the dismemberment of difference which is too large; of allowing it to capture the power of 
giddiness, intoxication and cruelty, and even of death. In short, it is the question of causing a little of 
Dionysus’s blood to flow in the organic veins of Apollo.’ Deleuze, Difference, p. 331. See also Deleuze 
and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 11. 
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criticism, particularly where the procedures and functions of the non-humanitarian 
disciplines would appear to better enable it. In this way, we might then proceed to make 
a close reading of Glen Love’s ecocriticism in the latter section of the chapter, 
dependent as it is upon a Darwinian outlook. 
 
(ii) Instrumental Reason, Nihilism and Cultural Declension 
 
To hope to characterise the ‘greening’ of literary studies, or what it means to read 
in an ecological connection, not only necessitates that we apprise ourselves of as much 
interdisciplinary complexity as we are professionally able to absorb, but moreover, 
remain adequate to the challenge posed by the relations between disciplines that evince 
a pronounced difference in kind. Whilst ecocriticism seeks to make literary 
engagements with complex ecological systems—systems that, by virtue of their extra-
literary nature, point up the limits of literary or philosophical erudition—it does not 
follow that its proponents must necessarily fall prone to homogenizing tendencies. And 
yet as a recent paper by Mario Biagioli demonstrates, largely through its own neglect of 
the term, the ideological basis for such homogeneity remains overlooked in this 
regard.19 
To attempt a ‘noological’ analysis of this collapsing of the differences particular 
to the arts and sciences is to exceed a classical mode of ideology critique, largely after a 
genealogical emphasis, or what in Deleuzoguattarian we have termed a ‘stratoanalysis’. 
We might begin, then, by considering how despite offering useful clinical lines of 
approach, Freudian psychoanalysis may well aid and abet some of the instrumentalist 
attitudes that we have raised as core eco-clinical concerns throughout the thesis. We can 
begin to address the relationship between interdisciplinarity and the Freudian ‘science’ 
by first considering if the only ‘solution’ to Climate Change appears to be the neo-
liberal ‘market solution’, or the reprehensible profit-making of the ‘cap and trade’ 
response to carbon emissions, then the profit-motive itself must be recognised in terms 
of the decoding process specific to the capitalist social-machine, or what Deleuze and 
                                                
19 Biagioli, Mario. ‘Postdisciplinary Liaisons: Science Studies and the Humanities’. Critical Inquiry. Vol. 
35, No. 4, The Fate of Disciplines. Eds. James Chandler and Arnold I. Davidson (Summer 2009): 816-
833. 
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Guattari term the ‘axiomatic’.20 By simultaneously stimulating over-production by way 
of decoding and at once inhibiting such production by way of anti-production, the 
capitalist axiomatic requires a sense of lack where there is plenitude, which is to say 
that it needs to sustain a certain sense of need per se as a stimulus for production.21 That 
a sense of lack remains so fundamental to consumerist culture has been the focus of 
certain other Marxo-Freudian analyses throughout the twentieth-century, not least those 
writers comprising the Frankfurt School; that Freud’s American nephew, Edward 
Bernays, was almost single-handedly responsible for the birth of public relations and 
the psychologically-savvy orientation of contemporary marketing practice, remains a 
key consideration for us, however, not least where we would oust the complicity of 
psychoanalysis and its sustainment of Oedipalisation with instrumentalist attitudes 
towards material resources, or what in his mildly eco-clinical project, Lee Rozelle has 
termed ‘depletionism.’22 
Whilst the suggestion that Freudian psychoanalysis constitutes a science would 
today be one that most cultural, political and scientific critics would scoff at, its cultural 
hold upon the popular imagination remains substantial. In view of this, we might 
reconsider how by initially striving to present itself as ‘scientific’, the Oedipalisation of 
psychoanalysis has loaned a certain post-theological authority to the capitalist 
axiomatic, chiefly via one of its basic paralogisms:  
 
Freud puts Oedipus before culture, before history; every child, 
regardless of sex, irrespective of where or when they are born, 
despite all differences of culture, religion, ethnicity, race, class, 
education and parenting, must resolve their desire to replace 
mummy or daddy (depending on sex) in their relation with the 
parent of the opposite sex. Achieving this is the principal aim or 
function of psychic repression as psychoanalysis conceives it. 
Social repression, on the Freudian view of things, comes to bear 
                                                
20 Buchanan, Deleuze and Guattari, pgs. 111-112. 
21 Buchanan, Deleuze and Guattari, p. 113. 
22  As we saw in chapter two, Rozelle’s project is hamstrung in many respects by his deep mistrust of 
Freudian but also Lacanian psychoanalysis. Again, the denials that he seeks to address with his term 
‘depletionist’ are given here: ‘Nature, the depletionist assures us, will magically become the source of 
infinite renewal and reliable productivity.’ Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 29.  
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later, in a secondary fashion, to keep in check the manifold 
‘returns of the repressed’ psychic repression is liable to.23 
 
From a certain perspective, this ‘universalism’ is itself the most heinous of 
ideological effects. And yet beyond any classical form of ideology critique, the 
‘scientific’ status that Freud sought for his discipline remains equally questionable, 
chiefly because he fails to allow for the deterritorialised, productive unconscious, and 
for the BwO that would enable a properly post-Kantian discernment of matter as 
‘hylozoic’, which is to say the degree to which an element of it resists and rejects the 
imposition of conscious form, and which Deleuze and Guattari suggest Freud opened 
up with his initial findings, yet which he ultimately reterritorialised in line with his 
bourgeois familial ideals. 24  On Deleuze and Guattari’s noological account, the 
‘reactive’, Oedipalising moment of the Freudian science is of course no real surprise, 
chiefly insofar as it remains consistent with the reactive bias that its own metaphysical 
limits place upon scientific operation per se. As such, if Deleuze and Guattari advance a 
universal, then it must be in terms of schizophrenia as process, a universalism of 
difference rather than one of identity.   
Again, this is of more than simply ‘ideological’ concern insofar as such 
metaphysical reactivity betrays the essentially ‘active’ domain of the unconscious; it is 
consciousness itself that thwarts the attainment of adequate ideas or images of thought, 
chiefly via the Oedipal paralogism: ‘The only true science is that of activity, but the 
science of activity is also the science of what is necessarily unconscious. The idea that 
science must follow in the footsteps of consciousness, in the same directions, is absurd. 
We can sense the morality in this idea.’25 This genealogical assessment gives us to 
nuance further what might be meant by ‘science’; if we are here concerned with 
ecocritical interdisciplinarity and the extent to which discrete disciplines may or may 
not retain a level of compartmentalized ‘identity’ for being the symptoms of a 
                                                
23 Buchanan, Ian. Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus. (London: Continuum, 2008). p. 71. 
24 ‘The great discovery of psychoanalysis was that of the production of desire, of the productions of the 
unconscious. But once Oedipus entered the picture, this discovery was soon buried beneath a new brand 
of idealism: a classical theater was substituted for the unconscious as a factory; and an unconscious that 
was capable of nothing but expressing itself—in myth, tragedy, dreams—was substituted for the 
productive unconscious.’ Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 25.  
25 Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche and Philosophy. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson. (London: Continuum, 2006). p. 
39. 
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consumerist culture that owes much to Freud’s identitarian metaphysics, then Deleuze’s 
genealogical reading of the term here leans on Nietzsche’s view of the sciences as 
potentially threatening to reduce and ‘equalise’ forces, chiefly by way of moral 
imperatives that inhere within the putatively ‘secular’ age of (post)modernity.26  
Deleuze’s great debt to Nietzsche’s genealogy contributes to a stratoanalysis of 
the ‘hard’ sciences on these terms. Outwardly, genetic science would appear to suggest 
itself as the quintessentially secular arm of a politics of difference, conferring freedom 
from ‘unscientific’ beliefs, and scotching such universal ‘creation myths’ as Oedipal 
castration. Again, whilst it might be true to suggest that in their emphases upon the 
‘machinic’ nature of desire in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari are themselves 
advancing something on the order of a universal of this type, the relational ontology 
they propose would nevertheless resist a reductive, identitarian tendency towards 
cultural homogenization and thus the subordination of difference in itself. As Deleuze 
acknowledges in his study of Nietzsche, the philosopher ‘criticises Darwin for 
interpreting evolution and chance within evolution in an entirely reactive way.’27 In 
other words, it might be that the lessons regarding molecularity and molarity that 
Deleuze and Guattari impart are ones that philosophers of science might here apprise 
themselves of. For our purposes, it is not so much the reintroduction of the reactive 
metaphysics of Oedipus into the sciences that might concern us, so much as the extent 
to which such a metaphysics has remained latent within the capitalist economy, and 
therefore as a clandestine influence upon Darwin as much as the next ‘modern’ thinker. 
As such, the paradoxical desire to retain a certain level of ‘humanity’, one that so 
evidently beleaguers the properly post-human (or deterritorialising) potential of the 
sciences, might be considered in this regard. 
Here, then, we see how our eco-clinical concerns with desire might begin to 
reckon with interdisciplinarity. Whilst from a ‘vulgar’ Marxian perspective, the 
relationship between such ‘interface territories’ as those ecocriticism describes might 
initially be read as symptomatic of pluralist modes of exchange, we have intimated how 
a Deleuzian approach might differ and exceed it. If for orthodox Marxism it is not 
simply the economies of interdisciplinary exchange that should concern us, but the 
material economies (or conditions) that give rise to them, then for a Deleuzian approach 
                                                
26 Deleuze, Nietzsche, p. 42. 
27 Deleuze, Nietzsche, pgs. 39, 77. 
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it is rather the metaphysical image of Oedipus and its power to triangulate and yoke the 
lacking subject that requires a noological violence sufficient to demystify and overturn 
it. Thus as we saw in our last chapter, Nietzsche’s example as a ‘private thinker’ 
supplies Deleuze and Guattari’s noological project with a more-than-ideological 
evaluation of thought’s exterior, and which thus calls for a genealogy of images of 
thought. In The Genealogy of Morals (1887), Nietzsche shows how no less than the 
ascetic priests of Christianity, the ideologues of science have fashioned a modernist 
world in which they too appear wholly essential.28 Despite how hyperbolic such an 
observation might initially appear, we might nevertheless consider how now more than 
ever before, the earth and life sciences are being looked to for solutions to 
environmental problems; the implicit question being, ‘who else is ‘qualified’ to save 
us?’  
Therefore, whilst technical, scientific ‘salvation’ to the issues raised by Climate 
Change—but also to associated issues of over-population, fuel and other resource 
shortages—is proffered in the form of sustainable technologies etc., what the majority 
of ‘hard’ sciences seem ill-equipped to attend to is the formation of eco-social values 
themselves. As they compete for exclusive means of access to ‘the truth’, the physical, 
chemical and biological sciences risk reactively impacting across all forms of cultural 
production, again enforcing nothing short of what we have hitherto referred to as a 
‘hermeneutic corridor’ of interpretation. Where the biological and physical sciences are 
concerned, not least when we take into account the immensely lucrative human genome 
and Hadron Super Collider projects—the complicity of which with capitalist funding, 
particularly in terms of pharmaceutical and military development, proves undeniably 
leading—we find very few clinical examinations of the libidinal, or ‘willful’ dimension 
that a Nietzschean critique would necessarily emphasise. 
Thus the suggestion of a further ‘science’, that of ‘ecology’, remains one that we 
are beginning to assert as a philosophical, as much as a scientific and artistic 
assemblage comprised of both physical or bodily (and machinic) elements, but which is 
also traversed and transformed by the immaterial elements that comprise the regime of 
signs operant within a capitalist milieu. Our concerns with Kafka’s literary contribution 
to understanding collective assemblages of enunciation in chapter three enable us to re-
                                                
28 See Section II of Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Genealogy of Morals / On the Genealogy of Morality. 
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emphasise the importance of grasping ecology as a more-than-scientific assemblage, 
one that we might duly reconnect to our schizoanalytic concerns with delirium, 
particularly if we sustain the more-than-liberal perspective of Nietzsche’s ‘Dionysian 
pessimism’, or his refusal to deprive life of its ‘enigmatic’ character, a refusal that leads 
us to acknowledge that ‘the effect of the work of art is to excite the state that creates 
art—intoxication’.29 But how does such ‘intoxication’ relate to the surely more ‘sober’ 
business of cultural transformation under the phenomenon of Climate Change? Whether 
or not a broadly ‘Eco-topian’ future (or one in which the humanly-contributed factors 
cease to outweigh those brought about by such ‘blameless’ factors as shifts in solar 
output and cosmic radiation etc) remains either possible or desirable, we might also 
enquire, does this not somehow suggest one from which life’s chaos is excised? As 
Deleuze and Guattari have it: ‘What would thinking be if it did not constantly confront 
chaos?… chaos has three daughters… the Chaoids - art, science, and philosophy… 
[Each] cut through the chaos in different ways. The brain is the junction - not the unity - 
of the three planes.’30 
When, in the latter half of this chapter, we turn to Glen Love’s reading of Willa 
Cather’s literature after a markedly Darwinian paradigm of interpretation, and which, 
after E. O. Wilson’s notion of ‘consilience’ between the arts and sciences, levels a form 
of ‘evolutionary psychology’ at the literary text in such a manner as to prove 
undeniable creative and deterritorialising, and yet at once reductive and all too moral in 
its familial emphases, we will once again consider how Deleuze and Guattari’s 
emphasis upon delirium in relation to literary form enables us to renegotiate the 
specifically capitalist variety of Oedipal interiority that sustains ‘unecological’ 
attitudes. Prior to making this close analysis, however, we might first consider a little 
further the difficulties facing an ‘environmentalist’ epoch that would continually 
valorise the techno-sciences, often at the expense of the humanities, particularly insofar 
as it is only from within the latter, surely, that we might acknowledge how values 
                                                
29 Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will To Power. Trans Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. Ed. Walter 
Kaufmann. (New York: Vintage Books, 1968). pgs. 262, 434. Moreover, Nick Land here recommends 
Bataille’s Nietzscheanism as a form of Dionysian Pessimism, or what he also describes as an ‘active 
nihilism’, largely on the basis that the writer was concerned ‘with value as the annihilation of life’ and 
with challenging ‘the utilitarianism that finds its only end in the preservation and expansion of existence.’ 
It is therefore ‘active’ inasmuch as it avers ‘the promotion of a violently convulsive expenditure rather 
than a weary renunciation.’ See Land, Fanged, p. 170.  
30 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 208. 
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emerge? Surely it is such non-scientific disciplines as history, ethics and law that would 
not simply promise an ‘antiscientific’ denial of capitalism as ‘the only game in town’, 
but teach of its formation and the existence of historical alternatives to it?  
 In his preface to American Earth: Environmental Writing Since Thoreau (2008), 
U.S. presidential candidate and environmental activist Al Gore emphasises the affective 
impact Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) had upon his developing sense of 
ecological networks of interdependency long before the word ‘environment’ had 
sufficiently entered the public lexicon.31 Like many ecocritics whose ostensibly literary 
motives would challenge scientific hegemony, Greg Garrard considers Carson’s book 
vital for being as literary as it is scientific: ‘... the rhetorical strategies, use of pastoral 
and apocalyptic imagery and literary allusions with which Carson shapes her scientific 
material may well be amenable to a more ‘literary’ or ‘cultural’ analysis. Such analysis 
is what we call ‘ecocriticism’’.32 Lee Rozelle appears typical of North American 
ecocritics who would uphold scientific bases for developing ‘acceptance one of 
personal convergence with ecological principles’, to which ‘vital is the active 
remembrance of place by becoming learned in the biological sciences.’33 Moreover, 
Rozelle even appears to suggest that all other discourses lead to his newly-adopted 
specialism as a critical ‘Rome’ of sorts: ‘On the road to ecological insight, critics like 
Bakhtin and notions such as the ecosublime are mere turns that lead to the science of 
ecology.’34  
 Where we have acknowledged that ideology is insufficiently considered by such 
ecocritics as Rozelle, however, what we have begun to highlight instead is a noological 
discussion of scientific instrumentalism as part of an androcentric cultural hegemony, 
taking into account what Nietzsche termed the ‘will to truth’ as a primary symptom of 
cultural declension after his career-long diagnosis of nihilism. In this regard, we might 
take into consideration North American ecologist Murray Bookchin’s assertion that it is 
via the interdisciplinary fusing of sociological and scientific disciplines that we have 
formulated one ‘unique to our age: social ecology.’35 As laudable as a social ecology no 
                                                
31 Gore, Albert Jr. ‘Foreword’. American Earth. (Library of America, 2008). p. xvii. 
32 Garrard, Greg. Ecocriticism. (London: Routledge, 2004). p. 3. 
33 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 9. 
34 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 63. 
35 As Bookchin has it: ‘Our own era needs a more sweeping and insightful body of knowledge—scientific 
as well as social—to deal with our problems…. We must seek the foundations for a more reconstructive 
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doubt appears, we might be given to wonder if the very drive to extrapolate from the 
findings of a ‘scientific’ ecology—typically the principles of systemic interdependency 
that characterise ecology’s break with atomistic values—might itself be considered 
after Nietzsche’s notion of the will to truth, specifically as this might condition any 
purview that would seek an ethics extracted from a sense of ‘natural’ order. We might 
mark in particular the degree to which such a venture might be subtended and 
conditioned by the methodological biases of ecology as more precisely a ‘scientism’, 
one that perversely threatens to obscure or deny the indifference and violence of non-
human Nature, and which therefore paradoxically risks a form of Kantian 
hylomorphism, denying the virtual differences constitutive of becoming. Again, it is in 
this way that the ‘inclusivity’ of a generalised ecology proves entirely symptomatic of 
the cultural crisis it would seek to overcome: as Timothy Luke has noted, despite 
remaining ‘one of the most vital projects on the scene today’, Bookchin’s 
environmentally-valenced social ecology ‘essentially sees humanity as the 
consciousness of a purposive and ordered Nature.’36  
 The sort of hazy, ‘unity of being’ that Bookchin assumes—and in which 
humanity nevertheless retains its privilege—betrays a will to truth that after our 
Deleuzoguattarian vocabulary we might described as an ‘inhibited synthesis’, or a 
limited mode of connectivity operating after the paralogism of lack [manque] and as 
such un-apprised of the plurality of ‘givings’ that a transcendental empiricism would 
allow for, thus sustaining precisely the anti-ecological mode of Kantian, transcendental 
narcissism we denigrated in chapters two and three. Again, on a Nietzschean view, this 
tendency might be diagnosed as an historically-contingent symptom: ‘Observe the ages 
in the history of peoples when the scholar steps into the foreground: they are ages of 
exhaustion, often of evening and decline.’37 As such, it is useful to note how in the 
section on critique in his book on Nietzsche, Deleuze discusses just how a 
                                                                                                                                        
approach to the grave problems posed by the apparent “contradictions” between nature and society. We 
can no longer afford to remain captives to the tendency of the more traditional sciences to dissect 
phenomena and examine their fragments. We must combine them, relate them, and see them in their 
totality as well as their specificity. In response to these needs, we have formulated a discipline unique to 
our age: social ecology’ (20-21). See Bookchin, Murray. The Ecology of Freedom. (Palo Alto, CA: 
Cheshire Books, 1982). Pgs. 20-21. 
36  Luke, Timothy W. Ecocritique: Contesting the Politics of Nature, Economy, and Culture. 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997). p. 178. 
37 Deleuze, Nietzsche, p. 68. 
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symptomatology is a new ‘science’, an active science that engages with forces and 
values.  
 Again, in our previous chapter we considered how schizoanalysis surpasses a 
broadly symptomnal approach. We have thus begun to demonstrate how we might 
rethink literary-scientific relations after Anti-Oedipus and also those of A Thousand 
Plateaus, in which Deleuze and Guattari themselves embrace Darwinian ideas. Whilst 
we might consider the slight shift they make in this regard later in the chapter, some of 
their final remarks in the first volume of Capitalism and Schizophrenia bear repeating 
here: 
 
we hold in the first place that art and science have a revolutionary 
potential, and nothing more, and that this potential appears all the 
more as one is less and less concerned with what art and science 
mean, from the standpoint of a signifier or signifieds that are 
necessarily reserved for specialists; but that art and science cause 
increasingly decoded and deterritorialized flows to circulate in the 
socius, flows that are perceptible to everyone, which force the 
social axiomatic to grow ever more complicated, to become more 
saturated, to the point where the scientist and the artist may be 
determined to rejoin an objective revolutionary situation in 
reaction against authoritarian designs of a State that is 
incompetent and above all castrating by nature. (For the State 
imposes a specifically artistic Oedipus, a specifically scientific 
Oedipus.).38 
 
 Unpacking this statement and its relation to the ‘new earth’ we acknowledged in 
chapter three will enable us to pursue further the positive potential science and art 
(especially literature) share, whilst reckoning with those retarding forces of 
reterritorialisation that would inhibit them. Part of the attainment of the new earth 
presupposes ‘[a]n active point of escape where the revolutionary machine, the artistic 
machine, the scientific machine, and the (schizo) analytic machine become parts and 
                                                
38 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 414. 
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pieces of one another.’39 If we are to examine utility and servility in a symptomnal 
manner that benefits any examination of instrumentalist hegemony, then this 
schizoanalytic insight might surpass any broadly Nietzschean emphasis on declension 
and specifically as it might relate to scientific instrumentality: ‘We can guess the source 
of ‘utility’: it is the source of all passive concepts in general, ressentiment, nothing but 
the requirements of ressentiment.’40 After schizoanalysis, such ressentiment remains 
attributable to Oedipus, the metaphysical spectre haunting the operations of desire, 
sustaining domesticated circuits of reactive passivity, productive of unthinking and 
‘enlightened’ Green consumers alike. 
 And so once again, it is the deterritorialising powers of philosophy and literature  
that might aid us in sloughing off the common sensibility that the sciences have come 
to contribute to so powerfully. Nick Land, a contemporary Nietzschean philosopher, 
might equally be referring to contemporary scientists when he writes that what State 
philosophers have never understood is that ‘it is the unintelligibility of the world that 
gives it worth.’41 In the notes posthumously published as Der Wille zur Macht [The Will 
to Power], Nietzsche writes that we must strive ‘not to desire to deprive the world of its 
disturbing and enigmatic character.’42  This prescription against scientific nihilism 
would appear to remain an active one; in his study of Nietzsche, Deleuze develops his 
symptomatology in precisely this connection: ‘...science is part of the nihilism of 
modern thought… part of the ascetic ideal and serves it in its own way… Physics is 
reactive in the same way as biology; things are always seen from the petty side, from 
the side of reactions.’43  
 As we have seen, this acknowledgement of Nietzsche’s position by Deleuze does 
not keep him and Guattari from celebrating the revolutionary potential of the sciences 
and the decoded flows they help to circulate. With this tension in mind, then, let us now 
examine the work of Glen A. Love, a leading ecocritical figure who brings the lessons 
of the life sciences to his literary and cultural analyses. Considering the primacy that 
Love affords the sciences in his work, the valorisation of the sciences beyond the eco-
literary sphere—their ‘truth function’ in contemporary society—appears a worthy 
                                                
39 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pgs. 353-54. 
40 Deleuze, Nietzsche, p. 69. 
41 Land, Fanged, p. 167. 
42 Nietzsche, Will, p. 419. 
43 Deleuze, Nietzsche, p. 42. 
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consideration. We might therefore begin by asking if their invocation is often largely 
strategic, or if they merely serve to substantiate and authorise the eco-political practice 
of those working in the humanitarian disciplines? As Terry Gifford has it in his reading 
of ecocritic Greg Garrard’s work: ‘Garrard typifies the pragmatic position of most 
ecocritics in facing the conundrum of whose version of ecology to use when he 
suggests that ecocritics must assess and then defer to scientific consensus, ‘even as they 
analyse the ways such results are shaped by ideology and rhetoric.’44  
 This might lead us to enquire after the ‘empirical evidence’ of evolutionary 
biology—as motivated by Love in his Practical Ecocriticism: Literature, Biology, and 
the Environment (2003)—on these grounds. Does such a deference to scientific 
consensus not problematically enchain literary ecocriticism to a particular paradigm of 
interpretation, to a ‘royal’ or ‘state’ science over and against the philosophy of 
‘involutionary’ becoming that Deleuze and Guattari describe as characteristic of a 
‘transversal’, non-filiative and ‘nomadic’ alternative?45 How might a ‘nomadic’ (or 
schizoanalytic) science relate to an ecoclinical orientation to literature? This distinction 
seems worthy of Love’s work, particularly inasmuch as he begins his defense of science 
in general by avowing that he does not ‘feel compelled to endorse [its] role […] in the 
technological engine of perceived prosperity and progress’, asserting that this is rather 
because he ‘would affirm the role of science—literally knowledge—in revealing how 
we, and nature, function, so that we are better able to think our way through the 
staggering environmental changes we face.’ 46  Whilst he confesses to a certain 
deficiency ‘in scientific aptitude and interests’, one shared by many of his eco-literary 
peers, he goes on to affirm ecology as much less another science than as ‘one of the 
most important correctives’ of the monolithic, technocratic edifice, describing it as ‘The 
Subversive Science’ after the title of a volume edited by Paul Shepard.47  
  Taking these concerns together, Love hopes to deter ‘antiscientific’ sentiments 
amongst his readership; it is methodology that initially concerns him: ‘To defend 
science is not to endorse the sins of its camp followers—such as a runaway 
technology—but to affirm its methods of investigation as the best means we have for 
                                                
44 Gifford, Recent, p. 17; see also Garrard, Ecocriticism, p. 107. 
45 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, p. 263. 
46 Love, Practical, p. 38. 
47 Love, Practical, p. 40. See also Shepard, Paul. ‘Introduction: Ecology and Man—A Viewpoint.’ The 
Subversive Science. Ed. Paul Shepard and Daniel McKinley. (Boston: Houghton, 1969). 1-10. 
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understanding our world and for finding solutions to the growing problems of pollution, 
overpopulation, and despoliation’.48 During a brief discussion of reductionism as part of 
his argument for scientific methodology, some of the techniques of which ‘may be 
required’ in studying complex systems, Love cites the infamous reductionist Edward O. 
Wilson, and with whose notion of ‘consilience’ we opened this chapter: ‘Complexity is 
what interests scientists in the end, not simplicity. Reductionism is the way to 
understand it. The love of complexity without reductionism makes art; the love of 
complexity with reductionism makes science’.49 This leads Love to posit something of 
a broadly Deleuzian statement insofar as he suggests that like literary realism, science is 
concerned with ‘understanding the system that works’. 50  Love’s ‘metacriticism’, 
however, extends only to the suggestion that articles published in the field of 
ecocriticism might be doubled-refereed, ‘increasing our efforts to end political 
polarization in the disciplines.’51  
 Yet as we have considered above, it is with the social machine that is presupposed 
by our technical machines that gives us to consider how certain universalising 
assumptions, such as those of Oedipus and the nuclear family structure, condition and 
influence scientific research. Love’s work becomes most interesting, then, when he 
speaks of the relationship between evolutionary biology, ecology and literature, the 
former of which he asserts is necessarily ‘ecological’ after Darwin’s own recognition 
that ‘ecological principles were inseparably intertwined with evolutionary 
development’.52 It is here, with the ‘fact’ of evolutionary biology, that he most 
lumpenly polarises the scientifically-minded and everyone else as mere ‘humanists’, the 
latter of whom he tends to caricature, somewhat surprisingly for a literary thinker, as a 
myth-obsessed species of ‘creationist’, and who sustain at best little more than a ‘smug 
ignorance.’53 Beyond such simplistic readings, however, we might ask a more properly 
philosophical question: namely, why Love did not apprise himself of the work of such 
writers as Stephen J. Gould, who have argued against teleologism in evolutionary 
                                                
48 As Love has it: ‘I hope there is room in ecocriticism for accommodation between a nature-endorsing 
postmodernism and the practice of scientific verification… ecocriticism should […] work in the direction 
of that spirit of rigorous methodology’. See Love, Practical, p. 44. 
49 Love, Practical, p. 46-7; Wilson, Consilience, p. 54. 
50 Love, Practical, p. 44. 
51 Love, Practical, p. 48. 
52 Love, Practical, p. 50. 
53 Ibid. 
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theory? 54  Love’s reactionary position renders the following statement, regarding 
whether or not those working in literary studies will be inclined to accept Darwinism as 
inviolable fact, somewhat insensitive to the immanent specificities of literary and 
scientific production: ‘Whether those of us in literary studies are inclined to accept this 
prediction or not, we need a better scientific understanding of our own and related 
fields, an ecologically expanded awareness of the social and biological context within 
which literary acts take place.’55  
 Citing Melville’s abundance of ‘whale-centered cetology’ in Moby Dick (1851) 
and Steinbeck’s ability, as a biologically-trained writer, to explore ‘strongly conflicted 
humanistic and scientific allegiances in the part-whole rhythm’ of The Grapes of Wrath 
(1939), Love discerns ‘common instances of the subtle interconnections between 
science and art that affirm the possibilities of deeply rewarding unities between them.’56 
He then acknowledges Aldous Huxley’s statement of 1963, in which the author called 
for the discovery of ‘the raw materials for a new kind of Nature literature’, to which 
Love adds, ‘and presumably, a new kind of criticism.’57 Here he champions Joseph 
Carroll’s Evolution and Literary Theory, which ‘includes a formidable argument to 
dismantle poststructuralism, finding it based upon unsound principles.’58 Where Carroll 
would ‘replace’ poststructuralism with ‘the evolutionary explanation of human 
experience as the most adequate and complete theory of life’, Love takes this to amply 
counter charges that ecocriticism, like ecology, ‘has no widely accepted underlying 
theory.’59  
 As such, it is with controversial American evolutionary psychologist and 
‘sociobiologist’ Edward O. Wilson’s ‘attention to literary and humanistic themes’, 
which ‘mark him as a notable presence in the humanities’, that Love finds a role model 
for his own interdisciplinary ecocriticism.60 He takes into account the ‘gene-culture 
coevolution’ theory of Wilson and Lumsden’s Promethean Fire (1983), but emphasises 
                                                
54 Gould, Stephen J. Wonderful Life: the Burgess Shale and the Nature of History (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1989). 
55 Love, Practical, p. 51. 
56 Love, Practical, p. 52. 
57 Love, Practical, p. 53.; see also Huxley, Aldous. Literature and Science. (New York: Harper and Row, 
1963). p. 110.   
58 Love, Practical, p. 55. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Love, Practical, p. 57. 
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the significance of Wilson’s more recent work, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge 
(1998), the title of which refers to ‘the linking of causal explanations across all 
disciplines.’61 As Love has it, Wilson ‘posits that the study of culture, assuming 
consilience is a correct description of the direction of world knowledge, will divide 
itself between the natural sciences and the humanities’.62 As Wilson writes: 
These domains will be the two great branches of learning in the 
twenty-first century. The social sciences will continue to split 
within each of its disciplines, a process already rancorously 
begun, with one part folding into or becoming continuous with 
biology, the other fusing with the humanities. Its disciplines will 
continue to exist but in radically altered form. In the process the 
humanities…. Will draw closer to the sciences and fuse with 
them.63 
  Not only has this ‘consilience’ of knowledge come under internal attack by 
ecocritics such as Wendell Berry, but it would appear to run entirely against Deleuze 
and Guattari’s rigorous separation of the powers particular to art, science and 
philosophy in their final collaborative venture, What is Philosophy? (1991/1994).64 As 
we have thus far only acknowledged in brief, whilst Deleuze and Guattari preserve 
what is particular or immanent to these disciplines, they nevertheless emphasise the 
relations of resonance and exchange between them. So how do Deleuze and Guattari 
advance and justify such separation? How might it relate to their anti-Oedipal 
historicisation of desire and which appears wholly at odds with the universalising of 
human nature that Love’s ecocriticism inherits from Wilson’s evolutionary 
psychology?  
 We might proceed, then, with Buchanan’s acknowledgment that against the 
concerns of anthropologists to examine ‘what the codes mean to the peoples whose 
lives are structured by them’, or the ‘local knowledge’ of ‘what natives think (in 
Clifford Geertz’s sense)’, Deleuze and Guattari are themselves trying to discern 
                                                
61 Love, Practical. p. 59. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Wilson, Consilience, p. 12. 
64 In fairness, Berry’s reservations are spiritual, rendering the debate somewhat easy to dismiss for many 
ecocritics. See Berry, Wendell. Life Is A Miracle. (Washington D.C.: Counterpoint, 2000). 
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‘something on the order of the universal… By universal they mean non-psychological 
and indeed non-cultural. If a label has to be applied, then their choice would be 
‘machinic.’’65 Thus, whilst Deleuze’s relationship to science is complex, beyond the 
remit of the present thesis, he nevertheless remained concerned throughout his work 
with relations. In fact it seems almost impossible to separate out percepts, affects, 
concepts and functives from the harlequin cloak of his nominally ‘philosophical’ 
project.66 In the appendix to his book on Foucault (1986), for example, Deleuze 
supplies an explicitly Nietzschean discussion of a post-human overcoming that 
acknowledges how it is that literary invention as much as ‘scientific’ development 
brings Man into contact with the forces of the outside, with ‘those of silicon which 
supersede carbon’ or ‘agrammaticalities which supersede the signifier’, and which 
must thus look as much to Nietzsche and Rimbaud as to ‘genetic components which 
supersede the organism.’67 
 Art and science should be distinguished from philosophy, therefore, as 
‘nonphilosophical’ modes of thought. As we saw in our discussion of Proust, art—and 
in our case literature—has at its core a non-representational power to produce affects 
but also ‘percepts’, the corollary to the philosophical concept: ‘Percepts can be 
telescopic or microscopic, giving characters and landscapes giant dimensions as if they 
were swollen by a life that no lived perception can attain.’68 A strictly a-conceptual 
force, the percept is of the order of sensation and remains qualifiable on the basis of its 
effect, which is to say, on the grounds that it works. Ian Buchanan has examined the 
extent to which certain of Deleuze’s concepts are both explained by, and depend for 
their rigour upon, percepts.69 Buchanan’s work on the debt Deleuze owes to Leslie 
Fiedler’s The Return of the Vanishing American (1968) can shed some light on 
Deleuze’s particular brand of ‘interdisciplinarity’, namely in showing how a particular 
percept, that of ‘America equals the west’, renders Fiedler an artist rather than either a 
‘theorist’ (philosopher), or a ‘scientist’ (geographer), chiefly because it brings together 
                                                
65 Buchanan, Deleuze and Guattari, p. 94. 
66 In response to Bergson’s claim that modern science had not yet found its metaphysics, Deleuze 
remarked that it was precisely this metaphysics that interested him. See Bonta and Protevi, Preface, p. vii-
ix. 
67 Deleuze, Foucault, pgs. 131-132. 
68 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 171. 
69  See Buchanan, Ian. ‘Deleuze and American (Mythopoeic) Literature.’ Southern Review: 
Communication, Politics & Culture. Vol. 34, No. 2, 2001: 72-85. 
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two ‘implications’, both of which ‘are geographical in origin, but of a mythopoeic 
rather than strictly topographical kind.’70  
 This ‘mythopoeic’ percept, drawn from the seemingly strange assertion that 
‘Europeans thought of themselves as inhabiting a world without a West’, and which 
defies any merely geographical, or scientific reckoning, informs Deleuze’s 
philosophical notion of the ‘line of flight.’71 If, as Buchanan maintains, we see ‘that in 
discovering America, Europe did not discover the West itself, but only found its 
expression’, what he is leading us to recognise is ‘a pure expression that has affect, but 
not content’, or in other words, the process by which ‘the name West was transferred, 
step by step, to whatever part of the continent lured men on just over the line of 
settlement, to the unexplored space behind the next natural barrier.’ 72  Buchanan 
clarifies this further: ‘it is not geography that gives us ‘the West’, but ambition.’73 As 
Deleuze puts it, ‘geography is no less mental and corporeal than physical in 
movement.’74 This ‘mythopoeic’ understanding of what impelled Europeans to leave 
for the geographical ‘West’ nevertheless relies on an evaluation of ‘the West’ as 
percept, or as a specifically literary  perception ‘in place of the cumbersome cause and 
effect scheme dear to traditional historians’, and which instead ‘offers inner necessity, a 
kind of inhuman momentum (or line of flight) that propels people into action in spite of 
themselves.’75 
 In addition to the ‘inhuman momentum’ of an impersonal desire that the percept 
attests to, do we not here see something of the ‘limited consilience’ that Love discerns 
between biology and ecocriticism in Deleuze’s literary-geographical approach? 
Perhaps, were we to concede a certain rigour to his analyses of science, might we even 
consider Deleuze a member of C. P. Snow’s ‘third culture’, one in which scholars from 
diverse fields possess working knowledge of both humanitarian and scientific 
disciplines?76 Given that Love himself began his ecocritical career by publishing a 
                                                
70 Buchanan, Mythopoeic, p. 76. See also Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. pgs 
282-3, 520 n18, and Deleuze, Gilles and Claire Parnet. Dialogues. p.37. 
71 Fiedler, Leslie. The Return of the Vanishing American. (New York: Stein Day, 1968). p. 26. 
72 Fiedler, Return, p. 29; Buchanan, Mythopoeic, p. 77. 
73 Buchanan, Mythopoeic, p. 77. 
74 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, p. 38. 
75 Buchanan, Mythopoeic. p .78. 
76 See Snow. C. P. The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1959). pgs. 70-71.  
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moratorium on poststructuralism and postmodernism more generally, and which we 
considered at the outset of this thesis, it proves key to note that where critical theory per 
se is concerned, Love briefly exhumes Alan Sokal’s infamous article for the journal 
Social Text, in which the deliberate misuse of scientific terms in an article that was 
ultimately accepted for publication served to underscore his perception of the 
generalised misuse of such by ‘postmodern’ critics.77 He does so to illustrate how it is 
precisely because the scientific method was not followed within the context of cultural 
studies that the bogus article was published.78 
 Therefore despite the importance of this methodological point to Love’s 
argument,  it is significant to note how, writing in 2003, he agrees that it now seems 
difficult to accept that, as Robert Storey, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone and Joseph Carroll 
have also indicated, that ‘the radical edge of the reigning poststructuralist explanation 
of things is incompatible with the Darwinian/ecological paradigm.’79 That Love is more 
prepared than he once was to allow for certain forms of poststructuralism is 
encouraging, despite the fact that we continue to find no further engagement with 
thinkers who have followed in the wake of Nietzsche and Lacan. Again, for all of his 
generosity towards a successive generation of ecocritics, and a somewhat broader 
endorsement of the very lines of investigation he had once more or less consigned to 
the same ‘depletionist’ dustbin to which Rozelle had dismissed psychoanalysis, Love 
nevertheless remains a good distance shy of the type of clinically-informed, metacritical 
ecocriticism this thesis has proposed as more necessary than ever before. Again, the 
fact that our scientifically-produced technical machines presuppose a social machine 
remains something that Love appears unable to account for without some form of 
socio-political theorisation, particularly if he would recognise a cultural unconscious in 
libidinal-materialist terms, or that a form of poststructuralism might be far less textual 
                                                
77 Love, Practical, pgs. 39, 45-46. 
78 This debate has been considered somewhat settled, a fact that Love himself concedes: “Sokal… later 
identified himself as a political leftist who thus might be considered sympathetic to the ideological 
leanings of Social Text, but one who, he claims, continues to believe that the left has been and should 
continue to be identified with science in its historical role of opposing “obscurantism.” (46). In his own 
words Sokal said: “The recent turn of many “progressive” or “leftist” academic humanists and social 
scientists toward one or another form of epistemic relativism betrays this worthy heritage and undermines 
the already fragile prospects for progressive social critique. Theorizing about “the social construction of 
reality” won’t help us to find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global 
warming. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics, and politics if we reject the 
notions of truth and falsity.” see Love, Practical, p. 46. 
79 Love, Practical, p. 63. 
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than the Derridean species that were so very popular at the time of North American 
ecocriticism’s first emergence. Love might, at the very least, have acknowledged the 
extent to which such important cultural formations as those he neglects intersect with 
Darwinism. As both Bruce Fink and Gregory Elliott have shown, the relationship 
between the hard sciences and psychoanalysis, for example, is as complex as the one 
Marxism shares. 80  Just as psychoanalysis since Freud has staked its claims for 
legitimacy by way of its ‘scientific’ status, the development of the Marxist ‘science’ of 
historical materialism owes much to the Darwinian turn; as Elliott indicates: ‘The 
‘general laws’ of the dialectic were taken from Hegel’s Logic and held by Engels to be 
verified by contemporary scientific developments (most portentously, Darwin’s theory 
of evolution).’81  
 It is here, then, that Deleuze and Guattari again aid us in assessing the distinctions 
or differences in kind between the disciplines in question, and by extension, their 
relative influence upon the socius. Let us first consider how Deleuze and Guattari 
determine science in What is Philosophy?:  
A scientific notion is defined not by concepts but by functions 
or propositions…. It is this idea of the function which enables 
the sciences to reflect and communicate. Science does not need 
philosophy for these tasks. On the other hand, when an 
object—a geometrical space, for example—is scientifically 
constructed by functions, its philosophical concept, which is by 
no means given in the function, must still be discovered.82  
 
                                                
80 ‘… once, Marxism had been all-powerful because it was true – and engendered such marvels as the 
Cultural Revolution; now Marxism was all-powerful because it was scientific – and gave birth to 
monsters. By a simple reversal of moral signs, an angelic was converted into a diabolical scientism. 
Marxism, totalitarian science and science of totalitarianism, remained the demiurge of history. ‘If we have 
any objection against Marxism,’ Foucault confided in 1976, ‘it lies in the fact that it could effectively be a 
science’. Qua scientific discourse, Marxism secreted a will-to-power whose truth was the Gulag’’. See 
Fink, Bruce. The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance. (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). P. 138.; Also, Elliott, Gregory. Althusser: The Detour of Theory. (Leiden: Brill, 
2006). p. 259. 
81 Elliott, Althusser, p. 63.  
82 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 117. 
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 Following this assertion, Deleuze and Guattari show how philosophy, science and 
art offer wholly different, if not entirely opposed approaches to nature as ‘chaos’. They 
later describe these as ‘three thoughts’, each with their corresponding ‘plane’ of 
implication, characterising thought per se as a ‘heterogenesis.’83 Let us first remain 
with the distinction between philosophy and science, before returning to their 
characterisation of ‘art’ (inclusive of literature) in the following paragraph. Whilst 
philosophy retains ‘the infinite’, giving consistency to the virtual through concepts, 
science relinquishes it, and instead ‘gives a reference to the virtual, which actualizes it 
through functions. Philosophy proceeds with a plane of immanence or consistency; 
science with a plane of reference.’84  
 Further to this isolation of the ‘function’ (or ‘functives’) as the scientific 
equivalent of the philosophical concept and literary percepts and affects, scientific 
thought is characterised by a ‘slowing down’, which owes something to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s reading of Cantor; despite ‘advancing accelerations’ with certain 
technologies, science sets ‘limits’ in chaos, establishing workable coordinates and 
degrees after the ‘abscissa’, a mathematical term which refers to the x-axis, enabling 
coordinate systems that enable a particle to ‘touch down’: ‘The first functives are 
therefore the limit and the variable.’ 85  Acknowledging Cantor himself to have 
attempted to ‘unite philosophical concept and scientific function’, Deleuze and Guattari 
insist that a difference in kind remains, ‘since the former unfolds on a plane of 
immanence or consistency without reference, but the other on a place of reference 
devoid of consistency.’86  
                                                
83 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 199. 
84 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 118. 
85 ‘...the primordial slowing down is not for these phenomena a zero-instant with which they break but 
rather a condition coextensive with their whole development. To slow down is to set a limit in chaos to 
which all speeds are subject, so that they form a variable determined as abscissa, at the same time as the 
limit forms a universal constant that cannot be gone beyond (for example, a maximum degree of 
contraction’. See Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 118. 
86 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 121. Moreover, although there is a difference in kind between 
disciplines, each nevertheless possesses the power to return us to immanence. This power can be seen to 
dismiss any ‘quasi-theological’ understanding of immanence, particularly when Deleuze and Guattari 
claim to ‘doubt the unitary vocation of science’, to which they should be taken to mean that like religion, 
scientific functives are unlike concepts inasmuch as they are ‘figural’, to which they add the image of a 
necessary ‘reading’, yet unlike religion, science thwarts its own unification by enacting ‘the substitution 
of reference for all transcendence’ See Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 125. 
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 What this means is that whereas science is ‘paradigmatic’ (after Thomas Kuhn), 
or concerns the (re)negotiation of accepted facts as references and their relationship to 
‘states of affairs’, philosophy is by contrast ‘syntagmatic’, or concerned with ‘events’, 
particularly if understood after Deleuze’s highly idiosyncratic conceptions of 
‘becoming’ and ‘sense’. 87  Literature, then, with its percepts and affects as the 
corollaries of scientific functives and philosophical concepts, retains a unique relation 
to sensation. Whilst the plastic arts such as painting are wrought upon an aesthetic 
plane of composition that can come to ‘cover up’ or ‘absorb’ the ‘technical plane’, 
literature is no less concerned with percepts and affects given as blocs or compounds of 
sensations: ‘There are indeed technical problems in art, and science may contribute 
toward their solution, but they are posed only as a function of aesthetic problems of 
composition that concern compounds of sensation and the plane to which they and their 
materials are necessarily linked. Every sensation is a question, even if the only answer 
is silence.’88  
 It may be curious for eco-literary critics, therefore, to note how amidst their 
otherwise very ‘dry’ discussion of scientific limits and variables, Deleuze and Guattari 
use a deeply affective image drawn from the animal kingdom: ‘The most closed system 
still has a thread that rises toward the virtual, and down which the spider descends’.89 
This usage, which itself might be seen to attest to the ‘rich tissue of correspondences 
[that] can be established between the planes’, and which might be read as a prime 
instance of their intersection and intertwining, should nevertheless be considered 
‘without synthesis or identification’.90 In this way, then, it seems wrongheaded after 
Deleuze and Guattari to privilege either a scientific or literary approach over the other, 
as to do so would suggest a misapprehension of their differences in kind.  
 
                                                
87 ‘Far from distributing cardinal points that organize syntagms on a plane of immanence, the scientist’s 
proper name draws up paradigms that are projected into necessarily ordered systems of reference.’ See 
Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 124-5. 
88 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 196. 
89 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 122. 
90 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 198-199. This would go against Deleuze’s earlier (and far more 
Althusserian) usage of the term ‘science’ in an interview with Arnaud Villani in November 1981: 
‘…philosophy might be considered a science: the science of determining the conditions of a problem’ (Q 
41). See Deleuze, Gilles. ‘Response to a Series of Questions’. Collapse III. (2007). 39-43. 
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...art should not be thought to be like a synthesis of science and 
philosophy, of the finite and infinite routes. The three routes are 
specific, each as direct as the others, and they are distinguished by 
the nature of the plane and by what occupies it. Thinking is 
thought through concepts, or functions, or sensations and no one 
of these thoughts is better than another, or more fully, completely, 
or synthetically “thought.” The frames of art are no more 
scientific coordinates than sensations are concepts, or vice versa. 
Abstract art and conceptual art are two recent attempts to bring art 
and philosophy together, but they do not substitute the concept for 
the sensation; rather they create sensations and not concepts.91 
 
 It is in this way, then, that we are bidden to accept that whilst there is intersection 
between the planes, it is ultimately one without synthesis: ‘With its concepts, 
philosophy brings forth events. Art erects monuments with its sensations. Science 
constructs states of affairs with its functions.... [T]he network has its culminating 
points, where sensation itself becomes sensation of concept or function, where the 
concept becomes concept of function or of sensation, and where the function becomes 
function of sensation or concept.... Philosophy needs a nonphilosophy that 
comprehends it; it needs a nonphilosophical comprehension just as art needs nonart and 
science needs nonscience.’92  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
91 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 197-198. Yet as ecocritic Timothy Morton has suggested: 
‘Ultimately, ambient [or ‘environmental’] art becomes science, pure and simple. Many modern artists 
pose themselves in a scientific manner’. See Morton, Ecology, p. 192. 
92 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy? pgs. 199, 218. 
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(iii) Evolutionary Biology and Archetypal Myth in Willa Cather’s  
The Professor’s House 
 
 Let us bring these insights to bear upon Love’s chapter on ‘Place, Style and 
Human Nature in Willa Cather’s The Professor’s House’ (1925). Outwardly a 
modernist novel about a mid-western history professor of advanced years, the work 
offers several examinations of human relationships to the biome, specifically to the 
Mesa Verde region of Colorado in the U.S.A. Suggesting Cather’s narrative as ‘much 
more than a pastoral interlude in the lives of urban subjects and readers’, Love is here 
ostensibly concerned with literary form, yet in a manner that sustains his commitment 
to evolutionary biology and scientific methodologies per se.93 Initially, Love invokes 
the scientific-literary work of Robert Storey, a literary critic and evolutionary biologist, 
who writes on affect in terms of its measurable impact upon the human nervous system.  
Yet this tantalising literary-scientific conjunction goes undeveloped, proving merely 
tributary to Love’s central recommendation that Cather’s modernism incorporates an 
‘environmental imagination’, one that is both ‘biological and topographical.’94 This he 
proceeds to explore by taking up two other stories within Cather’s novel, “Tom 
Outland’s Story” and “the secret of the Blue Mesa”, which he deems to be inserted in 
such a way as to suggest to him a number of, at times, complimentary methodological 
positions; not only is the work an instance of ‘memorable’ literature, but one of 
‘mythic’ or ‘archetypal’ stature, the appeals of which ‘may be shaped by culture but 
whose origins are often subcultural, epigenetic, in the language of evolutionary 
biology.’95  
 By this ‘epigenetic’ origin, Love hopes to assert a biological basis for a 
‘universal’ human nature, a literary-scientific argument that retains an ecocritical edge, 
and one that he believes might benefit his reading of Cather’s own ‘treatment of human 
nature and embodied place in [Tom Outland’s] relationship to the Cliff City.’96 As an 
amateur archaeologist, Tom’s story proves ideal ecocritical material, revealing 
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‘something of [Cather’s] keenly archetypal and place-centered imagination.’ 97 
Recognising the perilous ethical ground he is on, however, Love looks to philosopher 
of science Mary Midgley to try and allay any residual “fear of biology” as an over-
determining scientific discourse.98 Here he hopes that such terms as ‘epigenetic’ and 
‘universal’ will not render his study dismissible, but also that in doing so he might re-
assert a position against human behaviour as purely social in development. Taking into 
account Patrick Hogan’s essay “Literary Universals”, he then suggests that ‘such 
classifications carry no evaluative judgments.’99 This somewhat vague claim rests upon 
the observation, supported further still by ‘bioethicists’ Peter Singer and Steven Pinker, 
that it is not because certain ‘undesirable’ tendencies—such as hierarchy or male 
dominance—prevail in human cultures that we should affirm them as somehow 
biologically-‘inevitable’, but rather that a more ‘honest’ approach to human culture and 
morality is therefore possible; in other words, that the sort of ‘archetypal’ elements he 
discerns in Cather’s literature can be understood scientifically, with a basis in research 
on human adaptation to specific environments.100  
 Let us look more closely, then, at how the Tom Outland chapter of The 
Professor’s House supplies Love with both literary-archetypal and scientific-biological 
insights upon human-environmental relations. How does he ‘synthesise’ them and is his 
doing so somehow problematic after Deleuze and Guattari’s non-synthetic position? 
The ‘scientific’ appeal that the ‘Cliff City’ of the Blue Mesas has upon Tom Outland 
leads Love to attempt a fusion of scientific and formal, literary concerns; the imposing 
cliffs of the Mesa Verde had been home to aeons of pueblo civilization; as such, Tom is 
exposed to ‘the long ages of evolutionary development, during all of which time, place, 
and geography were life-and-death matters, and the ability to read the landscape 
correctly amounted to a survival factor.’101  
 Not only is Cather’s tale ‘a particularly packed meditation upon on biological-
cultural evolution’, however, but it is also one in which ‘the thing that teases the mind 
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is the archetypal element.’102 Love then seizes upon the relationship between this 
biological fact of survival and traces it through its cultural instantiation; cultural 
specifics are here deprivileged and yet the universality of human biological response 
promises a key to understanding the specificity of a North American ecocritical reading. 
This seemingly paradoxical position leads Love to acknowledge Tom Outland as ‘a 
version of the code western hero.’103 As Love maintains, “Tom Outland’s Story” 
‘reminds us that “The Western” in fiction and film is a clear example of the appeal of 
archetypes across cultural lines, leading to The Western’s position by the mid-twentieth 
century as what was called at the time the only contemporary worldwide myth.’104  
 As such it is evidently through the archetype that Love believes he can link 
literary and biological ‘universals’. Yet as Deleuze and Guattari make clear in What is 
Philosophy?, ‘The first principle of philosophy is that Universals explain nothing but 
must themselves be explained.’105 This can be usefully linked back to chapter three of 
Anti-Oedipus, in which we are bidden not to overlook the significance of historically-
specific forms of social repression and their relation to psychic repression in favour of 
any universalising psychology.106 It is thereby with respect to our prevailing culture-
nature discussion that we might engage such insight, one that often goes under-
inspected where universalising assumptions prevail. In unpicking Love’s scientific-
literary reading, one steeped as it is, in both evolutionary psychology and talk of the 
Western as a mode of archetypal literature, we might initially refer back to Buchanan’s 
Deleuzian clarification of the relationship between the mythopoeic register, the science 
of geography and the literary percept in his discussion of the American West. Where 
Buchanan historicizes, we retain awareness of how for Deleuze and Guattari it is social 
oppression that begets psychic repression and not vice versa. This will have 
                                                
102 Love, Practical, p. 105-6. 
103 Love, Practical, p. 105. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 7. 
106 As Holland notes with respect to the examples of despotism and fascism: ‘Positing a “universal nature 
of human infancy” to explain why “the slave is somehow in love with his own chains” amounts in 
Deleuze and Guattari’s view to justifying in advance total resignation to any and all forms of social 
oppression. Their solution will be not to subordinate socio- historical explanation to universalizing 
psychology, but to propose an apparently paradoxical model of the psyche… wherein the mechanisms 
that carry out repression at the same time free the human organism from instinctual determination, so that 
it is the form of social organization that determines whether psychic repression serves social oppression 
or escapes it.’ Holland, Introduction, p. 10. 
 176 
significance for how we redress Love’s ecocritical concerns with form in Cather’s 
novel. 
 Following Fiedler, but also Richard Slotkin, Buchanan distinguishes the Western 
from the Northern, the Eastern and the Southern, neither of which are as 
quintessentially ‘American’ as the former.107 What this non-geographical distinction of 
the Western affords us is again the West as percept; as we noted above, a certain 
misrecognition attends our understanding of the West wherever we persist in a merely 
geographical apprehension of it: ‘it is not geography that gives us ‘the West’, but 
ambition.’108 As Deleuze puts it, ‘geography is no less mental and corporeal than 
physical in movement.’109 Love might, then, have used his ‘scientism’ to address the 
reality of abstraction here, or the manner by which a virtual mechanism is linked, by 
way of percepts and affects, to the ‘inner necessity’ that Buchanan, following Deleuze, 
speaks of: ‘a kind of inhuman momentum (or line of flight) that propels people into 
action in spite of themselves.’110 
 
 This affective relationship to unconscious desire might be clarified further in 
any bid to understand Love’s confluence of literary and scientific concerns. By 
invoking ‘The Western’ mid-way into his discussion, Love fails to satisfyingly connect 
this affective cultural coding of human peoples in a desert terrain with those of his 
scientific-biological orientation; when he dispenses with Freud in a brief passage on 
the snake ‘archetype’ in Cather’s novel, he does so by way of E. O. Wilson’s mostly 
scientific, yet putatively ‘interdisciplinary’ studies in Consilience and Biophilia. 
Amongst other topics, in those books Wilson considers human reactions to poisonous 
snakes in terms of genetic heritage, enabling Love to affirm the links between biology 
and culture insofar as he recognises not only how such reptiles have brought man to an 
awareness of his mortality in harsh, desert environments, but thereby sufficiently 
impressed themselves upon his psyche: ‘Close attention to them, enhanced by dream 
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serpents and the symbols of culture, undoubtedly improves the chances of survival.’111 
Whilst in that same text, Wilson states that he and natural scientists share ‘the common 
goal to turn as much of philosophy as possible into science’, he nevertheless reserves a 
certain methodological value for the humanities, leading him to propose a mythic 
labour for his project of consilience, invoking the image of ‘the Cretan labyrinth, 
which can also serve as a metaphor for consilience… Consilience among the branches 
of learning is the Ariadne's thread needed to traverse it. Theseus is humanity, the 
Minotaur our own dangerous irrationality.’112 
 And yet amidst the branches of learning, the ‘nebula of pathways through the 
social sciences, humanities, art, and religion’ remain retraceable, ‘back through the 
behavioral sciences to biology, chemistry, and finally physics.’113 This retraceability 
that culminates ‘finally in physics’ suggests Wilson’s labyrinth metaphor as one 
casting the interdisciplinary researcher as an humanitarian hero like Theseus, a spirit of 
tutelary stature and yet whom Nietzsche castigated as the ‘sublime’ or ‘higher man’, he 
who assumes the weight of an heroic burden and thus, as Deleuze writes in his essay 
‘The Mystery of Ariadne According to Nietzsche’, is one who ‘claims to carry 
humanity to perfection, to completion.’114 Yet for the thinker of the eternal return, such 
a hero, particularly as an agent of ‘knowledge’, proves himself subject to reactive 
forces and thus the bearer of the ‘products of nihilism’: 
 The higher man claims knowledge as his authority: he claims to 
explore the labyrinth or the forest of knowledge. But knowledge 
is only a disguise for morality; the thread in the labyrinth is the 
moral thread. Morality, in turn, is a labyrinth, a disguise for the 
ascetic and religious ideal. From the ascetic ideal to the moral 
ideal, from the moral ideal to the ideal of knowledge, it is the 
same enterprise that is being pursued, that of killing the bull, that 
is, of denying life, crushing it beneath a weight, reducing it to its 
reactive forces.115 
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 As we have considered above, knowledge for Deleuze cannot be the goal of 
thought anymore than its forces be allied with the upright, good will, or ‘truth.’ To 
relate learning and conscious thought to the goal of knowledge is to think according to 
the eighth postulate of the ‘dogmatic’ image of thought. Thought is rather an event of 
pure difference, a power or potential of Life to undermine and transform itself, one that 
recasts learning after a paideïa, or ‘violent culture of learning’ that proceeds by way of 
the unconscious, and requires an experimentation that enables us to find what works; 
the conscious faculties must be taken beyond their limits after what Deleuze deems 
their ‘transcendental exercise’ and yet which crucially does not presuppose a 
universalism of those faculties. Not only does learning exceed the Kantian thesis on 
recognition, as to learn something new cannot be explained by recognition, but it does 
not take into account the differences that mark individual learners and their diverse, 
complex milieus or ‘environments’ in the broadest of senses: ‘We never know in 
advance how someone will learn: by means of what loves someone becomes good at 
Latin, what encounters make them a philosopher, or in what dictionaries they learn to 
think.’116 
 
 It is in this way, then, that Glen Love’s use of E. O. Wilson as a principal 
resource for his own brand of interdisciplinary ecocriticism suffers from a morality that 
is ultimately ‘unscientific’ in the post-Althusserian sense we have been at pains to 
elaborate. What is more, for all of the interdisciplinary promise of Wilson’s 
Consilience, we do not find in his ‘evolutionary psychology’ an approach to the 
‘inhuman momentum’ enabled by our Deleuzian account of the West as percept. Thus 
Love’s ‘archetypal’ concerns are foreshortened where he plays down the importance of 
psychoanalysis to both the production and reception of modernist literature. 
Emphasising Cather’s articulation of certain ‘primal memories’ in The Professor’s 
House, namely ‘with the intrusion of the snake-serpent into the relationship between 
Professor St. Peter’s two daughters’, Love employs ‘science’ to oust ‘traditional 
Freudian interpretations of snakes as phallic representations and forbidden wishes that 
                                                
116 Accordingly: ‘There is no more a method for learning than there is a method for finding treasures, but 
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evade the brain’s censorship’, largely on the grounds that these ‘have recently been 
seriously questioned or replaced by biological explanations’. 117  Not only is this 
‘scientific’ reading woefully lopsided, but it appears to fall entirely short of the mark 
when he addresses the rattlesnake that kills old Henry Atkins, Tom and Roddy’s cook 
and companion, as they are exploring the Blue Mesa ruins: despite his own admission 
that ‘the “terrible” 118  death of old Henry seems another example of Cather’s 
heightening the mythic trials of Tom’s quest’, he does not deem it worthy of any 
clinical analysis.119 
  Brought together as they are in Love’s work ‘under the sign of nature’, we might 
now extend our concerns with literature and science as they relate to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s revaluation of the Oedipal unconscious. Firstly, we might consider how 
desire, that which Love omits prolonged consideration of, is nevertheless hinted at in 
his concerns with the style of Cather’s novel. Despite how neglectful Love is of 
psychoanalysis, his intimation of The Professor’s House as a piece of proto-generic 
writing, as an eco-Western perhaps, lends us a first level of formal analysis. If for 
Fiedler, the Northern was concerned with a form of socio-political reassurance, 
reporting how the Puritans who penned them had not succumbed to the evils of nature 
and hostile savages—reports of prime importance for their colonist and Old World 
audiences—then it maintained a connection to the old ways. The Eastern then, also tied 
to the past, nevertheless contrasted the New World with its trans-Atlantic heritage: 
‘Customarily, the Eastern treats the return of the American to the Old World (only then 
does he know for sure that he is an American)’.120 As Buchanan has shown, such works 
emphasised how Europe somehow failed its people, emphasising the benefits of the 
New on those terms.121 The Southern, then, equally dramatised such failings, offering 
the New World as a zone in which the desire for decadence of Europe might receive the 
moral guidance it had long lacked; American Gothic tales, often articulated about the 
physical potency, yet at once mulish and passive spectre of the Negro and all of the 
heated socio-politics particular to slave-uprisings, nevertheless appear beholden to a 
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‘miasmal’ nostalgia: The Southern ‘Big House’ remains haunted by the glories of a 
‘cultivated’ European heritage.122  
 These distinctions render the Western a genre born of true ‘independence’, a 
literary testament to contact with an ‘outside’ that threatens established traditions, yet 
one nevertheless dependent upon an unshirking acceptance of the Otherness of the 
Indian, who darkly mirrored the Puritan. Paradoxically, this often came by way of tales 
of relative intimacy with them, yet in the case of such frontier heroes as Daniel Boone 
and Natty Bumpo, by way of a ‘regenerative violence’, an encounter with tribal alterity 
in which the adversary tested the mettle of the hero—a ‘hunter’ archetype—against the 
‘seductions’ of the native’s contagious atavisms, and whom therefore remained a 
creature of suspicion, whose proximity with the Other had surely contaminated him.123 
Although such regenerative violence as that expressed in the frontiersman narrative is 
not present in Cather’s novel, Tom nevertheless reconstructs a sense of the pueblo 
peoples as a sort of ‘foil’ against which a sense of ‘heroism’ could safely be tested and 
proven.124 In other words, it is via them that his own, ‘heroic’ sense of ecological 
‘emplacement’ comes to appear both hard-won and ennobling. What Love might be 
said to do on this view, then, is marshal such heroism in a manner that risks the fantasy 
of the ‘ecological Indian’, or (ecologically)-noble savage.  
 Beyond its generic status, however, it is in the book’s physical construction that 
we might obtain further apprehension of desire in a connection that exceeds Oedipal 
readings. Enclosed by Books One and Three of The Professor’s House, ‘where the 
characters in [a] modern setting are also uneasily experiencing the necessity of coming 
to terms with the implications of place’, Love notes that the novel’s sections are 
themselves ‘emplaced’.125 By this, he reminds us that they are each ‘focused […] upon 
a house, either a literally physical dwelling or an emblem of human emplacement.’126 
Book One concerns the Professor’s familial and professional life; Book Two details 
Tom’s discovery of the Cliff City in the Blue Mesa; Book Three is set in the Professor’s 
old study, where he ponders the grave. Despite their content, the relative lengths of the 
novel’s three sections—“Book One: The Family” is 166 pages long; “Book Two: Tom 
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Outland’s Story” is 75 pages; “Book Three: The Professor” is a mere 27 pages—attest 
to a certain asymmetry, a lack of balance that Cather herself said suggested the Tom 
Outland section as an enlivening respite, a gust of ‘fresh air that blew off the Blue 
Mesa.’127 
 How does Tom’s story effect this ‘fresh air? How might this relate to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s assertion that ‘a schizophrenic out for a stroll is a better model than a 
neurotic lying on the analyst’s couch’?128 How might Büchner’s Lenz supply an 
alternative literary example via whom we might understand a path beyond ‘the man-
nature dichotomy’, a ‘machinic’ path for which ‘there is no such thing as either man or 
nature… only a process that produces the one within the other and couples the 
machines together’?129 Tom’s relationship to the ‘lost’ settlements of the Blue Mesa, 
his bid to preserve the remains of the Cliff City, the bond he develops with the 
forgotten peoples (and which Love reads from his sense of a universal, biological 
bond), can, of course, be read as broadly symptomatic of modernity per se, attesting to 
Cather’s individual sense of the era’s increasing, technological distance from actual 
‘place’ under the market-intensified encroachments of interchangeable, commodifiable 
‘space’. In positioning his story at the heart of the novel, and by breaking with the 
laboured, overlong syntax of Book One, however, Cather not only contrasts Tom’s 
outdoor experiences at the level of her content with the interior, indoor life of the 
Professor, but invokes Tom as a fictional character through style, through shorter, less 
complicated sentences (Tom’s is a monologue). Attesting to Tom’s fictive persona—he 
is an unobtrusive, much under-stated individual, taciturn yet affable, with great 
economy of speech, often appearing almost monosyllabic—he suggests someone who 
requires a degree of ‘reading’, of interpretation perhaps, yet who remains ultimately 
elusive.  
 What makes Cather’s form interesting eco-clinically, is that as readers, we are 
never given the final satisfaction of having full disclosure of his humanity, but rather, 
rewarded with the ‘understated ardor of Outland’s Blue Mesa.’130 Whilst this never 
reaches the schizo-machinic proportions of Büchner’s Lenz, from whom Deleuze and 
Guattari extract a delirious experience of the non-human forces and affects as 
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inseparable from his sense of self after a radical, modernist decoding that leaves him at 
risk of madness and dissolution, it nevertheless imparts a sense of the dual importance 
of both the exterior world beyond the Oedipal hearth, and of the radical exteriority that 
the ‘desert’ passage of the BwO would figure. So, although Love seizes upon these 
formal aspects of Cather’s writing, noting that it is the ‘“unfurnished” quality of Tom’s 
story [that remains] its primary stylistic feature’, what remains unsatisfying in his 
ecocritical reading is the degree to which he returns all of these literary insights to his 
commitment to evolutionary biology.131   
 Suggesting that the Tom Outland section might itself appear as something of an 
‘archaeological’ element at the formal level, particularly as in Book Three, Professor 
St. Peter feels a backwards longing for those ‘rugged, untamed vistas dear to the 
American heart. Dear to all hearts, probably—at least calling to all’, Love plays down 
any recognition of the book in relation to his briefly invoked notion of a ‘literary 
universal’, or to the ‘archetypes’ that he had begun to explore in terms of the novel as a 
proto-Western, so that he can retain his broader commitment to a scientific 
‘methodology.’132 Skimming over Cather as an influence on Hemingway, who might 
also be reckoned as a writer of distinct value to ecocritics, Love turns instead to the 
scientific writing of Maxine Sheets-Johnstone and the biomechanics of Steven Vogel. 
Here he extracts some good points about human animality, about bodily relations to the 
desert environment, yet does so by describing them as ‘a novelist’s corroboration’ of 
such science.133 Moreover, an imposition of the order of Wilson’s consilience returns us 
to Love’s earlier, establishing argument in the opening of his chapter; much less a 
writer fashioning percepts and imparting affects, Love renders Cather a heroic scientist 
in her own right, one whose ‘position anticipates that of many of today’s evolutionary 
biologists and psychologists who find in all human cultures the expression of a heritage 
of commonly evolved tendencies.’134 
 Moreover, when in Book Three Professor St. Peter himself reverts to an almost 
mute, pre-intellectual, ‘pre-symbolic’ state, Cather may, as Love reads her, be 
‘anticipating, and undercutting, the assumption that culture and language have 
somehow lifted us above our biology and rendered our bodies and their elemental 
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displacement inconsequential.’135 Furthermore, Love deems Book Three’s ‘dominant 
thematic note [to be] that of a deterministic corporeality of human life, conveyed in a 
stylistic devaluation of language and dispensability of words.’136 The novel’s transition 
through Book’s One to Three sees the passage from third person, to first person, to 
interior monologue, which is also ‘a progression toward a prelinguistic and prehuman 
muteness.’ 137  It is not until the close of his chapter, when reckoning with the 
approaching death of Professor St. Peter himself, that Love invokes by name only the 
work on archetypes of psychologist Carl Jung. In the slim pages of Book Three, the 
Professor ‘regresses into a Jungian primitive dream state.’138  
 This second acknowledgement, whilst not entirely a dismissal, is nevertheless so 
insignificant as to again warrant a mere half paragraph, highlighting Cather’s own 
handling of St. Peter’s decline in such a way as to again attribute its affects to the  
fantasy of the (ecologically)-noble savage: ‘He was a primitive. He was only interested 
in earth and woods and water. Whenever sun sunned and rain rained and snow 
snowed… Desire under all desires, Truth under all truths… He was earth, and would 
return to earth.’139 Love is, however, attentive to the style of these pages, noting its 
‘extremely short sentences and clauses, devoid of sequentiality or the logic of 
subordination.’140 One might here suggest Deleuze’s thesis on the infinitive verb form 
and the extent to which it would enable us to consider the logic of sense particular to 
Cather’s ‘sun sunned’, ‘rain rained’, and ‘snow snowed’, or in terms of the event, the 
BwO and becoming. Love’s own reading, whilst theoretically-encouraging, is again 
somewhat too cursory, failing to connect its intuitions with any strong clinical insight: 
‘The Professor’s utterances seem drawn from a kind of primal language… they reveal a 
kind of denial of style, a refusal to reach out for graceful synonyms.’141 ‘From the 
perspective of the writer, Cather has carried her unfurnishing process almost to the 
point of having to renounce her medium.’142 This is part of a Symbolically-biased 
association of the approach of death with silence: ‘a wordless sensory existence, but 
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also a kind of rhetoric of obliteration, a paring down of place and action and style to the 
vanishing point.’143 
 Yet both of these concerns, the latter of which might, we would suggest, be read 
in terms of Lacan’s notion of the ‘unary trait’, remain unexplored clinically.144 Whilst 
this is perfectly in accordance with much ecocriticism to date, particularly from Love as 
an outspoken anti-poststructuralist, this nevertheless seems part of an ecocritical 
disavowal that would benefit immensely from the metacritical tools Deleuzian thinking 
would lend such reading, particularly when both of Love’s hermeneutic avenues, the 
biological and the mythopoeic, remain Oedipalised. Acknowledging the ‘verification’ 
of Tom’s universalist sentiments by way of the DNA in ‘our Darwinian bodies’, Love 
does not make good on the promise of his section heading, ‘Style and the Darwinian 
Body.’145 Instead he appears to retain the ‘scientific’ concerns with a sense of shared 
‘human bonds’ that he had set out earlier in the book, in which he made recourse to 
Steven Olson’s Mapping Human History: Discovering the Past Through Our Genes 
(2001), a study that not only affirms the commonality of all human beings by tracing 
them to ‘a common pool of ancestors’, but renders Tom’s ‘reverential naming of the 
mummified body of the woman among the ruins as “Mother Eve”, simply 
‘prescient.’146  
 Of course, we are not here refuting such mitochondrial ‘evidence’, nor the place 
of it in an ecocritical reading that would tie ‘human nature’—however problematically 
universalized—to an emphasis upon the specificity of place; on the contrary, it is here 
that science would offer a positively ‘anti-human’ materialism, a deterritorialising 
movement that promises to free life from its bondage to certain cultural codes, yet 
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difference after Saussurean linguistics. With regard to language and silence in Love’s reading of Cather, 
then, we could readily engage in a discussion of how the Symbolic is inherently totalising and how pre-
Symbolic jouissance by definition betokens a certain ‘silence’. See Verhaeghe, Paul. ‘Enjoyment and 
Impossibility: Lacan’s Revision of the Oedipus Complex.’ Jacques Lacan and the Other Side of 
Psychoanalysis. Eds. Justin Clemens and Russell Grigg. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006): 
29-49. p.46; Also, Lacan, Écrits, p. 523. 
145 Love, Practical, p. 110. 
146 Love, Practical, p.100. Olson’s study details the ‘mitochondrial Eve’ of 200,000 years ago, a lineage 
to which all 6 billion human mitochondrial DNA sequences can be traced. See Olson, Steve. Mapping 
Human History: Discovering the Past Through Our Genes. (Boston: Houghton, 2002). Pgs. 23-27, 237. 
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which nevertheless proves painfully at risk of being reterritorialised upon reactive 
social representations (Oedipal mother, family, tribal hearth). Here we are merely 
arguing that the relationship between bodily, pre-symbolic substantiality and symbolic 
insubstantiality might be read differently after the post-Lacanianism of Deleuze, in 
which the productive, immanent unconscious of connections is detached from the 
triangulating familial yoke of the transcendent Oedipal schema, and which is therefore 
suggestive of an altogether less domesticated (and domesticating) ‘western’ by way of 
the schizoanalytic ‘desert’ of the BwO. 
 
 If we have begun to demonstrate how an ecocritical usage of science might 
nevertheless betray an ‘illegitimate’ usage of the syntheses of desire, then we have 
begun to offer both a metacriticism of what remains a putatively ‘literary’ movement 
and at once, an ‘eco-clinical’ position on the interdisciplinarity it has necessarily 
entered into. With these insights in mind, we might now consider how the instrumental 
attitudes we have acknowledged open onto the concerns of our fifth and final chapter, 
which will entail an eco-clinical assessment of the relevance of humour to ecocritical 
debate. Insofar as the picaresque literary form has been motivated throughout a range of 
seminal environmentalist writings, we will consider the extent to which certain 
‘humoral’ dispositions, but also humour in the prosaic sense, and as it is manifest in 
forms of irony, satire and comedy, serve to draw together many of our prevailing 
noological concerns.   
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5: Towards an Earthly Humour
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(i) The Eco-Clinic and the Eco-Comic:  
Melancholy, Irony and Humour 
 
 
They sat and watched [the] mighty engine in motion, conveying coal at the rate 
of 50,000 tons per day across the mesa and down to the plain and up in to the towers. 
Fifty thousand tons. Everyday. For thirty-forty-fifty years. All to feed the power plant 
at Page. 
 
‘I think,’ said Doc, ‘these people are serious.’ 
 
                —Edward Abbey1
           
            
Humour is treacherous, it is treason. 
 
—Gilles Deleuze2  
 
 
We open our fifth and final chapter with a preliminary discussion of melancholy, 
or the Galenic humor most commonly attributed to the Romantic outlook and which 
much ecocritical writing appears to remain conditioned by. The yearning of Hegel’s 
‘beautiful soul’ [Schöne Seele]—an ethico-aesthetic figure for whom the gap between 
humanity and nature proves intolerable—gives ecocritic Timothy Morton to propose a 
dialectical critique of environmental ideology that would remain enthralled to an eco-
mimetic orientation. Where Morton insists the beautiful soul remains that undiagnosed 
disposition underwriting contemporary environmentalism, specifically where the 
desire to close the gap between ourselves and the non-human world remains palpable 
in our consumerist habits of consumption, we then consider how Deleuze’s own 
critique of the beautiful soul vis-à-vis his differential literary clinic enables us to 
reconsider the pastoral and tragic modes for eco-literary research, chiefly after the 
                                                
1 Abbey, Edward. The Monkey Wrench Gang. (London: Penguin, 2004). p. 167. 
2 Deleuze and Parnet. Dialogues, p. 68. 
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philosopher’s markedly Nietzschean bias. First-wave ecocritic Joseph Meeker supplies 
a significant resource in this connection; bearing many affinities with our Deleuzian 
framework, not least in his denigration of such tragic heroes as Hamlet, and his 
subsequent proposal that the picaresque literary form suggests a path beyond 
narcissistic anthropomorphism, Meeker would appear to suggest in all but name a 
‘humour of descent’ of the type Deleuze himself identifies, one that moreover appears 
highly commensurate with Deleuze’s own privileging of an embodied humour over an 
Idealistic irony.  
 
With these considerations in mind, we move in the final section of the chapter to 
a reading of Edward Abbey’s own ribald interpretation of the picaresque, chiefly in 
The Monkeywrench Gang (1975), a work that details the exploits of a crew of bawdy 
eco-saboteurs and which is popularly credited with inspiring the earliest instances of 
Earth First! activism in the United States of the 1970s. Given the ‘oppositional ethos’ 
typically attributed to Abbey’s work, and from which the term ‘monkeywrenching’ 
has since entered the ecocritical lexicon, we attempt to promote an altogether different, 
noological reading of the book after our examinations of Morton, Meeker and 
Deleuze-Guattari, one in which we recommend Abbey’s humorous revaluation of the 
tragic-pastoral mode and extension of the generic form of the Western as altogether 
pertinent to an eco-clinical outlook. Moreover, it is suggested that such an analysis 
enables us to conclude our thesis by dramatising the distinction between the 
seriousness and ‘labour’ of the Hegelian dialectic and the Zarathustran joy and levity 
of Nietzschean eternal return. 
 
 
* 
 
 
In Ecology Without Nature (2007), Timothy Morton develops his central conceit 
of a ‘Dark Ecology’ by invoking certain archaisms, reminding us that for Galenic 
medicine, ‘melancholy’ was the humor ‘closest to the earth.’3 However tenuous it 
might initially appear, the connection Morton draws between the melancholic and the 
                                                
3 Morton, Ecology, p. 76. 
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‘earthly’ is a tantalising one indeed for a study such as ours, concerned as it is with an 
eco-clinical relationship to literature. Alongside the sanguine, the choleric and the 
phlegmatic, the melancholic humor would appear to offer a ready-made category via 
which to account for those feelings of anguish and injustice particular to the ecocritical 
orientation, suggesting something of a complementary account of affects not entirely 
at odds with our Deleuzian critical-clinical framework. Moreover, where our concern 
with an ecological pathos remains pressing, it seems particularly valuable to note how 
Galen’s ‘humorism’ paired each of the four dispositions with climatic differences in 
temperature and moisture, while also showing them to possess a corresponding bodily 
organ and season. This he did by dogmatically synthesising the humoral pathology of 
Hippocrates, who thought ‘that the understanding of the body presupposed an 
understanding of surrounding nature.’4  
 
And yet Morton’s suggestion of a melancholy quality to ecocriticism appears 
informed in key respects by the negative dialectics of Adorno, who in Minima Moralia 
(1951/1974) described his own fragments as the expressions of a ‘melancholy 
science’, seemingly in direct opposition to Nietzsche’s ‘gay science’.5 This humoral 
classification stems, of course, from Adorno’s infamous definition of dialectics: ‘Its 
agony is the world’s agony raised to a concept.’6 As our thesis has indicated, a 
dialectical approach to ecocriticism might be surpassed by one informed by the 
Zarathustran spirit of eternal return, a power of selection and transformation that does 
not push difference all the way to contradiction. Prior to examining Morton’s thesis on 
melancholy, therefore, and which incorporates a significant attempt to diagnose 
contemporary environmentalism in terms of a syndrome that owes much to Hegel’s 
notion of the ‘beautiful soul’ [Schöne Seele], or the ‘unhappy consciousness’ that 
marks the separation of humanity from Nature, we might first make a few further 
                                                
4 A clinician of the second century A.D., Galen of Pergamon was the self-confessed heir of Hippocrates, 
whose system of the four humors, blood (sanguis), phlegm (phlegma), yellow and black bile (chole and 
melan chole), embodied pairs of the contrasting qualities warm-cold and moist-dry. This humoral 
pathology is given its environmental valence in Plato’s Phaedrus when Socrates asks if appreciable 
knowledge can be gained of the human soul without knowing the nature of the whole. There remains 
some dispute over what was meant by ‘the whole’ in this dialogue: ‘if by “the whole” is meant the 
universe, then Hippocrates thought that the understanding of the body presupposed an understanding of 
surrounding nature.’ See Temkin, Owsei. ‘Greek Medicine as Science and Craft’. Isis. Vol. 44. No. 3. 
(Sept., 1953):  213-225. p. 216. 
5 Adorno, T. W. Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life. (London: Verso, 2005). p. 15. 
6 Adorno, T. W. Negative Dialectics. (London: Routledge, 1990). p. 6. 
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remarks on how this correspondence between a humoral bearing and environmental 
experience might remain one that is invoked almost daily, that remains palpable in our 
everyday speech, colouring the common sensibility. 7 
 
We might do so by eco-clinically evaluating a recent news item, one concerning 
the case of Ivar Pall Bjartmarsson, part-time fire chief for the Icelandic town of Vik, 
which lies beneath the Myrdalsjökull glacier. Bjartmarsson was recently described by 
Financial Times columnist Andrew Ward as appearing ‘phlegmatic’ about the risk of a 
full-scale eruption from the island’s Katla volcano, the larger and more powerful 
neighbour of Eyjafjallajökull, and which proved so disruptive to Northern European 
aviation in the spring of 2010. As Bjartmarsson has it: ‘“We’ve lived with the threat 
all our lives so we’re not scared of it.”’8 Described by Galen as wintry, cold and moist, 
but also as rational, calm and unemotional, the phlegmatic humor appears entirely 
apposite for an Icelandic community, cultural stereotypes of Scandinavian character 
notwithstanding. This common sense usage of humoral pathology proves most 
interesting to our thesis, however, when we consider how it underpins the economic 
focus of Ward’s article. Whilst unsurprisingly sensationalistic, the title of the piece, 
‘Volcano Brings Catharsis for Iceland’, marries bodily, Galenic humor and fiscal 
concerns—namely, the aftermath of the 2008 banking crisis that ‘left its economy in 
ruins’—to a figure that recalls the katharsis of the Aristotelian poetics. 
 
This everyday usage of humoral terms might give us to consider the extent to 
which the common sensibility retains elements of such a pre-critical orientation. Also 
taking his cues from the humoral pathology of Hippocrates, Aristotle famously 
developed a bio-political thesis informed by an embodied theory of affect, and which 
has persisted most notably in our common notions of the relationship between 
katharsis and tragedy, which as Protevi has noted, ‘is the imitation (mimesis) of 
important actions of a man better than most who commits an error (hamartia) and 
brings down upon himself an undeserved evil; seeing this performed has a particular 
emotional effect on the spectators: it is a purging/purification (catharsis) of pity and 
                                                
7 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Trans. A. V. Miller. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1977). Pgs. 383-409; See also Morton, Ecology, p. 117-118. 
8 Originally published in the Financial Times, April 23 2010, the article is archived @ 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f38acad2-4ef0-11df-b8f4-00144feab49a.html#axzz1YljjJl00 
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fear. In a nutshell, seeing the bad effects of an error purges our feelings.’9 Whilst 
dependent upon an outdated model of human biology, such cathartic purging has 
remained linked to a sense of purification that remains palpable throughout many of 
today’s cultural assumptions concerning health and social ritual, informing the 
consumption of celebrity ‘reality TV’ culture as much as our passion for televised 
sporting events; for Aristotle, ‘bileless’ animals were longer lived because their blood 
was not impure, a sentiment which despite the rigours of contemporary medicine 
appears to haunt the popular imaginary, with its continual need to affirm its youth, 
growth, and productivity.10  
 
In this way we can consider the extent to which our ‘environmental’ epoch is no 
less interpreted in terms of such affects, particularly where a more-than-melancholic 
characterisation of environmental imperilment as ‘tragedy’ is concerned. Darkly 
bilious, melancholy (melan chole) was conceived by Galen as splenetic and yet at once 
as ‘autumnal’, suggesting a further range of associations that, we will consider, all too 
readily support the type of negative, dialectical eco-critique that Morton would 
recommend, and which might therefore benefit from an encounter with our Deleuzian 
position on difference. If Morton’s motivation of the ‘melancholic’ seems especially 
interesting, then it is again because he would appear to promote a type of eco-clinical 
thinking hitched to yesterday’s kultur kritik. And yet beyond facile, anthropomorphic 
associations of melancholy with the ‘suffering’ or anguish of a biospheric Gaian spirit 
(as ailing ‘earth mother’, perhaps), the humoral pathology Morton names after Adorno 
might be recognised as having come to underpin an altogether unsentimental, 
‘speculative realist’ eco-philosophical turn—one in which Morton is evidently a 
principal figure—and which would promise to unite a broadly ‘noological’ approach 
to ecological thinking with humoral theories of affect.  
 
Presently being referred to in the philosophy blogosphere as part of a ‘Dark 
Materialist’ movement, the highly suggestive, if somewhat unrefined notion of 
‘Melancology’ promises to bridge a great many of the post-psychoanalytic concerns of 
                                                
9 Protevi, John. Aristotle’s Poetics & Rhetoric [online] @ 
http://www.protevi.com/john/FH/PDF/AristotlesPoeticsRhetoric.pdf 
10 See Groarke, Louis. An Aristotelian Account of Induction: Creating Something from Nothing. 
(Quebec: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009). pgs. 124-125.  
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this thesis with humoral approaches to eco-cultural research.11 However antiquated it 
might initially appear, what Galen’s thesis on the temperaments and humoral 
constitution lends a dark materialism is an emphasis upon health, one that should give 
us to reconsider those literary modes that would impart a humour of a second, or 
‘molar’ type, namely the tragic-pastoral, the picaresque, and the knowing 
contrarianism of the ironic mode (eironeia / ironia). Again, in this way we identify the 
Galenic humors, but also comedic humour, as significant for any critique of the 
common sensibility, particularly where the tragic-pastoral and ironic modes would 
suggest paranoid, identitarian subjectivities that would keep us from developing a 
sense of openness to the ‘outside’ of Man, and thus an ecocriticism apprised of an 
actual/virtual ontology. 
 
The issue of the ‘labour’ of the dialectic therefore remains pressing; if a dark 
ecology is to take its part in aiding us in further surpassing reactionary eco-liberal 
attitudes to eco-systemic ‘imbalance’ or disequilibrium, then it seems we must once 
again consider how a philosophy of difference promotes an alternative for a 
theoretically-informed type of eco-cultural criticism. As we have considered 
throughout the thesis, on the one hand are the ‘bloody struggles’ of history, the 
dialectical recognition of historical progress as a process of negation, and which 
therefore would enable us to diagnose our eco-cultural epoch accordingly; on the other 
hand, however, we find the non-dialectical, non-totalising philosophy of difference, 
one that speaks of ‘pure differences’ that remain ‘independent of the negative and 
liberated from the identical’, and yet which Deleuze himself feared might ultimately 
risk the liberal pitfalls of the beautiful soul.12  
 
Beyond any simplistic equation of health with equilibrium, therefore, or of 
‘therapy’ with the cathartic ‘purging’ of poisons (vis-à-vis Lawrence Buell’s first-wave 
ecocritical trope of ‘toxicity discourses’), the characterisation of melancholy proposed 
by such ‘dark materialists’ as Morton appears one tied up with the distinction between 
                                                
11 Although something of a lone voice amongst literary ecocritics, Morton’s work finds affinity with the 
‘dark’ or ‘true’ materialisms that are presently being extracted from diverse academic fields. Such 
disciplines as physics, astronomy, psychoanalysis and literature all contribute towards a materialism in 
which matter and objecticity are conceived of as possessing a strict independence from mind, or the 
Kantian ‘correlation’. 
12  Deleuze, Difference, p. xviii. 
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dialectics as a properly ‘earthly’ materialism and a philosophy of difference as by 
contrast an avatar of liberalism. It is therefore a key theoretical concern with which our 
thesis opened and with which our final chapter will wrestle. If a dark ecology would 
appear to surpass in key ways any sentimental, all-too-human apprehension of the 
more-than-human world, opening up a properly post-Romantic evaluation of bodily 
health and the environment, then it would appear to do so by challenging the beautiful 
soul syndrome that would keep ecocriticism from the proper business of a dialectical 
critique. And yet as the insights of our Deleuzian eco-clinic have shown, a noological 
approach, informed as much by Marx as by Nietzsche, would suggest a further path 
beyond mere ideological concerns with subjectivity, instrumental utility and nihilistic 
patterns of consumption.  
 
* 
 
Given our prevailing concerns with affect and post-Kantian forms of sublimity, 
then, with a pathos that, in exceeding the experiencing subject by way of Deleuze’s 
immanent notion of ‘sympathy’ exceeds transcendental and phenomenological 
epistemologies, let us develop an understanding of the relationship between 
melancholy, the tragic, irony and humour, chiefly by continuing to eco-clinically 
challenge the ‘correlationist’ weltanschauung of subject and object.13 By doing so 
initially in terms of humoral pathology, we might usefully retain the distinction 
between Hegelian dialectics and our preferred Deleuzian approach. This seems 
valuable where we would note that the melancholia of Morton’s dark ecology is not 
necessarily one defined by a resignatory sentiment, by the reactive desire to become 
more greatly complacent in the face of a number of environmentally-‘inconvenient’ 
and altogether insurmountable ‘truths’. Whilst Morton’s own attention to Nietzschean 
lines of thought constitutes little more than a paragraph here or there, we might 
nevertheless consider if his ‘dialectics’ do not in fact suggest an ‘earthly’ orientation 
that, like Nietzsche’s ‘Dionysian pessimism’, affirms an impersonal form of 
intoxication, echoing the ‘delirium of interpretation’ that our Proustian ecology began 
                                                
13 The term ‘correlationist’ is Meillassoux’s and not Deleuze and Guattari’s. It does, however, provide 
an extremely useful shorthand term when describing any attempt to exceed or break with the 
subject/object correlation that has dominated modern epistemology. See Meillassoux, Quentin. After 
Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency. Trans. Ray Brassier. (London: Continuum, 2009). 
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to render explicit in chapter three, and which despite first impressions, ultimately 
possesses a lightness of spirit that would contrast Morton’s own avowed preference for 
Hegelian melancholia.14  
 
As our concerns remain literary, we might proceed by once again making an 
epistemological / aesthetic distinction. Influencing the comedies of Menander and 
Plautus, Theophrastus is credited with reading the humors toward particular character 
types. Evidently, in such classic literature we find a ‘pre-critical’ position upon eco-
literary affect.15 As we considered in chapter two, any pre-critical emphasis upon 
character of this sort was more or less supplanted by Kant’s transcendental Idealism; 
the Romantic era owed much to Kantian aesthetics, not least such 19th century 
American transcendentalists as Emerson, Thoreau, Dickinson and the Alcotts. After 
what Rozelle describes as a ‘post-natural’ ecosublime we considered how the sublime 
as Kant conceived of it can be read as a deontological calling, a spur to our conscience, 
and specifically one that might lead us to act on behalf of the environment. And yet 
such ethico-aesthetic concerns might here be read after our humoral emphasis, 
particularly when we consider how in The Romantic Sublime (1976), Thomas Weiskel 
characterises the periodic taste for the sublime amongst cultural and literary critics as 
itself ‘an episode in melancholy.’ 16 If, since Kant, the ‘inescapability’ of our 
subjecthood induces feelings of melancholy, then the deontological calling we 
considered in chapter two is again affirmed as an eminently Romantic one, implying 
that if we are to come to terms with it that must strive to become better acquainted 
with the laws of aesthetic theory.  
 
                                                
14 Nietzsche, Will, pgs. 262, 434. Moreover, Nick Land here recommends Bataille’s Nietzscheanism 
precisely in this sense as an ‘active nihilism’, largely insofar as the writer was concerned ‘with value as 
the annihilation of life’ and with ‘challenging ‘the utilitarianism that finds its only end in the 
preservation and expansion of existence.’ It is therefore ‘active’ inasmuch as it avers ‘the promotion of 
a violently convulsive expenditure rather than a weary renunciation.’ See Land, Fanged, p. 170.  
15 Theophrastus was a Peripatetic philosopher who attempted ‘character-drawing’ with some relation to 
Galenic humoral pathology. As Diggle acknowledges, attributions of ‘moral theorising’ by his later 
readers may be erroneous and amount to simple projection. See Diggle, James. Theophrastus 
Characters. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). p. 12. 
16 Weiskel, Thomas. The Romantic Sublime: Studies in the Structure and Psychology of Transcendence. 
(Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 1976). p. 97. 
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As we have begun to suggest, however, the relationship between the 
transcendental subject, aesthetics, and an ‘empirical’ biome of non-human objects ‘out 
there’—objects which remain barred to us by virtue of their very phenomenality—
becomes one that is altogether circumvented by the onto-aesthetic implications of the 
Deleuzian virtual. As Simon Sullivan has suggested, the transcendental subject might 
ultimately be considered a ‘melancholy’ one, or as ‘a being barred from the infinite in 
its very finitude.’17 With the lessons of the BwO in mind, therefore, we might already 
infer that the melancholy humor privileged by such writers as Morton might begin to 
suggest a noological sublime without explicitly naming it as such. Such a sublime 
confers a means of revaluing what is meant by the ‘tragedy’ of environmental 
imperilment, one that is itself born almost entirely of the instrumentality inherent to 
the correlationist episteme, and which he and other ‘speculative realists’ would by 
definition interrogate.18 
 
As we saw in our analysis of Kant, it was the sublime experience that gave him 
to wrestle with this aporia late in his third and final Critique, and thus to begin to 
articulate a sense of the unconscious (vis-à-vis creative ‘genius’) as an unrepresentable 
‘Real’ or beyond that exceeded his categories of aesthetic judgement. Similarly, for 
Edmund Burke, sublime experience was largely bathetic; this would also support 
Morton’s broadly Galenic notion of a dark materialism as one conceptually strong 
enough to affirm the ‘darkness’ of an exteriority beyond the narcissisms of subjective 
separation, yet only, it would seem, as a prelude to a negative dialectics inspired by 
Adorno and therefore capable of overturning those cultural assumptions that have 
hitherto insulated us (as subjects) from it. If few ecocritics have touched upon this 
connection between the humors as predispositional or affective categories and the 
clinical dimension of aesthetics—or aesthetics as an epistemological key to the 
historically-determined episteme and the subsequent aestheticisation of a particular 
                                                
17 See O’Sullivan, Simon. ‘Guattari’s Aesthetic Paradigm: From the Folding of the Finite/Infinite 
Relation to Schizoanalytic Metamodelisation.’ Deleuze Studies. 4.2 (2010): 256-286. p. 266. 
18 Whilst beyond the remit of the present thesis, it remains expedient to note how Speculative Realism 
(or ‘Object Oriented Ontology’) suggests a useful extension of the lines of flight indicated by our 
Deleuzian eco-clinic. Volume 2 of the journal Collapse is perhaps the single best introduction to 
Speculative Realism, but also such texts as Graham Harman’s Tool Being: Heidegger and the 
Metaphysics of Objects (2002), Guerilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things 
(2005) and Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (2009). Also Ray Brassier’s Nihil 
Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction (2007) and Quentin Meillassoux’s After Finitude: An Essay on 
the Necessity of Contingency (2008). 
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locale, bioregion or ecology—then as our thesis has suggested, this can only be 
because their ‘anti-theoretical’ stance has precluded the type of experiment it would 
necessitate.  
 
With these epistemological considerations in mind, then, we might now press on 
with an analysis of the difference between an approach informed by Adorno’s 
‘melancholy science’ and our Deleuzian philosophy of difference. By doing so with 
respect to Hegel’s figure of the beautiful soul, we might reconnect with our opening 
discussion of liberal pluralism in chapter one, marking the ways in which Adorno and 
Deleuze would countenance different understandings of cultural change, before 
moving to consider how a humour of the second type, or that given in molar terms as 
cultural expressions of irony and comedy, proves altogether problematic for 
ecocriticism, a movement preoccupied with the nominally ‘serious’ business of 
environmental imperilment, not least inasmuch as the latter type of humour serves as a 
form of social adhesive, routinely supporting of the common sensibility, or those 
manifest and dogmatic images of thought that would typically preclude the emergence 
of different forms of thought, whether more properly ‘ecological’ or otherwise. If as 
we have shown, this passage must include the construction of concepts that possess a 
greater sense of adequation, or which prove far less constrained by the epistemological 
poverties of the common sensibility, then an emphasis upon humour in this final 
chapter of our thesis should give us to make the fullest encounter with the eco-cultural 
shortcomings of the pop cultural alembic, or the retarding movement of 
reterritorialisation that draws together the findings of the arts and sciences without 
permitting their radical exteriorities to expose the routine production of ‘what 
everybody knows’. 
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(ii) Beautiful Soul Syndrome and the Revaluation of the  
Tragic-Pastoral Mode 
 
 
In Morton’s ‘dark ecology’ we find the suggestion of a path beyond Hegelian 
dialectics, yet which nevertheless maintains a variety of negative dialectics after 
Adorno’s self-described ‘melancholy’ brand of kultur kritik. In this way Morton 
asserts a manner of redressing the consumerist subsumption of Life under concepts 
allied with the dominant mode of subjectivity, insisting that we examine that 
‘consciousness raising’ process by which environmentalists would insist we take 
greater responsibility for our cultural hand in Climate Change. At first blush, Morton 
might appear to suggest little more than a ‘warts and all’ mode of ecological thinking, 
one that by ousting the conceptual complacencies of neo-liberal environmentalism, 
would ultimately enable us to theoretically interrogate the cynical ‘green washing’ of 
environmentally-indifferent business concerns, pollutive and ethically-questionable 
operations that have lately grown fearful of losing their profit margin by failing to 
cater for ‘environmentalism’ as self-evidently the latest in a series of post-war 
‘lifestyle choices’.  
 
And yet such a process is one that Morton himself is at pains to theoretically 
account for; equal to the ‘coming to consciousness’ of the epistemic form that begets 
our profligate and wasteful culture, he follows Adorno in deeming such a position as 
itself ultimately hypocritical, for as Hegel demonstrated ‘the beautiful soul… cannot 
see that the evil that it condemns is intrinsic to its existence.’19 In other words, 
contemporary environmentalism is, as we ourselves have also considered, 
insufficiently prepared to address the very form of contemporary subjectivity itself as 
the single greatest hurdle to thinking ecologically. Further to this, therefore, it is useful 
to note how Morton presents a critical-clinical emphasis upon melancholy as the 
humor accompanying the sense the beautiful soul has that phenomenal objects (or 
‘things’) can never be fully ‘immediate’ to his experience, that the subject can never 
be reconciled to the object, and as such can only ever promote doubt as to whether or 
                                                
19 Hegel, Phenomenology, pgs. 383-384; Morton, Ecology, p. 118. 
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not ‘they are real, originals, or copies’, something that first-wave ecocriticism felt it 
could overcome by way of an ‘hyper-aesthetic’ ‘ecomimetic’ turn: ‘In the sadness of 
its very capacity not to present immediacy, the aesthetic dimension gives body to the 
immediacy that hyper-aesthetic ecomimesis, pretending to be anti-aesthetic, wishes to 
force down our throats.’20   
 
Necessarily, then, this nominally ‘aesthetic’ enquiry gives Morton to take up the 
debt consumerism owes to the material consequences of Romanticism, chiefly after an 
assessment of the development of plate glass in the late 17th century and which 
enabled the growth of 19th century retail culture by making window displays possible, 
confirming the distance between subject and object as an eminently consumerist one, 
and which perversely stimulates our no-less ‘aesthetic’ desire for the recuperative 
powers of such wilderness preserves as zoos, national parks and other ‘nature spots’: 
‘To the extent that wilderness spaces and the laws that created them persist, we are still 
living, literally, within the Romantic period. It is strange to discover a secret passage 
between bottles of detergent and mountain ranges. But there is one, and it is called 
Romantic consumerism. Green consumerism is only one kind of environmental 
consumerism. Environmentalisms in general are consumerist.’21 Necessarily, this 
observation insists that we accept the paradoxes principal to an eco-subjectivity that 
nevertheless retains a subject: ‘If reason, devoid of sadistic instrumentality, is 
openness to nonidentity, that is still a kind of subjectivity. We cannot come up with a 
“new and improved” version of identity that will do without the paradoxes and aporias 
associated with it.’22  
 
This bid to circumvent Idealism is what gives Morton to suggest his position as 
akin to Adorno’s ‘melancholic science’, informing the ‘melancology’ we noted above, 
and which extends the paradox-denying fantasies of Hegel’s beautiful soul as a fully-
fledged syndrome, one informed as much by the literature of Shaftesbury (the 
                                                
20 Morton, Ecology, p. 182. 
21 Although plate glass was first developed in France in 1688, its manufacture would not be perfected 
until the industrial revolution, during which time it also became more greatly affordable, and therefore 
amenable for commercial use. As Morton has it: ‘It is Romantic consumerism that makes of the forest a 
shop window—and allows the ambience of a shop window to be experienced as the temple of nature.’ 
See Morton, Ecology, p. 114. 
22 Morton, Ecology, p. 182.  
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virtuoso), as by the aesthetic theory of Novalis and Schiller. Defined most precisely by 
its fusing of ‘the aesthetic and the moral’, beautiful soul syndrome enables Morton to 
theoretically reproach (or revalue) the ‘ambient poetics’ of proto-environmentalist 
nature-writing—or the ‘ecomimesis’ we considered in chapter one—for ever 
suggesting that we can ‘actually achieve ecology without a subject’, one dispersed into 
‘the’ environment and yet which therefore suggests by way of a negative dialectic the 
path beyond any unconscious reproduction of ‘bohemian Romantic consumerism.’23 
Yet it is where Morton continually raises dialectics that our thesis might attempt an 
intervention of sorts, particularly when Morton states that: ‘Dark ecology… is a 
perverse, melancholy ethics that refuses to digest the object into an ideal form… [it] 
diverges from those Romanticisms that follow a Hegelian dialectic…’; it ‘undermines 
the naturalness of the stories we tell about how we are involved in nature. It preserves 
the dark, depressive quality of life in the shadow of ecological catastrophe. Instead of 
whistling in the dark, insisting that we’re part of Gaia, why not stay with the 
darkness?’24  
 
Morton’s ‘melancholic’ emphasis might outwardly suggest a ‘noological’ 
analysis, aiding and abetting his basic insistence that we overturn the woefully 
inadequate concept of ‘Nature’, yet it does so by way of a negativity that as we have 
shown, remains tied to dialectical reductionism. It is in this sense that his call for an 
‘ecology without nature’ is an eminently eco-clinical one; such an ecology maintains a 
clinical apprehension of an eco-cultural unconscious, or reproaches environmentalism 
per se as a largely consumerist streamlining of an already Romantic instrumentality. 
Informed by the lessons of Freud and Lacan, Morton’s work moreover gestures 
towards the post-Kantian ‘ecosublime’ we considered in chapter two, naming the 
unrepresentable ‘Real’ of artistic, philosophical and scientific production; and yet it is 
here, perhaps, that we might assert Deleuze’s observation that ‘…real revolutions have 
the atmosphere of fêtes’, and that ‘contradiction is not the weapon of the proletariat 
but, rather, the manner in which the bourgeoisie defends and preserves itself.’25 The 
importance of advancing Deleuze’s lighter, non-melancholic ‘revolution’ proves more 
interesting still when we consider as Bonnet notes, how liberalism is ‘a ghost that 
                                                
23 Ibid. 
24 Morton, Ecology, pgs. 195-196; 187. 
25 Deleuze, Difference, p. 268. 
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haunts Deleuze, namely in his repeated precautions against the figure of the beautiful 
soul.’26   
 
Deleuze himself acknowledges this when discussing the pitfalls of ‘invoking 
pure differences, which have become independent of the negative and liberated from 
the identical’: ‘The greatest danger is that of lapsing into the representation of a 
beautiful soul: there are only reconcilable and federative differences, far removed from 
bloody struggles. The beautiful soul says: we are different, but not opposed…’.27 
Crucially, however, Deleuze writes: ‘Nevertheless, we believe that these problems 
attain their proper degree of positivity, and when difference becomes the object of a 
corresponding affirmation, they release a power of aggression and selection which 
destroys the beautiful soul.’28 Moreover, it is Marx as much as Nietzsche, who keeps 
us from this: ‘…the philosophy of difference must be wary of turning into the 
discourse of beautiful souls: differences, nothing but differences, in a peaceful co-
existence in the Idea of social places and functions… but the name Marx is sufficient 
to save us from this danger.’29 
 
Because ‘affirmation is itself difference’, Deleuze goes on to enlist Nietzsche in 
the destruction of the beautiful soul: ‘There are two ways—[Nietzsche] claims—to 
appeal to ‘necessary destructions’: that of the poet, who speaks in the name of a 
creative power, capable of overturning all orders and representations in order to affirm 
Difference in the state of permanent revolution which characterizes eternal return; and 
that of the politician, who is above all concerned to deny that which ‘differs’, so as to 
preserve or prolong an established historical order, or to establish a historical order 
which already calls forth in the world the forms of its representation.’30 Whilst it may 
be beyond the remit of this thesis to elaborate upon these concerns at any length, it is 
                                                
26 Bonnet, Alberto R. ‘Antagonism and Difference: Negative Dialectics and Post-Structuralism in View 
of the Critique of Modern Capitalism.’ Negativity and Revolution: Adorno and Political Activism. Eds. 
John Holloway, Fernando Matamoros and Sergio Tischler. (London: Pluto Press, 2009). p. 49. 
27 Deleuze, Difference, p. xviii. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Deleuze concedes that commentators on Marx have rightfully acknowledged how in Capital ‘the 
category of differentiation (the differentiation at the heart of a social multiplicity: the division of labour) 
is substituted for the Hegelian concepts of opposition, contradiction and alienation.’ Deleuze, 
Difference, pgs. 259, 207 and 52. 
30 Deleuze, Difference, p. 52. 
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nevertheless key to note how Deleuze follows Pierre Klossowski in presenting the 
eternal return as a ‘selective doctrine’ which ‘deselects’ whatever falls short of 
affirmation. Where our eco-clinic is concerned, selection is, in critical-clinical 
parlance, essentially a kind of ‘immanent evaluation’ (or self-diagnosis) which effects 
an overcoming of what is diagnosed. In other words, if negation is itself transformed 
into a power of affirming under the sign of eternal return, then we see how self-
overcoming points toward the actual/virtual ‘therapy’ of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
schizoanalytic position, and which we here prescribe over and against the interminable 
analysis of the subjectivism of the psychoanalytic ‘cure’.31 
 
Moreover, these Marxian and Nietzsche positions on the problem posed by the 
beautiful soul enable us to connect back to our concerns with North American cultural 
and political pluralism in chapter one; as Bonnet writes, after a Nietzschean 
perspective it is the affirmation of difference ‘with its potential for aggression and 
selection’ that ‘is precisely what would dissolve this pluralism of differences into a 
peaceful coexistence which is common to the beautiful soul.’32 And yet Bonnet too 
acknowledges that Nietzsche cannot be enough, for ‘the capitalist market and 
democracy are the quintessential names which denote the habitat of this coexistence of 
difference within liberal ideology.’33 It is therefore crucial to note how Deleuze uses 
Nietzsche to circumvent any sense of selection governed by the quasi-Darwinian 
selectivity of the market; Bonnet is not entirely convinced by this approach: ‘Of 
course, in Deleuze’s philosophy of difference, it is not staff management but the 
eternal return that makes the selection.’34 To which we might nevertheless add 
Deleuze’s assertion that ‘Nietzsche reproaches all those selection procedures based 
upon opposition or conflict with working to the advantage of the average forms and 
operating for the benefit of the ‘large number.’ Eternal return alone effects the true 
selection, because it eliminates the average forms and uncovers ‘the superior form of 
everything that is.’’35 
 
                                                
31 Not only does Deleuze draw upon Klossowski’s reading of Nietzsche at key points throughout 
Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense, but also throughout his schizoanalytic work with Guattari 
in Anti-Oedipus. See Klossowski, Pierre. Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle. (London: Continuum, 2005). 
32 Bonnet, Antagonism, p. 51. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Deleuze, Difference, pgs. 54-55. 
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This might then give us to value differently the pure exteriority of the arts and 
sciences, which would, after Deleuze and Guattari, promise something far ‘darker’ in 
alignment than a ‘melancholic science’ of negative dialectics, something with the 
power to disturb and overturn the manifest or dogmatic image of thought as one 
comprising the representational mode that guarantees dialectical contradiction, 
opposition and analogy. As we have seen, for Deleuze and Guattari, an emphasis upon 
the exteriority of relations also marks a departure from any signifying symptomatology 
that would retain a correlationist subjectivity, or one that would in many respects, 
remain complicit with an ‘un-ecological’ subject/object relation by way of an Oedipal 
metaphysics.  
 
It seems curious, then, that Morton does not extend his ‘melancholy ethics’ in a 
schizoanalytic connection; as our thesis has shown, by retaining the nuclear family 
structure we retain the locus of a paranoid, insular form of desire that forecloses on a 
pure, unrecuperable exteriority of the sort that a truly ‘dark’ ecology must surely 
imply. In precisely this way, then, a dark ecology of the sort we are here proposing not 
only suggests freedom from a biologically-biased vision of Life, and which on 
Deleuze and Guattari’s account is evidently already more-than-organic, more-than-
biological, and which cannot moreover remain tied to the organismic domain, but from 
the relationship between the Subject and the State we recognised as key to an eco-
valent stratoanalyis. At the very least, (and as vulgar as it sounds) such a ‘phlegmatics 
of the virtual’ would suggest a grasp of the more-than-biological world, of an an-
organicist, post-organismic realm that is dark yet not melancholic, and which as we 
saw in chapters three and four, remains enabled by certain pathological percepts and 
affects, chiefly after the risk-laden ascesis of the Artaudian BwO.  
 
Let us move, then, to a discussion of humour at the molar level, that which we 
attribute to cultural manifestations of comedy, irony and a sense of ‘play’. All too 
readily diagnosed as a reactive humor, melancholy may, where Morton’s thesis is 
overlooked in this connection, appear to betoken feelings of impotent rage and 
despondency, affects confirmed by way of Galen’s own ‘splenetic’ attribution. Yet as 
we have begun to suggest, our Deleuzian concern with a path beyond the dialectic 
offers a circumvention of ‘negative dialectics’ by way of Nietzsche; if a ‘Deleuzian 
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ecology’ can be considered at all ‘dark’, then its darkness amounts to that of an 
affirmative, Spinozo-Nietzschean position, yet one moreover championing of the 
ribald, the picaresque and the absurd, qualities that after Nietzsche we would again 
associate with an active rather than reactive orientation. In the distinction Deleuze 
draws between irony and humour we find an extension of the Nietzschean critique of 
the ‘higher man’ and of the life-denying values that would valorize the burden of a 
struggle over and against the lightness and gaiety that Nietzsche attributed to the 
Zarathustran spirit, free of ressentiment. Whilst we broached these concerns in chapter 
four, we might now take up their implications more fully towards an analysis in which 
we consider the place of such eminently ‘literary’ styles and tropes as the ‘picaresque’ 
for eco-clinical thinking. 
 
Although leaning on Nietzsche in its postulation of a ‘geology of morals’, it will 
be vital to emphasise here how Deleuze and Guattari present stratoanalysis after an 
undeniably humorous ‘theory-fiction’, a provocative disquisition upon the earth itself 
as BwO, and which features to great comic effect Arthur Conan Doyle’s pulp fiction 
hero Professor Challenger, an inveterate polymath ‘who made the earth scream with 
his pain machine’, and who now dramatises Deleuze and Guattari’s own brazen 
interdisciplinarity by giving ‘a lecture after mixing several textbooks on geology and 
biology in a fashion befitting his simian disposition.’36 In this way we might assert 
how stratoanalysis ultimately retains a Zarathustran joyfulness in its seemingly 
perverse assertion that ‘god is a lobster’, or that the process of double-articulation that 
we considered in chapter three remains provocative wheresoever prevailing religious 
(and scientific) orthodoxies would maintain an outmoded and morally-biased 
relationship between form and content. We might therefore suggest that humour of a 
comedic yet decidedly non-Aristotelian (or non-cathartic) sort also supplies a key 
strategy in the affirmation of difference. It is on this very basis that such eco-clinical 
matters as those presented by our dispositions, moods and temperaments might 
proceed by way of a Deleuzian engagement with Galen’s humoral pathology as by a 
post-structural analysis of literary preferences for irony and comedy, and moreover 
how these might give us to revalue and reapproach such critical-clinical tropes as the 
pastoral and tragic modes. 
                                                
36 Deleuze and Guattari, Plateaus, p. 40. 
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Given our bid to demonstrate an a-signifying symptomatology, one that opens 
onto a ‘therapeutic’ or schizo / stratoanalytic approach, we might now begin by 
acknowledging how, as Deleuze says, the ironist ‘has a particular tone, always of the 
signifier. Humour is completely the opposite: principles count for little, everything is 
taken literally, the consequences are expected of you (this is why humour is not 
transmitted through plays on words, puns, which are of the signifier, and like a 
principle within the principle).’37 Just as we saw in Deleuze’s quasi-canon of preferred 
Anglo-American literary figures, the empiricism that he discerns in their production of 
percepts and affects would deny principles in favour of an experimental pragmatics. 
As such, the humourous sensibility he gestures towards might profitably extend the 
‘humoral’ pathology we have begun to consider above, or in terms of an affective 
bearing that ultimately imparts an affirmative spirit; where a ‘dark ecology’ suggests 
one that would destabilize and disrupt the manifest cultural image of a negatively-
defined Nature, one in which a sense of ‘equilibrium’ promises the fantasy of 
‘salvation’ of an un-ecological humanity from the lack by which his ‘unnatural’ 
subjectivity is constituted, the ‘revolutionary joy’ that Deleuze discerns in Nietzsche, 
but thereafter in certain literary-philosophical affects, supplies a noological alternative 
with an uplifting joire de vivre, revaluing the tragic mode qua joy, and therefore 
dramatising the cultural and political power of a potent vis comica or ‘comic force’:38  
 
The tragic is not to be found in […] anguish or disgust, nor in a 
nostalgia for lost unity. The tragic is only to be found in 
multiplicity, in the diversity of affirmation as such. What defines 
the tragic is the joy of multiplicity, plural joy. This joy is not the 
result of a sublimation, a purging, a compensation, a resignation 
or a reconciliation. Nietzsche can attack all theories of the tragic 
for failing to recognise tragedy as an aesthetic phenomenon. The 
tragic is the aesthetic form of joy, not a medical phrase or a moral 
solution to pain, fear or pity. It is joy that is tragic.39  
                                                
37 Deleuze and Parnet, Dialogues, pgs. 68-69. 
38 Deleuze, Desert, p. 258. 
39 Deleuze, Nietzsche, p. 16. 
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For Deleuze, therefore, humour is contrasted with an irony that would keep us 
tied to the negativities of yesterday’s ideology critique, or of a nominally Hegelian 
Marxo-Lacanianism. This is because humour is rather ‘the art of consequences or 
effects… [it] is atonal, absolutely imperceptible, it makes something shoot off. It never 
goes up or down, it is on the surface: surface effects. Humour is an art of pure events. 
The arts of Zen, archery, gardening or taking tea, are exercises to make the event surge 
forth and dazzle on a pure surface. Jewish humour versus Greek irony, Job-humour 
versus Oedipus-irony, insular humour versus sadist irony, Proust-humour versus Gide-
irony, etc.’40 Just as we have acknowledged how Deleuze critiques the subordination 
of joyful ‘difference in itself’ to the labour of the negative, or the ‘crucifixion’ of Life 
upon the four-fold cross of representation, we will here note how literary studies can 
again aid us in clinically approaching issues of subjectivity for ecocriticism, initially 
by pursuing this important distinction, in which irony appears as a comic mode 
symptomatic of the logic of representation, and thereby of a dialectical negativity 
beyond which the eco-clinical noologist must be compelled to travel:  
 
irony ensures the individuation of the represented or the 
subjectivation of the representer. Classical irony, in fact, 
consists in showing that which is most universal in 
representation is the same as extreme individuality of the 
represented which serves as its principle (classical irony 
culminates in the theological affirmation according to which 
‘the whole of the possible’ is at the same time the reality of God 
as singular being). Romantic irony, for its part, discovers the 
subjectivity of the principle of all possible representation.41  
 
For Deleuze, humour breaks with the common sensibility, with the manifest or 
dogmatic image of thought. It is therefore allied with the minoritarianism of the 
outside, with the pure exteriority of the event, with the already more-than-human 
flows that evental-becoming presupposes. Such a minoritarianism thus implies an 
ethos of sorts, one in which the superiority of the higher man is supplanted by that of 
                                                
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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the joyful Zarathustran, whose humour has ‘always undermined games of principles or 
causes in favour of the event and games of individuation or subjectivation in favour of 
multiplicities. Irony contains an insufferable claim: that of belonging to a superior 
race, of being the preserve of the masters (a famous text of Renan says this without 
irony, for irony dries up quickly when talking of itself). Humour, on the other hand, 
claims kinship with a minority, with a minority-becoming. It is humour which makes 
language stammer, which imposes on it a minor usage, or which constitutes a complete 
bilingual system within the same language.’42 In this way we can see how for Deleuze, 
philosophy itself becomes what Kirby Olson has described as ‘an impious and pagan 
performance.’43 
 
Because it is only bad conscience that would render tragedy life-denying, a 
Dionysian conception of it is one that enables us to draw together all of our forgoing 
eco-clinical concerns, chiefly after its relationship to the literary mode of the 
picaresque, with its ribald and ‘joyful’ sensibility.44 Yet where, following Nietzsche, 
Deleuze would describe a joy that is ‘not the result of a sublimation, a purging, a 
compensation, a resignation or a reconciliation’, we see how these bodily 
predispositions relate to the tragic as part of a schizoanalytic form of eco-critique 
apprised of a genealogy of values. Again, our ‘anti-Oedipal’ stratoanalysis of literature 
then begins to impart a therapeutic orientation that enables us to surpass normative 
notions of the tragic mode where environmental depredation would typically prompt 
feelings of despair. In Anti-Oedipus, for example, Deleuze and Guattari describe how 
the ‘narrator-spider’ of Proust’s La recherche, figures ‘the world of transverse 
communications, where the finally conquered nonhuman sex mingles with the flowers, 
a new earth where desire functions according to its molecular elements and flows. 
Such a voyage does not necessarily imply great movements in extension; it becomes 
immobile, in a room and on a body without organs—an intensive voyage that undoes 
                                                
42 Ibid. 
43 Olson, Kirby. Comedy After Postmodernism: Reading Comedy from Edward Lear to Charles 
Willeford. (Texas: Texas Tech University Press, 2001). p. 17. 
44 ‘According to Nietzsche it has never been understood that the tragic = the joyful. This is another way 
of putting the great equation: to will = to create. We have not understood that the tragic is pure and 
multiple positivity, dynamic gaiety. Affirmation is tragic because it affirms chance and the necessity of 
chance; because it affirms multiplicity and the unity of multiplicity. The dicethrow is tragic. All the rest 
is nihilism. Christian and dialectic pathos, caricature of the tragic, comedy of bad conscience’  Deleuze, 
Nietzsche, p. 34. 
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all the lands for the benefit of the one it is creating’: ‘This very movement is humor, 
black humor.’45 Significantly, they later describe ‘Marx’s black humor’ as ‘the source 
of Capital.’46  
 
It remains unclear, however, if in this passage Deleuze and Guattari are referring 
to a Galenic humor, to melan chole (or black bile), or rather, to a knowingly humorous 
sensibility, and which itself might suggest a life-denying form of cynicism. In the first 
instance, the ‘new earth’ of which they speak is that of desire freed from the paranoid 
form of Oedipal representation; we saw in chapters three and four how this means that 
its syntheses be permitted their legitimate operation. In the second case, the 
‘symptoms’ that Althusser and Balibar discerned in their reading of Capital prove 
highly suggestive where Deleuze and Guattari would suggest the dismantling of the 
BwO as somehow equivalent to cathartic purging; we have shown above how this is 
not so where the Zarathustran spirit prevails. Whether or not this reference is, 
therefore, in fact an allusion to the black bile of Galenic pathology, and thus merely an 
assertion that the melancholy disposition requires the purging of a tragic spectacle so 
as to be ‘longer lived’ appears less important to our thesis than does the abiding 
sentiment that the affirmation of the tragic is the path beyond the dialectic. The 
affirmation of chance, amor fati and the experimental praxis of ‘counter-actualisation’ 
that is figured by the BwO thwarts the planning and labour, the bad conscience of 
capitalist instrumentalism as itself an avatar of dialectical negativity.47 
  
To sustain the Galenic humors in this way therefore appears useful if we are to 
grasp Deleuze and Guattari’s more specific position on comedic humour; whilst 
humoral pathology today appears superannuated, it might nevertheless supply an 
affective bearing beyond the supplantation of such a clinicism by Enlightenment 
rationality and the scientific determinations of contemporary medicine. What is more, 
it again supplies a means of approaching the tragic beyond Symbolic accounts of 
human interiority (Oedipus, Hamlet) by contemporary psychoanalysis. Let us continue 
here, then, to connect them to contemporary, post-renaissance conceptions of humour 
                                                
45 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, pgs. 350-351. 
46 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, p. 408. Deleuze and Guattari also discuss schizophrenic laughter 
after a lengthy citation from Michel Cournot’s work on Chaplin’s Modern Times. See pgs 348-49. 
47 ‘A true renaissance is needed in order to liberate the tragic from all the fear and pity of the bad 
listeners who gave it a mediocre sense born of bad conscience.’ See Deleuze, Nietzsche, p. 16. 
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with respect to the comedic, the ironic and the picaresque. Although in-explicitly 
‘ecocritical’, Ian Watt’s study does, however, emphasise the historical transition from 
different types of civic and social organisation in this regard:  
 
“Urbanity” denotes the qualities of politeness and 
understanding which are the product of the wider social 
experience which city life makes possible; with it goes the 
spirit of comedy which, in Italian, French or English comedy 
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries centers on the gay 
life of the streets and the squares, where the walls of houses 
afford a purely nominal privacy. “Suburban,” on the other 
hand, denotes the sheltered complacence and provinciality of 
the sheltered middle-class home.48  
 
The kind of ‘self-conscious identification between mood and environment’ of 
Trollope’s Louis Trevelyan, therefore, who in He Knew He Was Right (1869), holds 
up alone in a secluded house in the hills above Sienna, sheds further light upon the 
humours as both relational ‘styles of life’ and historical symptoms; as Jonathan Bate 
observes, Trollope’s ‘is not characteristic of older representations of melancholy.’49 
Rather, it is as Trollope’s contemporary John Ruskin showed, attributable to the 
‘pathetic fallacy’, which, as Bate points out, ‘is distinctly a mark of the modern—we 
would say the Romantic—artist.’50 If first-wave ecocritics were preoccupied with 
analyses of the Romantic relation to the non-human world, one chiefly characterised 
by critiques of industrial modernity, then as Morton’s work has shown, Romanticism 
must itself be recognised as one with the birth of consumerism; the correlationist spirit 
of the Romantic modern must be acknowledged wheresoever it retains the point of 
view of the alienated self (or ‘character’) for whom alienation is but a necessary (and 
eminently dialectical) pre-condition to personal transfiguration. Such ‘environmental’ 
interdependency unconsciously reproduces the consumerist dynamic (shop windows, 
national parks, nature reserves, digital nature photography), remaining blithely 
                                                
48 Watt, Rise, p. 187. 
49 Bate, Jonathan. The Song of the Earth. (London: Picador, 2000). p. 124. 
50 Ibid. 
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unaware of the bourgeois idealism that underwrote it, and which Morton’s work would 
suggest must meet with a more-than-ideological critique after his own, clinically-
informed brand of eco-justice.  
 
Taken together, the work of Morton and Deleuze-Guattari might thus be brought 
into contact with that of first-wave ecocritic Joseph W. Meeker, who broached such 
concerns in the 1970s, and chiefly after what he described as a ‘play ethic’. Whilst it 
might seem barbarous to suggest that perceptions of environmental impairment and the 
social inequities suffered by those who are subject to its ravages might be given 
differently through a humorous lens, this is precisely what Meeker recommends in his 
The Comedy of Survival: Literary Ecology and a Play Ethic (1974/1997). For Meeker, 
picaresque modes of literature might endow eco-literary thinking more broadly with a 
modus comica or ‘comic way’ that undermines the cultural legacy and ideology of 
tragic heroism and its prolongation by Romantic ideology. Where the interpretation of 
environmental-literary relations are concerned, such a view presents an important, if 
somewhat misunderstood strategy of engagement, a form of detournement, perhaps, 
incorporating humour and play as vital, transformative forces that appear equal, we 
will argue, to the Deleuzian approach we have hitherto nominated.  
 
Arguing that literary comedy as a plot pattern provides an important 
dramatisation of a particular philosophical bearing, Meeker might be said to moreover 
discern within it a first-order of ‘anti-humanism’. While tragedy ‘imitate[s] man 
insofar as he is a creature of suffering and greatness’, comedy ‘imitates man’s innate 
stupidity and ignorance and emphasizes the triviality of human passions by reducing 
them to the level of street-corner disputes.’51 Whilst this would, broadly speaking, 
appear commensurate with Deleuze’s Nietzschean-inspired position on the tragic, for 
Meeker tragedy emphasises human mastery over greater forces for the end of human 
transcendence; comedy emphasises human adaptation to greater forces for the end of 
survival. And yet we here risk a certain moral tonality; Meeker extracts an ethos for 
his modus comica, something that after Deleuze we might be given to treat with a 
measure of post-moral caution. Insofar as the comic pattern mimics ecology’s vision 
of the ‘natural ecosystem’ as accommodat[ing] not only the complete life of every 
                                                
51 Meeker, Joseph. The Comedy of Survival: Literary Ecology and a Play Ethic. (Third Ed.) (Tucson: 
The University of Arizona Press, 1997). pgs. 21-22. 
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species within it, but also provid[ing] for relatively harmonious relationships among 
all its constituent species’, Meeker suggests that it provides a ‘model for human 
behaviour’ with regard to the nonhuman world.52      
 
However, as well as imitating an ecological pattern of existence, Meeker appears 
to suggest that comedy dramatises Life’s foundation in chance and chaos. While 
tragedy ultimately presents a triumph of human understanding and knowledge, 
comedy, in its deflationary attitude toward anthropocentric hubris, investigates the 
options for living in a suspended state of provisionality or contingency, a state marked 
by continuing irresolution. This would certainly appear commensurate with Deleuze 
and Guattari’s experimental pragmatics, with their observation that as the three 
daughters of chaos, the disciplines of art, science and philosophy ‘cut through the 
chaos in different ways’, and never with more affirmative spirit than when he again 
invokes the notion of amor fati, chiefly by claiming that ‘[t]he comic point of view is 
that man’s high moral ideals and glorified heroic poses are themselves largely based 
upon fantasy and are likely to lead to misery or death for those who hold them. In the 
world as revealed by comedy, the important thing is to live and to encourage life, even 
though it is probably meaningless to do so.’53   
 
So how does this relate more precisely to the picaresque literary mode? What 
examples might we cull from modern literature and how might these relate to the 
specifically Northern American milieu we have taken as our focus? In developing his 
argument, Meeker himself begins in consideration of the tragic, principally after 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, before going on to contrast pastoral and picaresque literary 
modes towards broadly politicized, eco-cultural conceptions. Enthralled to the 
inherited cultural morality of tragic heroism, Hamlet’s story would remain one of feted 
familial vainglory if not, it seems, for Meeker’s active interpretation, which discerns 
how ‘[s]omewhere within him... is a force that resists and looks for alternatives.’54 It is 
this affirmative desire to resist dominant historico-cultural traditions, and the sense 
that there might be ‘alternative’ strategies despite prevailing instrumental and 
                                                
52 Meeker, Comedy, pgs. 29, 39. 
53 Deleuze and Guattari, Philosophy, p. 208; Meeker, Comedy, p. 26. 
54 Meeker, Comedy, p. 42. 
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utilitarian views of nature, that inspires Meeker’s novel eco-cultural position, and in a 
manner that is again suggestive of the Deleuzian journey across the intensive desert 
figured by the BwO. Subsequent to his demoting of the tragic mode on the grounds 
that it remains tied to a certain instrumentalist economy, and having noted the tragic 
orientation of Virgilian attitudes and ‘heroism’, his work looks to comic-picaresque 
writing against the anthropocentric, aristocratic, and altogether morally-conservative 
pastoral tradition, and specifically to Johann Jacob Christoffel von Grimelhausen’s 
Simplicius Simplicissimus (1668), Joseph Heller’s Catch 22 (1955), and Thomas 
Mann’s Confessions of Felix Krull, Confidence Man (1954/1955).  
 
What Meeker obtains from these works is variety of picaresque strategies, 
celebrating their assertion of the picaro’s ‘roguish’ relationship to the world that 
‘presents life as a continuous process’ informed by animal intelligence, and as such is 
playful and adaptive, yet accepting of social and biological uncertainties, and therefore 
ultimately inconclusive insofar as it promises no guarantees beyond itself.55 Stemming 
from what he discerns as the protagonist’s ‘gamesmanship,’ Hamlet’s example yields 
an ‘attempt to find a comic resolution to his problems [that] mocks the tragic and 
heroic ideals of Western civilization.’56 What this reading does, therefore, is enable 
Meeker to achieve a fairly exceptional position on humour for ecocriticism, tieing 
together the ethological work of Konrad Lorenz, the writing of James P. Carse on 
‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ games, and also the notion of ‘psuedospeciation’ in 
sociobiological psychologist Erik Erikson.57 Evidently, these writers enable Meeker to 
reconsider the picaresque in ethological terms that bear some similarity to the 
becoming-animal we noted in Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Kafka: ‘Picaresque 
life is animal existence augmented by the imaginative and adaptive powers of the 
human mind.’58  
 
Hamlet’s resistance to the murderous solution that would solve his again, 
nominally ‘tragic’ familial and stately problems are therefore transformed in terms of 
                                                
55 Meeker, Comedy, p. 71. 
56 Meeker, Comedy, p. 47. 
57 See Lorenz, Konrad. Studies in Animal and Human Behaviour. 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1971); Carse, James P. Finite and Infinite Games: A Vision of Life as Play and 
Possibility. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1986); Erikson, Erik. ‘The Ontogeny of Ritualization in 
Man.’ Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, ser. B, 251, no. 722 (1966): 147-526. 
58 Meeker, Comedy, p. 68. 
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an affective (yet non-zoomorphic) ethological view, one that again returns us to 
Kafka’s experimental path beyond the Oedipal impasse. The ‘sentimental journey 
away from present pain in search of past peace’ that would for Meeker characterise the 
tragic-pastoral mode seems reactive and Oedipal after Deleuze and Guattari’s 
schizoanalysis.59 The tragic-pastoral is estranging through its emphasis upon the 
ennobling function of suffering and the self-absorbedness that characterises the pursuit 
of human dignity as an end in itself, a mode that would persuade us that we might 
control the forces of nature and obtain respect and power. Thus the ideology of the 
Protestant work ethic demoted play, enforcing the belief that virtuous struggle in 
service to God would alone ‘raise’ humanity in dominion over the natural world: ‘The 
pastoral mode looks something like an ideology, for pastoral writers often claim to 
know how people should live and expect them to mend their ways; they often assume 
life to be perfectible, however great their despair at discovering that people often reject 
their chances for perfection.’60  
 
Where our thesis has maintained a schizo / stratoanalytic emphasis upon 
historically-contingent social machines, it seems altogether significant to note how 
Meeker’s ethology was ill-received in 1974 when his work was first published, but 
that it would go on to meet with greater acceptance later in the decade as part of an 
emergent trend in sociobiological research that began in the mid-1970s and which 
included E. O. Wilson’s Sociobiology (1975) and Richard Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene 
(1976).61 From the standpoint of Deleuzian noology, what Meeker was attempting 
with his own ethologically-informed eco-philosophy supplies a further example of 
how we might break with normative modes of ideology critique predicated upon 
dialectical negativity:  
 
Unlike the pastoral mode, in which the mind is used to create 
alternatives to a dangerous present reality, the picaresque mode 
                                                
59 Meeker, Comedy, p. 71. 
60 Meeker, Comedy, p. 70. 
61 The issue of free will versus genetic determinism was central to such debates. The ‘evolutionary 
psychology’ of later sociobiological writers such as Robert Wright—author of The Moral Animal 
(1994)—views human behaviour as little more than a device to ensure the replication of genes from one 
generation to the next. Significantly, Meeker finds no discussion of play in Wright’s work. See Meeker, 
Comedy, p. 79. 
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expresses acceptance of the present and adaptation to its 
conditions without concern for abstract ideologies or sentimental 
moralities. The comparison of the hero to animals, an almost 
universal feature of picaresque fiction, emphasizes the picaro’s 
acceptance of biological limitations that define the nature of life 
and suggest the proper purposes that should govern the human 
use of intellect. Faulkner’s rats and mules, Grimelhausen’s calf 
and goose, and the many other animals that recur in picaresque 
literary art are most often used as models of appropriate action 
rather than as images of debased life that threaten some 
conventional standard of human dignity.62 
 
It is key to note how Meeker allies the tragic with the pastoral mode as part of 
his broader critique of instrumental values. Meeker’s view of the comic-picaresque is 
immanent and affirming of the powers of this world: ‘it is an image of human 
adaptation to the world and acceptance of its given conditions without escape, 
rebellion, or egotistic insistence upon human centrality.’63 Given this clear 
demonstration of the importance of the picaresque to a broader eco-critique, it seems 
disobliging indeed that excepting Meeker’s study of the implications of the picaresque 
for eco-literary research, we find few other research projects of this type.64 As such, 
the question for us must now be: how then might we draw together Meeker’s work 
with that of Deleuze and Guattari’s schizo / stratoanalytic conception of literature to 
make an eco-clinical reading of a seminal work of eco-literature? How might the 
outline we have provided above of the relationship between the BwO, melancholy and 
the affirmation of the tragic relate to a specific example of eco-literary humour, and 
how might this relationship enable us to reconsider the environmental activism 
inspired by Edward Abbey’s hugely influential work, The Monkey Wrench Gang? 
 
                                                
62 Ibid. 
63 Meeker, Comedy, p. 103. 
64 The second edition of the book includes a meditation on the work's increased relevance to eco-literary 
debate since its first publication in the 1970s: ‘When The Comedy of Survival first appeared in 1974, 
some people were shocked and angry at comparisons between animals and literary characters, or at the 
idea that something so undignified and trivial as comedy could be presented as a philosophy of life.’ 
See p. 77. 
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Emboldened by the points of resonance between Meeker’s work and Deleuze 
and Guattari’s, we might therefore experiment further with how the comic-picaresque 
‘works’ after Deleuzian schizoanalysis, and therefore despite its overtly ‘eco-
defensive’ theme and manifest concerns with environmental imperilment, consider 
how it is that Abbey’s putative ‘eco-text’ might qualify as more than merely 
‘symptomatological’ after its frequent moments of bawdy humour, and therefore 
moreover as stratacritical, as ultimately ‘therapeutic’ after its wildly picaresque 
revaluation of the tragic mode. This seems achievable not only after Meeker’s 
connection of animal play instincts with sovereign and non-instrumental views of 
nature, but equally where we have seen how for Deleuze a conception of literature as 
‘a health’ makes discernible the impersonal, virtual dimension of Life after the post-
symptomatological figure of the BwO.  
 
To consider how the critical-clinical dimension of Deleuzian philosophy might 
sit with Meeker’s conception of an eco-literary ‘play ethic’ provides an important 
dimension to the concerns of this thesis thus far.  If in the course of The Monkey 
Wrench Gang—with its comic portrayals of eco-defense across the Utah canyon lands 
and mesas—Abbey would seem to unambiguously nail his shades of green to the 
ideological mast, then a schizoanalytic view would reveal instead how Abbey’s 
transformation of the Western genre serves to open up the work beyond such 
normative political readings as those that would keep the Western tied to an 
identitarian interpretation, and through a ‘play ethic’, towards instead the noological 
notion of Life that we have ourselves advanced in preceding chapters. Enabling us to 
consider such an ethology in terms of desire and experimentation, and after the 
relationship between the Oedipal impasse and creative becoming, we might ultimately 
discern a more-than-instrumental value of humour for our eco-clinic.  
 
Moreover, following such a reading, we might consider how the question of an 
ethics of levity is one that might not so much be specific to Abbey, but useful to any 
conception of ecocriticism that would attempt to overcome a normatively tragic or 
‘Jeremiad’ orientation. This should thereafter enable us to suggest a schizoanalytic 
approach to ‘reading under the sign of nature’ that again confronts the operation of 
those presuppositions that serve to underwrite our habits of reading and thinking in 
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this connection more generally. Concerns with presupposition and habit are, as we 
have seen, central to a schizoanalysis of eco-literature and can be nowhere more 
crucial, surely, than where our conceptions of environments are being constructed 
through a work of literature, and which ultimately function as the ideal against which 
we measure and judge a particular text as of ‘Green,’ ‘ecological’ or 
‘environmentalist’ worth. It is our habits that we fall back upon, often despite our best, 
and most ‘progressive’ intentions. Therefore, to argue for a view of literary 
ecocriticism that is in certain respects at odds with the prevailing, manifest view—in 
this instance one that embraces humour and play—requires that we deepen our 
understanding of experimentation (qua play) in this regard.  
 
 
(iii) Activism and the Picaresque in Edward Abbey’s  
The Monkey Wrench Gang (1975) 
 
 
  If the picaresque suggests a means of exceeding the negativity and ‘labour’ of 
the dialectic, how then might it give us to revalue Edward Abbey’s The Monkeywrench 
Gang? Edward Abbey (1927-1989) remains a figure of significance for scholars 
working with and assessing the amenability of North American nature writing to 
ecocritical argument. An account of his two summers as a novice park ranger in the 
canyon lands of south eastern Utah in the late 1950s, Abbey’s Desert Solitaire (1968) 
remains an important eco-literary touchstone, considered by such ecocritics as Scott 
Slovic to exceed the propagandism of Thoreauvian nature writing, chiefly by 
supplying instead an ‘unruly’ form of post-transcendental environmental writing, a 
literature that was more precisely ‘intended to alarm and disorient his readers—
precisely the opposite of what a tour guide or an ordinary rhapsodic publicist would 
try to do’.65 Abbey’s literary attention to landscape and bioregion therefore appears 
less constrained by a desire to cherish and celebrate than it does informed by a creative 
project of invention and defamiliarisation, resulting in something of a noological 
attempt to overturn the commonplace misapprehensions, personifications, and other 
anthropomorphisms of the non-human world. This assertion seems more valid still 
when we consider how in a 1977 interview and again in the introduction to Abbey’s 
                                                
65 Slovic, Seeking, p. 93. 
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Road (1979), Abbey claimed that he ‘never wanted to be an environmental crusader, 
an environmental journalist’, but rather that he ‘wanted to be a fiction writer, a 
novelist.’66  
 
Despite this confession, however, Abbey’s outspokenness against the strip-mining 
of the mesas and canyon lands, the clear-cutting and river-diversion projects that came 
to encroach so forcibly across his own portion of the American West throughout the 
1960s and 70s reinforced for him a certain notoriety, earning him the ‘expert’ moniker 
‘Cactus Ed.’ This professional attribution continued to obscure the ‘more-than-
environmental’ bearing of his creative output; despite having published four novels 
some years previously—Jonathan Troy (1954), The Brave Cowboy (1956), Fire on the 
Mountain (1962) and Black Sun (1971)—Abbey would only achieve widespread 
recognition as a novelist for The Monkey Wrench Gang (1975). Detailing the exploits 
of a group of Ned Ludd-inspired industrial saboteurs—the novel features an opening 
dedication to Ludd—the group initially refer to themselves as the ‘Wooden Shoe 
Conspiracy’ after Ludd’s 18th century act of ‘sabotage’ by throwing a wooden shoe 
(or sabot) into a piece of Leicestershire mill machinery. 
 
Although a Deleuzian analysis must remain less concerned with anecdotal 
evidence about Abbey the man, it nevertheless seems pertinent in this case to note the 
extent to which his bid to remain unassociated with the first-wave of environmental 
crusades seems more futile still given that he elected to preface The Monkey Wrench 
Gang with Walt Whitman’s oppositional dictum from Leaves of Grass (1900), words 
he claimed his father had lived by: ‘Resist much. Obey little’. That these words have 
been taken to summarise Abbey’s attitudes seems fair, if a little caricatural; Abbey was 
indeed a disputatious figure, and the many unlawful transgressions he was remanded 
for during the course of his private life amply attest to this. Given its ostensible 
content, therefore, the work’s publication reinforced an image of Abbey as a staunch 
preservationist with a curmudgeonly demeanour, all too readily cementing a reputation 
as an anarchic, humorless champion of eco-defense and eco-sabotage, and thus as a 
                                                
66 Hepworth, James. “The Poetry Center Interview.” Resist Much, Obey Little: Some Notes on Edward 
Abbey. Ed. James Hepworth and Gregory McNamee. (Salt Lake City: Dream Garden Press, 1985). Pgs. 
33-42. p. 39. 
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difficult, socially-antagonistic figure who moreover in 1959 wrote his Master’s thesis 
on ‘Anarchy and the Morality of Violence’, a fact that undoubtedly contributed in no 
small part to his being monitored by the FBI throughout his adult life. Such a 
sensational image of the man was self-evidently responsible for his inspiration to an 
entire generation of eco-saboteurs, above and beyond the formal ingenuities that might 
be attributed to his most widely-read text. 
 
And yet ultimately such a characterisation, particularly where emphasising his 
curmudgeonly misanthropy, tends to detract from the importance of humour to 
Abbey’s work, and most particularly in The Monkey Wrench Gang wheresoever it is 
read as an ‘eleventh hour’ attack upon instrumental progress and the environmental 
depredations attributable to it. Some commentators have deemed the novel’s form 
strategic in tenor, and Scott Slovic notes how ‘Abbey seems to take advantage of his 
readers’ perception of him as ‘an environmental crusader’ to defy facile wish 
fulfilment.’67 Whilst the book is self-evidently comic, it is again in many respects a 
contemporary Western, albeit perhaps of a type more closely resembling the Deleuzian 
sense of the term we advanced in chapter four. Featuring a bevy of outrageous and 
picaresque characters, we might therefore consider here whether or not The Monkey 
Wrench Gang is simply a picaresque retelling of events that Abbey was privy if not 
party to, or if perhaps there remains something akin to the impersonal ‘ambition’ of 
Buchanan’s reading of the Deleuzian ‘West’ as percept, an impersonal force that 
remains palpable in its ribald moments of defamiliarisation and disorientation by way 
of bodily slapstick and scatology.  
 
This generic concern seems to permit an important, eco-clinical revaluation of 
the book, particularly, as Robert Macfarlane has indicated, that it otherwise appears as 
a consummate mixture of genres: ‘spaghetti westerns tangled up with the Keystone 
Cops, the Cervantean romance tradition and Acme cartoon capers (in an ending that 
comes straight from the Wile E Coyote school of resurrection, Hayduke plummets 
over a canyon edge and falls thousands of feet – only to reappear a few pages later, 
                                                
67 Slovic, Seeking, p. 107. 
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wounded but well).’68 Yet where Macfarlane considers how ‘Abbey had gorged on the 
pulp tradition of the western novel… [taking] from the yellowbacks a Manichaean 
world of good (in his case, wilderness and the Pleistocene) and evil (techno-industry 
and the Anthropocene)’, we might pause to consider if there is in fact a more 
Deleuzian reading of ‘Abbey’s wild west’, in which ‘four lone rangers (the joke is his) 
ride out to administer frontier justice.’69 Although we might all too readily follow 
Macfarlane’s assessment that ‘[l]and-grabbers replace cattle rustlers, mining 
corporations substitute for ‘injun’ tribes, sandstone swaps for sage-brush’, and what is 
more, in such a manner that ‘the basic Western traits of self-sufficiency and casual 
misogyny persist’, we might instead attempt to perform a noological reading that 
exceeds his conclusion that ‘the novel’s overall effect comes to resemble a pair of 
riding chaps woven from hemp and sported by Kropotkin.’70 
 
Rather than pursuing Macfarlane’s ‘anarcho-Western’, then, we might sustain 
our Deleuzian conception of humour as a force that works against the ironic and the 
tragic meets with that of Meeker, enabling us to consider in non-identitarian terms 
how each of the four principal characters qualifies as impersonal avatars of the 
picaresque. The novel’s anti-hero, George W. Hayduke, a ‘pyromantic,’ and ‘a good 
healthy psychopath’ is an ex-Green Beret and veteran of the Vietnam conflict, given to 
incessant drinking and foul language, but whom we are informed has never (yet) killed 
a man.71 In what would otherwise constitute a character-establishing scene, Hayduke 
takes revenge on a policeman who had humiliated him prior to his enlistment and tour 
of duty in Vietnam. After stealing and destroying the officer’s patrol car, he drives 
wildly and drunkenly, climbing the mountains toward ‘the heartland of his heart,’ 
where he faces ‘the mysterious, solemn, inhuman nobility’ of the Vermilion Cliffs, and 
from his vantage on a bridge suspended across the canyon, there ‘unzips... send[ing] a 
four-hundred foot arc of filtered Schlitz’ into the Colorado river, a feat he deems ‘[n]o 
sacrilege - only a quiet jubilation.’72 This humorous detail marks from the outset the 
                                                
68 Macfarlane, Robert. ‘Rereading: Robert Macfarlane on The Monkeywrench Gang’. Originally 
published in The Guardian, Saturday 26th September 2009, the piece is archived @ 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2009/sep/26/robert-macfarlane-monkey-wrench-gang 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Abbey, Monkeywrench, pgs. 150, 181, 264. 
72 Abbey, Monkeywrench, p. 29. 
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ambiguity of the character’s motives; ‘Forgetting to rezip’ he descends the canyon, 
going down on his knees to eat a pinch of red sand before howling into the twilight 
stillness.73 These are the first of Hayduke’s urinary epiphanies, and after numerous 
acts of eco-sabotage, such scatological habits continue unabated, ultimately reaching 
cosmo-comic proportions, after which curious moments of eco-existential indifference 
follow: 
  
Alone at last (Jesus Christ what a relief) Hayduke unbuttoned 
the fly of his jeans and fumbled it out and staled proudly, like a 
stallion, upon the hard ground, the beer cans and pop bottles, the 
squashed aluminum and broken glass, the plastic six-pack 
carriers and forgotten wine jugs of Navajo-land USA (Jesus 
Christ what a relief). As he pissed he saw particulated images of 
stars a hundred thousand light years beyond our solar system 
glittering briefly, but bravely, on the trembling mirrors of his 
golden dew. He pondered for a moment the oceanic unity of 
things. Like the witch doctors say, we are truly all one. One 
what? What difference does it make? 
  
The grandeur of his reflections gave him solace as he bent to his 
lonely and ill-rewarded labors. Reconstituted, the chain saw in 
one hand, the loaded duffel bag in the other hand and an eighty-
pound pack on his broad mortal back, George W. Hayduke 
tramped forward—a staunch and unplacated force— toward the 
clanking apparatus the tough red eyes the armored jaws the tall 
floodlit and brazen towers of... the Enemy. His enemy? Whose 
enemy? The Enemy.74 
  
On Deleuze’s view, humour returns the human subject to its corporeality, but a 
non-enclosed corporeality, unlike that of irony. Whilst Hayduke (as character) is 
marshaling himself towards a formal assault upon ‘The Enemy’, the preceding 
moment of irreverence and flagrant bodily slapstick positions him as a picaro for 
                                                
73 Ibid. 
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whom the more-than-human world is a cosmi-comic sphere in which his act of 
political defiance qua ‘eco-defense’ is indissociable from the ignoble necessity of his 
defecatory functions. But such bodily descent in not limited to Hayduke; Abbey also 
presents a religiously-contentious figure in the form of Seldom Seen Smith, a 
‘polygamous Jack Mormon river-guide’—whom he elsewhere describes as being to a 
Mormon what a Jack Rabbit is to a cotton-tail—and whom repeatedly prays to God to 
do something about the Glen Canyon Dam, the focus of much of the 
monkeywrencher’s environmental activism in the latter portion of the novel. Making 
the frequent and ultimately stammering request for a ‘little pre-cision earthquake,’ 
Smith evokes, even if only faintly, the emphasis Deleuze places on stammering at the 
syntactical level, and which as Gaudlitz reminds us, again points up the world-
historical content of delirium.75  
 
In a scene of attempted sabotage with A. K. ‘Doc’ Sarvis, M.D., himself a 
middle-aged and unrepentantly lecherous figure whose questionable appetites add 
much affective brio to the narrative, Smith appears as much less a human character as 
a strategic assemblage of libidinal affects designed to explode the dam as itself a figure 
of instrumental impasse tied to an implicit moral program, chiefly after an 
experimental testing of the limits of his own faith and of the natural order itself qua 
deus siva natura: 
  
‘All we need is to make one little crack in it, Doc. One crack in that dam and 
nature she’ll take care of the rest. Nature and God.’ 
‘Whose side is God on?’ 
‘That’s something I wanta find out.’76 
  
The lecherous Doc Sarvis is perhaps the most explicitly ‘perverse’ quantity in 
the book, smoking Marsh-Wheeling ‘Conestoga’ cigars (or ‘stogies’), the oldest 
American cigar brand, and which he takes much pride in announcing were ‘hand-
rolled in the wagon seat, westward bound.’77 The impersonal ‘ambition’ that might be 
                                                
75 Abbey, Monkeywrench, pgs. 33, 34, 157-58, 270; Gaudlitz, Stuttering, p. 186.  
76 Abbey, Monkeywrench, p. 280. 
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discerned in the affects comprising Sarvis impart a sense of the West as 
simultaneously an erotic and over-eroticised landscape. At his most antinomian, Sarvis 
proclaims, ‘I want to bugger a Baskin-Robbins girl. While she’s scooping out the last 
of the caramel nut fudge. Before lunch.’78 The exaggerated pederasty of Sarvis clearly 
offers a slapstick caricature of the ‘freedoms’ promised by the puritanical move 
‘Westward’, or, despite their clear chauvinism, suggesting them as implicitly ‘Anti-
Oedipal’ for all their unchecked experimental (or ‘polymorphously perverse’) 
intensity, or as being inherently at variance with the deeply familial morality of the 
Puritan traditions the first settlers remained bound by. At the novel’s outset, a good 
while before Hayduke is introduced, this evocation of history and European heritage 
serves to revalue Westward ambition when we find Sarvis demolishing commercial 
advertising billboards with his ‘nurse and buddy’ Ms. Bonnie Abbzug, a Bronxite 
Jewess, holder of ‘an M.A. in Classical (yech!) French Lit,’ and most significantly 
where his own advanced years are concerned, an ‘old crone of twenty-eight.’79 
 
We can already discern, then, how such ribald characters and their largely 
salacious exploits might then be considered after notions of irreverence, indecency, 
and thus after the ‘humour of descent’ as Deleuze conceives of it. As we have noted, in 
his literary references Deleuze looked predominantly to high modern writers such as 
Beckett, Woolf and Joyce. Might so putatively ‘ecological’ a work as Abbey’s not also 
qualify as a critical-clinical example of populist genre writing, echoing, albeit faintly, 
the formal experiment of the high moderns in its own, scatological subversion of the 
Western form? Despite its lack of syntactical experiment, the very title of The 
Monkeywrench Gang comes to suggest a forceful ‘wrenching’ of its anthropomorphic 
elements, at once a diagnosis and exaggeration of human desires that nevertheless 
remains neither judgemental nor moralising in tone. The passages we have cited might 
be read as examples of Deleuze’s humour as one descending not merely down towards 
the body, but to another ontology of becoming and quasi-causal relations. As the 
unruly crew proceed en route to one particular act of sabotage, Abbey indicates with a 
bawdy emphasis upon culturally-censored bodily regions, an uneasy relationship 
between these proto-environmentalists and their pollutive machine, describing how 
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‘[t]hey roared down the high-centred road, bristly blackbrush and spring prickly pear 
clawing at the truck along the greasy perineum of its General Motors crotch.’80  
 
There are passages too that appear to target more explicitly the late capitalist 
mode of domestic organisation. In a further pair of vignettes in which the protagonists 
are described in their relationships to their living quarters, Abbey appears at pains to 
render the very act of habitation and the psychic territories principal to it altogether 
absurd. In ‘Dr. Sarvis at Home’ we find a plainly slapstick comic chase; alone without 
Bonnie Abbzug to chauffeur him, Sarvis cycles through the city of Alberque, New 
Mexico and is harried by the driver of a Duke City Reddy-Mix cement mixer. 
Objecting to the man’s bullyish driving, he responds with a series of lewd hand-
gestures. Enraged, the driver gives chase until Sarvis leads the truck into a collision 
with a pair of advertising billboards.81 In ‘Seldom Seen at Home,’ Smith dreams of a 
bizarre persecution by the monocular ‘Director’ whilst sleeping with Susan, one of his 
three wives, for the first time since embarking upon his spate of eco-sabotage with 
Hayduke, Abbzug and Sarvis.82 In this bizarre sequence he receives a cathode ‘[h]alf a 
meter’ ‘up the rectum’ and an ‘anode’ is inserted into his penis, whereafter he receives 
an ‘[i]mprint [of] the flip-flop circuit on his semi-circular canal.’83 Joined by 
additional cables and sensor wires by his coccyx and nostrils to a computer bank 
before him, Seldom receives a ‘program... [r]ight up through the old perineum.’84 
 
All of which clearly marks Abbey’s text for a revaluation on picaresque terms. 
And yet given these self-evidently picaresque moments, we might now turn to a more 
typical reading of the text, to consideration of how all of this seemingly ‘irrelevant’ 
human lust sits with the far more ‘serious’ business of ‘eco-defense’, marking how at 
the level of its narrative content, The Monkey Wrench Gang nevertheless inspires the 
image of the assiduous or ‘noble’ eco-saboteur as an agent whose clearly-defined 
ethics might jar with their treatment in terms of Meeker’s ‘play ethic’, appearing as it 
does to endorse an oppositional ethos of a putatively ‘sober’ sort. Eco-critic Lee 
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Rozelle appears blithely indifferent to the bawdy humour we have here acknowledged 
when he considers Abbey’s contribution to ‘eco-tage’ or ‘monkeywrenching’ to be 
one ‘explicitly defined as non-violent direct action employed under specific 
circumstances to slow or halt development.’85  
 
In playing down the work’s humour, Rozelle instead focuses, evidently out of a 
bid to extract something ‘useful’ from the text, upon the ‘eco-terror’ he identifies in 
Abbey, upon ‘the terror associated with the destruction of functioning ecosystems’,86 
upon the ‘slack-faced shock and rage’ that his protagonists exhibit in response to 
witnessing the ‘massacre of the pines’ over a two hundred acre plot.87 Whilst such 
moments are evidently prevalent throughout the book, providing a concerted contrast 
with the levity of its protagonists’ more-than-‘ecological’ desires, it seems key to note 
how Rozelle reads this particular response under the ‘eco-sublime’ rubric we 
considered in chapter two, with its emphasis upon ecocriticism as a deontological 
calling. Despite acknowledging an undeniably burlesque moment in which Abbey’s 
character Bonny defaces a Smokey the Bear sign by painting onto his crotch a limp 
pet-cock with hairy but shrivelled balls, Rozelle remains concerned primarily with the 
seriousness and violence of the monkeywrenchers’ oppositional politics: ‘The fantasy 
of halting widespread development through sabotage manifests itself in the same way 
that anti-nuclear pathos has evoked the sublimity of revolutionary mass movements... 
Through destruction, Abbey’s Monkeywrenchers seek to provide stark reminders of 
the potential might of radical activism.’88  
  
 It proves perhaps more salient to note, therefore, how Rozelle then cites the 
Unabomber, Theodore Kaczynski, who had read and endorsed Abbey’s The Monkey 
Wrench Gang, to engage in a brief assertion that Kaczynski’s own activities of eco-
tage went unacknowledged by Chris Waits and Dave Shors in their book Unabomber: 
The Secret Life of Ted Kaczynski (1999). This he emphasises in terms of ‘the 
connection between the terrorist’s post-ecocidal trauma, seeing his environs opened 
around him’ and ‘Waits’ own acts of deforestation (or ‘depletion’)’; a claim he bases 
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86 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 83. 
87 Abbey, Monkeywrench, p. 230; Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 84. 
88 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 86. 
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upon Waits confession of his own position as an incarnation of a depletionist 
archetype from The Monkey Wrench Gang.89 What seems crucial here is that for 
Rozelle, ‘Kaczynski’s acts of sabotage confirm Waits’ anti-ecological values, 
suggesting to the logger, his crew, and Waits’ readership that an overriding 
irrationality pervades those dedicated to deep ecology and conservation.’90 
  
  This dialectic appears key where our revaluation of ecocriticism after a ‘play 
ethic’ is concerned; Rozelle emphasises how Kaczynski acknowledged the killing of 
people as a necessary tactic in ‘jar(ing) his audience from their sedation’ and thus 
allow(ing) them to experience the vicarious terrors of a post-ecocidal “death world.”91 
Our earlier concerns with regimes of signs and incorporeal transformations would 
enable us to sustain the a-signifying semiotic of stratoanalysis in this regard, 
particularly where Rozelle asserts how ‘[n]ot unlike Abbey’s Monkeywrench gang, 
Kaczynski attempts to provide negative feedback to the runaway processes of 
technology on both material and semiotics levels.’92 For Deleuze and Guattari, humour 
might intervene in the process of judgements passed after the manner of the 
‘exaggerated Oedipus’ we find in Kafka, in the marginally slapstick image of Herr K 
before the aging judges in The Trial.93 Although he acknowledges the ‘ethical gap 
between Abbey’s literary sabotage and Kaczynski’s actual murders’, Rozelle 
nevertheless sustains their respective seriousness; the violence of the Unabomber and 
Abbey’s gang alike takes its part in transforming ‘the conditions of consciousness’ 
after a ‘logic of explosions and terror as negative feedbacks in media culture.’94  
 
This outlook would clearly benefit from the relatively slapstick figure of Herr K, 
most especially where Rozelle sustains Kaczynski as a noological enemy of 
representation: ‘Through violence, the Unabomber sought to present the postnatural 
unpresentable, to mediate between the transcendence of ecological collapse and the 
                                                
89 Rozelle, Ecosublime, pgs. 87, 86. 
90 Rozelle, Ecosublime, pgs. 87-88. 
91 Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 88. 
92 Ibid. 
93 For Deleuze and Guattari, Kafka ‘is an author who laughs with a profound joy, a joie de vivre, in spite 
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Guattari, Kafka, p. 41. 
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tangibility of forms. At the limits of imaginable catastrophe, the bomb “short-circuits 
thinking with itself.”95 It is a ‘violence to cognitively and spiritually revive ecological 
law’; in other words, Rozelle’s eco-sublime moment retains a negativity that is 
ultimately that of the burdened Higher Man that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra marshalled 
against, one that he theorises after Lyotard’s assertion that to promote ‘the sublime, 
the imagination must be subjected to violence, because it is by way of its suffering, the 
mediation of its violation, that the joy of seeing—or almost seeing—the law can be 
obtained.’96 The somewhat smugly discerned ‘irony’ being that ‘(b)ecause of the 
Unabomber’s noxious deeds, environmentalism in its more benign manifestations 
suffered an un-just disgrace.’97 
  
  Evidently, it remains important to note the extent to which Rozelle 
acknowledges Abbey’s Hayduke as ‘often-comic’, but that no prolonged examination 
follows this observation. Moreover, he does not acknowledge this in terms of 
picaresque literary form, which seems an oversight from an ostensibly literary scholar. 
Again, it seems most revealing when Rozelle notes the irony in the positions of both 
Hayduke and the Unabomber: ‘Ironically, the fantasies of Kaczynski and Hayduke 
echo Standard Manifest Destiny and Western expansion rhetoric of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries; in both contexts the frontier functions as repository and 
playground for the desires of an oppressed populace.’98 In many respects abjuring the 
basis for our ‘play ethic’, Rozelle takes the notion of ‘WILD life / WILD nature’ from 
the Unabomber’s manifesto, and in such a manner as to assert a self-evidently ascetic 
notion of ‘the playground for ... desires’, which seems key to Rozelle’s ultimately 
dialectical grasp of his concerns with eco-tage and eco-activism more generally.99  
Hayduke’s ‘anthropomorphic tantrums’ are not what Rozelle values; evidently, he 
requires from his protagonists more seriousness and the labour of the negative.100 
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publication in the New York Times and the Washington Post, ‘was written off as paranoid rant.’ See 
Rozelle, Ecosublime, p. 89.  
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  Thus the ‘violence’ that our Deleuzian affirmation of the tragic would propose 
by way of the picaresque literary form is at bottom noological. If for Rozelle, ‘Eco-
tage, both literary and literal, ultimately obscures at-risk ecologies and creates a green 
carnival that more often than not alienates potential allies’, then, we will argue, it is 
because in the final assessment his position remains identitarian and subjectivist; 
although he speaks of the non-dialectical manner by which ‘proponents of an 
ecological worldview must infiltrate rather than annihilate’, he continues to do so after 
a logic of ‘agency’ that again betrays in key respects his failure to grasp the 
importance of an affirmative theoretical framework, and thus by extension, how it is 
an ecstatic, embodied humour rather than a knowing, world-weary irony that would 
open his inhibited form of eco-clinical research to new considerations, and which 
would ultimately enable an affirmation of even the most keenly felt sense of 
environmental ‘injustice’, an affirmation adequate to the revaluation of Man as much 
less a ‘Higher’ being burdened by a morally-constrained deontological calling, than 
one actively dispersed into the Dionysian joy of a ‘post-natural’ eternal return.101 
 
And so where a Deleuzian eco-clinic might supplant a nominally Marxo-
Lacanian one, it is essential to acknowledge how Deleuze motivates Nietzsche’s 
eternal return beyond simplistic identitarian readings, conceiving of it as an idea or 
thought adequate to the endless becoming of differential forces. Enabling us to 
reconceive of desire for eco-literary research in terms of a-signifying affects and 
multiplicities, Deleuze’s conception of being affirmed of becoming implies eternal 
return as the movement of a becoming-active, a power that ultimately eliminates 
reactive states. In both his purely philosophical writing and the schizo and 
stratoanalytic works co-authored with Guattari, Deleuze recognises in the relationship 
between the eternal return and the will to power a ‘double selection’ that ultimately 
overcomes negation in a spirited, yet more-than-vital process of transvaluation, and 
which in chapter three we saw dramatised to some extent in Kafka’s line of flight born 
of the Oedipal impasse. If we subsequently extended this process towards an eco-
clinical sensibility, then we did so by acknowledging how the Thoreauvian line 
followed by a great many ecocritics remains, to a greater extent, beset by a markedly 
liberal reterritorialisation, productive of a monumentalising form of ‘nature writing’ 
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that in many respects ‘memorializes’ the Wild and Wilderness, and which thus retains 
a sense of the ecocritic as little more than the reactive champion of a Romantic cast, 
one who ultimately appears bereft of the strength to actively create new values by 
willing the negative out of being. 
  
For Deleuze, if the becoming-active of reactive force moves by way of the 
practice of amor fati, Nietzsche’s Stoic sentiment that calls upon us to affirm Life with 
all of our will, and which by valuing the tragic differently, can ultimately enable us to 
countenance the paradoxical activity of affirming negation itself, then we might 
thereby acquire the strength adequate to counter-actualise those morally-enforced 
judgements and relations that keep us in search of salvation, that underwrite a 
capitalist social machine in which neurotic circuits of desire reproduce modes of living 
inspired by transcendent, Oedipal values. Inaugurating an experimental ‘pragmatics’ 
or creative ethics that does not yet know what a body might do, an immanent eco-
cultural revaluation would by contrast ultimately expand the life of ‘living’ bodies of 
all kinds—including those non-biological forms and forces—freeing Life from the 
‘heroic’ burdens of a negativity that sustains certain forms of guilt, duty and 
slavishness. That Deleuze’s preference for Anglo-American literature directly imparts 
such an immanent pragmatics should rouse North American ecocritics from their anti-
theoretical slumber; certain formal qualities particular to the writers Deleuze selects 
deprivilege the mind and consciousness in such a way as to reassert the Spinozan 
parallelism we considered in chapter one, imparting a non-arborescent, rhizomatic 
sensibility that effectively disarticulates or destratifies the forces of capture, or those 
‘strata’ that would imprison life within organisms, individuals, and genera.  
 
In this way, D. H. Lawrence, Henry Miller, and Antonin Artaud are as much 
ethicists as Spinoza and Nietzsche; equally opposed to the psychology of the priest, 
the system of ‘cruelty’ that their work indicates promises a rhizomatic path beyond 
that of transcendental judgement, or of any aesthetic theory predicated upon it, 
encouraging us to turn our attention instead to the manner in which our knowledge of 
the body has been blocked as much by a cultural preoccupation with a signifying mode 
of psychoanalysis as by popular emphases upon egoic consciousness. Aided and 
abetted by a ‘Royal’ or State Science, one that typically retains fealty to a liberal 
humanist morality, we have seen how the common sensibility prevails wherever a 
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critical-clinical understanding of literature and language is denied its potential to 
challenge, disarticulate and transform those forces that would reterritorialise the pure 
exteriorities that art, science and philosophy would otherwise open onto. This has 
necessarily included a study of humour insofar as it remains perhaps the single 
greatest key to acknowledging how our patterns of enjoyment remain principal to our 
daily lives and politics, providing as it does a form of social cohesion by way of an 
articulation of common gestures, attitudes and ambivalences, most often affirming of 
rather than posing any substantial challenge to, the dominant mode of expression. 
 
If one seeks to grasp environments on Deleuzoguattarian terms as ‘milieux’, and 
therefore as mobile constellations of forces or points, of intersections between lines 
and planes, then Gilbert Simondon’s eco-political assertion proves wholly germane to 
our concluding summation of the degree to which the Deleuzoguattarian thesis on 
expression, hylomorphism, and incorporeal transformation turns upon the hubris of 
human pride and the humourous disposition that would typically support it: ‘form 
corresponds to what the man in command has thought to himself, and must express in 
a positive manner when he gives his orders: form is thus of the order of the 
expressible.’102 Thus, when the State ‘operates by stratification’, it does so by way of 
judgements made from a stratum beyond the substance of the milieu, the expression of 
which enact incorporeal transformations. If our concerns with a distinction between 
identitarian melancholy and a phlegmatism of the virtual proved useful to our critique 
of Timothy Morton’s discussion of ‘beautiful soul syndrome’, a largely Hegelian 
thesis with which we contrasted Deleuze’s Nietzschean heritage, then it highlighted 
the degree to which a secular humanist preoccupation with form, chiefly after a 
Romantic liberalism, might be contrasted with the ‘formlessness’ of the schizophrenic 
joy that would embrace the eternal return as part of a hylozoic affirmation of Life in 
all of its manifestations.  
 
Whilst Edward Abbey’s example gave us to contrast a Deleuzoguattarian 
reading of a humour of descent following a discussion of how it was equal to, if not 
theoretically more advanced than Joseph Meeker’s notion of an ecological ‘play ethic’, 
we might here provide a few more concluding remarks on the importance of grasping 
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this relationship between form and formlessness, between the emergent, or hylozoic 
properties that an immanent world view would concern itself with and the top down or 
transcendentally imposed values that the hylomorphic imperative implies. This is 
because in A Thousand Plateaus the example of a town is given primarily to articulate 
the relationship between built structures and State regulation of territory.103  
 
As Andrew Ballantyne has it: ‘Our sense of form derives not only from the 
emergent properties of the milieu, but also from the regimes of signs that surround us, 
and that we deploy.’104 If Engels’ concerns with, for example, the extent to which the 
English town of Manchester became a metropolis in the nineteenth-century are given 
almost solely in terms of class privilege, then this is because he was characteristically 
concerned with the socio-economic relationship between emergent properties at the 
level of those who populated the milieu and the architectonic judgements imposed by 
the transcendent values of town planning authorities; this ‘social ecology’ is self 
evident in Engels’ elementary discussion of ‘the circumstances that through an 
unconscious, tacit agreement as much as through conscious, explicit intention’ can 
give us to understand how ‘the working class districts are most sharply separated from 
the parts of the city reserved for the middle class.’105 Here the Deleuzoguattarian 
concern with incorporeal transformation, or the ordering of material bodies by the 
immaterial force of expression, would give us to exceed Marxist-humanist class 
interests by asserting how the already more-than-human Life of desiring-machines is 
brought into line with the hylomorphic schema as a consequence of the metaphysical, 
Oedipal paralogism.  
 
Beyond Engels’ identitarian concerns with class, therefore, we might consider 
more generally how, as Ballantyne has suggested, ‘heroic architects’ deploy a self-
consciousness in their engagements with matter, informed ultimately by the illusion of 
individual authorship; as Deleuze and Guattari’s hylozoic thesis insists, forms are 
already ‘implicit’ and ‘folded’ (or virtual) within the relative pathos of materials, an 
enfoldedness that is discernible in the French term ‘pli’, and which we find 
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etymologically in the words ‘imply’, ‘implicit’, ‘multiply’, ‘duplicate’, ‘replicate’ etc. 
Thus, our linguistic and semiotic articulations, particularly as conceived of in line with 
literary production vis-à-vis the common sensibility, and moreover, as this is informed 
by the persistent Kantian assumption of the alliance of thought with the ‘good’ and 
which contributes to the notions we hold of ‘good form’, can be diagnosed after an 
historicising symptomatology, or after a broadly Marxo-Lacanian conception of the 
symptom, but be more fully, more complexly conceived of after the molecular or 
micropolitics of the Deleuzoguattarian BwO.  
 
As a virtual, relational or synthetic figure that would subvert the transcendent 
judgements of the hylomorphic imperative, the BwO draws attention to the paradoxes 
of immanence and embodiment, and in our case, after the experimental repetitions that 
certain literary ingenuities imply. Our notion of an ‘ecological pathos’ thereby 
becomes one after which a certain therapeutic acknowledgement of formalism is 
reached; the unintelligibility of the undifferentiated, the schizophrenic, confirms the 
Lacanian sense that the social plane is already decided in advance, that castration is the 
constitutive process by way of which a sufficiently hylomorphic sensibility is adopted, 
begetting a diagnosis of instrumentalism that would thereby draw attention in terms of 
the conscious intentionality and therefore ideological shortcomings of such an 
orientation, rather than at the level of the relationship it clearly bears with the forces 
and affects of the pre-individual domain, and the molecular genesis of subjectivity as 
part of a post-Kantian thesis on limits that actively acknowledges the constitutive 
influence of those intensities that remain Real despite our inability or unwillingness to 
talk about them.  
 
If inter-personal decorum is something that remains key to understanding the 
limits of the Symbolic after the Lacanian schema, then we might extend it to the built 
environment in the way that Ballantyne’s Deleuzoguattarian thesis indicates, 
developing a sense not only of the civic decorum certain architectural forms remain 
bound by, but of the social habits and attitudes that they subsequently remain 
productive of. If for the great modern architect Le Corbusier, housing tenements were 
‘machines for living in’, then after our Deleuzoguattarian concern with social 
machines we confirm how under hylomorphic instrumentalism, formlessness 
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ultimately appears an un-decorous materiality awaiting its correct form, implying a 
type of substantial and libidinal ‘irresponsibility’ that, after our Deleuzian distinction 
between the tragic-pastoral literary mode and the affirmation of tragedy as a 
deterritorialising or counter-actualising power or potential, contributes to the ethics of 
the BwO as an altogether ‘de-monumentalising’ force.  
 
As a figure upon which only longitudinal and latitudinal lines are registered, 
drawing in the cartographic nature of literary experiment as we have conceived of it 
after Deleuze, the BwO enables us to advance a post-symptomatological relationship 
to repetition, to the differences that refrains and concepts provide a sufficiently 
adequate expression for, and which take their part in an ecology of ideas as much as in 
any liberal-humanist ecology that would privilege a negatively-defined ‘biosphere’ of 
non-human flora and fauna. Literary style, specifically after the examples of 
Nietzsche’s aphorism, Beckett’s stuttering, Kafka’s exaggeration, and Proust’s formal 
concerns with temporality and the limits of the social world, all indicate a material / 
immaterial relationship of sense and expression that would suggest an identity of the 
critical and the clinical after a concept of production that would profoundly reorient 
issues of desire and the unconscious for ecocriticism, one with a particular set of 
implications for North American literary production, with its inherent preoccupations 
with westward ambition, with cultural renewal, and a mythopoeic affirmation of desert 
life. 
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This thesis has called for the assemblage of an ‘eco-clinic’, a post-
psychoanalytic, speculative-materialist construct that draws upon the lessons of 
immanent critique. It is suggested as an attempt to produce a theoretical approach 
adequate to the ethico-aesthetic problematic presupposed by the ‘environmental’ turn 
that has swept across the humanities in recent years, and which promises to revalue 
issues of desire, literature and ecology. This proposal is advanced more precisely on 
the grounds that the embryonic first-wave of ecocritical scholarship—a timely, yet 
markedly nation-centred and theoretically-conservative literary specialism, and which 
first emerged under the North American cultural and political pluralism of the mid to 
late 1980s—proved insufficiently apprised of a critical-clinical dimension adequate to 
the ontological paradoxes presupposed by its nominally ‘environmental’ alignment. 
By drawing in a robust, yet self-reflexive and experimental way upon the economic, 
psychoanalytic, and cultural theory of such post-Althusserian thinkers as Fredric 
Jameson, Slavoj Žižek, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, our eco-clinic is suggested 
as a theoretical mode of reception that is conceptually adequate to the analysis of 
what we have hitherto described as an ‘ecological pathos’, an ontological and 
aesthetic sensibility that calls for a concerted re-emphasis upon those issues of desire 
and subjective constitution that have been actively neglected by the ecocritical turn 
under its ostensibly ‘post-anthropocentric’ orientation.  
 
 As paradoxical as the notion of an ‘active neglect’ might remain, therefore, it 
was one that nevertheless proved key to our initial postulation of the eco-clinic. 
Having constitutively excluded or ‘disavowed’ the post-structural principles that had 
otherwise proven so prevalent throughout its particular institutional context, first-
wave ecocriticism presented our thesis with the lineaments of an institutional-
disciplinary case study. Forming the principal symptom in a psycho-cultural 
pathology that, we argued, had ultimately given rise to a specific ‘ideology of the 
text’, one exerting an influence beyond its manifest ideological orientation as a 
‘literary-environmentalist’ discourse, it was our contention that the movement’s 
predominant, and largely under-acknowledged liberal-humanist orientation had 
paradoxically delimited its broadly ‘post-human’ aims and objectives. The apparent 
reluctance of first-wave ecocritics to acknowledge the constitutive failures that 
comprised their own psycho-cultural ‘pre-history’, one that remained indexical or 
‘symptomatic’ of a liberal-pluralist subjectivity, suggested the subsistence of a 
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cultural-libidinal blockage or impasse, a conditioning set of relations that remains 
productive of the cultural and political unconscious in question. Self-evidently 
productive of an inhibited and constraining first-wave of the movement, this impasse 
should, we suggested, ultimately prove no less productive of the criteria by way of 
which a subsequent, more ‘eco-clinically’-attuned pathway might be forged.  
 
This somewhat rudimentary presentation of immanent critique gave us to 
subsequently propose a series of post-Althusserian approaches to pre-history for 
ecocriticism, and moreover, to do so as part of a broader assertion that the specialism 
must itself seek to develop a greater ‘metacritical’ sensibility. By attending to their 
own grounding in an historically-specific liberal-humanist milieu, ecocritics might 
subsequently obtain a libidinal-materialist perspective upon the production of 
environmental values, specifically with respect to their abiding concerns with the 
literary-critical consequence of ecological equilibrium and systemic interdependence. 
If first-wave ecocriticism’s basic charge was to ‘challenge interpretation to its own 
grounding in the bedrock of natural fact’, then this might be brought into line with 
literary-clinical concerns with the psycho-pathological consequence of interpretation, 
emphasising the degree to which the ecocritical emphasis upon more-than-human 
ecologies might be conceived of as a response to issues of history qua totalising 
teleologies of Spirit, specifically insofar as the movement would tend in large part to 
remain neglectful of the pluralistic ideological biases that would colour any nominally 
eco-political motivation of particular concepts.  
 
In chapter one, therefore, we considered how, as an avowedly ‘non-’ or ‘post-
theoretical’ orientation, first-wave ecocriticism largely abjured deconstructive or 
psychoanalytic approaches to literature, or those that emphasised discourses of 
interiority and signification, but also that gave strong philosophical analysis to 
concepts of Nature and Totality. Nevertheless favoring an inherently totalising 
valuation of non-human environmental phenomena by way of an emphasis upon eco-
mimetic representation, first-wave ecocritics sought to distance their enterprise from 
the critical-clinical practices of the Lacanian and Derridean schools, chiefly on the 
grounds that such post-structural orientations appeared unduly concerned with matters 
of socio-linguistic representation as part of a broader, clinical-deconstructive trend in 
continental theory. Deeming such close textual analysis to be not simply ‘un-
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ecological’ for being more typically preoccupied with issues of semiotics and 
signification, but more precisely as something of a socio-political acerbic, we 
identified post-structuralism as a molecularising force that would ultimately threaten 
to dissolve the particular species of ‘alliance politics’ that, as Jameson himself gave 
us to acknowledge, had underwritten the ecocritical desire for a form of totalising 
discourse, emergent as the movement was within an ‘already molecular’ cultural-
political milieu. If the concept of totality proved so principal to our nation-centered 
analyses in chapter one, therefore, then it did so inasmuch as it supplied a focus upon 
environmental immanence qua unity, or upon the production of an ecocritical desire 
and discourse that, by ‘reading under the sign of Nature’, would risk the reductive 
lamination or ‘green-washing’ of inter-cultural difference. 
 
 It was on precisely this basis, therefore, that our first chapter asserted a more 
or less orthodox mode of ideology critique for ecocriticism, striving to identify the 
movement’s specific disciplinary pre-history with respect to the Althusserian 
conception of the ‘problematic field’, and placing particular emphasis upon the 
broadly ‘eco-psychological’ yet typically conservative and constrained contributions 
of the mere handful of eco-literary researchers who had attempted such work. Beyond 
any hasty denigration of these projects, however, we elected to pursue a discussion of 
the covert humanism that demonstrably haunts ecocritical attempts to promote non-
theoretical approaches to ‘environmental awareness’, emphasising in particular the 
inhibitions such projects retain with regard to Freudo-Lacanian psychoanalysis, 
suggesting that this owed much to a basic misapprehension of the merits of Lacan’s 
own, broadly Spinozan grasp of part-to-whole relations, principally by way of 
Althusser’s nominally ‘post-structural’ desire to break with normative Hegelian views 
of pre-history. Bringing Althusser’s Lacanianism to bear upon dialectical progression 
and the ‘manifest destiny’ of North American Spirit, we elected to draw out the 
Marxo-Spinozism with which he had developed a post-Hegelian thesis on history and 
causal relations, and which gave him in his work with Étienne Balibar to develop an 
altogether different cultural symptomatology after their seminal reading of Marx’s 
Capital.  
 
By developing their thesis in terms of Marx’s textual catachresis, this important 
study ultimately suggested a first-order of symptomatological diagnosis for our 
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project, specifically where the theoretical-immaturity of first-wave ecocriticism 
remained consequential for the ostensible ‘maturations’ of its burgeoning second-
wave, one that after Marx’s example, would ultimately be left behind following his 
‘epistemological break’, thereby productive of a more mature, and on Althusser’s 
view, more properly anti-humanist political economics. The Spinozan elements of 
Althusser and Balibar’s thesis therefore enabled us to begin to address the liberal-
humanist foundations of ecocriticism as part of precisely such a phase of theoretical-
immaturity (qua conceptual adequacy) and moreover, to proceed to consider the 
broader consequence of dialectics for any ‘un-ecological’ indictment of capitalist 
instrumentalism.  
 
Towards the chapter’s close, Ellen Rooney’s Althusserianism lead us to 
acknowledge the climate of ‘general persuasivity’ that had so palpably characterised 
the cold war cultural and political milieu out of which North American ecocriticism 
had initially emerged, and to which a sense of theoretical ‘innocence’ remained key, 
suggesting ecocriticism as more broadly symptomatic of the desire to resist the 
Marxist-Socialist tenor of much post-structural theory. This insight proved pivotal for 
our grasp of the ecocritical reluctance to address in any strong, conceptual way, issues 
of Nature vis-à-vis Totality as part of its elementary methodological practice. In this 
way, our first chapter remained concerned with relatively orthodox ideological issues, 
seeking to redress the balance somewhat for a movement that had so evidently 
neglected to reckon with the consequence of its own nation-centered 
conceptualisations of such concepts, and in a manner that might subsequently enable a 
genealogy of that which ecocriticism had to date necessarily implied but not in any 
strong sense confronted: the legacy of transcendental Idealism and the degree to 
which issues of subjectivity and aesthetics must be principal to any discussion of 
ideology since the Kantian critical turn.  
 
 If, at the close of chapter one, therefore, we asserted Althusser’s Spinozan 
notion of ‘relative autonomy’ as a means of allaying, to some extent, the fears of 
theory-wary ecocritics who would continually resist psychoanalytically-informed 
modes of immanent critique, principally insofar as their promotion might somehow 
involve the abject bowdlerisation of the cultural and literary productions in question, 
then this was so as to pave the way for the development of our Kantian discussion of 
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ideology and aesthetics in chapter two, in which we began to consider the relationship 
between the critical and the clinical in more formal terms. Whilst a certain psycho-
political Hegelianism clearly remains problematic for an eco-literary orientation that 
would seek to de-emphasise issues of interiority for its cultural and political work, we 
considered that it would nevertheless prove altogether remiss to neglect the influence 
of Kantian Idealism upon such a legacy, particularly insofar as it had given rise to a 
bourgeois humanist subjectivity so principal to the instrumentalist attitudes that 
almost all ecocritics stood united against. Furthermore, it was our contention that by 
deliberately seeking to investigate the limits of the finite subject as given by Kant’s 
18th century critical turn, that we might subsequently better apprehend the eco-
political consequence of those psychopathological theories that, since at least 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, but most visibly since Freud and Lacan, had worked to 
account for the inverse of Enlightenment reason, or to theoretically address those 
productions of the Will or libidinal drives that might, where understood in line with a 
properly immanent, post-Kantian critique, give us to extract a thesis upon a 
specifically ecocritical ‘will to truth’. 
 
 Following a discussion of the structural ambiguities of the concept of Nature 
in Kant’s critical philosophy, we advanced the amenability of transcendental critique 
to grasping the infelicities of instrumental reason vis-à-vis the capitalist mode of 
production. This important, prefatory discussion enabled us to then turn to the 
psychoanalytic work of Žižek and Zupančič, two post-Lacanian psycho-political 
theorists whose emphasis upon the ethical dimensions of psychoanalysis gave us to 
develop a sense of how the deontological thesis of Kant’s categorical imperative 
might explain the very desire for a specifically ‘ecocritical’ mode of engagement 
beyond its ostensibly ‘environmentalist’ necessity, and specifically after Kant’s 
influential conception of the aesthetic judgement of the sublime in his all important 
third and final Critique. It was in this section that we moved towards an analysis of 
Freud’s thesis on the guilt-inducing ethical agency of the super ego with its dual 
compulsions toward moral rectitude and social enjoyment, and which, we suggested,  
might give us to reckon with the ‘disinterestedness’ that Kant attributes to the triumph 
of reason following imaginative failure in the face of sublime experience, and 
thereafter how this might enable a fuller treatment of that which ecocritic Lee Rozelle 
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named, but seemed altogether reluctant to realise in strict Marxo-Lacanian terms, 
namely the prospect of a fully-fledged, libidinal-materialist ‘ecosublime’. 
 
 If Rozelle named Freudian psychopathology as a key, contributory factor in 
the rise of what he usefully, yet perhaps all too liberally terms ‘depletionist’ cultural 
values, then we were largely in agreement with his thesis, particularly over the issue 
of subjective interiority, and which would form the focus of our concerns with 
Oedipal metaphysics throughout the remainder of the thesis. Yet it was imperative to 
suggest that Rozelle need not have departed so completely from Freudian and 
Lacanian clinical theory, at least not without first having considered the psycho-
political mode of immanent critique that Žižek’s thesis on ‘sublime objects of 
ideology’ had prescribed. If, in his readings of Edgar Allen Poe and Isabella Bird, 
Rozelle developed a series of eminently useful eco-literary analyses of ‘the stark 
awareness that place matters’, principally after the eco-literary accounts of sublime 
experience in The Journal of Julius Rodman (1840) and A Lady’s Life in the Rocky 
Mountains (1879), and in which the sublime appears as little more than an epiphanous 
instance of ‘shock and awe’ via which the protagonists of those works summarily 
obtained eco-cultural values, then we sought to suggest that he might have better 
developed his thesis after the lines that both Žižek and Zupančič had proposed, 
namely those drawing attention to the genesis of subjectivity per se, onto-ideological 
lines that had themselves been developed upon the onto-ethical implications of the 
Kantian categorical imperative for the Freudian super-ego, and which itself gave rise 
to Lacanian concerns with jouissance, or the manner in which a society organises its 
enjoyment.  
 
If at this juncture, our thesis returned to a more or less dialectical analysis after 
a Marxo-Lacanian stripe of critical negativity, then this was again, mostly strategic, or 
so as to prepare the way at the ontological level for our post-symptomatological 
apprehension of an ‘ecological pathos’, specifically after the ‘body without organs’ 
(BwO) that Deleuze and Guattari posit in line with their non-personological 
conception of desire. By engaging the BwO, we began to acknowledge the 
shortcomings of the symptom as advanced by Žižek’s Marxo-Lacanianism, 
principally insofar as the BwO called upon us to privilege a positive conception of 
production over the negativities of signification and the lack [manque] that is 
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presupposed by it. It is here that our thesis reached its theoretical turning point, 
specifically over the single most important issue of the strict identity of the critical 
and the clinical, and which Deleuze and Guattari’s emphasis upon production implies. 
Not only does such an identity revalue interpretation in terms of impersonal delirium, 
supplanting normative conceptions of discrete being and the linear history such an 
ontology would presuppose, but moreover, simultaneously enables us to emphasise 
the significance of an experimental subjectivity for ecocriticism, principally by way 
of the relationship between Deleuze’s conception of a ‘superior empiricism’, or one 
that valorises the ‘exteriority of relations’, and how this imparts a conception of 
diagnosis as the creative formalisation of symptoms, a process that ultimately implies 
a therapeutic or ‘saving repetition’ that is extracted as much from the formal 
ingenuities of his preferred Anglo-American literary canon as from the ‘nomadic’ 
philosophical lineage that he and Guattari privilege throughout their collaborative 
work.  
 
Presenting the ‘singular’ case of the author as one by which issues of literature 
necessarily meet those of health, specifically after the immanence of pathos and 
logos, or the extent to which the relative ‘stupidity’ of embodied, libidinal processes 
remains productive of a type of thought that must be philosophically distinguished 
from general cognition and therefore the ‘common sensibility’, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s impersonal account of authorial style draws from Deleuze’s earlier, 
Nietzschean symptomatology of active and reactive forces. Most significantly where 
the BwO would supplant a symptomatology, however, is the emphasis the Deleuzian 
literary clinic presupposes upon Nietzsche’s revaluation of repetition after his concept 
of the eternal return, and which specific examples of authorial style render palpable, 
connecting specifically literary concerns with percepts and affects to properly 
philosophical ones after a noological grasp of the production of images of thought that 
is significantly distinct from an ideological analysis. In order to acknowledge the 
relationship between deterritorialisation, concepts, and the BwO in this connection, 
however, it proved necessary to initially acknowledge the importance of ‘honorary’ 
Anglo-American author Marcel Proust, chiefly insofar as his diagnosis of bourgeois 
social worlds offered perhaps one of the key contributions to the BwO beyond that of 
Artaud.  
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Opening onto a ‘new earth’ that would give us to develop a conception of eco-
critical desire beyond the ‘maternal sublime’ that Stephen Gilbert Brown had 
developed in his own, moderately ‘eco-clinical’ reading of Proust’s la recherche, 
chapter three therefore marked the transition from the signifying symptom to the 
BwO in such a way as to surpass any psycho-political thesis that would uphold a 
signifying semiotic after an Oedipal metaphysics that would presuppose literary 
language vis-à-vis socio-symbolic castration. This is because for Deleuze and 
Guattari, Oedipus itself presupposes an illegitimate usage of the syntheses of desire, 
one that problematises the relationship between form and content for any analysis of 
desire, and which literary disarticulations of the dominant mode of expression would 
uncover and render amenable to a schizoanalysis of texts. Identifying how a certain 
‘inadequacy’ attends the psychoanalytic concept of the symptom, which on the 
Lacanian view serves a securing role, binding the subject together, we asserted how 
the BwO enables us to exceed the subjectivist type of psycho-political theory and 
speculation that Žižek and Zupančič recommended, beyond the diagnosis of eco-
literary ideology in terms of the sublime objects of ideology that had held a key to 
understanding the ethico-aesthetic role of master signifiers and their quilting of the 
ideological fabric.  
 
This is because the BwO presents an understanding of the earth itself as a BwO 
or plane of consistency from which all other BwOs draw their flows, thereby enabling 
the extension of schizoanalysis into a stratoanalysis that takes its conceptual cues as 
much from geology as from genealogy. The more-than-human nature of such flows 
presupposes what Deleuze and Guattari describe as ‘transversal’ lines that draw them 
together as already broadly ‘ecological’, chiefly insofar as an a-signifying conception 
of machinic ‘assemblages’ turns upon the notion of a productive ‘sympathy’ between 
bodies of all kinds. Whether we are primarily concerned with the Organism, the 
Subject, or the State, such entities are ultimately limits whose socio-political authority 
is reinforced by the paralogistic usage of the three syntheses of desire, and which our 
literary sense of an ecological pathos and the sympathy principal to it would enable 
ecocritics to subsequently attend to after the personological and sociological 
limitations to which Proust and Kafka responded so creatively. Possessing the 
potential to produce a difference that is enabling and empowering, and yet all 
importantly that presupposes an engagement with a non-familial and world-historical 
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delirium that points up the inherent ‘redundancy’ of language, for Deleuze and 
Guattari repetition is inherently linked to a creative process of symptomnal 
formalization that connects desire to the world historical and political domains, and 
thus, particularly in the case of Kafka, to a form of impersonal ‘transference’ that 
enables us to subsequently propose a revaluation of those tentative, eco-clinical 
orientations that had proven so frustrating in chapters one and two. As an ‘honorary’ 
Anglo-American author by virtue of his literary ‘becoming-animal’, Kafka’s ability to 
expose the transformative power of order words under the capitalist social machine 
and the regime of signs particular to it would in chapter three enable us to reconsider 
Jane Bennett’s ecocritical reading of ‘sympathy’ in Thoreau, which we analysed in 
terms of its ultimately ‘monumentalising’ predisposition, one that despite her useful, 
and tentatively Deleuzoguattarian suggestion of an identity between the concept of the 
Wild and deterritorialisation, nevertheless appeared to remain all-too-liberal after 
Thoreau’s own, principally bourgeois-liberal subjectivity. 
 
This emphasis upon monumentality and reterritorialisation gave us in chapter 
four to consider the degree to which the earth and life sciences are looked to by a 
great many ecocritics as a hermeneutic guarantor, specifically were their cultural and 
political hegemony would seal a type of secular humanist mode of interpretation, not 
least where genetic science would beget an evolutionary psychology with a range of 
implications for those seeking to culturally-authorise eco-literary research. We 
therefore moved to consider Glen A. Love’s advancement of such a ‘scientific’ stripe 
of eco-psychology, specifically in his reading of Willa Cather’s The Professor’s 
House (1925). As promising as this reading initially appeared, it ultimately gave us to 
motivate a Deleuzoguattarian discussion of the degree to which Love appeared to 
homogenise the powers particular to the arts and sciences, an ultimately reductive 
approach that in its concerns with evolutionary science and archetypal myth appeared 
authorised to a significant degree by E. O. Wilson’s notion of ‘consilience’, and 
which emphasised interpretation as the logical channel of explanation between the 
arts and sciences. After Deleuze and Guattari, we attempted to suggest that such 
homogenization was inextricably linked to the imposition of the Oedipal paralogism 
by the State, productive of an inhibited synthesis that, in key respects, retained a 
passive cast of instrumental nihilism, and which reneges upon the pure exteriorities 
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that art, philosophy, and science would open onto after a domesticating drive to retain 
a liberal-humanist subjectivity.   
 
In this way, therefore, our final chapter, and which was ostensibly concerned 
with the tragic-pastoral literary mode and its relationship to ecocritical concerns with 
environmental despoilment, flagged up the degree to which the legacy of such 
Idealism returned us to our abiding concerns with the dialectical ‘binding together’ 
or totalising imperative of the subject in her love for her symptom as itself 
symptomatic of a culturally-contingent tendency to afford status and respect to that 
which has form. Following a discussion of the legacy of Romantic subjectivity and 
the manner in which it has contributed so fundamentally to the sustenance of the gap 
that contemporary modes of consumerism require, chiefly after a discussion of the 
relative merits of dialectical melancholy and Deleuzoguattarian affirmation of the 
tragic, we elected to reconceive of Edward Abbey’s own revaluation of the tragic-
pastoral mode, drawing from the work of veteran ecocritic Joseph Meeker on a ‘play 
ethic’. If Deleuze and Guattari’s work enabled us to extend Meeker’s own thesis, 
then it did so by emphasising the BwO, the virtual figure that gave us a purchase 
upon desire adequate to our eco-clinical concerns with difference and repetition and 
by way of which we were able to exceed Rozelle’s broadly symptomnal reading of 
Abbey’s influence upon the ostensibly ‘serious’ business of eco-tage. We were 
thereby able to present a concluding discussion of decorum and form, and which 
drew together our forgoing analysis of instrumental attitudes after the hylomorphic 
imperative, summarizing the abiding concerns of this thesis with issues of 
architecture and environments, language and literature, neurosis and psychosis.  
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